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Introduction: potentials of disorder 
in the Caucasus and Yugoslavia
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher
Conﬂict after empire
O - violence has been linked to primordial instincts, tothe struggle for power and proﬁt, to the ambitions of ethnic entrepren-eurs, and most often to uncertainty and fear. Here violence is linked to
institutions. It is asked which institutions foster violence, and which institutions,
on the contrary, provide for procedures that turn ‘either-or-conﬂicts’ into ‘more-
or-less’ conﬂicts. It is asked which institutional arrangements lead to societal
fragmentation, and which can integrate society even when state power is virtu-
ally absent. The implosion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and
the Federal Yugoslav Republic provide ample material for this endeavour. 
Judging by historical and contemporary evidence, the collapse of multi-
ethnic empires is almost inevitably a conﬂict-prone process. The implosion of the
central state and its hierarchies turns imperial peripheries into peripheries
without empires.The former centrally administered society fragments into multi-
ple societies, which have to (re-)build state administrations, (re-)draw boundaries
and (re-)invent loyalties. They have to establish new institutional arrangements
for self-regulation in order to ensure security, political participation and economic
development after empire. These institutions have to be inscribed into a political
space, whose boundaries are often ill-deﬁned and contested. And there has to be
an understanding of who is legitimately in charge of designing these institutions,
and to whom these new rules of the game are going to apply.
The implosion of the socialist empires forced the societies of the post-socialist
spaces to redeﬁne the most basic institutions that govern social life. They had, in
short, to embark upon a process of competitive and contested polity building.
All the societies of the collapsed empires faced this challenge. Not all soci-
eties, however, managed to ﬁnd a non-violent solution. Those administrative
units of the collapsing empires with a multi-ethnical population faced particular
problems: the ambitions and fears of two or more ethnic groups had to be
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addressed, separatist tendencies had to be avoided, growing antagonism along
ethnic lines needed to be defused and the attempts of ethnic entrepreneurs to
conquer the state by using ethnicity as a mobilising resource had to be blocked.
Some of the post-socialist societies have successfully managed these tasks and
have avoided violence; others have succeeded in polity building, but only at the
price of conﬂict and violence. And some have completely failed – they have lost
the state and internal violence has become endemic. 
Thus, it is not only violence that needs to be explained but, in a more general
sense, the diﬀerent response of the post-socialist societies to the conﬂicts that fol-
lowed the collapse of the central state. 
This volume deals with the institutional framework in post-socialist, after-
empire spaces. The volume consists of nine case studies and two contributions of
a more theoretical nature. Each of these analytical narratives sheds some light
on the micro-politics of organised violence. All case studies are taken from the
Caucasus and Former Yugoslavia. This has allowed, implicitly, and at times
directly, the use of a comparative approach in order to identify those institutions
which had an impact on the organisation of violence, and on the organisation of
non-violent stability, respectively. Comparing cases from the Caucasus and
Former Yugoslavia can be a rewarding endeavour for two reasons: ﬁrst, both
regions have produced ample material for the study of violent conﬂicts. Secondly,
both regions share a number of structural similarities. All cases are thus embed-
ded in a relatively similar context, which makes it easier to identify the relevant
factors.
In the Caucasus, there have been four major violent conﬂicts. The ﬁrst to
erupt was, in 1988, the quarrel between Armenians and Azeris over Nagorno-
Karabakh, an autonomous province within Azerbaijan but mainly populated by
Armenians (on this war see Koehler and Zürcher’s Chapter 8 in this volume). The
quest of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to join Armenia led to a large-
scale conﬂict and massive ethnic cleansing on the territories of Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The conﬂict is still not resolved and Nagorno-Karabakh’s status
remains undecided. 
The status of Georgia’s breakaway autonomous provinces of South-Ossetia
and Abkhazia is also undecided; both provinces broke away when their host state,
the Georgian Soviet Republic, became the independent sovereign Republic of
Georgia (see Baev’s Chapter 7 in this volume). After heavy ﬁghting, which caused
massive refugee ﬂows, the two conﬂicts are frozen, at least for the time being.
The fourth major Caucasian conﬂict is the Chechen war for independence.
When the USSR broke apart in 1991, the Chechens reacted by declaring their
independence, thus unilaterally seceding from the Russian Federation. This move
eventually triggered the ﬁrst Chechen war (1994–96), which Russia lost on the
battleﬁeld. Since October 1999, Russia has again engaged the Chechen guerril-
las, trying to re-establish its state authority. Surprisingly, Chechnya’s neighbour,
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the republic of Dagestan, has avoided internal turmoil and has opted to stay
within the Russian Federation. Kisriev’s Chapter 6 in this volume discusses the
factors that caused the very diﬀerent response to the Soviet breakdown by these
two republics which share many structural similarities.
In Yugoslavia, there were also four major violent conﬂicts: the ﬁrst to start
and to end was the short campaign of the Yugoslav army against the breakaway
republic of Slovenia in June 1991. This is the only conﬂict from this sample that
qualiﬁes as a typical inter-state war. The second was the violent clash in Croatia
between Croats and Serbs. In August 1991, the ﬁghting began in those regions
of Croatia where Serbs formed an absolute or relative majority of the population.
Intensive ﬁghting took place in eastern Croatia and in the Krajina. The Serbian
militias that had been organised well in advance, were armed mainly from the
stock of the Yugoslav Army, which actively took part in the ﬁghting. Grandits and
Leutloﬀ provide in Chapter 1 in this volume a detailed account of the organisa-
tion of violence in the Krajina.
The third Yugoslav conﬂict was the war in and about Bosnia and involved
ﬁerce ﬁghting between Serbs, Bosniaks1 and Croats, with changing local alli-
ances between adversaries in the course of the war (see Gosztonyi’s Chapter 2 in
this volume on consequences of the war for so-called ‘Herceg-Bosna’).
The most recent war so far in former Yugoslavia was the war over Kosovo,
which was fought on the one hand between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians in
Kosovo, and on the other hand between NATO and Serbia. Raufer’s Chapter 3 in
this volume treats one aspect of the Kosovo wars, namely the intertwining of
political violence and organised crime. Mappes-Niediek’s Chapter 5 in this
volume takes a broader perspective and sheds light on the process of restraint
and eventual escalation of violence focusing on the organisational potential of
the local population and the state in place.
All of these conﬂicts are often labelled ‘ethno-political conﬂicts’. This term
implies that at the core of the organisation of violence lies the political aspira-
tions of ethnically deﬁned groups. This is certainly not wrong: the slow decline
and eventual collapse of the Soviet and the Yugoslav empires was partly trig-
gered, partly accompanied by the quest for national sovereignty, put forward by
the ideologists of many nationalities in the crumbling empires. 
However, the label ‘ethno-political’ is in some respects more deceptive than
revealing. While all of these violent conﬂicts may have been fuelled by the aspi-
rations of ethnically deﬁned groups and their leaders, all were framed and
shaped by the administrative–territorial borders of the crumbling empires. At
the core of these conﬂicts lies the struggle over the status of territorial units,
which formerly belonged to federal states. Thus, the label of ‘status conﬂict’ is
probably more adequate than the label of ‘ethno-political conﬂict’. Status
conﬂicts arise when the main objective of one conﬂict group is to unilaterally
upgrade the status of its territory or its administrative unit or when an existing
Introduction
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status is downgraded by the central power. The objective can be to form an auton-
omous unit within the host state, to form an independent, sovereign state, or to
join a neighbouring state.
The fault line of all hot conﬂicts in the two regions can be traced back to the
system of ethno-federalism of the USSR and Yugoslavia: both the USSR and
Yugoslavia were asymmetric federations – that is, they consisted of territorial
units with diﬀerent status. On the ﬁrst level, there were, in the case of the USSR,
ﬁfteen federal republics, while Yugoslavia consisted of six federal republics. First-
order units were, according to the Soviet constitution, sovereign states and pos-
sessed all institutional prerequisites for statehood. They had political institutions,
politicalsymbols,aconstitution,bordersandatitularnation.Dejure theyevenhad
the right to have their own armed forces. Within these ﬁrst-order units, there were
units of the second order, which were subordinated to the ﬁrst-order units. While
these second-order units enjoyed lesser privileges than the ﬁrst-order units, they
nevertheless possessed similar institutional prerequisites for statehood. Overall,
there are eleven second-order units in the Caucasus.2 Three of them (Abkhazia,
Adjaria and South-Ossetia) were autonomous republics within Soviet Georgia;
Nagorno-Karabakh was a second-order unit within Soviet Azerbaijan. Seven
second-order units are within the Russian Federation. These are Chechnya,
Adygeya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesia and
North-Ossetia.
Yugoslavia had only two second-order administrative units, Kosovo and
Voivodina, both within Serbia. In 1989, Milosevic removed the autonomous status
of both units, a move which created a dramatic backlash in Kosovo, leading to the
establishment of a parallel shadow administration and aggravated the Kosovo-
Albanians’ quest for more autonomy or even independence. After the implosion of
the USSR and Yugoslavia, the ﬁrst-order subjects of the federations became inde-
pendent and were quickly recognised by the international community. Thus,
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan of the former USSR, and Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina,Croatia,Slovenia,MontenegroandMacedoniaof Yugoslaviabecame
newly independent states. (Serbia and Montenegro together form the successor
state of Yugoslavia) (Table 1).
The sovereignty and territorial integrity of these newly independent states
was from the beginning challenged by the secessionist ambitions of the second-
order units, the former Autonomous Republics. Thus, Russia was confronted
with breakaway Chechnya, Georgia with breakaway Abkhazia and South-
Ossetia, Azerbaijan with breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh and Serbia with break-
away Kosovo. In all these cases, the administrative borders of the USSR and of
the Yugoslav Federation provided the template for the secessionist movements,
while the bureaucracies of the second-order units provided the organisational
resources for the secessionist movements. Only the armed secessionist move-
ments in Croatia (the Serbs of the Krajina) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the
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Table 1 Administrative units in the Caucasus and former Yugoslavia, selected (ethnic,
religious and titular) identity groupsa
Administrative unit / Titular identity Largest other 
republic Population group (%) identity groups (%)
North Caucasus
Chechnyab 836,000 Chechen (73) Russian (27)
(Russian Federation)
Dagestan 1,802,188 None Avar (28)
(Russian Federation) Dargin (16)
Kumyk (13)
Russian (09)
Lezgin (11)
Tabasaran (04)
Nogay (02)
Rutul (01)
Aghul (01)
South Caucasus
Abkhazia (Georgia) 525,061 Abkhaz c (18) Georgian (46)
Armenian (14)
Russian (13)
Adjariad (Georgia) 392,432 Adjarian (63) Georgian (23)
(non-Muslim)
Russian (08)
Armenian (04)
South-Ossetia 98,527 Ossetian (66) Georgian (29)
(Georgia) Russian (02)
Nagorno-Karabakh 189,085 None Armenian (77)
(Azerbaijan) Azeri (22)
Former Yugoslavia e
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4,359,895 None Muslim (44)
Serb (31)
Croat (17)
Yugoslav (05)
Croatia 4,784,265 Croat (78) Serb (12)
Yugoslav (02)
Macedonia 2,159,503 Macedonian (65) Albanian (22)
Turkish (04)
Roma (03)
Serb (02)
Other (04)
Serbia and Montenegro 11,101,833 Serb (63) Albanian (14)
(Yugoslavia)f Montenegrins (06) Hungarian (04)
Other (13)
Croats and the Serbs) did not follow the template of the administrative borders,
but rather the patterns of ethnic settlements and ethnic geography. 
Notably, there has been no ‘classical’ inter-state war, with the possible excep-
tion of the short campaign of the Yugoslav Army against Slovenia. The form of
violence witnessed in the Caucasus and in Former Yugoslavia has typically not
been organised and executed by state armies, and the violence has typically been
conﬁned within the borders of the state or polity where it has its roots. Although
some of the neighbouring states assigned considerable resources to the support
of their secessionist ethnic brethren (Serbia supported the Serbs in the Krajina,
and later in Bosnia; Bosnian Croats were supported by Croatia; Armenia sup-
ported Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians), all avoided straight, oﬃcial interven-
tion, thus avoiding outright escalation on the one hand and stigmatisation by the
international community on the other hand (Gosztonyi 1998).
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Table 1 continued
Administrative unit / Titular identity Largest other 
republic Population group (%) identity groups (%)
Slovenia 1,965,116 Slovenian (91) Croat (03)
Serb (02)
Kosovog 1,974,747 None Albanian (82)
Serb (10)
Muslims (03)
Roma (02)
Montenegrin (01)
Notes
a The ﬁgures are, unless otherwise indicated, from the census of 1989 (Goskomstat 1991).
They do not reﬂect the considerable migration ﬂows, particular in Chechnya (Russians,
leaving for Russia, Chechen refugees to Ingushetia or Russia), Abkhazia (Georgians, ﬂeeing or
forced to leave) and South-Ossetia (refugees, mainly leaving for North-Ossetia).
b Exact ﬁgures are available only for the Chechen-Ingushetian Republic, which split into two
republics in 1992. Figures are based on the authors’ estimates.
c Other sources give 8 per cent (Pirtskhalava 1997). Evidently, the percentage of the Abkhaz
population is highly politicised.
d The data on Adjaria is not very reliable; Adjarians were counted as Georgians (324,813 –
83 per cent of the overall population), as they are distinguished by religion which was not
adequately reﬂected in the census. The approximate number of Adjarians, according to
estimates, is around 250,000. With thanks to Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi for sharing this
information with the authors.
e Figures refer to the census of 1991. Unless otherwise indicated, the data is taken from Heller
(1997).
f Data is from Gosztonyi 1998.
g Figures for 1991 are based on estimates of natural population growth and migration since
the census of 1981 conducted by the Federal Institute for Statistics of Yugoslavia (quoted in
Judah 2000: 313).
Violence is organised either between the state and an identity group, or
between two identity groups rather than between states. However, with regard to
the Caucasus and Yugoslavia during the ﬁrst years after the end of the empires,
the notion of ‘state’ is misleading. The successor states of the USSR and
Yugoslavia often had to organise their state capacities from scratch. The violent
contest between ‘secessionist rebels’ and ‘states’ thus resembles, especially in the
Caucasus, the competition between two upstarts competing for the same market.
With the wars of Azerbaijan against the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh and
Georgia against the breakaway Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, the ‘rebel upstarts’
proved to be much more eﬃcient in organising violence than the ‘upstart states’
they challenged. Consequently, the ‘rebels’ won on the battleﬁeld.
In all conﬂicts, the borders between privately organised, entrepreneurial vio-
lence and publicly organised, state-sponsored violence were somewhat perme-
able. The armed conﬂicts in the Caucasus and in Yugoslavia may have been
fought in the name of the state and of ethnicised groups, but the ﬁghters were
more often than not private entrepreneurs. In all cases not only state actors were
involved in the organisation of violence, but also a myriad of non-state actors,
like paramilitaries, warlords, criminal gang leaders, militias and self-defence
units, and the distinction between state actors and non-state actors was blurred.
Grandits and Leutloﬀ’s account of organised violence in the Krajina, Mappes-
Niediek’s of Kosovo, Koehler and Zürcher’s of Nagorno-Karabakh and Baev’s of
the internal war in Georgia underline this point.
Christophe in her Chapter 10 in this volume shows that the key actors in the
ethno-political conﬂicts in post-Soviet Caucasus are not ethnic groups, but
instead patrimonial networks with particular interests. These networks are in
turn an institutional legacy of the ‘socialist production state’. This socialist mode
of production required the total penetration of society by the state. As a result
the Soviet state constantly overstretched its capacities. In order to compensate
for the resulting institutional weakness, the state vested power in personal net-
works rather than institutions. Patron–client networks were used as a means of
governance. After the collapse in 1991, these networks ﬁlled the institutional
vacuum – patrimonial networks, using symbols and discourses of ethnicity, took
over what was left of the state. This, however, must be seen as a sign of weakness
rather than a sign of strength of nationalism: nationalism proved to be too weak
to overcome the patrimonial networks dominating society and regulating
conﬂicts over the distribution of resources. In this sense the weakness, not the
strength of Transcaucasian nationalism proved to be harmful. Nationalism can
be crucial in overcoming informal practices and ousting patrimonial networks,
as was the case in the Baltic States. As a rule in the Transcaucasus, it merely
served as an additional resource for patrimonial, private networks. 
The exception, as argued by Koehler and Zürcher’s Chapter 8 in this volume, is
the period of Armenian ‘war-nationalism’. For the period of perceived existential
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crisis, otherwise competing patrimonial networks were temporarily integrated,
an integration facilitated by the imitation of core functions of statehood through
nationalist mobilisation.
Organisers of violence may develop a vested interest in the sustainability of
organised violence for economic motives. Conﬂicts which started as struggles for
ideological–political goals may then turn into ‘markets of violence’, a term used
by Georg Elwert’s Chapter 12 in this volume to describe a situation where vio-
lence becomes a means for proﬁt making and warlords become entrepreneurs of
violence. Elwert argues that violence requires logistics and logistics requires
investments: one can steal weapons but one still needs to buy fuel. In environ-
ments where violence is proﬁtable the invisible hand of the market rewards those
who economically organise violence; this means that entrepreneurs in markets
of violence must trade in goods with a very high value per weight, such as drugs,
gold, diamonds or weapons; they must recruit a cheap ‘labour-force’ (ﬁghters)
through the spreading of fear and the destruction of alternative labour (‘burn
the crops and blame the enemy’); and they must tap humanitarian aid to sustain
the market of violence. By understanding the economic rationale of markets of
violence, conclusions can be drawn about how to stop violence: raising the costs
of violence can be achieved by closing the borders for supply, denying access to
ﬁnancial markets and eventually establishing a monopoly of violence by exter-
nal powers. 
Raufer’s Chapter 3 in this volume also stresses the importance of what he
calls an often-overlooked aspect of the Kosovo war, namely the symbiosis of polit-
ical and private violence, the latter being interested only in economic proﬁt. His
chapter focuses exclusively on Albanian organised crime and omits the political
context of the Kosovo conﬂict. This view from a criminologist reminds scholars
of organised violence that the linkages between political violence and organised
crime deserve more systematic research.
Yugoslavia and the Caucasus are ‘conﬂict regions’ that are characterised by
a remarkably similar environment. First, when the central states collapsed in
1989 (Yugoslavia), and 1991 (USSR), respectively, both regions fell victim to the
most dramatic mode of state weakness – state collapse. State weakness breeds
uncertainty and fear and opens windows of opportunity for political entrepren-
eurs, all of which increase the risk of violent conﬂicts.
Secondly – banal but highly important – both regions were ﬂooded with
cheap weapons after the collapse of empires. Each successor state of the two
empires received its share of weapons, and rebel upstarts simply stole or bought
weapons from the crumbling central armies.
Thirdly, both regions score relatively high on risk-increasing factors, such as
history of mutual grievances, rough terrain and complex, intermingled patterns
of ethnic settlement. These are the factors, among others, that the literature has
identiﬁed as having a negative impact on prospects for ethno-political stability.3
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Fourthly, there is the institutional legacy of the Socialist system. The most
important of the bits of imperial wreckage that continue to shape events is the
socialist system of ethno-federalism. As a peculiarity of Soviet and Yugoslav fed-
eralism, all ﬁrst-order units (the ﬁfteen federal republics in the USSR and the six
federal republics of Yugoslavia) and some of the second-order units (autono-
mous republics within federal republics) were ethnically deﬁned. Although
Yugoslav federalism was originally very much a copy of the Soviet system, there
were some diﬀerences. The USSR was de facto and de jure more centralised than
Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav Federal Republic enjoyed more privileges than a Soviet
Republic did. On the other hand, in the USSR there was an informal system of
quotas that assigned a more than proportional share of key posts within the
republic to members of the titular nation. This was not applied in Yugoslavia. The
relatively high percentage of Serbs in key position within Kosovo (10 per cent
Serbian population) and Croatia (17 per cent Serbian population) was indeed an
issue of complaint for Kosovo-Albanians and Croats.
The most important aspect of this system of ethno-federalism was, however,
that in both Federations, the federal units each had their titular nation; ethnic-
ity thus became ‘territorialised’. After the breakdown of the federal states, this
linkage of a territory to an ethnic group provided an excellent breeding ground
for a wave of secessionism, since the socialist ethno-federalism had provided the
titular nations with a clear-cut territory, a state bureaucracy, mass media, an
education system and national symbols. These were assets that considerably
reduced the cost of secessionism. Giordano reminds us in his Chapter 4 in this
volume that the territorialisation of ethnicity is not only the legacy of socialist
federalism but started earlier with land reforms motivated by emerging nation-
alist political elites in the Balkan region. 
All four factors – state weakness, cheap and readily available weapons, the
presence of risk-increasing factors and the legacy of the socialist ethno-federal-
ism – help explain the emergence of organised violence. And since all factors are
common to both regions, the comparability of the case studies presented here is
increased.
The rich empirical material that these regions have produced can be struc-
tured in diﬀerent ways. First, in both regions, hot conﬂicts have emerged on
the ruins of collapsed ethno-territorial, socialist federations. By comparing
Yugoslavia and the Caucasus as macro-regions and highlighting the similarities,
we are able to highlight the risk potential of the socialist legacy, most notably, of
the system of ethno-federalism.
A second comparison could be designed for addressing the diﬀerent pro-
cesses of conﬂict escalation in these two regions: organised violence in
Yugoslavia proved to be more intense and more contagious than in the Caucasus.
Organised violence in Yugoslavia has torn a country to pieces – Bosnia-
Herzegovina – and only international intervention has put it back together
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again, albeit in a rough and ready way. Violence in Yugoslavia has been organ-
ised on a larger scale and, as inappropriate this may sound with regard to indi-
vidual suﬀering, in all of these wars, has led to even worse atrocities than in the
Caucasus. Comparing the Caucasus with Yugoslavia may help to ﬁnd an answer
to the question of why the Caucasus has so far avoided following the worst-case
scenario. Two factors are apparent which help explain the diﬀerent outcomes.
The ﬁrst factor pertains to the way the federal centres reacted to the seces-
sionist ambitions of the subjects of the Federations. In Yugoslavia during the
1980s, the most powerful of the Republics, Serbia, tried to usurp the position of
the dwindling federal Yugoslav centre. This alienated the other republics, which
feared Serbian hegemony. Thus they intensiﬁed their struggle for secession, while
the Serbian-dominated centre tried to hold the federation together by force.
When this became apparently impossible, Milosevic tried to secure a ‘greater
Serbia’ – at the expense of the territorial integrity of Croatia and later Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
By contrast, in the USSR, the most powerful of the Republics, Russia, opposed
the Soviet centre. It was mainly the democratic movement in the Russian repub-
lic that prevented the centre from holding the Union together by force. Russia was,
until 1991, the natural ally of the secessionist Union Republics. The Russian
Republic under Yeltsin thus checked the hegemonic aspirations of the Soviet
centre, which explains the relative ease with which the centre let the republics go
during 1990–91.
Secondly, size matters. After the demise of the USSR, Russia became by far
the most powerful of the successor states. Russia still had, despite the period of
dramatic state weakness after 1991, the means to protect the vital interests of
the state, to protect Russian minorities living outside Russia and to scare oﬀ chal-
lengers. Russia thus, by and large, avoided ethno-political violence within its ter-
ritory and refrained from large-scale interventions outside its territory. The
bloody war in Chechnya is the exception. In Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia
emerged as two states with relatively similar capacities. Therefore, neither had
the means to scare oﬀ the other or decisively win. The results were the bloody
wars in Croatia and Bosnia.
The chapters in this volume are, however, mainly concerned with the third
aspect, namely with the micro-politics of organised violence. Most chapters in
this volume deal with the question of how conﬂict potential was either defused
or transferred into organised violence, taking into account the relatively similar
environment of Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. If there is a common question in
all of the case studies, it is the question of which institutions provided incentives
for the organisation of violence, and which institutions, on the contrary, discou-
raged the organisation of violence. The task that the contributors to this volume
have taken up in empirical case studies is to identify those particular institutional
frameworks that have blocked or promoted organised violence. The ﬁndings of
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the case studies (a synopsis of which is presented in Chapter 13) should therefore
be of interest to both area specialists and scholars of conﬂict and peace. 
Explaining violence: institutions at work
Violence, although here by no means the ‘black hole’ of irrationality and atavism
as often portrayed, nevertheless retains a great deal of contingency. In almost
every social situation, violence can be one of the strategies that actors chose in
order to obtain their goals. Violence is a socially ubiquitous phenomenon, and
therefore there are an unlimited number of possible factors and combinations of
factors that can trigger violence. The understanding of violence by the social sci-
ences is also seriously hampered by the fact that there are only few empirical
studies on the processes of violence available; such empirical expertise seems to
be, however, of special importance, since violence is a phenomenon of human
interaction in which discourse and action may radically diﬀer – the narratives on
the phenomenon may conceal rather than describe the process itself.4 This point
is demonstrated by Kisriev in Chapter 6 in this volume; according to his assess-
ment of the post-Soviet power games in Dagestan the public ethno-nationalist
discourse ‘does not reveal but hides the structures of power’. The same point is
stressed by Koehler and Zürcher in their account in Chapter 8 of the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
In their search for explanations of violence, many scholars focus on factors
which increase the risk of violence. Among the most often quoted are such
factors as cultural diﬀerences; a history of mutual grievances and ancient
hatreds; group cohesion and the strength of group identity; patterns of settle-
ment and ethnic demography; defendable borders and rough terrain; the degree
of state violence and group discrimination; external support and access to
weapons. While it is certainly not denied that these factors can and do increase
the risk of organised violence (and many chapters in this volume illustrate the
importance of some of these factors) the listing of such factors is considered to
be of only limited explanatory value.5
Organised stability and organised violence are always multi-factoral phe-
nomena, and it may be very diﬃcult to isolate the right factor or the right com-
bination of factors that have actually triggered violence. Therefore, the question
of ‘what causes violence’ may be of less heuristic value than ‘how and when vio-
lence is organised’.
For organised violence to emerge, it takes certain social situations in which
actors think that the relative costs of violence are smaller than the relative costs
of non-violence. There may be a myriad of such situations, each requiring a tail-
ored approach, but they all boil down to two words: fear and opportunity. 
Fear and opportunity are likely to emerge when trained and institutionalised
patterns of interactions between groups are subject to rapid change, and when
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the perpetuation of these patterns seems endangered or unlikely. In an ideal
world, the ideal state provides institutions that guarantee inter-group stability.
The state provides mediating structures between groups, checks aggressive
claims and protects weaker groups. State institutions regulate access to resources
and to political power. The state guarantees a continuous information ﬂow
between groups by providing impartial media6 and, lastly, the state defends its
monopoly over violence. 
The disintegration of the state structures that had, for seventy and ﬁfty
years, respectively, provided inter-ethnic accommodation is the key to the expla-
nation of organised violence in Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus. It was the state
collapse that has pushed the societies of these two regions into a state of fear and
uncertainty and has opened up windows of opportunity for political entrepren-
eurs. State weakness, and its most extreme manifestation, state collapse, has
been acknowledged by many authors as the key variable for explaining conﬂict.7
Michael Ignatieﬀ summarises the causal chain thus: 
Note here the causative order: ﬁrst the collapse of the overarching state, then
Hobbesian fear, and only then nationalist paranoia, followed by warfare. Disinte-
gration of the state comes ﬁrst, nationalist paranoia comes next. Nationalist senti-
ment on the ground, among common people, is a secondary consequence of
political disintegration, a response to the collapse of state order and the inter-ethnic
accommodation that made it possible. Nationalism creates communities of fear,
groups held together by the conviction that their security depends on sticking
together. People become ‘nationalistic’ when they are afraid; when the only answer
to the question ‘Who will protect me now?’ becomes ‘my own people’. (Ignatieﬀ
1998: 45)
Fear and opportunity, the two inevitable companions of state weakness,
often trigger violence. State weakness opens up large windows of opportunity for
political entrepreneurs. It is precisely through these windows that ethnic entre-
preneurs enter the political scene. State weakness, or state collapse, unblocks
access to resources and power: established institutions that have regulated access
to and distribution of resources crumble or collapse, and new ones have yet to be
designed. Elites thus inevitably engage in a competition, which is no longer
framed by existing, accepted institutions. A key resource in power struggles can
be ethnicity. Political entrepreneurs thus often turn into ethnic entrepreneurs –
they appeal to real or perceived threats and injustices in order to mobilise
support, that is, they instrumentalise ethnicity and fear. Instrumentalism
explains ethno-political conﬂict by the political ambitions of ethnic entrepren-
eurs.8 Ethniﬁcation of politics is thus a result of a strategic decision of elites in
search of a new power base or a new legitimisation. Successful ethnic entrepren-
eurs often portray themselves as the best safeguard against an aggressive, threat-
ening ‘Other’ while at the same time making sure to establish the means of
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internal coercion to punish those that do not perceive the imminent danger to
the collective and the necessity of action (something which results in acts of vio-
lence frequently blamed on the enemy). Not every social situation favours the
entry of ethnic entrepreneurs into the political scene. Ethnic entrepreneurs often
take centre stage only when state weakness and fears of coming anarchy lead
people to believe that the only viable answer to the question ‘who will protect me’
becomes ‘my ethnic kin’. A breeding ground for ethnic entrepreneurs is the situ-
ation when an ethnic group starts to think that their mistrust of the other group
is justiﬁed, the warnings of their leaders thus correct. When the group believes
that its fears of the other group are rational and well founded, it tends to enhance
its support for radical leaders. This ‘rationality of fear’ (de Figueirdo and
Weingast 1999) can quickly spiral into ethnic violence, as it has in numerous
cases in Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus. 
A detailed account of the rationality of fear is provided in Grandits and
Leutloﬀ’s Chapter 1 in this volume. Their chapter examines the role of discourses
of violence and threat and the exploitation of ‘violent events’ for conﬂict escala-
tion. After 1990, Serbs and Croats were competing over access to the resources
needed for institution building and state building. Fear proved to be the key
resource. Fear in turn triggered ethnic mobilisation. Within a year, an ‘unpro-
fessional’ riot of Serbs in the Krajina region developed into a professional war
between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, in which several thousand died and several
hundred thousand people were forcefully expelled from their homes. The authors
stress the relevance of institution building and the role of changing perceptions
in the process of escalation.
The instrumentalist approach is obviously highly plausible, and it is hard to
think of an ethno-political conﬂict where ethnic entrepreneurs did not play a
crucial role. The list of Yugoslav and Caucasian ethnic entrepreneurs is long and
prominent: Milosevic in Serbia, Tudjman in Croatia, Elchibey in Azerbaijan,
Dudaev in Chechnya, Ardzinba in Abkhazia and Gamsakhurdia in Georgia. They
have all pursued politics of ethniﬁcation and used a rhetoric which centred on
the rights of their ethnic group to sovereignty, on the threats that the group faced
from other groups and on the undivided loyalty that the group was entitled to
receive from individual members. 
There are other perils in state weakness. When state institutions fail, private
organisers of violence get more leverage. They develop private interests and
acquire the means to pursue their interests. The oﬃcial leaders of the state may
no longer be able to control them, even if they wished to. Thus, even if leaders
commit themselves to peace, they are no longer able to deliver, a dilemma dem-
onstrated in Koehler and Zürcher’s analysis in Chapter 8 in this volume of draw-
backs in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Such situations are referred to as
‘commitment problems’ (Fearon 1998; Walter 1999). In such a situation,
leaders might prefer a preventive strike to a shaky settlement which, they think,
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cannot hold. Again, the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh, Bosnia and Croatia provide
insights into the mechanism of the commitment problem.
Meaningful conﬂict resolution must take steps towards minimising the com-
mitment problem. However, in his intriguing Chapter 2 in this volume, Gosztonyi
describes how well intended ‘soft interventions’ by the international community
sometimes have the opposite eﬀect. The end of the Cold War, he argues, saw the
emergence of a new, ‘soft’ type of intervention, based on democratic principles
and an aversion to overt engagement. Under certain circumstances, ‘soft’ inter-
vention seems to eﬀect a decentralisation of power and responsibility rather than
its centralisation. Herceg-Bosna is such a case. External ‘soft’ intervention con-
tributes to a diﬀusion of power, when four conditions are met: the external inter-
vention is relatively restrained; the interveners target pre-existing political
structures instead of appointing new ones; there is a willingness on the side of the
interveners to hold the representatives of the local political structures responsible
for certain policy failures and human rights abuses; and there is a strong common
sentiment among the recipients of the foreign intervention that the aims of the
intervention are not just. These conditions, in turn, create an incentive structure,
which make it rational for local elites to appoint weak leaders and to create an
institutional ‘jungle’ in order to diﬀuse responsibility. In time, the local elite loses
the ability to commit themselves and to deliver – both preconditions for instability.
Institutions and the potential of disorder
Taking into account general risk factors, the institutional legacy of socialist
ethno-federalism and state weakness causing fear and opportunity go a long way
towards explaining organised violence. However, questions remain. Most impor-
tant (in the sense of it being heuristically the most rewarding to ask) is probably
the search for factors explaining the variation. 
Why do some potential conﬂicts not erupt into violence, even if the underly-
ing structures and proximate causes are remarkably similar to cases where vio-
lence has erupted? What are the factors that block ethnic mobilisation? What
does it take to remove the market for ethnic entrepreneurs? Why do some multi-
ethnic societies fragment, but others hold together, while both have to deal with
state weakness, fear and opportunity? Under what conditions can ethnic entre-
preneurs conquer the state? And under what conditions can they consolidate it?
Answers have been sought in the institutional framework of the post-socialist
societies of the Caucasus and of Yugoslavia. We assume that stability and violent
conﬂicts in inter-group relations are social outcomes that have been produced by
the combined eﬀect of many institutions, state or non-state, formal or informal,
self-enforcing or externally enforced. 
Institutions are, according to the classical deﬁnition of Douglass North,
‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanely devised
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constraints that shape human interaction’ (North 1990: 6). Institutions are
trained patterns of human interaction, which are codiﬁed in contracts and rules,
or which root in shared norms, values and codes of behaviour. Because institu-
tions are trained, repeated and ‘sticky’ patterns of interaction, they stabilise
social expectations and help reduce transaction costs. By focusing on the exist-
ing institutional framework, actors are placed in the context that structures their
actions. Thus, the ‘pathological social systems’ (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 6–7)
that make violence both probable and individually rational become the central
unit of analysis.
Institutions perform three functions which are relevant for the organisation
of stability/violence.
First, institutions are accepted, trained and sometimes enforced patterns of
interaction, which can frame conﬂicts. Conﬂict potentials can thus be defused.
The breakdown of such a framework may enable the risk factors to ‘go active’. As
a rule all societies have institutions in place that specialise in conﬂicts in a way
that contains violent dispute by fostering compromises in favour of alternative
conﬂicts (Hirschman 1994). On a smaller social scale or in remote stateless soci-
eties cross-cutting networks of loyalty and services of institutionalised mediators
or councils of elders may suﬃciently provide for this. In complex societies these
institutions provide for (due) procedures in the classic understanding of
Luhmann: they exclude the actual power of the antagonists and channel the
decision power over the conﬂict to a third party, implement a set of rules indepen-
dent from everyday-life reality and guarantee a meaningful and applied result
(Luhmann 1983: 38–53, 100–106). 
Secondly, the institutional framework provides the incentive structure for
local actors and thus determines their strategic action. Institutions can thus not
only diﬀuse violence, but they can also produce violence, if the incentive struc-
ture is ‘badly’ designed. 
Thirdly, institutions have distributional eﬀects. They determine the access to
resources crucial for organising violence and determine the relative position of
actors.
All three functions of institutions are of consequence in the probability of
organised violence emerging. 
Institutions matter. The institutional arrangement of a society produces
incentive structures for actors, deﬁnes the windows of opportunity for political
entrepreneurs and establishes the constraints in which actors are locked.
Challenging widespread state-centric approaches, it is argued here that the insti-
tutional framework consists not only of the institutional legacy of the ‘oﬃcial’
state institutions of the socialist systems, but also of the ‘shadow’ institutions that
have emerged as a response to the organisational deﬁcits of socialism. Attention
should also be paid to locally rooted norms and conventions that have survived in
niches not occupied by the socialist state. These three analytically distinct sets of
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institutions form together a hybrid, eclectic, locally distinct framework, which
structures actors’ incentives, opportunities and constraints.
‘Oﬃcial’ institutions
Oﬃcial institutions are understood to be the legacy of the socialist systems. The
relevancy of socialist ethno-federalism has already been underlined. It has left
behind territories, equipped with titular nations, territorial bureaucracies, terri-
torial media, proto-democratic institutions, such as parliaments (soviets), and an
ethno-territorial elite that was ready to take over this legacy. In the case of
Yugoslavia and the USSR, these borders thus formed a template for status
conﬂicts. Other residues of empire are not territorial, but functional (Rubin and
Snyder 1998: 6). These include military organisations, economic networks of
supply and production, networks of party or business nomenclature or parts of
bureaucracies that have survived the collapse. Some of them have adapted to
post-imperial circumstances. They became the new locus of power and formed
the functional backbone of the newly assembled polities. The rise of Milosevic,
for example, can be understood only by taking into account his taking over and
skilful manipulation of the Serbian Communist Party. Most of the authors in this
collection stress the importance of surviving socialist institutions. But while
Milosevic’s takeover of the Party structure led to escalation, there are also cases
when the takeover of post-socialist institutions, on the contrary, led to stabilisa-
tion. Kisriev on Dagestan and Koehler and Zürcher on Nagorno-Karabakh
(Chapters 6 and 8 in this volume) show that the ‘old’ Soviet institutions, and pri-
marily the rubber-stamp parliaments, were vital for the reconstruction of state-
hood, once they were allocated real power. 
Another often-overlooked oﬃcial institution is property rights. Giordano in
his Chapter 4 deals with the link between nationalism, agrarian policy and prop-
erty rights on land. Laws on land were and still are often used as a strategy for
cultural homogenisation and ‘puriﬁcation’. Emerging nation states claim the
management of property rights on land and often use it to change ethnic com-
position. Giordano compares over time and across borders the link between land
reform and nationalism in south-eastern Europe in 1900, between the two world
wars and after 1989.
‘Unoﬃcial’ institutions
Here, ‘unoﬃcial’ (or shadow) institutions are those which were not part of the
socialist state design, but which emerged as a reaction to the organisational voids
in the system. Institutions that survived the socialist modernisation also belong
in this category.
These unoﬃcial institutions went largely undetected by political science and
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‘sovietology’, which focused mainly on ‘oﬃcial’ state institutions, but they proved
to have a signiﬁcant impact on the way polities reassembled after the implosion of
the central state. A typical example of a shadow institution is the endemic second
economy and the highly sophisticated administrative corruption, both of which
are common features of post-socialist societies (Kordonskii 1995).9 Another
widespread unoﬃcial institution of socialist systems, which has retained its
importance and functionality beyond the collapse, is the networks of patronage
(Willerton 1992). In areas where the state lacked the resources to penetrate the
periphery with bureaucratic institutions, it had to rely on personal networks for
governance and control. After the collapse of the central state, networks of pat-
ronage became, in many places, the most cohesive institutional structure, substi-
tuting state tasks and concentrating political power and economic resources.
Other unoﬃcial institutions are based on local know-how and local tradi-
tions, which retained their functionality during and after the socialist period. For
many Caucasian and Balkan societies networks of trust based on a notion of
extended kin groups are important structuring elements.10 Political power is
vested, to a large extent, in these structures, a fact that could be easily overlooked,
since many powerful clans occupied important positions in the socialist hier-
archies.This does not mean, however, that the ‘modern’ bureaucratic state system
has replaced a ‘traditional’ clan system. Instead there was a parasitic exploitation
of the bureaucratic hierarchies by the clan system (cf. Willerton 1992: 191–222).
In large parts of the Caucasus and the Balkans, speciﬁc forms of local regu-
lation of justice, solidarity and conﬂict regulation exist, which do not depend on
a modern state bureaucracy, even though they might depend on it in their func-
tionality to regulate conﬂict on the monopoly of violence of the state. Codiﬁed
traditional value systems (e.g. adat – the ‘law of the mountains’ in many remote
parts of the Caucasus) existed together with the Soviet, and later, Russian legal
systems.11 Detecting and describing such local institutions is crucial for under-
standing post-socialist spaces – from the Balkans to Central Asia, the Caucasus
and the multi-ethnic provinces of China. It is precisely this hybrid, eclectic com-
bination of oﬃcial and unoﬃcial institutions that forms the institutional frame-
work which governs post-socialist, and in fact most political spaces after
modernity. Today it is obvious that socialist self-perception and western analysis
both dramatically underestimated the residual power of ‘the local’. A better
understanding of this simultaneous functioning of diﬀerent codes and value
systems is by no means only of ‘folkloristic’ value, but helps to understand the
capacity of a society to deal with conﬂicts and state building. 
Kisriev’s Chapter 6 in this volume on Dagestan oﬀers a stunning demonstra-
tion of this. Dagestan is notable for its ethnic diversity and, even by post-Soviet
standards, its dramatic economic deprivation. Dagestan’s ethno-political stabil-
ity against all odds is something that needs to be explained. Kisriev argues that
Dagestani society has avoided the pitfall of ethnic unrest owing to a functional
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integration of oﬃcial and unoﬃcial institutions. In a spontaneous and highly
political balancing act the political elite has successfully institutionalised mech-
anisms of restraint, cooperation and power sharing. These institutions draw
heavily on traditional, trained societal mechanisms of conﬂict mediating and
inter-group cooperation. Of crucial importance in overcoming the dangers of an
ethnic security dilemma proved to be the traditional dzhamaat, a cross-cutting,
non-ethnically deﬁned village community. 
Another view on the perspectives for stability is oﬀered by Vasilieva’s Chapter
9 in this volume. She analyses the integrative potential of cooperative move-
ments at the republican, the regional and the inter-state level for the Caucasus.
A major ﬁnding of the analysis is that cooperative movements had the strongest
impact on the republican level, while they remained marginal at the regional and
inter-state level. Within republics, cooperative movements were eﬀective only
when they became institutionalised procedures of power sharing within parlia-
ment or alternative bodies with legislative power.
If the local know-how of building cooperatives as networks of solidarity fails
to integrate with oﬃcial institutions it may instead be disruptive, as shown in
Grandits and Leutloﬀ’s and Mappes-Niedieck’s Chapters 1 and 5 on Kosovo and
Christophe’s Chapter 10 on Georgia in this volume. 
Elwert’s Chapter 12 oﬀers insights into the economics of ending violence. He
argues that violence can be ended by raising the costs of violence. This can be
achieved by closing the borders for supply, denying ‘rebels’ access to ﬁnancial
markets and eventually by external powers establishing a monopoly of violence.
Finally, Borneman’s Chapter 11 addresses the question of reconciliation
after ethnic cleansing. Reconciliation is seen here as a project of departure from
violence by breaking the vicious circle linking the present to the pains of the past.
Common futile strategies for survivors include the perpetuation of violence by
revenge and/or the group’s engagement in a further puriﬁcation of its principles
– usually connected with nostalgia for autochthony, obsession with origins and
clear demarcation of itself from other groups. Such a turn inward, an inner
puriﬁcation, not only appears to complete, in a putatively voluntaristic spirit, the
ethnic cleansing initially perpetrated on the group, but it also institutionalises a
further ‘cleansing’ of the group by enforcing endogamy on its members.
Reconciliation, says Borneman, is an inter-subjective process, an agreement to
settle accounts that involves at least two subjects who are related in time. They
are related in a temporal sense not in that they necessarily have a shared past or
a shared future. Consensus about what was shared in the past or what will be
shared in the future – in modern parlance, a ‘collective memory’ – is not neces-
sary for reconciliation, and its expectation may in fact awaken counterproduc-
tive drives to recover a lost whole or to produce a harmonious community.
Instead, in order to reconcile, diﬀerent subjects must agree only to share a
present, a present that is non-repetitive. Politics of intersubjectivity may be
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reached through the retribution of justice in judicial processes holding perpetra-
tors publicly accountable for their deeds.
The case studies presented here reinforce the argument that focusing on the
micro-politics of conﬂict and examining social institutions on the ground is
essential for the analyses of conﬂict. Generally speaking, the search for rules gov-
erning social processes is complicated by two factors when dealing with collec-
tive violent conﬂict: (1) the widening divide between the rationale of action and
the normative narratives assigning sense to deed ex post and (2) the increasing
relevance of informal institutions. 
‘This is not about religion’, Barnett R. Rubin is quoted as saying about the
building of a post-Taliban order in Afghanistan. ‘It’s about a ﬁght for the post-
colonial state system’ (Eurasia Insight 2001). Aside from the grand tale of good
and evil, war always involves institutionalised interests not directly connected to
or coinciding with the normative story.
Also for the post-socialist conﬂicts dealt with in this book the diﬀerentiation
between the normative framing of the conﬂict and the rules guiding the incen-
tives of relevant actors is essential. The normative framing of a conﬂict by the
parties and other interested observers is by no means just a fancy, an irrational
story of good and evil told by otherwise rational war-mongers in order to appease
their children and rid themselves of bad dreams. Making sense of violence (per-
petrated or endured) is but one crucial function of normative frameworking and
has strong implications for the chances of post-violence rapprochement and
healing. However, of much more immediate practical inﬂuence for the organisa-
tion and channelling of violence is the mobilising power of the normative story.
In terms of mobilising young people to ﬁght, kill and die it may come second only
to the organisation of fear. 
Despite the intimate interrelation between the normative and the practical
levels in the organisation of violent conﬂict, the diﬀerentiation between them
is crucial for our understanding of conﬂict as a dynamic process; this diﬀeren-
tiation is of particular importance when the rules set by the normative story are
not in tune with the incentives governing the practical level and may lead to the
failure of the overall operation (as in the abortive attempts to kick-start indepen-
dent statehood on a nationalist grand scale in Georgia and Azerbaijan as referred
to in Christophe’s Chapter 10 and Koehler and Zürcher’s Chapter 8 in this
volume). In order to come to terms with state weakness leading to violent conﬂict
or resulting from sustained conﬂict, analysing the dysfunctions of the oﬃcial
institutions is insuﬃcient. The ability of society to penetrate, exploit or replace
weak or even defunct oﬃcial institutions with informal rules, drawing on local
social or cultural know-how is of decisive importance in grasping patterns of
diﬀerence and similarity in post-socialist development. The post-colonial (here:
post-socialist) state system referred to above by Rubin is emerging from the
hybrids of the oﬃcial rump institutions of the state and informal networks of
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trust, capable of negotiating power and resources along channels considered
criminal in any functioning state.
Detecting potentials of disorder requires therefore that both oﬃcial and
unoﬃcial institutions are addressed in order to identify the real incentive struc-
tures of local actors. Actors in conﬂicts usually veil their real incentives behind
a discourse of seeming – but false – clarity. Particularly in situations of insecur-
ity and potential violence, political protagonists put great eﬀort into establishing
discourses of ‘unambiguity’ and creating a façade of clear codes for deﬁning
friend and foe, truth and justice. This discourse veils the typical post-socialist con-
dition of hybrid institutions. It also veils the fact that key players are most suc-
cessful when they command various social languages and can thus exploit
diﬀerent institutional settings – oﬃcial, unoﬃcial or even international. Both the
oﬃcial and informal levels have – when institutionalised and not contingent –
their own normative discourses and logic of action. These discourses may
compete with each other, or may be compatible. In any case all four levels of ‘the
rules of the game’– the oﬃcial and the unoﬃcial normative discourses and the
oﬃcial and the unoﬃcial practice – have to be addressed in order to gain a thor-
ough understanding of the potentials of order and disorder in weak states. The
editors hope that this volume presents a fruitful ﬁrst attempt. 

1 The term ‘Bosniak’ denotes the Muslim population of Bosnia, whereas Bosnian refers to
the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2 Here autonomous republics (ASSR) and autonomous oblasts (AO) are both treated as
second-order units. 
3 For useful overviews of factors which can increase the risk for ethno-political violence, see
van Evera (1994); Gurr and Harﬀ (1995); Brown (1997).
4 A series of papers addressing this issue is published in Elwert, Feuchtwang and Neubert
(1999).
5 For a criticism of what he calls ‘mainstream’ research on violence from a sociological
viewpoint, see von Trotha (1997). Trutz von Trotha argues that a sociology of the causes
of violence is not the same as a sociology of violence itself and presses for a paradigmatic
change in the research on violence, replacing the etiological ‘why?’ with the phenomen-
ological ‘how?’ For a discussion of the problems both ‘new’ and ‘mainstream’ research on
violence pose for the empirical work of social science, see Koehler (1998).
6 Exchange of information between groups is crucial. Once an information failure emerges,
groups are no longer able to judge the intentions and the real capabilities of the other
group. They might miscalculate the costs of a preventive strike, be it predatory or strictly
defensive, and engage in organised violence. See Lake and Rothchild (1998). 
7 On the importance of state weakness for explaining ethno-political conﬂict, see Fearon
and Laitin (1996); Brown (1997: 5).
8 For empirical evidence see Rothchild (1986); Gagnon (1994); Brass (1995); Glazer and
Moynihan (1995); Laitin (1995); Tishkov (1997).
9 The general theory of venality (Elwert 1985) would have to be adapted for socialist soci-
eties where, in most cases, favours and privileges replaced ﬁscal relations.
10 In particular for the Balkans the relevancy of institutions of loyalty based on an emic
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concept of extended kinship (e.g. the zadruga) has been intensely discussed and sometimes
branded more of a myth than a social reality (Todorova 1990; Kaser 1995: 36–60).
However, the line of argumentation presented here is not concerned with the question of
whether local institutions ‘survived’ by tradition, are invented or reactivated. Networks of
loyalty based on kinship or ethnicity may also well be consequences of organisational
shortcomings of the state. A convincing example is demonstrated by Verdery on how the
economy of shortages fostered ethnic networks in Romania (Verdery 1993).
11 As a case in point see Koehler (1999) on legal pluralism in Svanetia, Georgia.
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1Discourses, actors, violence: the organisation 
of war-escalation in the Krajina region of
Croatia 1990–911
Hannes Grandits and Carolin Leutloﬀ
Introduction
O 6  1990 the second and ﬁnal round of the ﬁrst free multi-party elec-tions since the end of the Second World War were held in Croatia. At thattime it was still a socialist republic within the Yugoslavian Federation. The
results of the elections were quite surprising. It was expected that the former
Communist Party would lose its absolute political predominance, but the decisive
victory of the nationalistic Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), led by Franjo
Tudjman, was remarkable.2 This party became the new leading political force
after forty-ﬁve years of socialist autocracy. The HDZ was able to form the new
government in the Croatian federal parliament (Sabor) without other parties.
Two weeks later, on 20 May 1990, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the small
nationalistic party of the Serbs in Croatia, which had only a few representatives
in the newly elected Sabor, suspended its contacts with the parliament.3 Their
withdrawal from formal politics in Croatia was one of the ﬁrst signs of the
growing conﬂict between Croats and Serbs within Croatia’s oﬃcial political life.
The background of this move by the SDS can be summed up as follows: the
ﬁrst two weeks after the elections brought a completely new orientation to the
political scene in Croatia. After coming to power, the leaders of the HDZ immedi-
ately began to launch initiatives for increasing the autonomy of Croatia within
Yugoslavia or, if this could not be achieved, Croatia’s full independence. But they
were threatened by the aggressive policy of the president of Serbia, Slobodan
Milosevic. Using Serbian nationalistic movements, Milosevic was on the way to
realising a more centralised, Belgrade-dominated concept of Yugoslavia. The
HDZ, as well as almost all other Croatian political parties, feared a Belgrade-
organised military intervention by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in Croatia.
There were constant rumours that actions had already been planned in Belgrade
to ‘restore order’ in Croatia and put down all democratic eﬀorts and ‘national’ aspi-
rations by such a military intervention. Under these circumstances ‘Serbophobic’
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tendencies became increasingly popular in Croatian society and began to domi-
nate public and political discourse. This anti-Serbian attitude was also one of the
key factors in the electoral success of the nationalist HDZ.
But there were also opposing developments, which tended to lessen national
antagonisms; thus, after the elections the leader of the SDS, Jovan Raskovic,
wanted to disassociate himself from the nationalistic proponents on his own side.
He stressed that he saw a positive future for Serbs in Croatia, if the political
leaders of both sides would be willing to cooperate and try to eliminate the
growing ‘national phobias’ among the people (Vjesnik 1990a: 5). Shortly after
the elections Raskovic and Tudjman began to discuss the possibility of a ‘historic
compromise’ for future coexistence between Croats and Serbs after the fall of the
Communist Party in Croatia. 
However, the ﬁrst Croat–Serbian attempts at cooperation, between the HDZ
and the SDS, were soon overshadowed by violent events. On the ﬁrst Sunday after
the elections in the Maksimir Stadium in Zagreb, a football game between the
football clubs Dynamo Zagreb and Crvena Zvezda (Red Star) Belgrade ended with
a major brawl between the Croat and Serb fans. The police became increasingly
involved. The riot later moved from the stadium to the centre of the city. More
than one hundred people were seriously hurt. Then, just a few days later, there
was an attempted assassination of a local SDS functionary in Benkovac, a small
ethnically mixed town in south-western Croatia. This event politically radicalised
the SDS. Since it was not known who was responsible for this act of violence, the
SDS functionaries interpreted it as a political move against their party. In reac-
tion, as already mentioned, they suspended their collaboration in the newly
elected parliament until responsibility for that event could be established. 
These violent events would soon be followed by other smaller incidents.
Attempts to contain hostile Croat and Serb interpretations of the situation in the
country became increasingly complicated. Also inﬂuential politicians became
increasingly uninterested in this approach, since the media and the public dis-
course tended more and more to accept only ‘clear’ and nationally one-sided
explanations. In the course of 1991 this conﬂict escalated into a war and, by its
end in 1995, thousands of people had been killed and hundreds of thousands
made refugees.
In this chapter we attempt to investigate the interplay between hostile and
threatening public discourses, the action of political leaders, and subsequent
violent events in the Serbo-Croatian conﬂict in Croatia. Special attention will be
given to the changing interpretations of the threatening situation within the
communities involved and to the role of institutional reform and institutional
formation in the process of societal transformation. The leader–follower-
oriented perspective was chosen to avoid the hypothesis that conﬂict escalation
was inevitable.
The analysis of the year before the outbreak of open war in June 1991 is sub-
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divided into three sections focusing on distinct phases in the development: ﬁrst
the popularisation and institutionalisation of national front-lines, secondly, the
mobilisation for violent conﬂict resolution and, ﬁnally, the importance of the
potential of war. Clearly these aspects overlapped in the course of conﬂict esca-
lation but, as will be shown, their respective importance changed over time. 
Popularisation and institutionalisation of national frontlines 
On 30 May 1990, three weeks after the elections, the HDZ sponsored a big cele-
bration on the occasion of the oﬃcial inauguration of the new Croatian parlia-
ment. This day, declared as the ‘Dan Hrvatske Drzavnosti’ [‘Day of Croatian
Statehood’], developed into the biggest Croatian festival since the 1970s. (Vjesnik
1990b: 3) It was an impressive event not only in Zagreb, but also in the whole
country.These festivities expressed ﬁrst of all the end of the communist system and
the introduction of a multi-party democracy but also the celebration of the
Croatian ‘ethno-nation’ (Sundhaussen 1994).The new ruling party had thus con-
verted their national programme into the new oﬃcial position of the federal state.
This programme was represented by several ‘Croatian’ symbols. One of the
crucial symbols was the ‘Sahovnica’, the red and white chessboard ﬂag, which
later became the oﬃcial Croatian national ﬂag. But the ‘Sahovnica’ as well as
many other Croatian symbols also recalled the fascist wartime Croatian state
which was formed by Nazi Germany in the Second World War.4 Because of their
Second World War connection, these symbols could also be read as a threat to the
Serbs living in Croatia.5
In the light of this, those Serbs of Croatia who felt alienated by these symbols
did not participate in the celebrations. On a political level all SDS members of par-
liament boycotted the oﬃcial ceremonies. However, most of the members of par-
liament of Serbian nationality in the SDP-SKH (the former Communist Party)
were present at the oﬃcial celebrations. At that time, hostile boundaries between
Serbs and Croats were not yet so well established. 
In socialist times, ethnic or national aﬃliations were known in neighbour-
hood situations as well as at work places and other spheres of everyday life.
However, up to 1990 everyday inter-ethnic relations were depicted as being to a
large extent harmonious, and it was often asserted that ethnic aﬃliations were
not at all important for the people (Nyström 1987; Siber 1988; Dugandzija
1991; Denich 1994a). But at the time of the election campaign and especially
after the elections in May 1990 discussions about possible ‘cultural and material
discrimination’ and also about violent aggression – especially those put in the
context of the Second World War – were of growing importance (Grandits 1998;
Zakosek 1998b). The people became involved in a process of increasing national
self-consciousness and consequently also one of ethnic segregation (Elwert
1995a: 114–115). 
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Feelings of being endangered on both the Serbian and Croatian side were in
fact evident in some ethnically mixed regions at that time, and they began to
increase, as the following interview illustrates. When asked who after the elec-
tions in 1990 had been more frightened in the Kordun (an ethnically mixed
region in south-western Croatia), the Serbs, because the HDZ had come to power
in Croatia, or the Croats, because here the Serbian-dominated SDP (former
Communist Party) was in power at the regional level, S. Livada, a sociologist who
came from that region, answered:
Both sides were frightened. On the one side was a movement with really dangerous
intentions [he refers here to the ruling HDZ], on the other side a structure came into
being, I think here of the Serbs in the Kordun, which had no longer any kind of polit-
ical centre. In former times this had been the Central Committee of Croatia or the
Central Committee of Yugoslavia, but both were already dissolved at that time.
Because of the danger they were facing or they thought themselves to be in, the polit-
ical structure of the Serbs now turned exclusively to a monstrous power, the Yugoslav
National Army. (Livada 1995: 19)
In this statement, reference to the missing political centre of the Serbian
community in Croatia and the broken relationship to Croatian governmental
institutions are of particular interest.6 In this way Livada explains the strong
movement of the ‘Serbian structure’ in Croatia towards a new orientation, to the
JNA. At the same time the JNA was subjected to transformation from a Yugoslav
to a Serbian-national institution. 
This political institutional deﬁcit of the Serbs in Croatia and the new orien-
tation of Serbian political life from Yugoslav to Serbian national institutions form
the background for the enormous popularisation of the nationalistic Serbian
SDS in the summer of 1990. Not until then was a network of local SDS organ-
isations, extending over all regions with Serbian settlements in Croatia, organ-
ised. In all communities with a large proportion of Serbian inhabitants – for the
most part ex-communist SDP functionaries were still governing the local aﬀairs
– founding ceremonies of new SDS branches took place in June 1990. 
After the elections of April–May 1990 the ex-communist SDP in Croatia was
increasingly shifting from their former Yugoslav orientation into a Croatian
nationalist one, very much in reaction to the strong centralist and Serbian-
nationalist developments in Belgrade. Consequently, the ex-communists succes-
sively lost the support of their functionaries and voters of Serbian nationality.
This was an important precondition for the success of the SDS politicians in
Croatia. 
Also signiﬁcant was the ceremonial organisation of the SDS gatherings:
often several times a week, so-called ‘mitings’ were held by the SDS in the course
of the founding of new local branches of the party. They were attended by several
hundred, and sometimes even several thousand Serbs. The key person in these
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foundation ceremonies was Jovan Raskovic, the leader of the SDS and charis-
matic main speaker in most of these meetings. In these very emotionalised mass
gatherings, the speeches of the SDS leaders, and in particular of Raskovic, were
full of national pathos and historic myths. These views fell on fertile ground and
were really able to generate a following for the SDS movement. The principal
political core of Raskovic’s speeches, not to prevent a possible independence of
Croatia at all costs, but to ﬁght for the oﬃcial acknowledgement of the special
individual and collective rights of the Serbs in Croatia, was pushed into the back-
ground by his emotional nationalistic rhetoric.
Already during these emotional days of the political mobilisation of large
parts of the Serbian population for the SDS, the local SDS mayor of Knin, Milan
Babic, began his ‘Initiative of Knin’, which soon came to be of prime importance
for the ‘Serbian question’ in Croatia. His plan aimed for a reorganisation of the
local administration borders in the south-west of Croatia. The Knin area should
become a newly established administrative unit containing all Serb-populated
villages of the region. Knin was proposed as the centre of this administrative dis-
trict, with the name ‘District of Northern Dalmatia and Lika’ (‘Opcina sjeverne
Dalmacije i Like’). On 28 June 1990, the Serb holiday ‘Vidovdan’ (this day is also
one of the most important Serbian national holidays commemorating the legen-
dary Kosovo battle), an assembly of SDS regional leaders, quickly organised by
Babic, adopted this proposal as an ‘oﬃcial’ resolution. In this way a project was
initiated which would soon become the centre of the violent escalation of the
conﬂict in Croatia. 
But at the end of June, the public discourse in Croatia did not take much
notice of the occurrences in Knin. The people were primarily interested in the
presentation of the ﬁrst draft of the ﬁrst post-communist constitution by the
HDZ. When this draft was presented in a working meeting of the Sabor, which
also took place on the Serb holiday of ‘Vidovdan’ on 28 June 1990, it became
obvious that the HDZ wanted with this constitution ‘to give Croatia a new iden-
tity’ (Vjesnik 1990c). This new identity was built upon ‘breaking free from social-
ism’ and was an increasingly ‘Croatian’ one. Croatia should be the state of the
Croatian nation. In this draft, which dealt with various aspects of the social and
political transformation, the Serbs were labelled as a national minority. Under
communist rule they had always been a ‘titular nation’ within the Social
Republic of Croatia. Thus the Serbian politicians in Croatia perceived this plan to
declare the Serbs a ‘minority’ as an act of discrimination and a massive under-
mining of their status. 
The coincidence of these two events on 28 June 1990, the presentation of
the draft of the ﬁrst constitution and of the resolution in Knin, marked the ﬁrst
oﬃcial antagonistic moves of national(-istic) Croatian and Serbian political pro-
jects and were ﬁrmly linked to the process of Croatian state building. The reor-
ganisation of old and the foundation of new state institutions formed the
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background for ethnicised competition for participation in the new state. The
question of the ways in which power could be allocated became the prime polit-
ical question and source of conﬂicts.7
Cautious and compromise-oriented institutionalisation policies might well
at that time have calmed emotions and reduced the danger of violent conﬂict.
But another path was chosen by initiatives which promoted political radicalisa-
tion and the consequent mobilisation of competing groups. In this short period
after the democratic elections, the political positions were thus quickly trans-
formed into diﬀerences and became irreconcilable antagonisms leading to
nationalistic mobilisation of the respective populations and subsequently to
violent conﬂict.
The mobilisation for violent options of conﬂict resolution
Barricades were built on the outskirts of villages in case the Croats would come at
night, four or ﬁve armed men, who would come and kill people . . . That was the
reason why the barricades were built, to block oﬀ the Serbian villages from the
Croatian ones. In my town the Serbs were in the majority, but half way to Knin there
was a village mainly inhabited by Croats. We built up our barricades in this direction,
because the people were frightened. (‘J’ from Knin 1996: INT)8
This recollection from a 1996 interview refers to circumstances in the Knin
area in August 1990, barely two months after the above-mentioned political
confrontation over constitutional provisions and administrative jurisdictions.
The situation escalated in some of the regions in south-western Croatia where a
high percentage of the total population was Serbian. Part of the Serbian people
had taken up arms. What had happened? To better understand the perspective of
the Serbian people who participated in this uprising we can gain perspective from
an interview dealing with those critical days in August 1990: 
Then we saw many people from our village with arms. Hunting riﬂes, but not
weapons from the army. They gathered in the village centre and discussed, what to
do at night. They were frightened that the Croats would come at night to kill Serbs.
They also told my father that he should go to the barricades, but he said that he did
not have a gun. One of the neighbours gave my father a kind of riﬂe with ammuni-
tion and told him, that he should go to a certain place. He did go, since he did not want
to get into a quarrel with the neighbour. 
My mother began to cry – what should she do with the little children? My father
left a long knife by the door. We usually used it to slaughter the pigs in autumn. He
told us, that we must use it, if someone should come. We were very nervous and
scared during the night. I stayed at home with my mother, while my father was at the
front. To have this weapon in the house and to be scared at the same time, that was
really a horrible time. Of course, I had never had a weapon before – CDs and a televi-
sion yes, of course. (‘S’ from Knin 1996: INT)
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In this and the other interview with two Serbs, who later ﬂed from the region
of rebellion, the ‘taking up of weapons’ has been described as an act of self-
defence, which resulted from intense fear (Elwert 1995b: 130–131, 1997:
91–92). They pointed out that fear of extremists made life really unsafe in the
region. They felt endangered just for the reason that they were of Serbian ethnic-
ity. The strong meaning that the ethnic identiﬁcation came to represent indicates
the extent of national mobilisation (Scheﬄer 1995). 
However, a deeper analysis of this fear leading to the national mobilisation
reveals that it did not necessary correspond to a real threat. Rather it represented
a reaction to perceptions of threat as an interpretation of reality not necessarily
closely linked to external ‘objectiﬁable’ criteria (Nicklas 1991). 
In this setting it is absolutely necessary ﬁrst to point out the most important
initiatives of those strategic actors and their clients, who were the main driving
forces of the threat messages. These people can be called ‘ethnic’ or ‘national’
entrepreneurs (see Bailey 1970: 44–57). These ethnic entrepreneurs propagated
a discourse of the conﬂict promoting escalation into a violent conﬂict. In their
discussions the use of violence was always legitimised by representing it as being
defensive. The Serbs would have to defend themselves or they would soon become
victims of violent acts coming from the others. This was their message. In the
escalating conﬂict, the majority of the aﬀected population followed the interpre-
tations presented by their leaders. In this way, the former dominant local or even
Yugoslav self-deﬁnition was successively replaced by a widened national one.
Generally in the Krajina region this process of strategic escalation of vio-
lence was strongly connected to the ‘Knin initiative’, which was driven by the
SDS mayor of Knin, Milan Babic, step-by-step. While his SDS colleague but oppo-
nent Raskovic was partly engaged in negotiations with oﬃcial representatives of
the new Croatian government, Babic worked on his ambitious project to unify
Serbian communities. He visited diﬀerent settlements with a Serbian majority. By
that summer Obrovac, Dvor, Vojnic, Donji Lapac, and all communities in the
region of Knin, had agreed to the uniﬁcation (Silber and Little 1995: 105).
However, many communities, especially those where the SDP was still in power,
were not immediately ready to support the Knin initiative. On the contrary, it
would not have been surprising if the project had failed. In these cases, to ‘win
over’ these communities, Babic, together with his closest followers, started to
strategically use violence in the emotionally heated atmosphere. Thus he suc-
ceeded in creating support without democratic legitimisation. These methods are
shown very vividly in the following description of the village Titova Korenica:
In Korenica . . . the SDP [the former Communist Party] members composed the major-
ity in the regional assembly. They did not want to join the union of Babic. Instead of
this they invited Tudjman’s Minister for Regional administration, Slavko Degoricija,
into the region. They wanted to negotiate about internal investigations and plans to
develop the tourist potential of the Plitvice National Park . . . Babic anticipated this
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meeting by sending forty armed men from Knin into the city in the night before
Degoricija was supposed to arrive. In the following weeks, the SDS organised demon-
strations in Korenica until the SDP representatives were chased away from their posi-
tions. (Silber and Little 1995: 106)
During that summer, while questions of the transformation from socialism
and the consequences of the possible independence of Croatia from Belgrade
dominated media in Croatia, Babic and his followers, at that time not really taken
seriously by Zagreb, continued to work on their plan. Their objective of auton-
omy from the Croatian government and administration became increasingly
clear. It also became increasingly apparent that this was supported by Belgrade. 
The next step in Babic’s plan was the call for a ‘people’s assembly’ of Serbs,
who lived in regions of the Krajina, the area in Croatia with a high proportion of
Serbian population. On 25 July 1990, a ‘Serbian National Council’ was founded
in Knin and it decided to hold a referendum in August about the autonomy of the
‘Serbian Krajina’.9
Parallel to this ﬁrst step of building up a parallel political institution, Milan
Martic, the chief of police in Knin and associate of Babic, encouraged the pre-
dominantly Serbian police of Knin to disobey the authority of the newly elected
government of Croatia. Initially the oﬃcers refused to wear the newly introduced
uniforms. Milan Martic legitimised this by pointing out that police forces of
Serbian nationality should not be forced to wear the same badges and uniforms
‘which were worn by Croatian fascists at the time of the criminal NDH state’
(BBC/ORF-TV 1996). 
The government in Zagreb was provoked by the acts of the police in Knin,
but they still counted on mediation of the conﬂict. They sent a high-ranking del-
egation to Knin. It consisted of the Croatian Minister of the Interior, his deputy
and the chief of police of Sibenik, which was the direct superior of Martic. They
tried to normalise the situation by making concessions to the police in Knin in
order to bring them into line. But this action ran counter to that of the leadership
of Martic and Babic in Knin. The delegation was confronted with a tumultuous
situation shortly after the beginning of the negotiations. An agreement could
not be reached and soon it became an open disagreement. At the same time more
than a thousand people were organised by Babic and Martic to gather in front of
the police station where the negotiations were taking place. They loudly ‘sup-
ported’ the position of ‘their’ police. Finally, the delegation was forced to hastily
leave Knin (BBC/ORF-TV 1996; Vjesnik 1990d). This ﬁrst attempt at a peaceful
agreement with the protesting police, which could have led to a wider dialogue,
and possibly a compromise between the Croatian and Serbian protagonists, had
failed.
When some weeks later the Croatian Ministry of the Interior sent special
police forces to reclaim control of the police station and to disarm the disobedi-
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ent police of Knin, an open revolt began in the villages of Krajina. It was organ-
ised under the energetic leadership of SDS activists led by Babic and Martic and
soon got called the ‘Balvan revolution’. The name derives from the building of
barricades from tree trunks which, during the revolt, were manned by armed
guards to ‘protect’ the Serbian villages. 
Let us turn here again to the motives of the local Serbian population in par-
ticipating actively in this armed ‘Balvan rebellion’. As explained above, the
Serbian population has to be seen as behaving in a scenario of threat. Following
the fact that ‘Croatian special forces were sent to punish Serbs’, as the Krajina
Serb leader claimed, the situation appeared increasingly dangerous to them and
formed a new, somehow ‘second reality’ (Rösel 1997: 165). In this reality the
present developments were constantly mixed with the experience of the Croatian
Serbs in the Second World War, when Serbs were violently persecuted by the
Croatian Ustasha. In the interpretation of the Serbian people the violence
suﬀered during the Second World War threatened to be repeated. This increased
the fear of the imminent use of violence. Thus, the historical situation was pro-
jected onto the current situation. 
Paradoxically, because of the authoritarian suppression of nationality issues
by the Yugoslav communists, these unresolved issues became more explosive.
Especially after the collapse of communist rule at the end of the 1980s, stories
about the atrocities in the Second World War began to circulate again. They were
often based on the experiences of the older generation. This situation is reﬂected
in the views of the above-cited respondent who described the Ustasha crimes as
‘national events’, experienced by his grandfather in the Second World War:
My grandfather was in the Partisan army of Tito . . . he knew many problems between
Serbs and Croats during the Second World War. He told me that at the beginning of
the Second World War, the Croats killed 520 Serbs not far from our house, only
twenty to twenty-ﬁve kilometres away. Civilians, girls, young children, etc. . . . I know,
that Croats, Ustasha, killed at least 10,000 people in our area within a radius of
about a hundred kilometres. I do not know why . . . In Glina, about sixty miles from
our home, I am not sure, but there were about 1010 or 1012 people shot by Ustasha,
that means shot by Croatian soldiers . . . (‘B’ from Vojnic, Kordun region 1996: INT) 
In these detailed explanations, it is striking that the exact locations of the
crimes, and even the numbers of victims, could be given. Although it is possible
that these details were really given by the grandfather, as most of the Serb fami-
lies did have victims of the Ustasha terror during the Second World War among
their relatives, it is more probable that the informant knows about these events
from the media, which were increasingly controlled by nationalists.10
Since the end of the 1980s, the Yugoslav population was permanently
inﬂuenced by actualised pictures of the enemy and by historical myths with little
opportunity to verify the information given (Sundhaussen 1994: 418). In the
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Krajina the rhetoric of the SDS constantly re-emphasised that with the ‘return’
of the symbols of the Ustasha period, e.g. as with the introduction of the new
police uniforms, it could be ‘assumed’ that the return of the fascist policy of the
ethnic cleansing of Serbs would soon follow. The fear of a ‘new genocide’ was
therefore increasingly based on synchronised representations of the present and
the past, which were one-dimensionally described along friend–enemy schemes
opposing Serbs and Croats.11
Smaller acts of violence, which slowly began to increase in number,
intensiﬁed fears even more. Often ethno-political entrepreneurs consciously
planned this violence. In this way they, along with their initial small group of
supporters, created loyal relationships along ethnic lines. Thus through these
acts of violence the ethno-political entrepreneurs, which at the beginning repre-
sented only a small minority of the proclaimed ‘nation’, eventually created a
frame of conﬂictual relationships manifested in notions of protection and obedi-
ence. National unity was manifested by a reliance on force (for comparison, see
Scheﬄer 1995:33 and Waldmann 1999). 
In this context, the extreme fear of violence was often linked to the social
expectation of self-defence. To defend one’s home and family was accepted as the
norm in a perceived situation of threat. It was propagated and even expected that
men would take up arms in Krajina in 1990.
The readiness to use violence for self-defence is a widespread attitude. Still,
the question may be asked whether people act in situations of conﬂict totally
without any reference to so-called ‘cultural dispositions’.12 This matter can be
examined by reference to two levels of meaning. First the symbolic level can be
investigated, in which ‘culturally immanent pictures’ may be awoken which
recreate a special tradition and which may eﬀect the escalation of violence
(Elwert 1989). Secondly, one should investigate the ‘level of action’, which may
relate to traditional patterns of behaviour. 
The culturally immanent pictures in connection with the armed self-defence
of Krajina society are partly taken from a culture of armed self-defence, which
has characterised life in this region at diﬀerent stages and in diﬀerent forms: as
border peasant soldiers up to the end of the nineteenth century, during Partisan
battles in the Second Word War and during the communistic organisation of ter-
ritorial defence. The ﬁrst particularly represents a regional characteristic.13
In 1990, in the situation of threat, the Krajina–Serb group consciousness
was strengthened by those culturally speciﬁc characteristics. A tradition of
taking up arms for self-defence was present in the form of historic pictures, which
were at the same time deprived of their context. They functioned as symbols
which were used in a speciﬁc way to strengthen the demarcation of nationality
and to inﬂuence social attitudes and expectations. Present value systems could
be modiﬁed and/or – in the actual situation of threat – constructed anew.14
However, the credibility of the special meaning which was given to the pictures
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was bound to special constellations. In the summer of 1990, as discussed here,
these pictures gained plausibility only with the situation of immanent threat and
the rapid weakening of the state power monopoly (Grandits and Promitzer
2001b).
A discussion of the actualisation of a traditional pattern of action, involving
the readiness to defend oneself, is much more diﬃcult (Kaser 1996: 132). A
culture of armed self-defence in the sense of a social organisation of border
peasant soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could not survive after the dis-
solution of the system at the end of the nineteenth century. Perceptions of a tra-
dition of taking up arms for self-defence survived as a kind of a male ideal, which
in former times was bound to patriarchal–militaristic structures, and which still
may have had some inﬂuence on the process of socialisation and in this form was
a reference point for the use of special cultural immanent pictures (Grandits and
Halpern 1994).15
Despite the fact that cultural and social expectations to take up arms could
be found in wide sections of the population, this certainly does not mean that it
had universal power. Many individuals refused to be mobilised voluntarily. But
with the development of the conﬂict and the expansion of a militaristic–
administrative infrastructure, these individuals were increasingly put under pres-
sure. Withdrawal from armed resistance was soon deﬁned as being shameful and
dishonourable by the public. From the summer of 1991 many people were mob-
ilised by force. This left little scope for withdrawal from participation in the armed
conﬂict. This situation was reﬂected in an interview: ‘They have all been mobil-
ised by the Krajina-army. If they had refused, they would have been declared as
deserters and would have been imprisoned’ (‘J’ from Knin 1996: INT).
From rebellion to war: the importance of the potential of war 
Until now the focus has been primarily on the local level of the conﬂict constel-
lation and perception. But to understand how this conﬂict developed into a
broader regional war it is essential to discuss how it was embedded in a broader
context. As noted, the struggle for power between the centralist Serbian political
elite in Belgrade and the Croatian policy makers in Zagreb, who aimed for a more
federal-based sovereignty or national independence, represented a necessary
precondition for the successful ethno-national mobilisation in all of Croatia. The
developments in Krajina were used for, and increasingly inﬂuenced by, tactical
and strategic considerations from outside powerful protagonists. The local front-
lines and ambitions were instrumentalised for their political plans. 
On the side of the Krajina Serbs, the Milosevic-led regime in Belgrade, and to
a growing degree also the JNA, became increasingly important in the local
conﬂict.16 The integration of the Krajina into ‘larger structures’ and the building
up of a potential for war, i.e. a suﬃcient supply of weapons, the maintenance of
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a functioning wartime economy, etc. was fundamental for securing such a pre-
condition for war and one of the most important consequences of the ‘Balvan
revolution’ (Orywal 1996: 40–41). These eﬀorts were also a main reason for the
incipient conﬂict – at both a regional and a supra-regional level – which from
now on became triggered by the same actions: the repeated attempts at disarm-
ing the progressively growing armed forces. 
First of all, the ‘Balvan revolution’ itself had been triggered by the attempt
of Croatian special forces to disarm the rebellious policemen in Knin. The failure
of this move was caused by the involvement of the JNA. JNA combat aircraft
forced the Croatian police helicopters, which had been sent to Knin, to return to
Zagreb and JNA units stationed in Krajina are reported to have marched out of
their barracks. Both actions were interpreted as a sign for the rebellious Krajina
Serbs that they could count on the support of the Yugoslav National Army in the
future (Tanjug 1990; Vjesnik 1990d).17
This ﬁrst armed confrontation shocked public life in Croatia. It also
inﬂuenced the public discourse on both sides of the conﬂict. The argument that
weapons and the organisation of defence had really become necessary because
the other side seemed ready to act violently became increasingly persuasive. The
following statement of Milan Babic, the radical leader of ‘Serbian Krajina’, illus-
trates this very vividly. After SDS functionaries had just handed out weapons
from police magazines and from oﬃcial military Territorial Defence (TO) reserv-
ist depots to the people, Milan Babic told the press: 
The Croatian government wages a psychological war through its Ministry of the
Interior and its Police headquarters in Sibenik against the Serbian people in Croatia.
Now an ultimatum was delivered to us, that the people should return their weapons,
that the barricades should be removed and that all weapons should be registered.
That means that the Serbian people should be disarmed. I do not have the moral right
to request from my people not to defend themselves from any form of terrorism,
including when it is coming from the Croatian government. (Politika 1990)
In this statement, Babic denies the legitimacy of the oﬃcial administration
in Croatia and at the same time he refers to the fact that the Croatian Serbs have
a necessity and a right to organise an armed self-defence. In the following
months he devoted all his eﬀorts to organising this ‘self-defence’.
After the events of 17 August 1990 the authorities of the Croatian republic,
referred to in the above quotation, tried to prevent the arming of the Serbian pop-
ulation in Krajina and attempted to ‘restore order’ and reassert their authority.
Initiatives to disarm the population began. But these attempts were met with
resistance and aggravated the whole situation. For example, on 28 September
1990 special forces of the Croatian police began to conﬁscate the weapons of mil-
itary reservists, mainly in villages with a high proportion of Serbs. This resulted
in demonstrations and clashes between the police and Serbian civilians (Archiv
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der Gegenwart 1990: 35182; Vjesnik 1990e). The unrest and disturbances not
only worsened the atmosphere in the region, but also encouraged extremists on
both sides, supported by the media, to outdo each other in the creation of threat-
ening scenarios.18 In such an atmosphere of distrust and fear, disarmament
hardly became possible. On the contrary, the arming of the Serbian people in the
insurgent region as well as the organisation of local combat units proceeded with
the support of the JNA based in the Krajina region.19
The arming of the Croatian combat forces has to be seen in a much larger
dimension.20 After the HDZ took over power in Croatia, the Croatian govern-
ment, as it was just a federal-component government within Yugoslavia, had
only a relatively small police force with almost no heavy weapons at its disposal.21
Most of the heavy weapons belonged to the JNA. The JNA’s supreme command
was the joint Yugoslav state presidium in Belgrade, which consisted of represen-
tatives of all Yugoslav republics and autonomous provinces. Soon after the elec-
tions, the HDZ decided to expand its police force and, in addition, to secretly build
up their own Croatian army. Thousands of Croatian men were enrolled in the
armed forces through the ﬁrst months after the HDZ took power in Croatia.22
Weapons were bought abroad and illegally smuggled into the country. 
The arming of Croatia’s military did not remain a secret to the leaders of the
JNA and the socialist elite in Belgrade. However, for months they did not intervene.
But on 9 January 1991, at a meeting of the Yugoslav state presidium in Belgrade
a resolution to launch an oﬀensive against Croatia surprisingly became the main
topic. The leading commanders of the JNA together with Milosevic’s people in the
presidium wanted the state presidium to give an order to the JNA to react against
the ‘illegal and secret formation’ of a new Croatian army. They called the forma-
tion of an independent Croatian army an aggressive act against theYugoslav Fed-
eration. The resolution for a military intervention was even discussed a second
time in the Yugoslav state presidency, but in the end did not get a majority. The
whole initiative ended up as a compromise with further negotiations. Veljko
Kadijevic, the Yugoslav minister of defence and highest oﬃcer of the JNA, and
Tudjman agreed that the JNA would end their alert if Croatia followed its obliga-
tion to hand over the people ‘responsible’ for the smuggling of weapons.23
At about the same time Milosevic and the leading ﬁgures in his Serbian polit-
ical circle came to the realisation that the unity of Yugoslavia could no longer be
‘saved’ and they changed their strategy on the Yugoslav question. From now on
they no longer in principle opposed the independence of Croatia and Slovenia;
but they felt that Croatia should not be allowed to keep those parts of its republic
which the Belgrade authorities regarded as Serbian territory. These areas ‘must
stay in Yugoslavia at any cost’.24 Within these conﬂicts about the future of
Yugoslavia, the rebels of the Serbian Krajina now attained enormous strategic
importance in the struggles for power. 
It seems reasonable to return here to the local context in the Krajina. The
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uprising had meanwhile become increasingly institutionalised and its own
‘oﬃcial’ political and military administration had been built up. Already on 1
October 1990, the ‘Serbian National Council’ in Knin, presided over by Milan
Babic, proclaimed the autonomy of the regions under their control.25 A few
months later in February 1991 the declaration of independence of the ‘Republic
of Serbian Krajina’ followed. The secession from Croatia and the building up of a
new state structure were justiﬁed by Croatia’s ambitions to separate from
Yugoslavia.26 At the beginning, the territory of the ‘Republic of Serbian Krajina’
encompassed only the immediate region of Knin. 
The support of Belgrade for the Krajina rebels, as ﬁghters for the ‘Serbian
cause’ in Yugoslavia, had meanwhile been growing constantly. In return, the
Serbian regime in Belgrade had gained much control over the aims and strate-
gies of the Krajina Serbian insurgents. This was also the time when so-called ‘vol-
unteers’, diﬀerent heavily armed paramilitary individuals and groups from
Serbia and other Yugoslav regions, increased their presence in the Krajina. 
Further developments in Krajina in the spring and summer of 1991, can be
characterised by two combined processes: the mobilisation and the regulation of
violence. As a reaction to individual acts of violence – some of which were stra-
tegically calculated, others seemingly ‘unplanned’ – an increasing part of the
population was won over to support the use of force. This was the time of nation-
alistic hard-liners and extremists claiming radical solutions. Conciliatory politi-
cians, arguing for negotiations and non-violent solutions, rapidly lost inﬂuence.
The regional authorities began to tolerate acts of violence against members of
the other ethnic group. Until the escalation into war in June 1991 this develop-
ment was reﬂected in public discussions associated with a series of bloody
clashes. They dominated the media on both sides and helped to unify public
opinion. Fierce ﬁghting broke out between special forces of the Krajina Serbian
and the Croatian police for the control of strategic centres. 
On 2 and 3 March 1991 in the ethnically mixed town of Pakrac in western
Slavonia, Krajina Serbian special forces came into the town, took over a police
station and disarmed the sixteen Croatian policemen stationed there. The follow-
ing night in a large-scale police operation, Croatian special police forces stormed
the police building and forced out the Krajina Serbian forces (Borba 1991;
Politika 1991; Vjesnik 1991a).
In Plitvice, a thinly populated tourist area about 150 km south-west of
Zagreb, a similar occurrence ended with the ﬁrst casualties of the conﬂict. In the
ﬁghting, one soldier on each side was killed and at least twenty ﬁghters were very
seriously injured. The JNA intervened on the order of the Yugoslav state presid-
ium. JNA troops separated the ﬁghting forces and installed a buﬀer zone between
them. In the following weeks, the JNA reinforced its presence in the region and
grew in importance (Proﬁl 1991; Vjesnik 1991b).
As a consequence of these strategic violent events more soldiers and
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weapons were sent to all areas of conﬂict. Smaller clashes, which followed in
several places, had an eﬀect on the conﬂict constellation in the region as a whole.
Consequently the Croatian population in ethnically mixed or in the vicinity of
predominantly Serbian areas ‘sensed’ danger and organised a defence against
attacks from the ‘Serbian terrorists’ (Danas 1991a). Barricades were built and
patrols organised. The same happened in the predominantly Serbian villages in
Croatia outside the territory of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. 
Particularly aﬀected by this national panic were the Serbian or ethnically
mixed villages in eastern Slavonia. One of these villages, Borovo selo, became the
place where the next signiﬁcant violent event broke out in early May 1991. After
a series of smaller incidents – initially provoked by nationalistic HDZ radicals –
two Croatian policemen were detained in the village. Two buses full of Croatian
policemen moved into the village of Borovo selo to ‘free’ their colleagues. Their
arrival had been expected and a large number of Serbian ﬁghters waited in
ambush, among them were also ‘volunteers’ from the Chetnik movement of the
ultra-nationalist Vojislav Seselj in Serbia. They began to ﬁre on the buses. Twelve
Croatian policemen were killed and more than twenty seriously injured. The
number of Serbian ﬁghters killed has not been made public (Borba 1990; Danas
1990: 7–9; Der Standard 1990: 3, Silber and Little 1995: 158–160).
After the incident at Borovo selo was publicised, the conﬂict took on a new
dimension. The dead bodies of the policemen were omnipresent in the Croatian
media. The Serbs were collectively referred to as Chetniks or terrorists and were
declared to be enemies of the Croatian state. Reciprocally, on the Serbian side,
Croats were collectively labelled as ‘Ustasha who were again attacking Serbian
villages’ and were proclaimed enemies of the Serbian people. Consequently, the
chances for initiatives to reach some kind of non-violent compromise were enor-
mously diminished. 
When the war began in Croatia at the end of June 1991, after Croatia’s dec-
laration of independence and with a large military oﬀensive from the Krajina
Serbs, long-lasting preparations on both sides had preceded this escalation of
violence. Supported and/or directed by their allies, the JNA as well as nationalis-
tic volunteer militias from Serbia, the Krajina Serbian troops tried to take over
those parts of Croatia they claimed as Serbian and to successively expel the
Croatian population. To get an impression of the dimensions of the potential for
war which was built up by the warring factions, one need only look at the list of
combat troops, which were ﬁghting each other soon after the outbreak of war.27
At that time the militia of the ‘Republic of Serbian Krajina’ had, according
to Milan Martic, 35,000 men under arms. The ‘Knindze’, the so-called army of
the Krajina, which had partly developed out of the former territorial defence,
consisted of hundreds of combat units. In addition volunteers and paramilitary
units from Serbia (Cetniks, Arkanovci, etc.) also played an important role in the
ﬁghting.
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The oﬃcial size of the JNA in Croatia was 60,000–70,000 soldiers (it is
diﬃcult to estimate how many Croatian soldiers left the army before or after the
ﬁghting started). In addition about 20,000–25,000 JNA soldiers were trans-
ferred from Slovenia to Croatia and 10,000–15,000 were stationed at the
Serbian and Bosnian borders with Croatia.
The Croatian police (Mupovci) consisted, with their regular and reservist
members, of 45,000 men, the ‘Zbor narodne garde’ (new Croatian army), had
about 30,000 soldiers but at that time still limited resources of arms. In addition,
many armed civilians and several paramilitary units were also involved in the
ﬁghting.
Conclusion
This analysis has tried to show why, after the decade-long, basically harmonious,
everyday inter-ethnic life of Croats and Serbs in Croatia, the ‘Balvan revolution’
took place in the Krajina region in the summer of 1990, and why in the course
of the following year this rather amateur local revolt was able to escalate into a
brutal war between Serbs and Croats. 
The ﬁrst section focused on the popularisation and institutionalisation of
boundary-maintenance mechanisms in Croatia in 1990. The HDZ, which
formed the government after the ﬁrst free multi-party elections in Croatia,
increasingly integrated its nationalistic position into the newly developing post-
socialist state machinery. Political antagonisms, which in the breakdown of the
socialist system and the following temporary power vacuum seemed inevitable,
aroused national conﬂicts between Croats and Serbs about the form and charac-
ter of the new institutions of the developing national state. These conﬂicts
became manifest in serious disputes over the character of the new constitution
and new power relations within the police. The emerging leaders of the Serbian
population in Croatia feared that the takeover of the government by the Croatian
nationalistic HDZ would be followed by discrimination against Serbs. They pas-
sionately demanded explicit acknowledgements of their special claims. The
Croat population feared a Belgrade-organised intervention of the JNA against
the new democratically elected ﬁrst post-socialist government in Croatia. It was
feared that this would be accompanied by a wave of repression and a return to
the socialist one-party system.
Soon two deeply antagonistic positions on the ‘national question’ were con-
fronting each other in political life. Masses of the Serbian, as well as the Croatian,
population could in this way be won over to radical nationalistic positions. In the
beginning these positions were abstract, but slowly they began to become rele-
vant in everyday life. 
In the second section, the readiness of the Serbian people in the region
around Knin to participate in the so-called ‘Balvan revolution’ was discussed. It
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was shown that the people in Krajina explained their participation in the rebel-
lion as a necessary and inevitable act of self-defence for the protection of their
rights, their property, and even their lives which they felt were threatened by
Croatian extremists and by the newly elected Croatian authorities. But these feel-
ings of being threatened and the closely connected readiness to use violence were
very much caused by speciﬁc discourses of conﬂict scenarios and programmed
violent incidents, which were often produced by political entrepreneurs.
Political leaders, intellectuals and the media not only on the Serbian, but
also on the Croatian side, projected historical conﬂicts between Croats and Serbs
into the developing situation. By this means, they were very successful in stirring
up fear among the people, which pushed them to an even greater degree towards
confrontational national self-deﬁnitions and prepared them for violence. In this
constellation, the discursive projection and instrumentation of speciﬁc cultural
images of virility, especially of traditional male role expectations, became one of
the important aspects in mobilising the people for conﬂict. The images were taken
partly from the perceived heroic history of Krajina society. This analysis of the
escalation of violence has also shown the diﬃculty in ﬁnding the dividing line
between the voluntary mobilisation of the population and the sequential social-
role expectations in the use of force.
It has to be stressed that the strategic use of force and violence were probably
the most important means of winning over the people to a confrontational mode
that promoted the ensuing conﬂict. The strategic use of violence was able to pow-
erfully transform the interpretation of the conﬂict in the respective societies. 
However, that the ‘Balvan revolution’ of the Krajina Serbs could lead within
several months to a large-scale war was, besides the strategic employment of vio-
lence, predominantly a consequence of the instrumentalisation of the regional
conﬂict into a trans-regional confrontation of interest. The third section dealt
with this decisive element. Only the accumulation of a potential for warfare, i.e.
the necessary supplies of weapons, trained soldiers, the maintenance of a func-
tioning war economy, and, further, the evolution of an institutional infrastruc-
ture, made it possible that this local conﬂict could develop into a war. Initiatives
from outside, for the Krajina Serbs, especially from Serbia and from the now
Serbian-dominated JNA, were of crucial importance in the outbreak of war in
the Krajina region in Croatia. 
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1 Many colleagues helped us with their comments and criticisms in the writing of this
chapter. We are especially grateful to Joel M. Halpern for his work on the ﬁnal draft.
2 On the elections, see Grdesic et al. (1991) and Siber (1997); for analysis on the back-
ground to the new political elite, see Dejan (1993) and Zakosek (1998a).
3 In the 1990 election the great majority of Serbs in Croatia did not vote for the Serbian
nationalistic SDS, which had candidates in only a few electoral districts. Instead they voted
for the former Communist Party, which ran under the new name SDP-SKH. For details of
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the election results, including regional diﬀerences, see Vjesnik (1990a). Some 581,663 or
12 per cent of the 4,784,265 people living in Croatia in 1991 were ethnic Serbs (accord-
ing to the population census of 1991), see Republicki zavod za statistiku (1992: 9).
4 The Sahovnica has been the symbol for the kingdom of Croatia since the Middle Ages.
From 1102 this kingdom was ruled by the kings of Hungary and from 1526 it was part of
the Habsburg Empire. Between 1941 and 1945 the Sahovnica became the oﬃcial ﬂag of
the ﬁrst Croatian national state, the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (NDH). In the
Communist post-war period this ﬂag was therefore also seen as a symbol for this Second
World War Croatian quisling state.
5 The Second World War ‘Independent State of Croatia’ was governed by the fascist Croat-
centric Ustasha movement. Between 1941 and 1945 mass persecution, expulsion and
murder made hundreds of thousands Serbs victims of the Croatian Ustasha state (which
at that time also encompassed Bosnia-Herzegovina).
6 For the background of the strong attachment of Croatian Serbs to the Communist Party
in the post-war period see Roksandic (1991: 157).
7 This mechanism is theoretically described in the articles of Nagel (1994), Neckel (1995)
and Wimmer (1995). They point out that as soon as a state distributes resources by ethnic
categories, or as soon as a group does not have the same access to citizens’ rights and
therefore is not able to access resources, the members of the group may try to become
members of the privileged group or, if that is not possible, may postulate an ethnic iden-
tity which diﬀers from the identity of the major nation. Ethnicity, respectively, nationality
may win increasing importance very fast.
8 Most of the interviews with Serbs from the Krajina quoted in this text were made by
Carolin Leutloﬀ in the course of ﬁeldwork in Former Yugoslavia on identity aspects of
Krajina-Serb refugees in 1996, one year after their ﬂight from Croatia. For results of this
research see Leutloﬀ (1998).
9 The ‘Krajina’ encompassed the region close to the north-west border of Bosnia, large parts
of the northern Dalmatian hinterland, and the regions of Lika, Krbava, Kordun and
Banija. Historically these territories belonged to the so-called ‘Vojna Krajina’, or ‘military
border’, which was for centuries a multi-ethnic defence zone of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire against the Ottomans, until it was dissolved and reintegrated into Croatia in 1881.
In 1990 Croatian Serbs tried to ideologically re-establish the meaning of ‘Krajina’ (see, for
example, Grandits and Promitzer 1997). See especially also n. 13.
10 For theoretical input see Halbwachs (1985: 35): ‘The national group I belong to was in
the course of my life the scene of a special number of events from which I think that I
would remember them, but which I only know from newspapers or from evidence of those
who were actually involved in these events. These events take a special place in the
memory of one nation. When I vitalise them again I am forced to fully rely on the memory
of others, which does not complete my own memory, but which are the only source of
what I want to remember.’
11 For the dynamic of parallel existing perceptions of oﬃcial and unoﬃcial historicisations
in Krajina, see Denich (1994b). 
12 Compare critical reﬂections concerning this matter, which draw attention to the Balkans
in general, in Höpken (1997).
13 In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the most southerly Croatian
regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which bordered with the Ottoman Empire were
organised as a separate Military Border territory (the Croatian expression was ‘Vojna
krajina’ or even ‘Krajina’). The population was attracted to settle into this dangerous
region by several privileges. In return they had, as border-men, the duty to defend the
Military Border. Over the centuries the Military Border society functioned according to
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military needs. It was diﬀerent to the neighbouring Croatian feudal regions; armed
defence was a major criterion of social organisation and this gave its inhabitants a very
special identity. Only after the dissolution of the Military Border system and after the
reuniﬁcation of the Military Border with Croatia in 1881 did these diﬀerences began to
disappear. About the history of the Military Border and its society, see especially Kaser
(1997). The population of the Military Border had a diﬀerent confessional (orthodox and
catholic) as well as ethnic background. But the orthodox and catholic border-men were
uniﬁed in the same social structure for centuries. At the end of the nineteenth century
after the dissolution of the Military Border these diﬀerent backgrounds began to be trans-
formed into national self-deﬁnitions. Compare in this context Promitzer (1998).
14 Compare the reﬂections in the context of symbolic systems by Bausinger (1990) and the
concepts of Erdheim (1992: 201–270).
15 With respect to the modernisation of patriarchal structures in former Yugoslavia in the
period after the Second World War see especially the works of Joel Halpern, e.g. Halpern
(1967, 1980).
16 For the connection between the state and actors level in ethnic conﬂicts, see Elwert and
Gosztonyi (forthcoming).
17 The confrontational agitation of the political entrepreneurs (Babic, Martic) may have
already started after agreements with the leadership of JNA. At this point one may ask if
the JNA was acting according to ‘instructions’, possibly from Milosevic. It can only be
speculated if the leaders in Krajina only realised the possibility of the situation escalating
and took advantage of it, or if the conﬂict was stirred up after agreement on plans devel-
oped in Belgrade.
18 For the media war, see the published round table discussions of Croatian and Serbian intel-
lectuals in Zagreb in 1993 during the war in Erasmus (1994). See also the contributions
on the ‘war of the media’ in Popov (1996). 
19 The news magazine Proﬁl (1990) describes the atmosphere of the situation at the end of
September–beginning of October: ‘During Friday night Serbs in diﬀerent villages of
Croatia attacked police stations to arm themselves. In the following hours Croatian special
police forces tried to collect the arms in the police stations to prevent them from being
taken by militant Serbs. Protests in Petrinja, Glina and Dvor na Uni were quashed by
heavily armed Croatian police forces with tear-gas and truncheons . . . After two police-
men were hurt on Wednesday, 100,000 Croats demonstrated in the streets of Split,
screaming: “give us weapons”.’
20 See here also the detailed report of the Croatian Defence Minister of 1990–91: Spegelj
(1999) and Tus (1999). For the point of view of the JNA command, see the memoirs of
the Yugoslav defence minister of 1991 Kadijevic (1993).
21 The territorial defence forces (Teritorijalna odbrana –TO), a people’s militia in reserve, were,
along with the police forces, under the command of the individual republics of Yugoslavia.
However, they were mostly disarmed during a broad action of the JNA in May 1990.
22 Nationality was of course very important in the recruitment of soldiers in the very begin-
ning of this process. That the Croatian military forces were very much based on party
membership was later openly declared in an interview by Spegelj, the former Minister of
Defence. To give an example, during the establishment of military forces in Slavonia,
about 40 per cent were members of HDZ, 30 per cent members of other Croatian parties
and another 30 per cent did not belong to any party (Promitzer 1991: 20). After the HDZ
assumed power, it was very diﬃcult, if not to say impossible, for police forces of Serbian
ethnicity to start a career; some policemen of Serb ethnicity were dismissed from their
duties. In communist times, belonging to the Serb ethnic group had on the contrary been
a decidedly signiﬁcant advantage.
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23 See the political memoirs of the last Serbian and the last Croatian president of the
Yugoslav state presidium of that year; both were at that time directly involved (Jovic 1995;
Mesic 1992). At that time, international pressure was exerted on Kadijevic to refrain from
the use of violence (Kadijevic 1993). 
24 This was described in detail by the then Milosevic protégé and at that time Serbian repre-
sentative on the Yugoslav State committee, Borisav Jovic, in a TV interview in the docu-
mentary ‘Bruderkrieg’ (BBC/ORF-TV 1996).
25 This happened on the basis of a referendum which was organised by the SDS in the second
half of August. This referendum was held in Croatian communities with a Serbian major-
ity and in those districts with a signiﬁcant Serbian population share. It was announced
that 560,000 voted for Serbian autonomy, while only 144 voted against it. At the same
time the Serbian population was asked to resist in all ways the ‘Terror of the Ustasha-like
administrations’ (Archiv der Gegenwart 1990: 35182).
26 On 21 December 1990 the new Croatian constitution was agreed in the Croatian Sabor.
In it, the resignation of Croatia from the Yugoslav Federation and the announcement of
independence were to be proclaimed, as soon as two-thirds of its members approved and
a majority of voters in Croatia agreed to this action in a referendum.
27 During the escalation of war in July 1991, a detailed map of the towns and villages in
which ﬁghting took place was created by the Serbian opposition weekly magazine Vreme.
Compiled by a military expert, it encompassed a detailed list of armed forces which were
engaged in the ﬁghting in Croatia (Vreme 1991: 4–5). Another detailed military expert
estimate of the number of troops mobilised against each other can be found in Danas
(1991b: 18–19).
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2Non-existent states with
strange institutions
Kristóf Gosztonyi
Introduction
T   Republic of Herceg-Bosna is an especially opaquephenomenon even taking into account the usual obscurity of Bosnianevents. As ﬁghting erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian Forces under
the command of the Herceg-Bosna authorities fought together with the ﬂedgling
troops of the Bosnian government against the Serb aggression. Rivalries between
Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, which seemed to have been present from the begin-
ning of their alliance (Halilovic 1997), led to increasingly violent clashes in
January 1993 and to full-scale war four months later. At the height of this war
(28August 1993) the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna transformed itself into
a Republic and declared its independence. Military losses and international pres-
sure compelled Franjo Tudjman, the President of the Republic of Croatia, to pres-
sure Bosnian Croats to sign a peace agreement with the Bosnian central
government in the spring of 1994, the so-called ‘Washington Agreement’. 
Until the signing of the Washington Agreement, Herceg-Bosna was a
‘normal’ secessionist pseudo-state with a dubious and authoritarian leader, Mate
Boban, a more or less eﬃcient and hierarchical wartime administration, and an
increasingly centralised military corps (the HVO). In the course of the peace
talks, Mate Boban was forced to resign and Krezimir Zubak, a previously
unknown politician, took his place.
At the time of commencing ﬁeldwork in February 1996, the impression
gained from discussions diﬀered strongly from the one-man-dominated para-
state which had been described previously. Herceg-Bosna, though always a dis-
puted and dubious political unit, seemed to be an obscure and undeﬁned entity
which gained a clear shape only if nationalist issues were touched upon. If asked
about power holders, the names of politicians, military leaders and criminals
were mentioned repeatedly, but none of them seemed to be anything other than
second- or third-rank as far as political power was concerned.
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So what happened? How was this amorphous and decidedly nationalistic
political monster created? It may be argued that a general lesson can be learned
from the Herceg-Bosna case.
Hypothesis
The major problem of Herceg-Bosna is that to the outside world it says that it is
not a state, but it actually acts like a state and says it is to its population. This line
of thought leads to an examination of the interaction of an outside agency (the
international community) with the local political structures. 
The impact of changes induced by the simple interaction between a hege-
monic external agency and local structures can be extremely far-reaching. A
total transformation of political systems can result. Usually an increase in cen-
tralisation and bureaucratic control is expected as a consequence of this devel-
opment. This phenomenon has been repeatedly observed by scholars and is part
of the common- sense knowledge of social sciences (Bierschenk 1984; Evers and
Schiel 1988; Spittler 1981; Sigrist 1979, etc.).
These external interventions have been characterised by an authoritarian
and undemocratic mindset. The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of a new,
‘soft’ type of intervention, based on democratic principles and an aversion to
overt engagement. International engagement still has unintended eﬀects.
However, under certain circumstances, recent interventions seem to eﬀect a dec-
entralisation of power and responsibility rather than its centralisation. Herceg-
Bosna is such a case. 
Modern (peacekeeping) interventions take place in a political universe, the
determining factors of which are: (a) traditional ‘Realpolitik’, (b) democratic prin-
ciples, (c) human rights and (d) an aversion to overt engagement owing to
domestic political concerns. 
It may be argued that under such circumstances a diﬀusion of power can
take place in the political entity under pressure. This is what happened in Herceg-
Bosna. Four conditions seem to contribute to such a diﬀusion of power owing to
outside pressure:
• A relatively restrained foreign intervention.
• A tendency on the side of the interveners to address pre-existing political
structures (instead of appointing new ones) or to accept new political struc-
tures legitimised by ‘democratic’ elections.
• A willingness on the side of the interveners to hold the representatives of the
local political structures responsible for certain policy failures and human
rights abuses. 
• A strong identity and a common sentiment among the recipients of the
foreign intervention that the aims of the intervention are not just.
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If the above conditions are present, the diﬀusion of power and responsibility
takes place as an eﬀect of the following four mechanisms:
• The appointment of weak leaders (this strategy is conscious and rational on
the level of group interests).
• The conscious dismantling of personal power by some politicians.
• The loss of legitimacy of politicians who bow to external pressure.
• The conscious creation of an institutional ‘jungle’ in order to diﬀuse respon-
sibility.
The historical genesis of Herceg-Bosna will be brieﬂy described ﬁrst, and
subsequently, its current amorphous condition will be treated in detail.
Herceg-Bosna: a normal separatist state
The ﬁrst free elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990 resulted in a clear victory
for the ethnic parties. The distribution of the votes between the national parties
is almost identical to the national distribution of Bosnia-Herzegovina: 43 per
cent Muslims, 31 per cent Serbs, 17 per cent Croats and 6 per cent Other (most
of whom described themselves as being Yugoslavs).
When war broke out in 1992 the three leading national parties took over the
state and organised the spontaneously forming defence groups into a structured
military system. For the Croats the leading national party was the Croatian
Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HDZ BiH – a party closely
connected to the ruling Croatian party, the HDZ. 
Extremist forces within the HDZ BiH linked up and were supported by extre-
mist groupings in Croatia planning to establish a Greater Croatia through the
annexation of parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result of this hard-line conspir-
acy within the HDZ, the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZ HB) was
founded on 18 November 1991. The aim of the HZ HB was to protect the inter-
ests and historical territories of all Croat people, though it still claimed to be com-
mitted to a uniﬁed Bosnia-Herzegovina. The founding document already listed
the regions of which it claimed to be composed and mentioned the town Mostar
as its seat (Narodni List HZ Herceg-Bosna 1991).
The president of the newly founded HZ HB was Mate Boban. Soon after-
wards, in February 1992, in a coup-style takeover Boban also became the presi-
dent of the HDZ BiH and begin the cleansing of the party of liberal, pro-Bosnian
elements. This coup thus marked a change in Bosnian–Croat policies concerning
their Bosniak allies. Another signiﬁcant event in this respect was the assassina-
tion of Bla Kraljevic, the leader of the paramilitary organisation the HOS
(Hrvatske ombrambene snage – Croatian Defence Forces). He was killed in the
summer of 1992 near Mostar and his organisation was disbanded following this.
What was remarkable about the murder is that Kraljevic and the HOS, a military
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group of the extreme right, supported the continued alliance of Croats and
Bosniaks against the Serbs. 
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant clashes between the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) and the
Bosniak-dominated Bosnian government forces (ARBiH) erupted in Central
Bosnia in the beginning of 1993 and were followed by a counter-oﬀensive of the
ARBiH somewhat later. The heavily outnumbered Croats suﬀered heavy losses.
Throughout these skirmishes the situation around Mostar and in
Herzegovina remained relatively calm. Nominally the HVO and ARBiH were still
allies in this region. This changed on 9 May 1993 when the HVO launched a full-
scale, but not very successful attack on the mainly Bosniak-dominated east side
of Mostar. 
A nine-month-long bloody war ensued between the former allies. During
this war even those areas which until then had escaped such atrocities were eth-
nically cleansed. The result was three, nationally homogeneous regions – one
Serb, one Croat and one Bosniak. At the height of this war, 28 August 1993, the
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was transformed into the Croat Republic
of Herceg-Bosna and its independence was declared. Croatia reacted positively. 
For the rest of 1993 the Croats continued to suﬀer heavy losses especially in
Central Bosnia, where the previously numerous Croats were now surrounded in
a few embattled enclaves. Additionally foreign and domestic Croatian pressure
was increasing on President Tudjman to change his policies towards Mate Boban
and Herceg-Bosna. In February 1994 Mate Boban was forced to resign. His place
was taken by ‘an anonymous politician, Kresimir Zubak’ (BOSNET 4 March
1994).
Still in February a ceaseﬁre was brokered between Bosniaks and Croats and
on 1 March 1994 the Washington Agreement was signed. The Agreement envis-
aged the foundation of a Federation based on Swiss-style cantons (four Bosniak,
two Croat, two Mixed and a special Sarajevo district). The Federation would even-
tually join in a confederation with Croatia. ‘Zubak said after taking oﬃce that a
confederation with Moslems was “possible, even desirable”’ (BOSNET 4 March
1994).
This marks the beginning of intense international involvement in the
Bosnian War and also of the amorphous state of Herceg-Bosna. Before address-
ing this topic, however, the political structures of Herceg-Bosna prior to the
diﬀusion of political authority in this entity will be examined.
Political structures in Herceg-Bosna until the end of the war
In the period until the fall of Mate Boban, Herceg-Bosna was a normal separatist
state emerging from the chaos of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.
Herceg-Bosna had, it seems, a functioning party apparatus and at its head an
authoritarian leader, Boban.To demonstrate the diﬀerence between the emerging
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political authority and organisation (until February 1994) and the later state of
‘disbanded’ political control in Herceg-Bosna, two aspects of para-state politics
have to be examined. First, the increasing uniﬁcation and bureaucratisation of
control over spontaneously formed military defence units and secondly, the polit-
ical leadership and the relation of Herceg-Bosna to Croatia.
Uniﬁcation and bureaucratic control of paramilitary units 
Paramilitary units already began to be formed at the end of the 1980s as tensions
between the federal partners of the Yugoslav state were increasing. In the initial
period of the war, the military landscape was truly confusing. A report of the
Hague War Crimes Tribunal summarises the situation accurately:
The Croatian Defence Council forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are supported by the
Croatian Army, local Croatian police, volunteer civilians and ‘special forces’ like
the military wing of the Croatian Party of Rights (named after the former Ustashas
of the Second World War, who also fought against the Serbs in the Krajina area).
Other Croatian armed civilian forces operate essentially in local areas. (Report of the
Hague War Crimes Tribunal: The military structure of the warring factions and the
strategies and tactics they employ 1995) 
In this initial phase of the war, there were still no eﬃcient command structures;
the relationship between the diﬀerent units was not yet established. The subse-
quent evolution towards a uniﬁed command structure aﬀected the diﬀerent par-
amilitary groupings – the local Croat police, ‘special forces’ and local forces of
armed citizens – in diﬀerent ways.
Whereas the bringing together of police forces and the local militias under a
uniﬁed command structure seems to have been relatively easy, the ‘disciplining’
of the ‘special troops’ deserves particular attention. In all the theatres of war in
the former Yugoslavia a cleansing of such troops and of their individual leaders
has taken place. In Croatia it occurred towards the end of the ﬁrst war year in
1991 and the beginning of 1992. The Serb insurgent para-states (i.e. the
Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia) and the
Bosnian government all cleansed their militaries in the course of 1992 and
1993. ‘These heroes were either killed, put in jail, or disciplined’, wrote the war
reporter, Vladimir Jovanovic (1995).
However, not all ‘special troops’ suﬀered the same fate. Only ‘those paramil-
itaries disloyal to the ruling elite were caught by a wave of never solved murders’.
Cooperative special troop leaders continued to participate in the ﬁghting, and
were occasionally redeployed for ‘special tasks’ such as ethnic cleansing or to
break the ‘remnants of the democratic opposition and independent media’
(Jovanovic 1995). 
Concerning Herceg-Bosna the elimination of Bla Kraljevic, the leader of
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HOS, ﬁts into this same pattern. Other ‘special troop’ leaders, such as Mladen
Naletilic Tuta, continued to exert inﬂuence and actually became one of the most
powerful military leaders of Herceg-Bosna. Unlike Kraljevic, however, Tuta sup-
ported a split between the Croats and Bosniaks.
Thus, until the beginning of 1994, Herceg-Bosna seems to ﬁt in the general
pattern of all the warring parties. All these states increasingly began to unify
their initially loose military units under a joint command and were thereby elim-
inating troublesome, independent-minded paramilitary units and their leaders.
This process could not be completed in a short space of time and it is still ongoing.
Additionally, it was probably never intended to be a completely ﬁnished process;
semi-independent paramilitaries were a useful tool for doing the ‘dirty work’ of
ethnic cleansing and terrorising the political opposition. 
Nevertheless, it may be concluded that a movement towards the centralisa-
tion of power took place in Herceg-Bosna. If it was successful with regard to the
armed forces it can be assumed to have been even more successful concerning
other branches of the wartime administration of Herceg-Bosna. The next section
examines the political leadership in Herceg-Bosna and the relations of Herceg-
Bosna with Croatia.
Political leadership and the relations of Herceg-Bosna with Croatia 
As has been already stated, Mate Boban was a leader with authority. His steady
rise, ﬁrst to the post of the President of the Croatian Community of Herceg-
Bosna, then the President of the Bosnian HDZ and ﬁnally to the head of the self-
proclaimed Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, shows his strong ambitions. In the
course of his advance he reshaped the politics of the Bosnian Croats and of the
HDZ BiH, though he received strong support for this project from the Croatian
President, Tudjman and his Defence Minister, the Herzegovinian Gojko Susak,
who died in April 1998. 
Boban therefore must have held signiﬁcant authority and even after his
forced resignation he remained an inﬂuential ﬁgure in Herceg-Bosna until his
death in the summer of 1997. His portrait hangs in the oﬃce of the Mostar
Municipal Board of the HDZ. Without any doubt in 1992–93 he shaped Bosnian
Croat politics. President Izetbegovic bitterly accused him of wanting to establish
a ‘Bobanistan’. Clearly he also saw Boban as wielding great power. 
The actions of Boban supported Izetbegovic’s views. In the course of 1993
he participated in the Geneva talks, and met for a round of secret negotiations
with Karadjic where they attempted to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina
between Croats and Serbs. In other words, the actions of Boban indicate that he
was an authoritarian leader with real power who was also treated that way by
other politicians.
The further important question concerns the relationship of Croatia to
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Herceg-Bosna. It seems that President Tudjman had at least four instruments
available to put pressure on Boban and Herceg-Bosna: the structure of the HDZ,
personal networks through his Herzegovinian Defence Minister Gojko Susak, the
military and ﬁnancial aid Croatia was giving to Herceg-Bosna and the networks
of the Croatian secret service (SIS) and its Bosnian–Croat counterpart the HIS.
Particularly in this period the Croatian leadership viewed Herceg-Bosna as
its own territory. Even more revealing about the Croatian inﬂuence on Herceg-
Bosna in this period is the fact that facing mounting foreign and domestic pres-
sure added with the deteriorating military situation in Central Bosnia, President
Tudjman was able to force Boban to withdraw from his position as President of
Herceg-Bosna at the beginning of 1994. 
To summarise, Herceg-Bosna in the period before the beginning of 1994 was
a nationalist para-state emerging from the chaos of the dissolution of the former
Yugoslavia and later of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The disorderly, spontaneously
formed units of this new state were, however, rapidly being transformed and inte-
grated into an increasingly centralised, though never internationally recognised
state. All this occurred under the leadership of an authoritarian leader, Mate
Boban, who was able to shape the policies of the state and, it would seem, to
enforce his decisions. He was treated accordingly by foreign statesmen.
Moreover, the structures of the para-state Herceg-Bosna were being merged into
Croatian structures of power, with Croatia being able to exert signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on Herceg-Bosnian events.
The question is, therefore, how did the breakdown of power, or at least the
decentralisation of power, which is currently experienced by diplomats and
foreign statesmen trying to deal with Herceg-Bosna, occur?
Mysterious Herceg-Bosna
Kresimir Zubak, the new President of Herceg-Bosna, stated after taking oﬃce in
February 1994 ‘that a confederation with Moslems was “possible, even desir-
able”’ (BOSNET 4 March 1994).
There was, however, little movement towards the implementation of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The superstructure of the Federation was
established but it remained without any eﬀective power and without any institu-
tions on the ground. No steps were made either towards the dismantling of
Herceg-Bosna, ‘a direct negation of the idea of the Federation’. Cooperation
between Bosniaks and Croats was reduced to occasional joint military actions
against the Serbs.
Some movement came with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on
10–11 November 1995. The Dayton Agreement on Implementing the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November 1995 conﬁrmed the abolition of Herceg-
Bosna and set deadlines for the establishing of the cantons as agreed in the
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Washington Agreement. The dismantling of Herceg-Bosna was a complicated
process of transferring the competencies of the para-state to the Federation
and/or to the cantons.
Under the Dayton Agreement, Herceg-Bosna was to disappear within two
weeks of the signing of the Agreement. But Herceg-Bosna was not dismantled.
Croat oﬃcials referred to the fact that the institutions of the Federation were not
yet functioning. A transfer of competencies would thus leave Croat areas in an
administrative vacuum. Facing mounting international pressure various dis-
tracting and confusing steps were taken and some competencies were formally
transferred to new ministries or cantons. 
Finally, ‘Kresimir Zubak, the former President of the Muslim–Croat Federa-
tion and a Croat member of the three-man Bosnian presidency [announced] that
the Bosnian Croat para-state of Herceg-Bosna ceased to exist on 17 December,
the same day that the Bosnian republican government transferred its functions
to the federation’ (Sito Sucic 20 December 1996). A little over one month later,
on 27 January 1997, representatives of all Bosnian Croat associations met to set
up a new Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna. The new community replaced the
banned para-state of the same name (Sito Sucic, 28 January 1997). Obviously
Herceg-Bosna had not ceased to exist.
Since 1997 further signiﬁcant improvements have taken place, and cantons
have been established. The establishing of the ethnically pure Croat cantons
posed no problems. The establishing of the two mixed cantons, however, proved
to be more diﬃcult. In order to meet the Dayton Agreement deadlines all canto-
nal assemblies did hold meetings, though not very productive ones. Whole can-
tonal sessions could be spent with the discussion of such interesting topics as to
what the ﬂag of the canton should be. Unfortunately the mixed cantons may
prove as powerless as the Federation as a whole. 
While a number of joint institutions – among others a joint police force –
have been established, and one can see signs of increasingly coordinated joint
action, in practice they still function as separate institutions. Thus, in a joint
Federal Ministry the Croat head would give instructions to the Croat oﬃcials and
the Bosniak head to the Bosniak oﬃcials.
As of 1999, the institutions of the Federation still did not function satisfac-
torily. The top-to-bottom strategy of establishing common institutions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is not a success. The orders of these institutions, which can be
established only under signiﬁcant international pressure, are not carried out.
The blockade occurs on the one hand on an institutional level, e.g. the re-
establishment of Herceg-Bosna, and on the other hand by individual level actors
like policemen, administrative clerks, etc. who refuse to carry out the instruc-
tions issued by institutions which they do not consider legitimate. 
Even though progress has been made in implementing the Federation, the
general picture is still one of two separate para-states. The joint Croat–Bosniak
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institutions of the Federation wield little authority. But do the Herceg-Bosnian
authorities hold power? Naturally, Herceg-Bosnian authorities are more power-
ful than any of the Federal institutions, but there is no centralised power or
responsibility which would be usual for modern states.
However, the following indicators show the lack of coherent command
structures, which are then discussed in greater detail:
• There is no strongly coordinated strategic action. Herceg-Bosna politics are
mostly only able to act reactively, or to act in order to achieve simple objec-
tives.
• The occasional total breakdown of hierarchical structures.
• An unconscious recognition of the loose command structures by the inter-
national community, as their representatives go to negotiate at a municipal
levels.
Lack of strategic action
In addition to the usual political divisions within a party (e.g. hard-liners versus
moderates) which usually appear at all levels of the party as vertical splits, and
regional divisions, which are also quite frequent in most political organisations,
in Herceg-Bosna a very strong division or chasm in a hierarchical sense may also
be found. The leadership is frequently simply unable to impose its decisions on the
hierarchically subordinate units. 
A comparison with the Bosniaks is revealing. In the summer of 1997 the
Oﬃce of the High Representative of the UN to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR),
the main international organisation tasked with the implementation of the
Dayton Agreement, increased its pressure on the Bosniak East-Mostarian leader-
ship to evict some 150 Bosniak families from Croat houses near the former con-
frontation zone, but within ARBiH-held territory, the Bosniak leadership
conceded. They had committed themselves to vacating the area in an interna-
tionally brokered agreement a few months earlier. Evacuating the 150 families
was very unpopular among the population, but the leadership nevertheless went
ahead with the project and succeeded. In the general scheme of Mostar politics,
the Bosniak side appeared once again suﬃciently cooperative, while the Croats
remained the ‘bad guys’. Compared with the Bosniak structures, the Croat side
was unable to sacriﬁce short-term nationalist goals or achievements in order to
gain longer-term political beneﬁts.
Breakdown of hierarchic structures
An example of the breakdown of hierarchic structures occurred in early October
1998, when Bosniaks attempted a return to the strategically crucial village of
Tasovcici. The reason for Tasovcici’s strategic importance lies in its location on
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the major road leading from the Croatian Coast to Mostar. Additionally, there is
a bridge of similar military importance spanning the Neretva. Immediately after
the return took place, tensions ﬂared and two days later the returnees were
attacked with hand-grenades by a Croat mob after a demonstration organised by
the Mayor of the Municipality. The attacks left one Bosniak dead and several
wounded and increased international political pressure on the Croat side tre-
mendously. 
Probably because of the expected negative repercussions for the cause of
Herceg-Bosna, a number of high-level Bosnian Croat politicians went to see Sir
Martin Garrod, the Head of the Southern Oﬃce of OHR, in order, basically, to beg
him to remove the Bosniak returnees from Tasovcici. They said they feared incal-
culable consequences if the returnees stayed. While they were still in discussions
with Sir Martin, the ﬁrst reports about the attacks on the returnees arrived. In
the following days, the Croat Interior Minister of the Canton, who was one of the
delegation asking Sir Martin to remove the returnees, completely lost control
over the police administration of the municipality responsible for Tasovcici. The
police there openly deﬁed his instructions which were aimed at a de-escalation of
the situation. 
Recognition of loose command structures by the international community
Even though most international oﬃcials believed there was a clandestine and
tightly organised hierarchy in Herceg-Bosna, when faced with a political
problem in a certain Croat-controlled area, they usually try negotiating with all
levels of decision making. Thus they approached the Croatian President, Franjo
Tudjman, they held discussions with the Bosnian Croat leaders, i.e. Kresimir
Zubak and later Ante Jelavic, as well as with cantonal and usually also munici-
pal (!) heads. If there was a tight hierarchy within Herceg-Bosna, there would
have been no need for high-level international representatives, such as, for
example, the OHR Deputy High Representative Hanns Schumacher, to negotiate
with the Mayor of the Croat-dominated Municipality of Stolac concerning the
return of Bosniaks in the spring of 1997. The fact that high-level international
oﬃcials repeatedly negotiated with mayors of municipalities reveals that they
‘unconsciously’ realised the true power of such low-level politicians within
Herceg-Bosna.
Institutional anarchy
It is very diﬃcult to show the partial absence of power in Herceg-Bosna, which
has been hypothesised here. It is diﬃcult to show the decentralisation and disin-
tegration of power owing to the confusing presence of an administrative and
party hierarchy which has created the impression of an organised political entity.
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To a certain extent Herceg-Bosna does present a normal picture – roads are built,
business permits are issued, etc. Other aspects of a functioning state are,
however, absent.
Another diﬃculty in proving the absence of centralised power is the possibil-
ity that an unknown strong man or a grouping of power holders might control
events from behind the scenes – a conspiracy theory. Additionally, the politics of
the region are full of lies, deceit and confusion.
Owing to these diﬃculties and a general lack of information the evidence
presented here is sketchy and is drawn from a variety of sources. Furthermore, a
major part of the argument is based on indirect evidence. Conﬂicts of interest
between certain groupings or individuals who are suspected of having determi-
nate power or authority may reveal hidden structures. 
It is important to clarify what is meant by a ‘lack of power’. It is clear that no
social system has an unambiguously hierarchical and centralised power struc-
ture. What will be shown here is that a number of individuals and groupings can
be found which all hold certain powers in Herceg-Bosna. The relative status of
these actors, regarding the amount of inﬂuence and authority they wield, is that
of more or less equals, it is anarchy within an oligarchy.
Several diﬀerent social actors, in the widest sense of the word, are usually
suspected of wielding or having wielded power in Herceg-Bosna, namely: 
• the state of Herceg-Bosna, or in other words the administrative organisation
of that state; 
• the HDZ;
• Croatia, i.e. Franjo Tudjman or Gojko Susak, the now deceased Croatian
Defence Minister; 
• criminals like Mladen Naletilic Tuta;
• the general population.
However, on several occasions all them have been proven incapable of
imposing their will on the other power factors. Decision making frequently tends
to become collective, carried out by bodies of the Assemblies of Municipal
Boards of the HDZ. Finally, a number of power holding actors (organised crime,
municipal boards of the HDZ, the general population, etc.) have the capability to
block certain political developments. This capability can function as an eﬀective
veto.
The question is, then, how did this decentralisation of power occur? The phe-
nomena of power decentralisation described above need to be connected to the
actions of the international community. In this concluding section, an attempt
is made to show how the international intervention caused the decentralisation
of power in the region.
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The international community
It has been shown that in the course of its historical evolution, Herceg-Bosna,
emerging from the total chaos of the initial phase of the Bosnian war, entered a
stage of increasing centralisation of power. This occurred from the beginning of
1992 until the end of 1993 under the leadership of Mate Boban. 
Following the signing of the Washington Agreement, a change in the lead-
ership of Herceg-Bosna took place. This period of Herceg-Bosnian history was
characterised by a decentralisation of power and decision making, though its
main nationalist goals remained untouched. It was also argued that modern
international pressure is eﬀective, though its eﬀects are often not immediately
obvious. Usually they manifest themselves only with a certain time lag.
The dissolution of power in Herceg-Bosna occurred as an unintended result
of international pressure. However, this is not easy to establish as the kind of
social mechanisms which are supposed to be operative in the process of power
decentralisation are diﬃcult to describe. The conditions for a Herceg-Bosna style
dissolution of power, as discussed already, are outlined below:
• Owing to a relatively restrained international intervention (the unwilling-
ness to suﬀer losses, etc.) the main instruments of enforcement are positive
and negative economic sanctions. Military threats or sanctions are rare.
• The willingness on the side of the interveners to address pre-existing politi-
cal structures (instead of appointing new ones) or to accept new political
structures legitimised by ‘democratic’ elections.
• The willingness on the side of the interveners to hold the representatives of
the local political structures personally responsible for certain policy failures
and human rights abuses. With regard to this aspect of the international
intervention, the main instrument available to the international commu-
nity has been the Hague War Crimes Tribunal and more generally the United
Nations (UN).
• A strong identity and a common sentiment among the recipients of the
foreign intervention that the aims of the intervention are not just.
How did Croat and local Herceg-Bosnian politicians react to the approach of
the international community as described in the ﬁrst three conditions, given the
strong common identity in the region as referred to in the fourth? The following
mechanisms were suggested in the introduction:
• the appointment of weak leaders (this strategy is conscious and rational at
the level of group interests);
• the conscious blurring of the chain of command or even dismantlement of
personal power by some politicians;
• the loss of legitimacy of politicians who bowed to external pressure;
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• the conscious creation of an institutional ‘jungle’ in order to diﬀuse respon-
sibility.
The reality of these social mechanisms as a response to international pres-
sure can only be surmised, because these strategies are formed on the basis of
considerations not explicitly formulated. It would be naive to expect politicians to
acknowledge having concealed their channels of authority or even that they
consciously dismantled their personal power. Therefore, the diﬀerent mecha-
nisms proposed above as being a response to international intervention and as
contributing to the current state of the dissolution of eﬀective power, are elab-
orated upon through relevant examples. 
Appointment of weak leaders
Two Croat leaders, Kresimir Zubak, the ﬁrst President of the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Mijo Brajkovic, the former Mayor of West Mostar, seem to
fall into this category. Both were previously relatively unknown and both had a
reputation for being moderate. It seems that neither of them was usually capable
of enforcing agreements made with the representatives of international institu-
tions. Weak political leaders often ﬁnd themselves caught in a rather uncomfort-
able situation: on the one hand they are pressured by the international
community, and on the other by their own national hard-liners.
Obscuring command structures and dismantling personal power
The Hague War Crimes Tribunal wrote the following concerning the blurring
of command structures, particularly with regard to the unclear hierarchical
relationship between diﬀerent military units and between certain units and the
national leadership: ‘such a structure and the strategies and tactics employed
help to blur the chain of command and conceal responsibility. This concealment
may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible
deniability.’
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Oﬃcers who served in the area during the Bosniak–Croat War soon after the
establishing of the Hague War Crimes Tribunal, the Mayor of the west
Herzegovinian town of Capljina began to refer international oﬃcials to his
Deputy, Krunoslav Kordic when approached about the concentration camp for
Bosniaks. Markovic claimed he was not responsible.
The reaction was the severance of formal chains of command to Bosnian
Croats and a switch to an increasingly clandestine manipulation of Herceg-
Bosnian politics. It is diﬃcult to imagine that the dismantling of oﬃcial channels
of authority would not also result in a consequent loss of power. 
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A similar concealing, blurring and conscious dissolution of organised
command can be suspected as having taken place at all levels of politics. However,
the observation that decision makers do occasionally conceal authority, even at
the cost of eﬀectively dismantling the chain of command, can be accepted as valid
for the situation with which Herceg-Bosna is currently confronted.
Loss of legitimacy for ‘compromisers’
If leaders were strong prior to their contact with international actors, their com-
promising attitude would probably make them weak. A ‘compromising’ attitude
means here a tendency to give in to pressure from international actors. The loss
of power for such a ‘compromiser’ would probably happen gradually.
Increasingly their subordinates would refuse to execute orders which they con-
sidered unjustiﬁed or harmful to national goals. 
In a number of instances Herceg-Bosnian Croat police refused to execute the
orders of Croat politicians, for example participating in Joint Police Patrols with
Bosniaks in Mostar or prosecuting the individuals who evicted non-Croats from
West Mostar (i.e. the Croat part of the town). The case of Ivan Prskalo, the Mayor
of Mostar, provides another example. With regard to the expulsions ‘Prskalo
assured the city council during its December 14 session that these criminal acts
[i.e. the expulsions of non-Croats from their apartments in West Mostar] would
cease. The next day the expulsions continued’ (BOSNET 1997). 
By the same token, weak leaders can be forced to adopt more nationalist atti-
tudes. Brajkovic, the former Mayor of West Mostar was originally regarded as a
moderate. After he called for the infamous ‘peaceful’ demonstration against the
European Union Administrator of Mostar, Hans Koschnick which, some foreign
diplomats say, he could not avoid, he completely lost all credibility in the eyes of
international actors. He is now generally known as a Croat hard-liner. He had
nothing more to lose with regard to the international community.
Conscious creation of an institutional ‘jungle’
This is the mechanism for which it is most diﬃcult to provide ‘hard’ evidence. The
argument that a confusing set of institutions, committees and subcommittees
can easily be used by Herceg-Bosnian politicians eager to divert attention from
themselves rests on two clues and on the general plausibility of the notion.
International oﬃcials told me repeatedly in interviews that they were con-
vinced that when local politicians wanted to obstruct constructive negotiations
they often forced the foundation of a working group of ‘experts’. Such meetings
were truly frustrating and rarely came up with anything constructive. Another
hint as to the conscious use of an ‘institutional jungle’ to conceal responsibility
is even more vague. It seems that Herceg-Bosnian institutions are restructured
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and their personnel changed with a confusing frequency. The names of certain
functionaries turn up again and again in diﬀerent positions.
It has to be noted, however, that the presence of such a highly complex insti-
tutional structure as prescribed in the Dayton Agreement, combined with the
institutional reality of Herceg-Bosna is in itself suﬃcient to completely blur com-
petence.
In summary, the above mechanisms of avoiding compromise when faced
with international pressure can only be successful given the current form of
restrained international intervention and by the presence of a strong common
identity in Herceg-Bosna. The restrained character of international intervention
is important in opening up the avenues of local resistance mentioned above,
because its sanctions are relatively ‘soft’, and it shows little commitment to com-
pletely purging the Herceg-Bosnian political elite and replacing it with one more
acceptable to international actors. The problems of such a relatively weak
approach were already apparent to Holbrooke during the negotiations.
Accordingly he pushed for a stronger mandate of international organisations
implementing the Dayton Agreement, e.g. for the International Police Task Force
to have real policing functions and not just the role of monitoring the perfor-
mance of the local police, and also for the NATO-led Implementation Force
(IFOR) to have a more robust mandate (Holbrooke 1998). 
Past interventions often did not have such constraints. Soviet occupation of
Eeastern European countries replaced the entire ruling elite of those countries
with communist cadres favourable to Soviet interests. Also US interventions in
South America, for example, did not have many constraints. Economic pressure
was frequently supplemented with all kinds of subversive US activities. With
ruthless strategies interveners thus either created their own elite or gave a com-
promising, opportunistic new elite such powers that it could stabilise its position
regardless of public acceptance.
Given the current restrained interventions on the one hand, and a strong
identity and a common rejection of the aims of the intervention by the popula-
tion being subjected to the intervention on the other, the Herceg-Bosnian style of
resistance can be surprisingly eﬀective. The reason for the success of resistance
in areas with strong common identities when faced with a restrained interven-
tion lies in the social sanctioning of potential collaborators. This way opportu-
nistic elites, who would be willing to accept the resources of the foreign
interveners to build up their own power base, are discouraged. This discourag-
ment can take the form of ‘shaming’ collaborators, boycotting cooperation with
them or can even include violent sanctions against them.
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3A neglected dimension of conﬂict:
the Albanian maﬁa
Xavier Raufer
The Albanian maﬁa: a real maﬁa at the heart of the Balkans?
A   of 1999, the Kosovo daily newspaper Koha Ditore decided tobreak the law of silence: ‘Drugs are ﬂowing into Kosovo where we are wit-nessing the birth of a powerful maﬁa network’, the province is gradually
becoming ‘a Colombia at the heart of Europe’ (Koha Ditore 23 December 1999).
On 10 March 2000 the special UN human rights investigator returned from a
ten-day tour of the Balkans. What Jiri Dienstbier said is, if possible, even clearer:
‘Kosovo is in chaos’, the province has become ‘a maﬁa paradise’ (RFE/RL
Newsline 21 March 2000).
This is not the ﬁrst time that the term ‘maﬁa’ has served to describe organ-
ised crime at work throughout the albanophone area in the Balkans. But this
debased word has lost so much force that now it describes any band of hoodlums.
Whereas a real maﬁa is, on the contrary, a precise, very deﬁnite criminal entity
having little in common with the ‘milieu’ of villains which is normally found
almost everywhere in the world.
The real maﬁa
A maﬁa is a permanent secret society uniting a coalition of ‘families’ bound by
blood or marriage; it is closed, endowed with elaborate hierarchies and rules from
which one deviates only at the risk of one’s life. A merciless law of silence
(omertà) is made to surround it. A gang can be joined through aﬃnity or friend-
ship; but a maﬁa may be joined only by family or clan co-option, after an initia-
tion. Maﬁas pass over but the ‘family’ endures – some have been in existence for
centuries, whereas, if its boss is dead or locked up, a gang does not survive for
long. Maﬁas recruit only on the basis of race or sex; thus, by cousinhood or clan.
Initiation into the Cosa Nostra is only for those who are Sicilian, born in Sicily
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and male. Even if they are implicit, these rules always exist in a maﬁa. Able to
resist the worst repression, a maﬁa is a state within a state with territory, sub-
jects, laws and armed forces. ‘The maﬁa family never dies out. You arrest two or
three of them but the family remains, and if there are not enough children it co-
opts even more daring men and gives them its daughters as wives’ (Bocca 1993).
The Cosa Nostra survived twenty years of fascism. The Chinese Triads have
resisted ﬁfty years of communism, ten of which were the ‘Cultural Revolution’
that claimed 30 million victims.
Is the Albanian–Kosovan–western Macedonian agglomeration a ‘maﬁa’ in
the strict sense of the word? Taking strict deﬁnitions let us see if the proven facts
in our possession conﬁrm the diagnosis or not.
A real maﬁa? The circumstances of its appearance
Several visible signs show that Albanian crime has attained a high degree of
organisation and sophistication. If this stage in itself is not enough for one to
speak of a maﬁa, discussion is none the less eminently necessary. The signs are
in the multi-criminal activity. The Albanian villains traﬃc in drugs, illegal
migrants, arms, stolen vehicles, contraband cigarettes and alcohol. They devote
themselves to pimping and burglary on a grand scale, kidnapping for ransom,
contract killings, audio and video pirating, falsifying oﬃcial documents (visas,
etc.) and laundering criminal money.
The impressive capacity to conduct highly complex transnational operations
The secret mass transfer of migrants from the Albanian coastline to nearby Italy
is anything but spontaneous and disorderly. According to a number of ﬁrst-hand
accounts – and the best Albanian and Italian experts – it is, on the contrary, a
concerted operation aimed at making Puglia a criminal outpost in the Balkans
for the European Union. At the point of departure ships are ‘requisitioned’ by dis-
ciplined, well-armed teams – not by panic-stricken, destitute hordes. Passengers
are carefully selected on the basis of future possibilities of ‘agreement’ and of
their hard currency funds; once on board, order is assured by armed criminals
who melt into thin air in sight of the Italian coast.
There are other examples of international cooperation practised by
Albanian organised crime:
• From Tirana a front company situated in Albania buys and then has deliv-
ered from the US safes, top-quality alarm and security systems. Subsequently,
expert burglars from gangs come from Europe and America to train using
these ‘demonstration’ materials.
• In the ﬁeld of burglary, specialised gangs have teams variously qualiﬁed
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depending on the diﬃculty of the target. Among them are elite elements
whose operations are accompanied by a wealth of security and protection.
Consummate protection
Even more internalised than at the disappearance of the communist regime, two-
thirds of the agents of the very paranoid Albanian GPU (the Sigurimi or Secret
Police) were sacked; a number of them soon joined the local criminal clans. These
individuals all go under the cover of pseudonyms, nicknames and false identities.
Worse still, according to their local origins, Albanian hill-dwellers speak dialects
crossed with slang which – even in the nearby valleys – their neighbours under-
stand poorly. Take these diﬃculties together (pseudonyms and dialect) and
imagine the diﬃculties for Italian or Swiss police who have to decipher the tran-
scripts produced from telephone tapping.
Reliable evidence of criminal sophistication
Michael Lauber, head of the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and until 2000
head of the Centre for Organised Crime/Crime-Analyses of the Federal Police
Oﬃce in Switzerland, has stated: ‘The Kosovars and Albanians operate in the
greatest secrecy. It is very diﬃcult to get information from them during inquiries
because they are grouped in small closed clans – almost in families comparable
to the old model of the Italian maﬁa. Besides, they are experts in the art of using
new technologies such as laptops, mobiles and the Internet’ (Le Matin-Dimanche
15 August 1999).
An oﬃcer of the Italian ROS (the elite operations section of the Italian gendar-
merie,specialisinginhigh-riskanti-maﬁaactions)hassaid: ‘TheKosovoAlbanians
are among the most dangerous drugs and arms traﬃckers. These men are deter-
mined, violent and capable of the worst. They can mobilise in a few hours a host of
men at arms and have at their disposal enormous amounts of ready money.To keep
in trim they burgle homes and businesses every night while constantly being on the
move from one part of Lombardy to another’ (Corriere della Sera15 October 1998).
These facts and testimony reveal a high level of criminal professionalism,
but this still does not allow us to speak of a maﬁa in the strict sense. Two decisive
elements are lacking.
A clan society: Kanun, honour and vendetta
In Albania, and even more so in the mountainous north of the country, there
survives in an almost chemically pure form (owing to the constant isolation of
the country throughout the twentieth century) a traditional Mediterranean clan
society, respectful of ancestral traditions of honour and vengeance. For most of
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the maﬁas these rules and laws are implicit, passed down by word of mouth. But
in Albania the code of honour or Kanun is written down and the brochure that
contains it is on sale in newspaper kiosks.
Complex organisation, iron discipline
Up to this point all the elements which would allow us to qualify a sophisticated
trans-national criminal organisation as a maﬁa have been listed. Only one,
deciding factor is lacking, which in itself allows us to conﬁrm or disqualify the
maﬁa claim: the mode of organisation. For, in Corsica for example, a clan society
and a very active criminal scene have produced – for the lack of an appropriate
organisational model or the will to apply one – only a circle (milieu) rather than
a maﬁa.
Starting at the base of the pyramid, among Albanian criminals the basic cell
is a team of four to ten men from the same clan and the same village, often from
the same biological family. Specialising in a distinct kind of criminal activity
(pimping, burglary, various types of traﬃcking, etc.) and most often very ‘pro-
fessional’, the team obeys a boss blindly. Several teams operate on a territory, in
a given sector. In emigration, coordinating the activity of the basic cells is done
by a ‘liaison coordination oﬃcer’ who operates most often under the cover of a
cultural or folkloric activity. Throughout Europe the police diagnosis is the same:
these teams live discreetly, without attracting attention; they systematically
practice countersurveillance of the forces of order. The actions they demonstrate
often have a military precision.
To ‘work’ in a cell is to belong to a distinct criminal clan; the conditions of
access to this criminal clan are strict, codiﬁed, ritualised. There is one code, the
Kanun, and one biological cadre, an extended family. There is a hierarchy in
which the ties of blood win out over those of marriage – for example, tactical
coordination among local teams is entrusted to a man who can have entered
the criminal clan only through marriage; but for strategic planning, between
branches of activity or extended geographical areas and the criminal directo-
rate situated at home, the coordinator must belong to the clan by blood and the
biological family. At the intermediate level, the second-in-command controls a
geographical area or a branch of activity. Depending on place and time, the
various elements of the criminal clan act separately or come together in a
ﬂexible and decentralised manner. At the apex is a boss, assisted by a directing
council which determines major policies and acts as arbiter in crises. Overall the
organisation is adaptable, ﬂexible and capable of evolving. With regard to tradi-
tion and the omertà, personal initiative is possible – even recommended; muta-
tions and adaptations are even better since the obedience of the troops is
assured and the scorn of the bosses for the law of the country in which they
operate is absolute.
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Finances of the Albanian maﬁa
It is hard to estimate the ‘turnover’ of one of a secret and ferocious criminal
society. Especially when the only police force which could, under the circum-
stances, be eﬀective, that of the Republic of Albania, prefers most of the time to
steer clear of such dangerous entities. We should note, however, that in the
Croatian journal National (No. 287, May 2001) the Croatian minister of the
interior, Mr Sime Lucin, estimated the fortune of one of the main Serb gangsters,
Stanko Subotic Cane, at US$ 500 million. And Cane’s main line of activity is only
traﬃcking in cigarettes, which is much less lucrative than drugs. Besides which
it is known that most of the heroin transported along the Balkans route passes
through the hands of Albanian maﬁa groups; that this traﬃc has taken oﬀ since
summer 1999 (before then only 5–10 kg of heroin was being seized; since then,
from 50 kg to nearly 1 metric tonne); and that 1 kg of ‘good’ heroin from the
Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, etc.) brings a wholesale price, in western Europe,
of US$ 80,000–100,000. This gives some idea of the scale of proﬁts made by the
Albanian maﬁa.
The deciding distinction made by Italian experts
In autumn 1999 the Italian Directorate for Anti-Maﬁa Investigations (DIA)
transmitted to its supervising authorities a conﬁdential report entitled ‘Strategic
and tactical importance of Albanian criminal organisations’. Let us recall that
the DIA brings together – for a good reason – the best experts on maﬁa phenom-
ena who have been confronted for years by the most ferocious and intractable
criminal families in the European Union. These are specialists in observation and
penetration – one might say dissection – who, moreover, have long been planted
on the criminals’ patch, in Albania itself. Nobody is better qualiﬁed than they to
diﬀerentiate between a real maﬁa and a simple criminal gang.
In a text showing a high degree of analytical subtlety the DIA experts ﬂag up
from the outset a trap which must not be fallen into – and into which the Albanian
maﬁa intends to make us fall, by urging us to confuse the disorder and chaos reign-
ing in Albania for almost a decade and the reality of the maﬁa in that country. In
fact for the DIA nothing would be more wrong than to confuse the Albanian maﬁa
with ‘the groups of looters leaving their trails throughout the country without
being disturbed, groups with no equivalent in any European country’, this ‘multi-
tude of hardened gangs operating at the local level with no link between them’
which functions ‘under a regime of reciprocal non-interference, without one
being able to pick out [among them] dominant cells, and devoting themselves to
acts of pillage pure and simple’ (DIA 1999). Gangs ‘whose fragmentation reﬂects
the social and political break-up of the [Albanian] nation’ (DIA 1999).
The Albanian maﬁa and these anarchical gangs do not mingle. Worse, these
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gangs embarrass the local maﬁas, men of order who prefer to reach agreements
with politicians in their pay and corrupt an apparently repressive police rather
than evolving among the looters who threaten their proﬁts and the peace of their
(biological or criminal) family. However, on the day when, inevitably, the
Albanian disorder is resolved, when an apparent calm reigns in Tirana, the usual
optimists will proclaim the ‘Good News’ of the death of the local maﬁa. But on
the contrary, that will be the sign that this maﬁa has ﬁnally imposed order on the
anarchic gangs who simply cause trouble prejudicial to ‘business’. 
But what do the DIA experts say about the Albanian maﬁa itself? ‘Today we
can speak of a true Albanian maﬁa in a state of permanent evolution; it is devel-
oping in a criminal context capable of making remarkable qualitative leaps . . .
The actual criminal level of the Albanian maﬁa has no equal in any country in
the Mediterranean basin, not even in Turkey’ (DIA 1999):
• The Albanian maﬁa in Italy ‘has at its disposal there a formidable network of
accomplices and supporters used to squeal on members of rival groups and
assist in assassinations’ (DIA 1999).
• Putting down international roots: ‘The Albanian [maﬁa] groups operating
abroad work in conditions of perfect criminal sophistication and territorial
integration in the states where their members have been planted (Germany,
Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland)’ (DIA 1999). There is ‘a perfect
osmosis between Albanian maﬁosi residing in Italy and those living in their
country of origin’ (DIA 1999). We should note that certain ‘globalised’
Albanian maﬁa clans are based outside the albanophone area, for example
in Turkey.
• Unity of criminal law, competition for territory: ‘Groups active in Italy
operate in competition and are often locked in a struggle with each other,
reﬂecting the cleavages which exist in Albania’ (DIA 1999).
• Centralisation of decision making: ‘Murders committed in Italy are often a
consequence of incidents which happen in Albania linked with the redistri-
bution of the Italian, and therefore European, heroin market’ (DIA 1999).
• Law of silence: ‘The very pronounced maﬁa character of the Albanian
[criminal] associations follows equally from the behaviour of its members
after an arrest. There is never, even in conﬁdence, any revealing of the fea-
tures of the group to which they belong. The response is unchanging: my
[biological] family is in danger in Albania’ (DIA 1999).
• Finance and money laundering: ‘The Albanian criminal groups show a
remarkable aptitude in the matter of ﬁnancial management and a theoreti-
cal ability to carry out recycling’ (DIA 1999).
All the characteristics are deﬁnitely there. Albanian organised crime is a
maﬁa, of the ﬁrst rank. It is also a maﬁa whose activism is growing in its primary
base in Europe, in Italy. Early in January 2000 the DIA published another report,
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this one public, intended for parliamentarians. It is entitled ‘Vitality of the Italian
maﬁa, the rise of the Albanian maﬁa’. In this study the latter is described as ‘par-
ticularly aggressive and determined’, the experts underline that it ‘has succeeded
in planting its networks and logistics in the great metropolises of northern Italy
and on the Adriatic coast’ (DIA 2000).
Kosovo, guerillas, maﬁa: causality or symbiosis?
Since the public appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) during 1996
the accusations and rumours have not ceased. The UCK is a narco-guerrilla force
ﬁnanced by heroin from the Balkans route. In an interview given to the weekly
Der Spiegel, Norbert Spinrath, president of the association of German police
oﬃcers, returning from a stay in Kosovo, declared: ‘The UCK is a criminal organ-
isation . . . the UCK sequesters, steals, loots, kidnaps, blackmails, pressurises wit-
nesses and carries out assassinations.’ In short it ‘behaves like a maﬁa’ (Der
Spiegel 15 December 1999). Shortly afterwards, Walter Kege, head of the equiv-
alent Swiss general intelligence police, aﬃrmed that they have information indi-
cating a link between drug money and the UCK. In January 1999, La Repubblica,
a heavyweight and respected daily, ran the following headline: ‘Heroin sold in
Milan ﬁnances the Kosovo Liberation Army.’ 
As early as March 1998 commissioner Olivier Gueniat, head of the
Neuchâtel criminal investigations department, warned: ‘Drugs are ﬁnancing
ethnic war’ (Le Temps 28 March 1998). He was referring to the war in Kosovo.
Conﬁrmation came in June 1998 when an international police operation out of
Italy arrested ninety villains and broke up eight networks of drugs traﬃckers of
which ‘one group of Albanians from Kosovo was smuggling arms destined for
their province which was rebelling’ (AFP 9 June 1998). In total, in that single
haul, 100 kg of heroin and cocaine was seized. The base of the networks is in
Milan where the drugs traﬃckers have as cover a vast infrastructure of cafés, res-
taurants, garages and various companies.
But even if it seemed serious to the European media the suspicion of drugs
traﬃcking hanging over the UCK – ‘drugs are ﬁnancing the guerrilla’ – does not
have much meaning insofar as it transfers onto the Balkan situation blueprints
and values peculiar to western Europe but unknown in eastern Europe, espe-
cially in the albanophone area of the Balkans.
Our, western European, society is individualist. The individual is practically
the only motor and actor in social life. Getting involved in a party, acting as a mil-
itant in a union, taking up a religion or joining an association are personal acts
relevant to the political, social or religious conscience of an individual. In the
albanophone area of the Balkans this is absolutely not the case. War, guerrilla,
clans and the like should be less compared to western European society but
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rather to, say, Lebanon during the civil war (1975–90). In the south of that
country and at that time, it was not individuals who joined Amal or Hezbollah –
in the same way as westerners join Republican or Socialist Parties – but whole
villages, families or clans. In a society of this type the individual is nothing
outside their extended family. 
Returning to the albanophone area of the Balkans the clan dimension has
always been a reality, and how it disguises itself according to circumstance
simply a masquerade to amuse the gallery. When some western Marxist–
Leninists of the 1960s idolised Enver Hoxha as a pure, tough revolutionary they
missed the point that in 1962, of ﬁfty-eight members of his Central Committee,
twenty-eight came from the same clan and eight had married among them-
selves. The Albanian Communist Party resembled a tribal coalition – it was an
aﬀair of the extended family.
The search for material proof of a signiﬁcant drugs traﬃc organised by the
UCK itself is most likely in vain. There is no hope of ﬁnding a ‘smoking gun’ here.
It may be unpalatable, but the UCK evolved in the bosom of a criminal economy,
bathing in nourishing plankton of felony. This classic division of labour was
explained by an (anonymous) American oﬃcial posted to Kosovo as thus: ‘The
Albanian maﬁa has played a key role in the rise of the UCK. The latter needed
money, smuggling routes and contacts in the Kosovan diaspora; in exchange, the
UCK gave these “patriotic” gangsters political legitimacy.’ As a result throughout
Europe, from Oslo to Prague (with Princ Dobroshi), and across to Milan (with
Agim Gashi – see below for proﬁles), maﬁa cells and networks are ﬁnancing ‘The
cause’, buying arms on behalf of the guerrillas. Even criminals in obscurity,
those without rank, cooperate. In Barcelona, it is a group called the ‘Vanguardia’,
a gang which burgles companies in the region and uses its booty to ﬁnance the
UCK.
There remains the case of the high-level (i.e. ‘political’ and ‘military’) staﬀ of
the UCK. Even though there certainly seem to be a number of clues pointing to
the assumption that they are hand in glove with the important ﬁgures in the
maﬁa it proves diﬃcult to carry out investigations among some of them, as
‘L’Humanité’ emphasises: ‘What would happen if one were to ﬁnd out that
Hashim Thaci, the man on whom the international community has staked
everything to rebuild the province, is implicated in almost all this traﬃc? It was
without doubt in order to avoid this embarrassing question that Bernard
Kouchner decided to ﬁlter out all enquiries directed against the latter.’ But in spite
of these hurdles the maﬁa connections among some of the UCK leaders are well
established, a notch above the army itself and outside of Kosovo proper, in fact
what is known allows us to speak of serious criminal involvement.
Among the sixteen Kosovar delegates to the Rambouillet conference in
February 1999 was Xhavit Haliti, presented as a member of the political bureau
of the UCK. Close to Hashim Thaci (the political head of the UCK) this man is
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inﬂuential in the Albanian diaspora in Switzerland and Germany. But this former
adviser to Enver Hoxha under the Stalinist regime is nowadays linked to the
special services and to the Tirana government, and is above all the link between
Hasim Thaci and another Thaci (or Thaqi, according to records), ﬁrst name
Menduli, one of the heads of the Albanian community in Macedonia.
All experts on the Balkan criminal scene are categorical that the Albanian
parties in Macedonia emanate directly from the local maﬁa. Several of their
leaders (Midhat Emini and Husein Haskaj) have already been convicted of arms
traﬃcking. These experts warned the French government about this in good
time, before the Rambouillet meeting. They added that leaders of these parties,
like Menduli Thaci and his colleague Abdurahman Haliti, have since 1994
directed an armed community militia forming in reality a criminal bloc bound
up with corrupt elements of the SHIK, the Albanian secret service, and the local
maﬁa. This bloc operates throughout the ‘Golden Triangle’ on perfect terms
with the heads of the UCK, thanks to the diligence of consigliere such as Xhavit
Haliti.
After Xhavit Haliti there are evidently plenty of others in the shadows. To
identify them and reveal their maﬁa connections would allow us to draw a crim-
inal web at the centre of which, unsurprisingly, the heads of the Albanian maﬁa
reign. And potentially more or less near to the centre of the web one would also
be able to identify certain Kosovar politicians or military chiefs. But this last point
is at best secondary; in the region there is no lack of candidates ready to get rich
quick.
The two ‘godfathers’ of the Albanian maﬁa
In northern Europe: Princ Dobroshi
On 23 February 1999 Princ Dobroshi, 35, was arrested in Prague by a police
special unit, the Czech equivalent of RAID. At the wheel of a BMW, the man was
parking in front of the Hotel Atrium. A little later his right-hand man, Murati
Limani, was in turn questioned at his home in Prague. In Dobroshi’s apartment
a Croatian machine-pistol, a Chinese telescopic riﬂe with a silencer, a Czech
handgun and a banknote counter (of the kind used in banking establishments)
were found. This is the usual arsenal of a drugs traﬃcker, which is exactly Princ
Dobroshi’s trade. He is a big-time drug traﬃcker and for the Norwegian police,
Dobroshi ‘controls the Scandinavian drugs market’; to be exact, the northern
path of the Balkans route (Turkey–Balkans–Czech Republic–Nordic countries).
Dobroshi has imported hundreds of kilograms, even tonnes of heroin into
Scandinavia. Arrested in Norway in 1993, Dobroshi was sentenced at the end of
1994 to fourteen years in prison for drugs traﬃcking. He escaped in January
1997 from the Ullersmo prison in Oslo after bribing a guard (who was paid FF
Xavier Raufer
70
120,000 to turn a blind eye). He got as far as Croatia where plastic surgery made
him unrecognisable. He moved to Prague in 1997.
For several months a joint operation (codenamed ‘Cage’) between Czech,
Norwegian, Danish and Swedish police targeted the Dobroshi network, forty-two
members of which were questioned up to February 1999. But when its boss was
arrested the ‘family’ quickly made it known that it would hand over the sum of
FF 4 million to whomever in the Czech Republic could set him free.
Signiﬁcantly, a note by the BIS (the Czech special services) stated that part of
the drugs money went towards buying arms for the UCK (Lidove Noviny March
1999). And when the Czechs decided to extradite Dobroshi, the Norwegian
police eventually chose to take him back to Oslo in a private plane as ‘it would be
too dangerous to transport him on a commercial ﬂight due to his close links with
the UCK’ (The Norway Post 13 April 1999). Dobroshi was returned to his cell in
Norway in August 1999.
In southern Europe: Agim Gashi
In July 1998, the special anti-maﬁa unit of the Italian carabinieri, the ROS,
launched operation ‘Africa’. It was aimed at dismantling an important Albanian
maﬁa clan traﬃcking heroin worth ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ (The
Philadelphia Inquirer 15 March 1999). In all, 124 arrests were made, most of
them Albanians, but also Italians, Germans, Tunisians, Spaniards and Turks. At
the head of the ‘family’ was Agim Gashi, 33, an Albanian from Pristina (in
Kosovo) where at the beginning of the 1990s he directed a drugs traﬃcking
network under the cover of beauty parlours and estate agencies.
In January 1992 Gashi settled in the suburbs of Milan and married an
Italian. At that time the Albanian criminal clans were active in Milan – but not
yet in drugs. Their speciality then was enslaving children who were forced into
begging, into becoming pickpockets or prostitution for paedophiles. Violent and
pitiless, the Albanian gangsters quickly imposed themselves on the low life of
Milan, and from prostitution soon moved into drugs traﬃcking. Gashi ruled over
this traﬃc. From 1995 he owned beauty parlours and perfume shops in London
and companies in Hungary, Germany and Norway. In Italy itself Gashi estab-
lished close professional links with the Ndrangheta, the Calabrian maﬁa. It was
a case of importing cargoes of drugs into Italy; his associate Avni I. Ademer, a
wholesaler specialising in trade with Turkey, every day hid tens of kilos of heroin
in his containers of nuts and cotton goods, etc.
Gashi lived the high life in a luxury villa on the outskirts of Milan, but nev-
ertheless, as a good ‘patriotic bandit’ did not forget his country. ‘When war broke
out in Kosovo’, as Carlos De Donno, commander of the carabinieri intelligence
unit, remarked, ‘Kosovar criminals planted in Italy suddenly took an interest in
arms traﬃcking. Up till then they only traﬃcked in drugs’ (The Philadelphia
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Inquirer 15 March 1999). Since then the activity in Italy of the Albanian maﬁa
and that of the overseas elements of the UCK merged, everybody lent a hand, as
telephone tapping operated by the ROS proved (Corriere Della Sera 19 January
1999). Gashi was in talks with arms dealers from Bulgaria, Romania and
Albania to buy automatic weapons, rocket launchers and grenades. In these
‘business’ transactions it should be noted that Gashi spoke Serbo-Croat.
Having been convicted and receiving a heavy sentence in Milan in March
1999, Gashi sows less fear. Which doubtless explains why, at the end of February
1999, his cousin and associate Ekrem Gashi was assassinated in Pristina; in the
purest maﬁa tradition, his Mercedes was riddled with bursts of automatic
gunﬁre.
Why was the Albanian maﬁa able to spread in Europe at this point?
Forgetting the criminal dimension
In April 1999 the ‘seventy-eight-day war’ broke out in Kosovo. A criminologist
should not expound on the political or military dimension of such a conﬂict but
should warn of the risk, if it exists, and then analyse the possible criminal con-
sequences of the conﬂict. With a mind to the future the criminologist should also
think preventively and see how best to integrate the notion of respect for the law
into the ‘speciﬁcations’ of future international operations or peacekeeping
actions.
What happened prior to the NATO military intervention in Kosovo?
In Europe (in France and Great Britain, but also in the United States) oﬃcial
experts or products of the academic world (criminologists, police, intelligence
oﬃcers, etc.) warned the coalition’s political and military leaders about the very
speciﬁc nature of the conﬂict in the Balkans, peculiarities, complex and deeply
rooted in history, which are impossible to fully expound upon here. But brieﬂy,
these experts insisted on:
• The hybrid nature of the conﬂicts in the region. These Balkan conﬂicts have
always had a military dimension, of course, but also a strong criminal
element.
• The presence in the region of authentic maﬁas – especially the Albanian
maﬁa. One degree lower, these experts did not fail to emphasise the existence
in the Balkans of powerful organised crime, which was rich and well armed.
Truth obliges us to say that no heed was taken of these warnings. Diplomats
continued to carry on their diplomacy, politicians their policy, and the military
made war. The result of this disastrous neglect of the criminal dimension of the
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conﬂict in the Balkans is that, since then, traﬃcking in drugs, stolen vehicles and
human beings has exploded in the region and from there has spread to western
Europe.
As mentioned above Interpol notes that seizures of heroin along the Balkans
Route, which were until the beginning of 1999 from 1 to 5 kg on average, have
gone since the summer of 1999 to 50 kg and sometimes even 1 metric tonne of
pure heroin per seizure! 
Preventing such catastrophes tomorrow 
What can be done to avoid international intervention fostering the spread of
criminal networks – for which Europe will pay the price for a long time? What
could be the role of the United Nations, in particular that of the UN Bureau for
the Control of Drugs and Prevention of Crime, in the domain of crisis prevention?
One must be realistic, there will be more such serious international crises in
the future, in the absence of a world order which is clear, lasting, stable and
acceptable to all. In these conditions military interventions and peacekeeping
missions will again be necessary. What can be done so that, in case of need, the
criminal dimension of a given region can be taken into account? 
In this case, clamouring for the establishment of the rule of law is not enough.
Asking for the application of the law is a rhetorical demand if one does not know
what laws are in question and what crimes are most likely to be committed – in
short, if one ignores the criminal reality of the region concerned. In fact laws and
legal procedures have, always and everywhere, one aim: to check and punish
speciﬁc crimes. As long as one has no serious idea about the nature of these crimes
one cannot speak seriously of restoring the rule of law. So what is to be done?
Civil and military oﬃcials tend to neglect the advice of experts – naturally,
put forward in secrecy – when faced with the intense media bombardment to
which they are submitted. In a time of grave crisis and serious criminal danger
the warning must therefore be strong and come from the top. The community of
nations should therefore have at its disposal a crime observatory allowing it to
carry out with authority, responsibility and independence a criminal diagnosis
of the region concerned. The mission of this observatory would be dual:
• To provide the leaders of the United Nations and the forces of order with
precise and neutral information on the criminal situation in the region con-
cerned. 
• To make sure that this information is taken into account by political and mil-
itary leaders involved in the operation.
This observatory could also appraise needs in terms of judges and precise
juridical texts, if a crime wave was to follow intervention. It is all the more impor-
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tant to have this type of ‘crime X-ray’ tool since the forces of justice are slow –
bound as they are by laws, rules and procedures – and since, on the contrary,
criminal societies are essentially opportunist and fast-moving.
Kosovo provides a clear example: since the arrival of NATO forces, from the
beginning of July 1999 at the latest, the maﬁas were at work throughout the
province. Eighteen months after the start of the NATO intervention, Kosovo and
Albania had no eﬀective reciprocal extradition agreement allowing Kosovar crim-
inals captured in Albania to be taken back to Kosovo, and to send back the former
Albanian maﬁas arrested in Kosovo, without complex juridical wrangling.
In concrete terms we can see that from the point of view of crime the inter-
national community is confronted by problems which are serious but few in
number and similar in nature. Prior to the establishment or re-establishment of
the rule of law it seems important to deﬁne a few great anti-criminal principles
of universal import and accepted by all. The anti-terrorist struggle provides a
concrete example here, great progress has been made in this area when the inter-
national community decided in its entirety that certain acts (indiscriminate
attacks, hijacking aeroplanes, massacres, etc.) were ideologically, politically and
morally unjustiﬁed and would henceforth only be considered serious crimes and
inexcusable terrorist acts. These sorts of rules must be created and approved in
the course of the struggle against organised international crime.
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4Land reforms and ethnic tensions: 
scenarios in south east Europe 
Christian Giordano
Introduction: ‘Staatsnation’ and the ‘purity myth’
B   and eastern Europe the speciﬁc combination of territory,language, creed with citizenship and/or nationality, is generally perceivedas an invariable and inviolable heritage of individual and collective ‘identi-
ties’ (Conte 1995: 138). It is a widespread belief that can be found even in the
most common aspects of everyday life. This belief reaches its political–institu-
tional achievement in the concept of Staatnation. This German term of French
origin (Pierré-Caps 1995: 56) is based on the doctrine according to which each
‘nation’ must have its own territorial State and each State must consist of one
‘nation’ only (Altermatt 1996: 53). It is not surprising that the past century has
been marked by repeated eﬀorts to make individual national territories more and
more ethnically and culturally homogeneous, especially in south east Europe
where the principle of Staatnation was applied much later than in western Europe;
that is, only after the downfall of the imperial multi-ethnic states. Connected with
this ‘logic of purity’ land reforms played a signiﬁcant role in this part of Europe.
Land reforms and ‘ethnic recomposition’
It is well known that, in very broad terms, a land reform implies a redeﬁnition of
property rights on land through State legislative acts. The deﬁnition of land
regimes are basic duties that Staatsnationen claimed from the very beginning,
almost without exception. Hence, land reform as a legislative instrument is the
cornerstone of any territorial policy that pursues the heightening of national
cohesion and unity.
In substance, land reforms in the south east European Staatsnationen was
meant to achieve the following goals:
• To carry through an ‘act of justice’ mainly by retrenching the latifundist
regime in order to apportion ‘the land to the peasants’. Land reforms were
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intended to ﬁnd a solution to the ‘social question’ which, given the speciﬁc
socio-economic situation in south east Europe (as in several other societies),
is above all an ‘agrarian question’.
• To create an economic basis for the rise or growth of a rural ‘middle class’ or
‘ﬁfth estate’ of wealthy peasants who could rapidly modernise agriculture,
which was considered indispensable to a successful industrialisation policy. 
• To ‘nationalise’ the state’s territory by ‘ethnicising’ landed property: that is,
preferably apportioning it only to the members of the ‘titular nation’.
This last point, which is generally not oﬃcially stated in land redistribution
policies, often becomes the heart of reform action (Warriner 1969: 11).
As far as south east Europe is concerned, the exigency of land reform rose
primarily as the need to resolve the ‘social question’ which in this area is more an
‘agrarian question’, as mentioned above. From the beginning of the twentieth
century onwards, the rural masses’ indebtedness and impoverishment, usury,
overpopulation and unemployment in the farmlands, emigration, an extreme
fragmentation of small and medium-sized property holding, and the persistence
of latifundia, led to further precarious living conditions in south east Europe’s
rural regions. A lame and at times entirely oﬀ-the-mark industrialisation
process, which was absolutely incapable of employing the agricultural work
force surplus, heightened an already dire critical situation. Added to this was the
international recession between the two world wars, which brought down both
agricultural produce prices and exports.
In most of Europe’s south eastern countries, these economic factors have
created a widespread atmosphere of social tension that has often broken out into
bloody revolts such as the well-known case of the Romanian farmers in the
spring of 1907 (Castellan 1994: 51). This endemic rebelliousness, reinforced by
sweeping historical events such as the Russian Revolution, summoned the
phantom of bolshevisation among the big landowners in south east European
societies. Even the more conservative classes saw the pressing need to bring
about land reform that would abate friction, protests and conﬂicts through land
redistribution. It is therefore no coincidence that major land reforms with a
liberal background were undertaken between the two world wars. The two main
goals of the reform process seemed to be an ‘equitable’ property redistribution
and agricultural modernisation. For these same reasons, some western
European observers and experts were pleased by projects which tended towards
deep socio-economic changes in the backward rural areas of Europe’s south-east
regions (Ancel 1930; Mirkovitch 1934).
However, under the inﬂuence of increasing nationalism, this attitude
changed rapidly and land distribution’s ethnicisation became the main charac-
teristic of several land reforms in this region. In this way land reforms turned into
legislative actions of a more political than socio-economic nature, which aimed
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at changing the ethnic diversity of historically mixed regions along with dis-
puted, changeable, uncertain and essentially unstable boundaries. From this
geopolitical point of view, owing to the ethnic homogenisation and recomposi-
tion processes involved, land reforms were conceived increasingly often as a
major remedy to the ‘variable geometry’ of national territories which had always
ailed Europe’s south-eastern States. Two examples clearly show the ‘ethnicisa-
tion’ of land reforms in south east Europe.
From the ‘social question’ to the ‘national question’ in Romania and
Yugoslavia: the power of ‘ethnicity’ in land reforms
Romania
Undoubtedly Romania, after the actual liberation from Ottoman dominion in
1859, was the south eastern European country that had undergone the greatest
number of land reforms. In terms of expected modernisation outcome, some of
them should be considered to be among the most advanced, on paper at least
(Roberts 1969; Hitchins 1994).
The ﬁrst reform dates back to the period directly following the uniﬁcation of
the two Principalities, which became known as the ‘Old Kingdom’, until the end
of the First World War. Since this reform concerned the expropriation of eccle-
siastical property, it was a ‘secularisation law’ regarding mainly land that had
belonged to monasteries since the Middle Ages, some of which were abroad (Holy
Sites, Mount Athos, Sinai). This landed property accounted for more than a
quarter of the country’s land expropriated in December 1863. However, the then
Prime Minister Mihail Kogalniceau, a great promoter of reforms that he deemed
essential, aimed at a broader project based on two points: the abolition of com-
pulsory labour and the establishment of private small holdings. In a country
dominated by latifundism and boyars, the land reform law, strongly supported by
Kogalniceau, caused uproar and was promulgated in August 1864 only after a
bitter political struggle, the aftermath of which even included constitutional
change. The law that came into force in 1865 released farmers from compulsory
labour and 500,000 families were able to take possession of over 2 million hec-
tares which they already farmed (Castellan 1994: 43). However, the boyars kept
one-third of the land, the best obviously (Roberts 1969: 11), and were lavishly
compensated by the State to whom the new small land owners reimbursed their
dues in thirty-ﬁve annuities. However, the expected results of the land reform
were quickly undermined, for several reasons. In the ﬁrst place, too little land was
assigned to too many candidates even though many farmers were excluded from
the redistribution and went on working in semi-serfdom on the boyars’ estates.
Secondly, a demographic increase caused devastating overpopulation in the
rural areas. Thirdly, the inheritance practice based on equally divided portions
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gave rise to alarming property fragmentation (Mitrany 1930: 161; Roberts
1969: 11; Castellan 1994: 44). Owing to these circumstances, the new land-
owners quickly ran into debt and because of the inadequate banking system of
the times were compelled to borrow from boyars, large tenants, or usurers at
exorbitant interest rates. Another strategy was to transfer the land back to the
former owners and toil again on the estates, basically as before. Either way,
researchers agree that within a few decades neo-serfdom had been established
and that in Romania around 1905 the gap between large and small property
ownership exceeded that of any other European State, including Russia
(Creanga 1914; Mitrany 1930: 63; Roberts 1964:6). As Mitrany aptly states,
Romanian rural society and economy at the beginning of the twentieth century
were a distinctive mixture of feudal serfdom and capitalism (Mitrany 1930: 80).
The farmers’ chronic discontent, which ﬂared up in recurrent uprisings culmi-
nating in 1907, is not surprising. The 1907 uprising came very close to being a
full-blown national revolution. Its traumatic eﬀect on the regnant house and the
country’s elites may be seen as a recurrent intention to sanction the new land
reform. Avowed by King Ferdinand in a famous speech to the Romanian troops
at the height of the First World War in April 1917, the new land reform was
promulgated between 1918 and 1921 (Roberts 1964: 23). This second land
reform also aimed chieﬂy at solving the country’s greatest social problem, i.e. the
age-old land question (Castellan 1994: 77). In fact, the law stated that landed
property could not be over 100 ha. Any land exceeding this, expropriated from
the big landowners through state compensation, should be redistributed on
repayment in lots of 5 and 8 ha (Mitrany 1930: 136; Castellan 1994: 77).
Consequently, 2.8 million hectares of the Old Kingdom’s territory (one-third of
it) went from the boyars to the farmers. However, Romania’s borders after the
First World War had changed considerably. In contrast to Hungary, which terri-
torially had lost the most in central and eastern Europe after the First World War,
Romania was the greatest winner. After the Treaty of Versailles in 1920,
Romania more than doubled its area and had a 70 per cent population increase.
Through this expansion, Romania had gained regions such as Transylvania, the
Banat, Bukovina and Bessarabia that were very unlike the Old Kingdom. If the
Old Kingdom had been a quite homogeneous entity, the new ‘Greater Romania’
was a rather more heteroclite state, socio-economically and even more so ethni-
cally. Owing to distinct historical processes, Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina
and Bessarabia had very diﬀerent socio-economic structures and relations even
in rural areas. Moreover, large minority groups lived in these regions of the
country. Ukrainians (also known as Ruthenians) were mainly in Bukovina and
Bessarabia, while Hungarians, Germans (Saxons and Swabians), ‘Szekler’,
Serbians and others, were in Transylvania and the Banat. 
As far as the land reform was concerned, the government in Bucharest was
compelled to apply distinct standards for each region because of their marked
Christian Giordano
78
diversity; single laws were therefore promulgated and applied in speciﬁc regional
contexts. Within this remarkably complex socio-economic, ethnic and legislative
framework, according to 1921 oﬃcial data, a total of 6 million ha were expropri-
ated; 4 million were apportioned to 1.4 million farmers while 2 million became
State property or were assigned to the municipalities (Castellan 1994: 78). 
At ﬁrst sight, the reform appears imposing. A strong modernisation drive
could be hoped for, indeed, even a solution to the ‘land question’ in terms of the
‘social question’; but this was not so. Before the Second World War, agriculture
did not progress much and rural living standards were among Europe’s lowest
(Castellan 1994: 79). Moreover, according to the 1930 census, 6,700 big land-
owners still held 24 per cent of the land while 2.5 million indigent farmers
owned only 28 per cent. Notwithstanding the unmistakable increase in the size
of the average holding, which had been yearned for and was almost unani-
mously held to be the basis of the nation’s stability and socio-economic develop-
ment (Ancel 1926: 178), the average holding was again slowly declining owing
to rural overpopulation, which in turn caused extreme land fragmentation as a
consequence of the inheritance practice in force (Roberts 1969: 53; Castellan
1994: 78). Both politicians’ and expert evaluations of the reform were often as
trenchant as Ion Michalache’s, an inﬂuential leader of the National Farmer’s
Party, who in 1922 stated that: ‘The ruling class made only such concessions as
were necessary to assure its own existence. The reforms have been a kind of
safety valve’ (Michalache 1922: 5, 29, quoted in Roberts 1969: 30).
It is worth noting that Michalache, even with his slightly overstated and
drastic attitude, like most Romanian authors overlooked the problem of the rela-
tionship between land distribution and ethnic groups. In spite of this intentional
or unintentional reticence, it is now well known that Romanian land reform in the
regions obtained after the First World War, primarily in Transylvania, became a
‘thorny branch’, as David Mitrany phrased it, within the troubled ‘Greater
Romanian’ minorities issue (Mitrany 1930: 211). The promulgation of speciﬁc
regional laws was perceived, especially by Transylvanian Hungarians, as the
premise for an unchecked discrimination against non-Romanians. Likewise, a
subtle indeterminateness and inaccuracy in the legislative acts, which cannot be
examined thoroughly in this context, were considered deliberate and therefore
aimed at establishing a land reform with a nationalistic bias (Mitrany 1930: 211).
Indeed,certainaspectsof thelawpostulatedatendencytoexcludeminorities from
the reform’s inherent advantages. In fact, in the acquired territories, especially the
frontier ones, the land had to be assigned to veterans, and war orphans or widows
who were obviously national Romanians (Teichova 1988: 43; Sterbling 1995:
91). This measure paved the way for a ‘colonisation’ of Transylvania. In fact, the
lands on a controversial border were to be entrusted to loyal citizens (Sterbling
1995: 91). According to some Romanian politicians, for example Octavian Goga,
land reform should be regarded as ‘the most powerful means in the Rumenisation
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process of Transylvania’ (Mitrany 1930: 181). Almost concurrently the French
geographer Jacques Ancel, without hiding his partiality for the ‘colonisation’
cause, literally wrote about the Romanian farmers’ ‘agrarian re-conquering’ of
Transylvania (Ancel 1926: 178). According to the authoritative historian Seton-
Watson, in the regions acquired by the Old Kingdom, particularly inTransylvania,
the land reform brought about a ‘territorial Rumenisation’ that ﬁnds its match in
several other central and eastern European countries (Seton-Watson 1986: 79).
However, some further consideration of this point is necessary.The ‘territorial
Rumenisation’ process enacted through the land reform was a reaction against
the agrarian colonisation of the Hungarian government, which began at the end
of the nineteenth century and lasted until the First World War. The Hungarian
government had established a special fund of 3 million ﬂorins to aid national
Hungarian farmers settle in the Transylvania districts which had a signiﬁcant
non-Hungarian population (Mitrany 1930: 214). In 1911 the fund had bought
over 7 million ﬂorins’ worth of property. Moreover, in the case of municipally
owned landed property fragmentation and privatisation in Transylvania, settlers
of Hungarian descent, if necessary brought from other regions, were granted priv-
ileges. Romanian farmers living in the same areas were, to a large extent, excluded
from this land distribution (Mitrany 1930: 215). Mitrany also highlights how this
intrinsically ‘ethnic’ colonisation policy created a desire for retaliation among
Transylvania’s Romanian population who then took a sort of revenge through
Romanian land reform (Mitrany 1930: 215).
In Transylvania, class division almost coincided with ethno-national divi-
sion (Mitrany 1930: 214). Therefore, it is not surprising that after the First World
War land reform favoured the Romanian population (mostly farmers) while this
was not the case for the Hungarians since most Transylvanian big land owners
were Hungarian and would have been expropriated regardless of their national-
ity. However, the land reform was undoubtedly applied more rigorously in this
region than in the Old Kingdom; Hungarian big landowners were more com-
monly aﬀected than Romanian boyars. Nonetheless, farm labourers and small
land owners of Hungarian descent rarely experienced impartial application of
the reforms although the law guaranteed equal treatment. The simple fact of
being from the ‘enemy nation’, therefore not the ‘titular nation’, could have been
a discriminatory element in land redistribution (Seton-Watson 1986: 79). For
example, Mitrany reports that Romanian authorities in charge of applying the
land reform laws in Transylvania even expropriated several Hungarian small
landowners, the oﬃcial reason being that a church or a school was going to be
built on that property (Mitrany 1930: 217).
The land reform was undeniably perceived in nationalistic terms as pursu-
ing the ideal of a cultural and territorial ‘Rumenisation’ in the whole region
(Mitrany 1930: 175), although in Transylvania there was no fully ﬂedged ethnic
persecution of minority groups related to the land reform (Mitrany 1930: 218).
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The Hungarian and Saxon population also reacted loudly against this project
and their spokespeople persistently denounced the shady and sometimes bla-
tantly corrupt methods by which land expropriation and distribution were
enacted with the intention of modifying this crucial frontier area’s ethnic com-
position (Connert 1928: 262).
The land reform in ‘Greater Romania’ after the First World War, which
should have modernised the rural areas, reducing the gap between Romania and
western European countries, also failed for economic reasons. Nonetheless, it
became a controversial issue among the various nationalities. It poisoned inter-
ethnic relations, which had been strained for centuries owing to conﬂicting class
interests, mainly between Hungarian big land owners and the mainly Romanian
farmers which represented Transylvanian social life. 
In conclusion, although the land reform discussed so far did not incite civil
war and can deﬁnitely not be considered a form of ‘ethnic cleansing’, it may be
said that it encouraged the nationalism of diﬀerent ethnic groups, deepening
enmities which were already present.
Yugoslavia
The centuries-old Ottoman domination in Europe ended in 1913 after the second
Balkan War. The ‘sick man on the Bosphorus’ held only a small territory, namely
present-day European Turkey. Serbia and Montenegro united after the First
World War into the Kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, which in turn
became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, and took over most of the ‘liberated’
regions; i.e. northern Macedonia and Kosovo. However, the Ottoman legacy was
burdened with problems. In the ﬁrst place, Serbia and Montenegro had an
archaic social and economic system, a consequence of the breakdown of the
original imperial patrimonialism based upon the timar institution. The sultan, as
absolute ruler and sole owner of the land, entrusted military commanders with
collecting tributes and recruiting soldiers. In exchange for these bureaucratic
duties, the sultan allotted them non-hereditary lands called timar. The timar
included the ciftlik: lands and real estate that the timariot (timar controller) could
exploit directly for his family’s needs. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, while centralised power was waning, the military commanders seized ina-
lienable property that belonged to farmers and repeatedly appropriated lands of
the timar on a hereditary basis. Therefore, the ciftlik areas were signiﬁcantly
increased although several remained quite small and would never become large
landed estates. Furthermore, the ciftlik were privatised, de facto becoming allodial
lands. Nineteenth-century reforms, despite Koranic law, gave a legal foundation
to this unsettled situation and the term ciftlik became synonymous with private
property. While striving to modernise and lead their countries closer to European
standards, Serbia, Montenegro, and later Yugoslavia encountered the problem of
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dismantling this semi-hereditary structure that was unanimously considered
unjust and utterly obsolete. The most obvious solution to this problem was to
promote land reform. This was also the authoritative opinion of eminent foreign
experts, such as the renowned French geographer Jacques Ancel, who knew the
region well having been in situ during the First World War (Ancel 1930: 1).
According to all these western experts, researchers as well as travellers and dip-
lomats, the ciftlik was perceived, on the one hand, as a symbol of a fearful admin-
istration and low economic productivity, and, on the other, as the bulwark of an
agrarian system based on semi-serfdom: social relations that implied exorbitant
taxes as well as arbitrary and iniquitous services for the peasants (Schultze-Jena
1927: 50). Present-day researches have re-examined this institution and have
reached more discriminate conclusions (Adanir 1979); however in those days
the ciftlik represented, ﬁguratively speaking, an insult to civilisation. In light of
this outlook, land reform was launched in an area whose economic situation was
deplorable to say the least (in northern Macedonia and Kosovo) taking into
account not only the ciftlik but also a ﬁfty-year span of political instability
marked by uprisings and wars. Therefore, these two regions were characterised
by massive land abandonment and the utter insecurity of a territory overrun by
bands of irregular troops halfway between a liberation warfare and simple ban-
ditry. Overall, Yugoslav land reform required an elaborate series of measures
which pivoted, however, on colonisation. In fact, by the end of the second Balkan
War (1912–13) a conspicuous migratory trend ensued, more or less forced,
mainly towards Turkey or Albania. The migration was of ciftlik owners of Turk
or Albanian descent who left the country anticipating changes to the rural prop-
erty regime. Around 1913–14 indigenous families of Slav ancestry had already
begun an unforeseen takeover of the deserted lands or were buying them at low
prices (Roux 1992: 191). The governments of Serbia and Montenegro immedi-
ately tried to check this tendency. A law concerning the peopling of the ‘liberated’
regions, which provided for the state management of all deserted lands plus all
lands lacking a property title, was promulgated in Montenegro in February
1914. This law may be considered a prologue to the land reform itself, the prom-
ulgation of which took an incredibly long time (from 1919 to 1934) owing to
numerous additions and amendments. These few data provide evidence for the
Yugoslav government’s signiﬁcant eﬀorts to modernise agriculture in the two
peripheral and economically backward regions mentioned above.
Undoubtedly, the pillar of this complex reform action was the decree dated
24 September 1920 that regulated the new southern regions’ ‘colonisation’,
whereby colonisation meant the granting of State lands to farmers. This project
had two main aims:
• land redistribution to the most poverty-stricken indigenous rural population
through the subdivision of ciftlik;
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• the settlement of farmers from other areas of Yugoslavia on deserted and
former State or municipal properties (Ancel 1930: 58).
The allocated plots were between 4 and 5 ha, congruent with family unit
size. According to the reform’s promoters, this amount of land would be enough
to guarantee an entire family’s subsistence. However, most of the land in
Macedonia and Kosovo was unproductive and the allocated plots soon proved to
be inadequate (Ancel 1930: 60). This already suggests that the ﬁrst stages of the
reform were indeed superﬁcial, chaotic and irrational. Moreover, there were no
plans for the subsequent establishment of any infrastructure. In 1923, the
Yugoslav government, to cope with the operation’s tangible shortcomings,
undertook road, canal and rural housing construction, swampland drainage, a
ﬁght against malaria, professional training for farmers and the promotion of
cooperatives (Roux 1992: 192). To complete the reform process, further govern-
ment decrees enacted between 1931 and 1934 concerning colonisation
demanded the migration of numerous farmers into Macedonia and Kosovo from
other regions of the country (Roux 1992: 193). 
At the time, several western European experts of rural problems were
impressed by the accomplishments and regarded them as evidence of eﬀective
modernisation. In his book on colonisation in Macedonia, Jacques Ancel praised
the Yugoslav land reform in relation to the wonders worked in Old Serbia and
Kosovo (Ancel 1930: 2).
However, the Yugoslav land reform was not only a means to promote socio-
economic development as it appeared to the enthusiastic foreign observers of the
time. Nowadays it is well known that an ethnic homogenisation project linked to
a clearly nationalistic policy, adopted particularly by Serbia since the second half
of the eighteenth century, lurked behind the ‘progressive’ façade. In fact, in 1878
Serbia had been able to expel Albanians from the Upper Morava River basin, a
territory assigned to Serbia by the Treaty of Berlin (Roux 1992: 187). Later,
Nikola Pasic (Serbian Prime Minister from 1909 to 1918) took up this notion of
‘de-Albanising’ and simultaneously ‘re-Slavising’ the south of future Yugoslavia.
He hoped to complete this project within twenty years (Roux 1992: 187). This
plan was resumed in the Yugoslav land reform after the First World War and, as
mentioned above, concerned only the southern regions of the new State, i.e. a
region known to be a territory with vast areas of Albanian predominance. From
a present-day standpoint, inﬂuenced by ideals of multi-culturalism, such an
undertaking might seem monstrous. At the time however, projects of ethnic
homogenisation by agricultural colonisation, i.e. more or less forced migrations,
were deemed wholly appropriate if not expedient in increasing the political
stability of a region, as in the speciﬁc case of the Balkan area. The ‘normality’ of
such procedures, which we might deﬁne ‘post-imperial’, has been skilfully high-
lighted by Rogers Brubaker (Brubaker 1996: 10, 148–178). Corroborated by the
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international community’s approbation and ﬁrmly believing in the historical
right due to their nation as well as the presumed recentness of the Albanians’ set-
tlement in that territory, Serbians and Montenegrins had no doubts concerning
the legitimacy of changing the ethnic composition of these two regions since,
according to them, their nation held historical rights over Macedonia and Kosovo
which the Albanians had only recently settled. Albanians were seen as invaders
or occupiers because for centuries they had collaborated with Ottoman powers
often as high-ranking civil service oﬃcials. Moreover, Albanians were regarded
as ‘Turks’ in the ﬁrst place owing to their Islamic faith and secondly because their
national identity had only recently become apparent; at the turn of the twenti-
eth century Albanians as a nationality obtained only vague regional and inter-
national acknowledgement. The same religious faith plus a real similarity in
some everyday behaviour, especially publicly, could have given rise to fabricated
narratives that were easily utilised by nationalistic policies aimed at a shift in the
ethnic composition of the southern regions. Therefore, Macedonia and Kosovo,
the latter acclaimed as the ‘cradle of the Serbian nation’, had to be ‘liberated’ not
only from Ottoman domination but also from the intolerable and unmanageable
foreign, i.e. non–Slav, population. The true logic behind the land reform lies here. 
It was not so much the need to modernise Yugoslavia’s south as the eager-
ness to strengthen the ‘national element’ by re-Slavising the two regions which
counted (Roux 1992: 191). Consequently, the ciftlik liquidation was not princi-
pally a programme to abolish unjust and entirely corrupt, archaic semi-
patrimonialism; it was a scheme to seize the land of a class of landowners who
were regarded as ‘alien’ because of their ethnic background. The predominance
of an ‘ethnic logic’ instead of a ‘social logic’ behind the elimination of ciftlik is
conﬁrmed mainly by the fact that most ciftlik in Macedonia and Kosovo were
expropriated merely and tacitly because their owners were not of Slav origin,
although their ciftlik were below average size; therefore, this was quite unlike the
redistribution of large estates (Roux 1992: 194). As Ancel also notes, just before
the land reform the ciftlik owners in southern Yugoslavia were not like the rich
absentee ‘beg’ who lived in Istanbul yet collected a speciﬁc income in kind from
their landed property (Ancel 1930: 60). In southern Yugoslavia they were
average farmers mainly of Albanian descent whose land was tilled by servants
(Ancel 1930: 60; Roux 1992: 194), and not a class of ‘landlord-capitalists’ with
a ‘parasitic’ mentality (Bobek 1962). In fact, only 37 of the 6,973 ciftlik cata-
logued by the administrators of the land reform exceeded 500 ha while 75 per
cent were below 50 ha and half of this percentage was not above 20 ha (Roux
1992: 194). Although this data indicates the presence of a nascent rural middle
class, the ideal aim of several land reforms, ciftlik were declared state property
without exception and subsequently allotted free of charge to tenants of Slavic
stock leaving the former owners with a quota from 5 to 15 ha (Roux 1992: 194).
The ‘ethnic’ project of the ‘(re)Slavisation’ of Albanian lands in the southern
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regions, chieﬂy in Kosovo, is even more unmistakable in the colonisation policy.
Agrarian colonisation was a remarkable undertaking charged with symbolic
consequences particularly in Macedonia, the so-called ‘cradle of the Serbian
nation’. The goal was to re-establish the supposed primordial Slav nucleus
through the settlement of immigrants from other areas of Yugoslavia. More than
100,000 ha, over one-quarter of Kosovo’s agricultural land, was apportioned to
between 12,000 and 14,000 families, according to diﬀerent sources (Roux
1992: 195). In order to evaluate the real extent of the reform, the further 60,000
ha apportioned to 14,000 local allotted families must also be taken into account. 
In line with the prevailing ‘Yugoslavist’ ideology of the time and propagated
by the renowned geographer Jovan Cvijic, a conﬁrmed believer in the historical
ethno-national fusion amongst southern Slavs (Cvijic 1918), the newcomers
hailed from various regions of the country. The settlers’ geographic origin shows
that the vast majority, 76.4 per cent, came from Montenegro and Serbia, 11 per
cent from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1.2 per cent from Vojvodina, while 4.4 per
cent arrived even from Croatia (Roux 1992:196). Since the authorities wished to
avoid the dispersion of the immigrants, they were settled in speciﬁc colonisation
areas from which Albanians were banned. In fact, if the latter owned any land
within these areas, they were expropriated and then compensated either with
low-quality lands far away from towns or with inadequate indemnities (Roux
1992: 195). A veritable ethnic segregation strategy came to the fore.
However, this was not the only discrimination connected with the agrarian
colonisation that Albanians from that area had to endure. In Metohija (nowa-
days western Kosovo, near the present border with Albania) only 0.4 ha of agri-
cultural land per person were left to farmers of non-Slav origin. Concurrently,
agrarian courts of law would rarely uphold any appeals ﬁled (Roux 1992: 195).
This ethnic struggle over territorial appropriation went awry and the
Yugoslav land reform’s implicit nationalistic policy fell short. One of the main
reasons for the ﬁasco in Kosovo was certainly the demographic issue owing to the
rural class’ high birth rate, especially among the Albanians. This phenomenon
with the settlers’ arrival plus the small chance of internal or external emigration
at the time brought about rural overpopulation in the region. A national and
international drop in produce prices, meaning lower incomes for farmers, made
things even worse.
It is not surprising that around 1930 inter-ethnic relations worsened, giving
rise to strong tensions between Slavs and Albanians culminating in a violent
atmosphere strewn with clashes and atrocities (Roux 1992: 199). The political
and intellectual elites saw this crescendo of inter-ethnic clashes as proof of the
land reform’s political weakness and the need for more drastic measures to push
back Albanian expansion in the ‘cradle of the Serbian nation’. At this time, more
deﬁnite projects, which indeed correspond to present-day ‘ethnic cleansing’ or
‘ethnic puriﬁcation’, arose and multiplied for the active ‘transfer of Albanians’
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(Grmek, Gjidara and Simac 1993). The strongest supporter of this new policy
which should have strengthened the (re)Slavisation of Kosovo, which was
started but not completed by the land reform, was certainly Vasacubrilovic, an
eminent representative of the Serbian intelligentsia, professor at Belgrade
University’s Literature Department, besides being a cabinet member of several
Yugoslav governments after the Second World War (Grmek, Gjidara and Simac
1993: 149). In his famous conference on ‘The expulsion of Albanians’ held at
Belgrade’s Serbian Cultural Circle on 7 March 1937, Vasacubrilovic proved the
relationship between the land reform’s ethno-political failure with particular
regard to colonisation on the one hand, and the need to relocate Albanians on
the other (Gasparini 1999: 1). The closing statements of this text, which the
‘ethnic cleansing engineers’ of present-day former Yugoslavia regard as ‘sacred’,
is worth quoting verbatim:
Compte tenu de tout ce qui vient d’être dit, ce n’est pas par hasard que, dans l’analyse
de la colonisation du sud, nous partons de la conception selon laquelle le seul moyen
eﬃcace pour résoudre ce problème, c’est le transfert massif des Albanais. La colon-
isation graduelle n’a pas eu de succès chez nous, pas plus que dans les autres pays.
Lorsque le pouvoir d’Etat désire intervenir, dans l’intérêt de son propre élement, dans
la lutte pour la terre, il ne . . . peut réussir que s’l’agit brutalement. Sinon, l’aborigène
installé sur sa terre natale et qui . . . est acclimaté est toujours plus fort que le colon.
Dans notre cas, il faut d’autant plus tenir compte que nous avons aﬀaire à une race
rude, bien implantée, résistante, et féconde, dont feu Cvijic disait qu’elle est la plus
expansive dans les Balkans. De 1870 à 1914, l’Allemagne a dépensé des milliards de
marks pour coloniser graduellement ses territoires de l’Est, en achetant des terres
aux Polonais, mais la fécondité des mères polonaises a eu dessus sur l’organisation et
l’argent allemands. (Quoted in Grmek, Gjidara and Simac 1993: 184)1
This drastic programme, as with similar ones by Serbian intellectuals and
politicians, remained a dead letter owing to the upcoming Second World War
which led to Yugoslavia’s ‘ﬁrst dismemberment’ in the Spring of 1941 when
eastern Macedonia and most of Kosovo were annexed to ‘Greater Albania’ under
Italian control. As was to be expected, the trend shifted since the assimilation and
expulsion policy was subsequently directed against Slavs, especially against
farmers who had settled since the 1920s. Under Marshal Tito’s establishment of
the ‘second Yugoslavia’, pre-war boundaries were reinstated but the ‘Albanian
issue’ was only ‘set aside’ until the 1980s when strong inter-ethnic tensions
ﬂared up again in Kosovo: the beginning of the present tragedy. Since the mid-
1980s the ‘transfer of Albanians’ issue, devised between the two world wars as
an extension of the land reform, reoccurred peremptorily in the Balkans, bring-
ing with it hatred and bloodshed.
In conclusion, the Yugoslav land reform was surely not a prior instance of
‘ethnic cleansing’ but it certainly was a relevant factor contributing to the esca-
lation of ethnic tension in the southern regions, especially in Kosovo.
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Undoubtedly it can be interpreted as a primary historical antecedent to the
conﬂicts at the end of the twentieth century consequent on Yugoslavia’s ‘second
dismemberment’.
Comprehending land reform experiences in south east Europe: 
some theoretical comments 
First of all, analysis of the two cases examined indicates how land reforms
enacted in Romania, and Yugoslavia between the two world wars were reputedly
legislative acts to solve both the ‘social question’ and the ‘agrarian question’.
Actually, they were decreed to ‘nationalise’ the territory of regions with centu-
ries of ethnic complexity in an attempt to turn the territory into a mono-ethnic
space. Therefore, land reforms were extremely expedient for the exasperated and
opposed nationalisms that clashed at that time in south east Europe.
The outcome of the three processes examined was to some extent to introduce
the socio-political premises for the development of highly antagonistic ‘ethnic dis-
courses’ and simultaneously induce ‘autoethniﬁcation’ and ‘heteroethniﬁcation’
processes. Until then, these phenomena had surfaced unplanned and irregularly,
although it would be deceptive and misleading to assume that relations between
the diﬀerent groups were untroubled before the land reforms. In all two cases, a
rising ‘diversity’, experienced and perceived daily, caused several problems among
the diﬀerent communities sharing the same space.
Owing to the new ways of acquiring land, a vital resource at the time, an
atmosphere laden with inter-ethnic tension began to crystallise in these cases
leading to an escalation of reciprocal physical and symbolic acts of violence. At
length, land reforms with their ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’ policies greatly encour-
aged or emphasised ‘ethnic diﬀerences’ and boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’
veriﬁable to date in the regions mentioned. In such cases, land redistribution
through ‘ethnic’ criteria is an important ‘historical precedent’ that works its way
into present inter-ethnic relations from the deepest strata of collective memory.
Therefore, it is not surprising that distribution and colonisation laws concerning
such a basic resource as land have caused strong ‘collective traumas’ by being
enacted as already explained. To this day, after several generations, reciprocal
feelings of mistrust, fear and hostility in areas that are still predominantly agri-
cultural are reinforced and nourished by these ‘collective traumas’. A study of
‘potentials for conﬂict and disorder’ from a historic–anthropological point of view
wishing to overcome the instantaneous and mechanistic approach of a structu-
ral and functionalist type cannot put aside a sort of ‘dramatological’ analysis of
the ‘ﬂow of events’, i.e., the ‘conjunctural cycle’ distributed along the ‘longue
durée’ (Braudel, 1977: 47). Therefore, what Marshall Sahlins has called the
‘structure of the conjuncture’ must be reconstructed (Sahlins 1981). In other
words, starting from certain historical events, apparently not very signiﬁcant at
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the time, but in the end crucially relevant, how such dramatic changes, which
have repercussions to this day on the collective representations of ‘otherness’ and
on the social relations between ethnic communities, are produced.
At this point, however, there is also the question of how the socialist politi-
cal regimes, which for ﬁfty years ruled over Romania and Yugoslavia, faced the
ethnic polarisation: a pre-war legacy partly owing to the land reforms.
First, it must be emphasised that searching for a uniform and coherent
‘method’ used by all regimes under Soviet inﬂuence to resolve their speciﬁc
‘national question’ would be a fruitless task. Each regime developed its own pecu-
liar policy; hence, even the ‘historical patterns’ are diﬀerent. Therefore, present
‘potentials of conﬂict and disorder’ cannot be drawn from assumed elements of
an abstract and monolithic socialist order, which existed only in the minds of
western Sovietologists and Party oﬃcials’ ideology. The circumstances in
Romania, and Yugoslavia instead reveal that socialism applied two diﬀerent ‘poli-
cies’ in each case:
• ‘Increasing’ the contrast between majority and minority. This was the case
of Romania under Ceausescu, who with his peculiar national-communism
tried vainly to ‘obliterate’ Transylvania’s and the Banat’s minority groups,
especially the Hungarians, by means of repressive measures. During the
socialist era inter-ethnic tensions were further sharpened but never reached
the point of open hostilities mainly because the repressions were acknowl-
edged for what they really were: the outcome of the personal policy of a
tyrannical ‘conductor’ rather than the collective will of the ‘titular nation’.
• ‘Promoting’ a contradictory and opportunistic strategy of the institutional
recognition of ethnic diversity. This was the case in Tito’s Yugoslavia, where
such a policy played permanently and ambiguously upon the institutional-
ised diﬀerence between ‘nations’ and ‘nationalities’. Owing to a fully appar-
ent federalism with a deliberately inert institutional framework, which made
all ethnic groups discontented in the end, pre-war problems and obsessions
stemming also (but not only) from the land reform were hauled over and
augmented from pre-socialist to post-socialist eras.
Looking back, socialism chose inadequate, grievous and often deliberately
counterproductive strategies to ‘manage’ ethnic diversity. The existing tensions,
rifts, and conﬂicts were aggravated or postponed. In the cases examined, among
the elements that determine present ‘potentials of conﬂict and disorder’ there are
processes, such as those instigated by the land reforms, which date back to pre-
socialist times. Socialism was never a true break from the past, although to
regard it as a mere ‘freezer’ of history would be a serious oversight. This is one
more reason that further justiﬁes the analysis of the ‘structure of the conjunc-
ture’ so as to understand the ‘logic’ underlying the unexpected but foreseeable
escalation of ethnic disputes in south east Europe since 1990.
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
1 ‘Taking into consideration all aspects, it is not far-fetched that in analysing southern
colonisation we have reached the conclusion that the only eﬀective way to solve this
problem is a mass transfer of Albanians. Gradual colonisation was not as successful here
as in other countries. When the State wants to intervene to safeguard its own interests, its
own land, it can only do so by acting ruthlessly. If not, the aboriginal, settled and acclim-
atised in his native land, is always stronger than the coloniser. In our case, we must also
bear in mind that we are dealing with a tough race, deeply rooted, hardy and proliﬁc; as
Cvijic notes, it is one of the most widespread in the Balkans. From 1870 to 1914, Germany
spent billions of marks buying land from the Poles to gradually colonise its eastern terri-
tories but the fertility of Polish mothers defeated German organisation and capital.’

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5‘Freedom!’: Albanian society and the quest 
for independence from statehood in Kosovo 
and Macedonia
Norbert Mappes-Niediek
T   of the Albanian conﬂicts has been widely discussed anddocumented in numerous publications (see, for example, the IndependentInternational Commission on Kosovo 2000). But to understand the
Kosovo and Macedonian wars, one needs to travel up into the mountains south
of Vitina, keep on driving even when there is nor more asphalt on the road and
enter one of the large compounds in the hills. In S, for example, one would be
received by AR, a friendly man of sixty years with no incisors, and his wife,
dressed in colourful baggy trousers, shyly waving from behind. Politics is not an
issue for these hard-working people, life has made them wise and they feel no
hatred towards any other nation. Their oldest son is a physics teacher at Vitina
grammar school, the second and third sons are electricians, and a further,
younger son is a student in Austria. Dad formally collects all the money that the
sons earn and M, the oldest, decides on what to spend it. They hate being inter-
rogated by the police, the corrupt municipality oﬃcials and the visa problems
they face when they want to travel to Ljubljana, which is vital for them as they
hold an exclusive licence for the import of electric counters from Slovenia. The
Rs want to live freely and in peace, and they are ready to ﬁght for it. 
Focusing on the shortcomings within the Albanian societies of former
Yugoslavia might lead to a serious misunderstanding of the situation. These soci-
eties are indeed always at risk of conﬂict; however, at least the Kosovo war in
1998 and 1999 was caused to a much greater extent by outside factors. The
Kosovo Albanian society may be blamed only for its failure to avoid conﬂict and
its poor capacity to manage problems that were generated elsewhere. Once it had
begun, the conﬂict was extremely diﬃcult to stop, and instead of dying out or
continuing on a small scale, it tended to spill over into neighbouring areas inhab-
ited by Albanians. The explanation for this phenomenon is one which can actu-
ally be found within these societies. 
From 1986 onwards, when a wave of nationalist feelings accompanied the
rise of Slobodan Milosevic, Kosovo Albanians became its mainly innocent and
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almost accidental victims. After the Pristina rallies in 1981, nothing had hap-
pened in Kosovo to stir up nationalist feelings among Serbs. In fact, the percent-
age of Serbs in the Kosovo population was declining, owing both to the much
higher birth rate among Albanians and the emigration of Serbs. The ‘exodus’, as
Belgrade media liked to call the steady Serb emigration, was above all a conse-
quence of the high unemployment and the poor economic status of the south-
ern province. As opposed to Albanians, Serbs in Kosovo found it easy to leave the
impoverished area and to settle somewhere in Serbia proper or in other, more
prosperous parts of what was then Yugoslavia. Back in 1974 when there was a
change in Yugoslavia’s constitution, a feeling of alienation spread among Kosovo
Serbs who from then on were no longer privileged; they started to feel like foreign-
ers in what they considered their own country. To be fair, it was certainly hard for
Serbs to live in a rapidly changing society with diﬀerent values, a diﬀerent relig-
ion and a diﬀerent language; and the notorious priority Albanians give to family
life certainly contributed to the isolation of the minority, which in 1991 was
about 10 per cent of the Kosovo population. Nevertheless, there was never a per-
ceivable political strategy to expel Serbs from Kosovo or even to create an ‘ethni-
cally pure’ province. The incidents of the years to come – e.g. the killing of
soldiers by an Albanian in Prokuplje or the smear story of the Serb who had a
bottle forced into his anus by an Albanian – were all invented or at least exagger-
ated and misused. Outside interested political circles, there are not even reports
of any particular hostility of Albanians towards their Serb neighbours. The
alleged rape of Serb women by Albanian men simply did not take place, as the
Croatian academic Branko Horvat has shown in detail (Horvat 1989: 148–167).
In fact, the conﬂict started in Belgrade. Kosovo was the ﬁrst and easiest means of
feeding the aspirations of the new Serb nationalists and this was the most impor-
tant factor. ‘Srbija cela, a ne u tri dela’ (Serbia is one, not separated into three),
was the slogan. Serbia and its position in Yugoslavia was the target, not Kosovo.
The second most important factor was the policy of the international com-
munity. The Badinter Commission, inaugurated by the then European
Community to regulate the succession of the dissolved Yugoslav Federation,
decided to recognise – and thus grant the status of sovereign states to – the six
former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), if they
applied. Although ethnically mixed and, in the east European sense of the word,
‘nationally’ divided, Bosnia was recognised. Kosovo was not, although it had
been, as a former ‘Autonomous province’, a constitutive part of the federation
and thus equal to the republics. After the Dayton Peace Accord in late 1995, the
blockade of economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ)
was not lifted. Albanians, undoubtedly the ﬁrst victims of Serb nationalism,
suﬀered most from the sanctions as their province belonged to the SRJ as its
poorest part. Seen from a diﬀerent point of view, Belgrade was deprived of all
means of calming the conﬂict with the Albanians. Even if Milosevic had wanted
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to, he had nothing to oﬀer them. Albanian representatives were told by western
diplomats they should make do with their status, while at the same time the SRJ
was gradually redeﬁned as a ‘rogue state’. This approach sought to seal a lid on
the steam-pot rather than to diminish the heat: a recipe for an explosion. No
strategy, not even a positive option existed for the Kosovo Albanians. For them
gaining independence was the only plausible aim.
The small political elite of Kosovo was badly prepared to meet these serious
challenges. The Albanian communist establishment in Pristina opposed the loss
of autonomy in 1989–90, but was unable to retaliate. Using familiar party struc-
tures, Belgrade replaced uncomfortable leaders such as Azem Vllasi with faith-
ful lapdogs such as Rahman Morina. Before they were dismissed, most of the
Albanian communist leaders had been forced to crack down on ‘nationalists’ and
movements of unrest among their fellow citizens. As a result, they were all
unpopular. The Yugoslav federation was already weak, and Kosovo had no true
allies among the other nations gaining independence. Once autonomy was lost,
Kosovo Albanian leaders – with very few exceptions – found themselves ousted.
Their immediate and natural reaction was not to accept the unilateral constitu-
tional changes. Nobody really expected them to accept the changes; Belgrade did
not even try to convince anybody in Kosovo of their worth. From now on, the
Albanians were simply the enemy and had to be kept down. The declaration of
independence from the dissolving Yugoslavia was a logical and uncontested con-
sequence. The loss of autonomy came with a wave of strong anti-Albanian prop-
aganda, and not even the most loyal Albanians could feel invited to cooperate in
the new structures. Thus, even uniﬁcation came from outside. The only non-
communist party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), founded in December
1989, became the natural backup system for the Albanian communist elite, who
were the only ones with at least a little political experience. The ‘Autonomous
province’ deserved its name only from 1974, when the constitution was
changed, and historically it was the only political body Kosovars had ever run
themselves. There were no dissidents, there was no old bourgeoisie, and there
was no political emigration. The thin layer of politically educated people came
from rural families and they were brought up during communism. University
teaching in Albanian started only in 1970. In 1945, Kosovo had had an illiter-
acy rate of 74 per cent.
The ousted Kosovo Albanian leaders were so desperate that they could not
even ﬁnd a leader. Those who had been in oﬃce were compromised, and those
who had not were incapable. Mahmut Bakalli, head of the Kosovo Central
Committee in 1974, has told how Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Kosovo
Albanian Writers’ Association, became the leader of LDK. When they had to
leave the Party premises, a building was needed. They found the small pavilion of
the Writers’ Association close to the Pristina stadium. ‘Rugova was elected for
practical reasons. The seat of the newly founded Democratic League was the
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building of the Writers’ Association. He is a serious and quiet man, so he was
elected’ (Petrovic 1996: 26). Whatever was needed to form an independent state
was now provided. A constitutive assembly was formed and a referendum was
organised, spontaneously supported by all political and civil authorities in every
town and village.1 When the ﬁrst unoﬃcial elections had taken place, the job was
done. The shy and friendly Rugova lacked any political sense, let alone experi-
ence. In his whole political ‘career’, he has stubbornly kept repeating his politi-
cal mantra that Kosovo was an independent state. During the ﬁrst years, it was
the policy to act as if the goal of independence had already been achieved. Like
ousted monarchs, Kosovo Albanian leaders acted as ‘legitimists’ and simply
ignored the new authorities, claiming they were the only legitimate authority.
This kind of behaviour may be typical of emigrants who have nothing in hand
but an abstract legal position. But the LDK leadership acted inside the country,
and everybody could see their weakness. Two attempts to gather the newly
elected parliament were inhibited by the police. Its authority was transformed
into an unoﬃcial ‘council of parties’. Instead of forming a state, Kosovo
Albanian leaders pretended to have one. 
From the outside, the ‘Independent State of Kosovo’ was frequently viewed
as something comparable to Mahatma Gandhi’s movement of civil disobedience.
Indeed, Rugova is a deeply peaceful person who detests violence and war. Born
into a rural family in the village of Istok, he was awarded a scholarship and
studied literature in Paris, where he heard Roland Barthes, a famous existential-
ist (Carlen, Duchene and Ehrhart 1999: 51). Paciﬁsm was and still is a rare phe-
nomenon in Kosovo. Albanians are a Balkan people with a long tradition of war
and heroism. Virtues and values are deeply patriarchal, as is typical in formerly
cattle-breeding societies, and to be a man, one has to carry a gun. Islam, the pre-
dominant religion among Kosovo Albanians, has no speciﬁc sympathy to ideas
of non-violence – unlike Hinduism in India. Even communist Yugoslavia was not
at all paciﬁstic, on the contrary: war was intensely gloriﬁed in hundreds of ﬁlms
about the partisans. Rugova’s so-called ‘Gandhi strategy’ had no roots in Kosovo
Albanian society. Rugova, once a member of the communist party himself
(Carlen, Duchene and Ehrhart 1999: 70), has no charisma and is not persuasive.
His paciﬁst approach was accepted only because there was no alternative. Serbia,
aware of the mood in Kosovo, concentrated large numbers of police and army in
the province. Nobody could even think of open resistance. Public rallies were
impossible. Whenever more than three people gathered in the centre of Pristina,
armed policemen would appear and disperse them. Whoever tried to speak out
against the regime in public risked being terribly beaten. 
As opposed to Gandhi, Rugova and the Kosovo Albanian leadership never
had a plan, except that by calling their weakness paciﬁsm, they tried to beneﬁt
from western countries’ sympathy. ‘Passive resistance’ in India was an active
strategy, including demonstrations and sabotage, aimed at destabilising the colo-
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nial regime and inﬂuencing the British public. Kosovo Albanian leaders, by con-
trast, never took action.2 They chose to build a ‘parallel system’, as analysts put
it. But even the setting up of this parallel system was hardly planned and required
little organisational performance. In less than a year, most ‘socially owned’ ﬁrms
changed into Serb hands and their managers were dismissed.3 The Albanian
party and state authority ceased to exist. In the Albanian community, nobody
accepted the changes, and mere non-acceptance was the founding act of the
‘Independent State of Kosovo’. In practice, Albanians in public jobs lost their
money, their weapons, their oﬃces, but kept their titles. The new, Serb-dominated
authorities tended to ignore the Albanian majority of the province. The
Albanian-dominated communist society of the 1980s was changed to into a
virtual system of meaningless claims and pretensions. 
In July 1990, most of the Albanians in public service had been asked by the
new Serb authorities to sign a declaration of loyalty. Many of them refused and
were immediately dismissed, and many of those who signed were ﬁred later.4
Unemployment was high even before this. The pressure was greatest on school
and university teachers. The province’s authorities, now installed by Belgrade,
decided to introduce Serbian curricula and had Serbian textbooks translated into
Albanian. Very few Albanian teachers remained, and Serbs were unable to teach
Albanian children in their mother tongue. So school teaching simply went on as
it had been before, but with two changes: ousted teachers no longer got a salary
and, in many cases, the authorities kept the school buildings closed. The organ-
isation of a ‘parallel system’ thus meant providing money and sometimes alter-
native school rooms. Transition to a modern system of education did not and
could not take place. Teachers formally stayed in oﬃce for ten years, not con-
trolled by anybody. University teachers in particular look back on this period
when they taught students in their private homes as a time of heroism, and they
think they deserve gratitude and at least permanent employment (Koliqi 1997). 
The ‘government’ of the ‘Republic of Kosovo’, headed by the Germany-based
physician Bujar Bukoshi, organised a system of tax collection to ﬁnance the few
state-like authorities. In practice, taxes were collected by the LDK, as Noel
Malcolm put it (1998: 349). Precise data are missing, but most of the money was
almost certainly collected among young Albanians in western Europe who had
left the country ﬂeeing unemployment. The only state-like apparatus in Kosovo
besides education was the health system, organised by a humanitarian founda-
tion called ‘Mother Teresa’. The organisation played an important role in keeping
up some social welfare and medical treatment, although on a very low scale
(Malcolm 1998: 351). In fact, many Albanian health workers kept their jobs
even after 1990. In principle, there was always free access to hospitals and out-
patient clinics.
Oﬃcial tax collection more or less stopped, as the Serb ﬁnancial authorities
were unable to replace their Albanian colleagues. Not even electricity bills were
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paid. The infrastructure suﬀered from the lack of any repair and there was no
longer any public construction. Of course, the Serbian state continued to pay
pensions, but in fact, Albanian pensioners avoided the state bureaux in order to
avoid being humiliated or shouted at. Although the oﬃcial Serbian state institu-
tions never openly refused to cooperate with Albanians, most of the citizens were
reluctant to come into contact with ‘the Serbs’. The atmosphere in public build-
ings was rude. Going into a public oﬃce, younger men risked being handed over
to the police for anything suspicious, checked for weapons or beaten up. What
remained of the Serbian state served the needs of the Serb and Roma minority in
Kosovo. For the rest of the population, there was nothing but the police. 
Both communism and the pre-modern structure of Kosovo society pre-
vented the existence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Besides the
state and the family, there was no third sector. While the Orthodox Church in
Serbia fuelled nationalism, the Muslim community in Kosovo was completely
useless for political purposes. Although more than 90 per cent of Kosovo
Albanians come from a Muslim tradition, religion never had deep roots (Malcolm
1998: 134–138). Albanian nationalism has always been anti-Muslim. Its most
important mythical hero is Skanderbeg, who in the ﬁfteenth century organised
the Christian resistance against conquest by the Ottomans. According to nation-
alists, Islam is something that has been imposed on Albanians by foreign con-
querors; it is not looked upon as their ‘essential religion’. Referring to the famous
Kosovo battle of 1389, when a Christian army led by the Serbian Tsar Lazar was
beaten by the Ottoman forces under the sultan Murat, Albanian nationalists
claim their forefathers had instead fought on the Christian side. In their mythol-
ogy, Lazar was an Illyrian, i.e. pre-Albanian, and ‘had nothing to do with Serbs’
(Rizaj 1992: 122).
After 1990, most of the state functions were taken over by the family, which
had always played a very important role in Albanian societies. Even today, a con-
siderable part of the population live in so-called ‘complex households’ with up to
several dozen people, linked by kinship in the male line. In the countryside, family
compounds form entire village quarters, each of them surrounded by walls.
Villages frequently lack public places like pubs, mosques, or assembly halls as all
social life remains in the family. Neighbourhood is unimportant compared with
family links. When an enemy came, villagers in western Europe would gather in
the market place; in Albanian villages, there is no such thing. Everybody would
seek shelter within their own family walls. It is still amazing how little people
know about each other, and this fosters an atmosphere in which suspicions and
conspiracy theories ﬂourish. But on the other hand, the family provides for all an
individual’s basic needs and gives solidarity to all members. 
In rural and conservative areas, especially in western Macedonia, the state
has never really replaced the authority of the family. There was opposition to
female employment among religious Muslims which excluded Macedonian
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Albanians from industrialisation in the 1950s. Everything else the state
demanded was even more unpopular, above all taxes and military service. An
Austrian scholar has deﬁned the south-western Balkans societies as ‘acephal’
rather than pyramidal (Kaser 1992). At the time of the Ottoman Empire, the
Sublime Porte was interested only in the regular payment of tributes and had no
interest in self-organisation at a higher level (Kaser 1992: 164). Everything else
was left to the families. When, after the Balkan wars, Serbia occupied Kosovo,
people for the ﬁrst time came into contact with the challenges of a modern state.
The famous upheavals of the ‘Kacaks’ in the 1920s were primarily resistance to
the modern state as such, and not a national struggle (Banac 1995: 238–250).
Even now, one can feel a spirit of ‘freedom’ in all Albanian lands. ‘Freedom’ is the
most important slogan in all movements, against the Serbian or the Macedonian
state as well as those against the government in Tirana. In all of these move-
ments, freedom means the absence of the state, be it Serbian, Macedonian, or
even Albanian. The remains of ‘Kanun’, the ancient legal system still known to
many people in the countryside, regulates the relations between families; part-
time judges play a minor role, no police and no correctional system is needed.
Even in the most developed areas, contempt for the public space is visible to any
visitor. There are large private houses with some luxury, carefully cleaned and
abundantly decorated with brass and false marble, but schools look like ruins,
and nobody cares about rubbish collection. Sometimes families and neighbour-
hoods replace the absent state by self-organisation. In villages even road con-
struction is done privately. Many people prefer it this way. Interference by the
state means control, corruption and sometimes violence. Even in Albania proper
with its ninety years of state tradition, state authorities are often looked upon as
adhering to ‘another gang’. The notion of the state as a power neutral to personal
interests simply does not exist. 
Everywhere in the Balkans, but especially in Albanian areas, families are the
most important institution. After the collapse of the Yugoslav state authorities in
Kosovo in 1990, the families functioned as the natural backup system. They had
to care for the ill, the elderly and the disabled, give shelter to persecuted family
members and, during the war, form important defence units. Following an old
tradition, women were kept at home and the young men sent abroad to make
money, while the parents, the father’s unmarried brothers and the young wives
were engaged in household maintenance and agriculture. Many urban families
in Pristina, Peja/Pec or Skopje/Shkup keep close ties with their family houses
somewhere in the countryside. Even today, a big household is a sign of wealth
rather than a sign of backwardness.
Families like the Rs, in the hills above Vitina, were and still are the place
where the transition to market economy has happened. While many Serbs or
Macedonians were sitting in their tower blocks waiting for jobs to come,
Albanian families rapidly turned into modern proﬁt centres. From 1991 to 1992,
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the number of private enterprises in Kosovo increased 2.9 times (Lidhja 1996:
16). Many families can boast about ten or even more trained workers and profes-
sionals, all of them being supported by the women, wives and sisters, aunts or
nieces. Inside the family everybody can rely on each other and strict obedience to
the father or even the oldest brother (addressed by the title ‘bac’) is common. In
some parts it is the custom that all the money every family member earns is col-
lected and guarded by the head of the family. Some families engaged in interna-
tional trade and soon became wealthy. Emigration helped to ﬁnd partners
abroad. It is certainly true that quite a few families were involved in illegal busi-
nesses such as the drugs and arms trade and the traﬃcking of women; moral
standards beyond the borders of the wider family are certainly low. But it can also
be said that the pre-modern structure of Albanian families turned out to be more
modern in its ﬂexibility than any other structure in the area. 
Family spirit is also the explanation for what is erroneously called ‘Albanian
nationalism’. Everywhere else in Europe, nationalism is an ideology that came
about along with the bourgeoisie and industrialisation, replacing traditional
bindings by a spirit of belonging to a spiritual community. Nationalism among
Slav peoples in the Balkans started in the nineteenth century, often copying the
ideas and myths in western nations, with Serbs producing the richest mythology
and the highest aspirations of all. Like German nationalism, national ideas in the
Balkans were not at all conﬁned by state borders; most people lived in multi-ethnic
empires, the Ottoman or the Austrian-Hungarian Empires, and some, like the
Serbs, lived in small and emerging states. According to the German poet and phi-
losopher Johann Gottfried Herder, publisher of Slav fairy tales and an inﬂuential
thinker for East Europeans, a nation is a community based on common language,
common culture and common descent (Herder 1965: 224). The State is not even
mentioned. Nationalism is at ﬁrst a purely spiritual, ideological phenomenon
which might become political once the period of ‘liberation’ has begun.
Common descent, replacing the common state in western European nation-
alism, in German and Slav nationalism is a myth to give people the feeling of
belonging together, with little respect for real relations people might have. The
feeling of national solidarity, for example, led Croats in central Bosnia into a fatal
trap when they took sides with Croats in Herzegovina rather than with their
Muslim neighbours. In Bosnia, nationalism even split families. In Kosovo or
Macedonia it did not. For Albanians, the ‘national’ feeling of belonging together
is not a myth, but a part of their reality. Many people are able to recite the names
of their forefathers for more than ten generations back, and there is an amazing
awareness of to whom one is related. People feel closest to those to whom they
are the closest kin. An individual sees the social world in concentric circles, the
inner circle formed by his or her parents, children, brothers and sisters, outer
ones by cousins, some would even feel they belong to a ‘tribe’ (‘ﬁs’), and all feel
they belong to the Albanian nation, a large family united by real descent. Being
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itself the outer circle of a kind of family relation, national adherence can never
destroy family links. There are no reports that the very few mixed Albanian–Serb
families were divided by the conﬂict. Even the popular ‘godfather’ relations that
imitate kinship survived the war. 
But the crisis of the 1990s not only empowered families, it also signiﬁcantly
challenged them. Obvious police oppression was humiliating and harmed the
traditional authorities. Everybody could see that even the supposedly almighty
father, as head of the family, was afraid of the police. Adolescent sons sending
money from Switzerland objectively became much more important for the survi-
val of the family than their fathers. And ﬁnally, families could not compensate for
everything that the state had once provided. Kosovo Albanian society is the
youngest in Europe, with more than half of the population being aged under
twenty-ﬁve.5 The parallel educational system failed to provide everybody with
the necessary schooling, and generation after generation was sent into unem-
ployment and no prospects. Everybody who graduated from Pristina University
was solemnly handed their diploma, but few ever got a job, either in Kosovo, or
in Macedonia, let alone in western Europe. The old, mainly former communist
dignitaries of the Kosovo Albanian societies got their salaries, paid by young emi-
grants in Switzerland or Germany, but the ‘parallel system’ had nothing to oﬀer
the Kosovar youth. Although most young Kosovo Albanians remained loyal to
their families, a spirit of anger and of independence grew, especially among the
temporary emigrants in Zurich or Munich. 
In Kosovo, Rugova’s attentism and passivity led to more and more divisions
within the national movement (Troebst 1998: 9). Adem Demaci, a very popular
former political prisoner labelled ‘the Albanian Mandela’, was the ﬁrst to openly
criticise the oﬃcial policy, urging action instead. There was particular unrest
among students who repeatedly ignored the LDK recommendations and demon-
strated in public. The faction of ‘former political prisoners’, forming the so-called
‘left wing’ of the Kosovo political scene, gradually distanced itself from the
leaders. In 1996, the ‘Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves’ (Kosovo Liberation Army/
UCK) started to kill Serb policemen. A conspiratorial organisation based above all
in Switzerland and Germany and directed mainly by students, it gained more and
more sympathy among the young in Kosovo. When, in 1997, people in Albania
proper stood up against the semi-dictatorship of Sali Berisha, arms deposits were
looted on a massive scale, and much of the booty was sold into Kosovo. The
Kosovo Albanian establishment, unable to react, simply ignored the new force.
Yet in 1998, when Kosovo was already at war, Rugova claimed the UCK was only
an invention by the Serbian secret service. When in late February 1998 army
and police units cracked down on the rebel clan of the Jashari in a village in the
Drenica Mountains, the conspiratorial circle of the UCK suddenly became the
synonym for overall upheaval (Halimi and Shala 2000). However, neither before
nor after the Jashari massacre could the UCK be called a real army. 
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After the 78-day bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO forces in spring 1999, the
UCK was transformed into a paramilitary ‘civil protection corps’ in order to keep
the soldiers and oﬃcers under control and prevent them from terrorising the
province. But according to regional military traditions, leaders kept their inde-
pendence and did not subject themselves to political orders. For Albanians in
former Yugoslavia, and not only for them, the borders of the successor states
have little meaning. It was normal for everybody to continue to ﬁght for ‘freedom’
in Serbian Presevo or Macedonian Tetovo. The Albanians in the neighbouring
states and territories shared the desire for ‘freedom’. In Macedonia, there was a
ﬁerce debate on whether the Macedonian UCK was made up of Kosovars or
Macedonian Albanians. Among the Albanians nobody considered the question
important. In Yugoslav times, Pristina was the cultural centre and also the only
university for Macedonian Albanians, many of whom spent most of their lives in
Pristina which is only 70 km from Skopje. Borders are considered artiﬁcial and
unnatural, places of birth are more or less accidental, and it was the ﬁxing of the
border between Macedonia and Kosovo near the village of Tanusevci that incited
the war in Macedonia. 
The situation in Macedonia lifted the political veil from the events in Kosovo
and showed its social nature. In Macedonia there had never been any autonomy
for Albanians. Consequently there were no ‘parallel institutions’.Yet the societies
were and are strictly separated. The number of mixed Albanian–Macedonian
marriages amounted to just sixteen in 1999 (Brunnbauer 2001: 160).
Macedonians run the post-socialist state institutions, and Albanians have built up
a private sector. The latter have coped much better with the transition from self-
administrative socialism to capitalism. Although it is not easy to ﬁnd a meaning-
ful indicator, areas populated by Albanians are visibly wealthier than others.6 The
peace agreement of 16 August 2001, brokered by the European Union, invited
Albanians to engage in state institutions, which is anything but tempting to them.
Average salaries in ministries are as low as 100 Euro per month, and the private
sector oﬀers much better opportunities. A special quota allows ethnic Albanian
students to enrol at Skopje University with worse marks than Macedonians, but
few Albanians make use of the opportunity. With the peace agreement, Albanians
achieved something they had never sought.
As opposed to Kosovo, the situation in Macedonia was not unbearable for
Albanians when the violent conﬂict broke out. Arben Xhaferi, the ‘moderate’
leader of the Macedonian Albanians, was not as passive as Rugova in Kosovo. Yet
the radicals soon became more popular than the elected leaders. There are two
main reasons for this, ﬁrst, any conﬂict with the slightest national connotations
gathers all Albanians under one ﬂag – right or wrong, my family. There is hardly
a forum among Albanians to discuss diﬀerent opinions; the press is poor and obe-
dient to varying leaders. Second, the UCK insurgents met the spirit of ‘freedom’
as they promised to ‘liberate’ Albanians from the state rather than oﬀering to
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integrate them into it. Xhaferi’s party had joined the government only in late
1998, sharing power and sinecures with the national party of Macedonians, the
VMRO. From the perspective of professional western observers, Xhaferi’s party
had achieved a lot, important positions in Albanian-dominated municipalities
were for the ﬁrst time given to Albanians. But those who beneﬁted were all
members of Xhaferi’s party. Ordinary people in Tetovo or Gostivar did not feel
proud that the head of the county hospital or the culture hall was now a compa-
triot. They wanted ‘freedom’ and felt betrayed by Xhaferi. This is not a distinction
between ‘moderates’ and ‘radicals’, it is a rift between ordinary people, on the one
hand, who do not want to be bothered by any state authority and, on the other,
politicians who see a chance to exploit the institutions.
It is an old and sad story. Misled by the ‘national’ aspirations in the Balkans,
western diplomats force people into new states with nobody having a clear
picture of what they should look like or what they are good for. Albanians, at
least, want freedom of movement all over Europe rather than a national state,
and they are not interested in the heritage of corrupt and ruined socialist repub-
lics with which they never identiﬁed. But they get what others think is good for
them. Since the infamous London conference on New Year’s Eve 1912–13, when
a handful of ambassadors generously gave birth to the independent state of
Albania, little has been learned. 

1 The referendum took place on 26–30 September 1991. According to the oﬃcial result, 87
per cent participated, of whom 99 per cent voted in favour (see Zajimi 1994: 145).
2 Rugova himself, typically, sees it exactly the other way round: ‘C’est pourquoi, meme si
cela m’honore, je n’aime pas trop que l’on parle de résistance passive, gandhienne. Je dis
qu’il s’agit d’une résistance politique, non passive, donc non gandhienne’ (Rugova 1994:
126).
3 Stavileci (1995: 550) mentions 250 managers.
4 According to Stavileci (1995: 551), 135,000 were ﬁred, among them 20,000 teachers.
5 In Yugoslavia, Kosovo had by far the highest birth rate at 3.00. 
6 Natalja Nikolovska, a Macedonian professor of economics, has compared house construc-
tion in Macedonian and Albanian areas and found it several times higher in the latter
(Nikolovska 2001). 
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6Why is there stability in Dagestan 
but not in Chechnya?
Enver Kisriev
The formulation of the question
D,hasdemonstratedenviablepoliticalstability.ThisCaucasian republic, unique in its multi-ethnic composition,1 undergoingradical changes and similarly experiencing serious social transformations,
nevertheless successfully preserved its integrity; it did not allow mass inter-ethnic
clashes,socialdisorderanduprisings,andrefrainedfromborderdisputeswithneigh-
bours. Although there were instances of serious tension in the republic (the last mil-
itary actions in the Botlikhskii and Tsumadinskii mountains were in
August–September 1999 – the bloody conﬂicts with the ‘independent Islamic terri-
tory’ of the villages of Karamakha and Chabanmakha, and the conﬂict with the
armed Chechen divisions, who penetrated into Novolakskii raion), the course of their
development and their results bears witness to the fact that in Dagestani society there
are mechanisms at work which have up until now helped prevent the worst.
Particularly striking in this respect is the contrast with the political fate of
neighbouring Chechnya. The Republic of Chechnya borders on Dagestan.
Chechnya and Dagestan are linked through many signiﬁcant episodes of history,
in particular the general struggle against Russian expansion in the nineteenth
century and the formation of a single state, the Imamat of Shamil, who lead the
Caucasus mountain peoples’ struggle against Russian colonisation for twenty-
ﬁve years.2
Meanwhile, recent history demonstrates completely diﬀerent political
conduct in Dagestan and Chechnya. In Chechnya there has been a national rev-
olution and independence has been declared, but in Dagestan it has not been pos-
sible (for internal reasons) even to approve the sham ‘Declaration of State
Sovereignty’, which all the national republics of the Russian Federation passed
in 1991 under the direction of the Kremlin. Chechnya put up an unprecedented
armed resistance to the Russian army in 1994–96, whereas Dagestan constantly
devoted its energies to ever greater integration with Russia. 
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How is this to be explained? Which historical, socio-cultural or political con-
ditions and mechanisms secure the maintenance of internal stability in multi-
ethnic Dagestani society but do not allow the single Chechen nationality3 to aim
for the unity of their own political elite necessary for the founding of an indepen-
dent state? Why does the multi-ethnic, continuously in-ﬁghting Dagestani elite
nevertheless arrange a system of eﬀective cooperation among themselves and
seek close collaboration with Moscow, but the Chechen leaders, who belong to
one nationality, are at odds with one another in the periods of peaceful indepen-
dent development and unite only in times of direct opposition to Russia, exhibit-
ing a monolithic and eﬀective unity in these instances? These are diﬃcult
questions and this is an attempt only partially to clarify the relevant issues. Most
attention will be concentrated on the analysis of most recent political processes
in Dagestan. In the course of the analysis we try to note the essential diﬀerences
between Dagestan and Chechnya within the examined parameters of ethno-
cultural, historical and socio-political themes. 
The structure of the new elite
The political and economic revolution which took place in the Soviet Union in
the late 1980s and early 1990s may be called a ‘revolution from above’. Quite
clearly the famous existentialistic philosopher Karl Jaspers was not right when
he formulated the idea that ‘once introduced, a dictatorship cannot be removed
from within’ (Jaspers 1991: 218). Drawing on the experience of the political
history of the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, he maintained that ‘everything
that we know of the terroristic state with its characteristic total planning and
bureaucracy bears witness to the fundamental impossibility of stopping this
almost automatically self-preserving machine, which grinds up all internal resis-
tance’. Indeed, a leadership totalitarian in character and without the control of
society cannot be changed from below, but it has turned out that for this purpose
external interference is not at all necessary; change in the political regime and
all systems of social relations can take place from above, if the political and eco-
nomic elite, having been gradually reconstituted, takes on this task. Radical
changes in the political and economical structure of the state, eﬀected by the
ruling elite in correspondence with its new system of values, are possible pre-
cisely in a totalitarian political structure, in which there is no possibility of soci-
etal inﬂuence on the selection of political leaders and the taking of decisions of
crucial importance for the country. That such a revolution took place in
Dagestan is shown by the fact that radical transformations with catastrophic
eﬀects on most layers of society and especially on those who determine the char-
acter of the development of contemporary industrial society – i.e. qualiﬁed
workers and technicians, highly qualiﬁed specialists (doctors, engineers, teach-
ers, university lecturers, scientists, etc.) – practically did not aﬀect the top layer
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of society (the political, economic and cultural elite of the country), which
remained almost entirely as it was, ‘on top’.
In the meantime, however conscious and purposeful this process, once
embarked upon, it unavoidably called into being developments which the initia-
tors of perestroika did not expect. Such is the nature of social process: it can never
be completely assessed and controlled. New tendencies, developing unobserved
in the social system, unexpectedly begin to reveal themselves and alter the future
which the reformers would like to reach. Already after the ‘glorious revolution’
the social elite begins to undergo essential changes not only in the course of the
natural succession of cadres, but also under the inﬂuence of deep-seated and
unforeseen changes in society. 
In Dagestan and in Chechnya these processes developed as in the rest of the
country, but with essential, quite deﬁnite peculiarities conditioned by the
diﬀerence of historical conditions and existing ethno-cultural speciﬁcities, which
did not reveal themselves in any way within the framework of the totalitarian
communist regime, but with its collapse burst out and began to build new polit-
ical relations.
The general nature of the elite’s structural changes in the new post-
Communist society was that the main development was not the replacement of
representatives of the ‘old guard’ by the leaders of a new formation, but the
swelling of their number by the nouveaux riches, which Soviet society had not
known. Previously, advancement ‘upwards’ as a rule proceeded by moderate
steps under the strict control of high Party and state authorities. Special princi-
ples for the selection and positioning of cadres were consciously framed by a
large number of formal requirements and procedures (for instance by the com-
position of a nomenklatura of responsible workers of diﬀerent levels and the
supervision of their advancement), which it was formally impossible to avoid.
The sharp increase in the total number of state bureaucrats in the country
speaks vividly of the fact that in the new conditions a uniﬁcation of the old elite
with the new took place. While it seemed that the fall of the giant Soviet commu-
nist regime should have lead to the simpliﬁcation and rationalisation of the insti-
tutions of state governance, the opposite occurred: according to estimates, the
total number of civil servants increased in Russia by 50 per cent, and in Dagestan
by 100 per cent.
In Chechnya these processes developed diﬀerently, beginning with the fact
that the political history of these two republics in the socialist system diﬀered
signiﬁcantly. At the end of the 1920s in the North Caucasus the young Bolshevik
regime, after putting down the uprising of the Imam Nazhmudin Gotsinskii and
Sheikh Uzuna-Khadzhi Saltinskii in Dagestan (subsequently to be taken up by
the inhabitants of Chechnya), proclaimed the formation of two ‘autonomous’
multi-ethnic republics: the Dagestani and the Gorskii Soviet Socialist Republics
(SSR).
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For the ﬁrst three years the political fates of these North Caucasus state for-
mations appeared diametrically opposed: the Gorskii SSR began to collapse in the
ﬁrst year of its existence and by 1924 had ceased to exist, falling into eight
administrative units: six national oblasts (Karachaevo-Cherkasskii, Adygeiskii,
Kabardino-Balkarskii, Chechen, North-Ossetian and Ingush) and the two cities,
Vladikavkaz and Groznyi, became independent administrative units with direct
subordination to the recently formed krai of ‘South-Eastern Russia’ with its
capital in Rostov-on-Don, part of the Russian Republic of the Soviet Union
(RSFSR). Dagestan, in this same period, not only preserved its state status of
‘autonomous national republic’ but also almost doubled its territory at the
expense of Caspian coastal ﬂat lands to the North. 
The further history of Chechen statehood is even more dramatic. In 1922
the Chechen okrug was separated from the Gorskii SSR and made into an auton-
omous oblast (AO) of the RSFSR. After the complete abolition of the Gorskii
Republic in 1924, the Ingush AO was also founded. At the very beginning
of 1934 both of these oblasts were uniﬁed into the Chechen–Ingush AO, which
in three years, in December 1936, was ﬁnally made into a republic, the
Chechen–Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (CIASSR). However, in
February 1944 this Republic, under the order of Moscow, was abolished and the
Chechen and Ingush peoples were one and all rounded up from their homes,
loaded onto railway carriages and sent to remote regions beyond the Urals and
in Central Asia. Only in 1957 was the CIASSR restored with the loss of the
Prigorodnyi region, left in Ossetia, but the Chechens and Ingush permitted to
return to their lands. Finally, in the autumn of 1991, after the fall of the commu-
nist regime, and in the course of opposition to the centre for independence, the
Chechen–Ingush Republic painlessly and by mutual agreement once again fell
apart into the Chechen (independent) and the Ingush (‘autonomous’, but part of
Russia) Republics. In the course of this long period of Chechen and Ingush polit-
ical formations, the political status of Dagestan did not change once. 
The existing diﬀerence between Dagestan and Chechnya in the period of
communist leadership was also that in Dagestan throughout the whole of its
Republican status the highest leaders were, as a rule, representatives of the core
nationalities. In the early years after the Revolution and in the period of pre-war
economic development in Dagestan, the key posts were given to representatives
of local peoples. Many of them had received high-class educations before the
Revolution in the universities of St Petersburg, Moscow, and in Germany and
France – the Dargin Alibek Takho-Godi; the Kumyk Dzhalalutdin Korkmasov;
the Avar Magomed Khizroev; the Lezgin Nazhmudina Samurskii and others.
Starting with the post-war period, the primary oﬃcials (First Secretaries of the
Republican Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – CPSU) of
Dagestan were exclusively Dagestanis. In 1948, after the departure of the
Azerbaijani A. Aliev, who lead the republic throughout the Second World War,
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the Avar Abdurakhman Daniyalov was the head of the Republic until 1967;
then the Dargin Magomed-Salam Umakhanov until 1983; the Avar Magomed
Yusupov until 1990 and Mukhu Aliev right up to the liquidation of the CPSU in
autumn 1991. Apart from this post, all three of the highest positions in the
Republic (First Secretary of the CPSU, Representative to the Union of Ministers
and Representative to the Upper Soviet) were always, from the post-war period
onwards, occupied by ethnic Dagestanis. At the same time, these three posts were
formed in such a way as to be always held by representatives of the three diﬀerent
nationalities. In the post-war period the following sequences in the changing
‘troika’ were arranged as follows: Avar – Lezgin – Dargin; Dargin – Kumyk –
Avar; Dargin – Avar – Kumyk; Avar – Kumyk – Dargin. The controlling presence
of the Russians was manifested only in the institution of the ‘second secretary’
of the republican CPSU organisation and the post of the head of the KGB in
Dagestan. 
In Chechnya–Ingushetia the ﬁrst time that the highest post in the Republic
could be held by a ‘national’ was only in 1989, in the later phase of Gorbachev’s
perestroika. It was held by the Chechen Doku Zavgaev. At the same time, the First
Secretary of the republican CPSU organisation received his post not from the
hands of Moscow, as it had been always and everywhere, but contrary to
the Central Committee’s recommendation, in the course of internal conﬂicts in the
republican CPSU organisation and on a wave of glasnost and ‘democratisation’.
This aspect of Chechnya’s political history, namely that the ﬁrst Chechen
came to power in the Republic only in the phase of breakdown in ‘the leading and
guiding power’ and as one of its manifestations, is usually underestimated by
analysts trying to understand the reasons for the ‘Chechen phenomenon’. In
Chechnya–Ingushetia the communist regime possessed qualities which it did not
possess in Dagestan. In Dagestan the Russian component in the creative sphere
(science, literature, art) did not have a meaning linked to the exercising of domin-
ion power. Thus, for example, in Dagestan the most authoritative academics in
historical studies were ethnic Dagestanis. At the same time, it stands to reason
that there was no dominating concept of Dagestani history. After 1956, when
the ten-year period of the, imposed from above, historical negative attitude
towards the activity of Imam Shamil ended, the theme of ‘the national libera-
tion movement against tsarism of Dagestan and Chechnya’s mountain peoples
under the leadership of Shamil’ was one of the most researched and widely
taught university courses in the Republic. 
In Chechnya–Ingushetia in the last period of communist rule the Russian
professor V. G. Vinogradov, who was hated by the local intelligentsia, held com-
plete sway in historical studies and generally in the ﬁeld of ideology. He was the
chief ideologist of the republican CPSU organisation, in which the highest post
was always occupied by a Russian. His absurd and cynical ‘concept’ of ‘the peace-
ful and voluntary entry of Chechnya into the Russian Empire’ was thrust upon
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society. He was the censor for all academic activity within the Republic and the
chief selector of national cadres for the state-Party nomenklatura (Gakaev 1999:
150). Thus, right up until the very end of the communist regime’s supremacy,
Chechens experienced direct and tangible national–cultural oppression from the
centre, which was absent in Dagestan.
It is notable that in Dagestan one of the famous historians Professor Vladilen
Gadzhiev also adhered to the theory of the voluntary joining of Dagestan to
Russia. He based his point of view on diplomatic documents, which were evi-
dence of the numerous agreements of local Dagestani landowners with Tsarist
powers. However, his position was never the only one and never predominated. 
Therefore the coming to power of a Chechen in 1989 in Chechnya–
Ingushetia was a genuine revolution in the Republic’s history, it was viewed by
the national intelligentsia and people as a long-awaited liberation from Russian
diktat and to a signiﬁcant extent this event determined the character of future
events, which so diﬀer from how events developed in Dagestan. 
In Dagestan in the course of perestroika no particular changes in the cadres
of power took place. The CPSU was headed by an Avar, the government by a
Kumyk and the so-called representative of (Soviet) power was a Dargin. These
three people cooperating and clashing between themselves throughout the
upheavals of the perestroika process maintained the Republic in a condition of
relative calm. Not one of them could be ‘extracted’ from the system without all
the remaining leaders undergoing precisely the same fate. 
The ﬁrst real threat to destabilise power in Dagestan came with the fall of the
communist regime (August–September 1991). The Avars (numerically the
largest people in Dagestan) as a result of the fall lost the ‘highest’ (although at
that time already signiﬁcantly dissipated in its inﬂuence) post – the leader of the
republican CPSU organisation. After a few impressive ‘people’s demonstrations’,
which threatened mass inter-ethnic clashes, order was restored; and the former
leader of the Republican Committee of the CPSU took the post of the ﬁrst deputy
to the Chairman of the Upper Soviet of Dagestan. The shaken parity of powers
was in this way partially restored. Of course, hidden tendencies continued to
develop and in the end, essentially transformed the structure of the political elite
in Dagestan. To characterise this structure let us begin with the subdivision of
the ruling elite in Dagestan in two groups:
• high-ranking oﬃcials and bureaucrats;
• authorities in the non-governmental sphere, large-scale entrepreneurs,
leaders of social organisations and (or) informal groups, drawing on large
ﬁnancial resources and the mass support of their followers.
The relationship between these categories on the Dagestani Olympus could be
thought of graphically as a partial overlapping of two large groups. Thus, the for-
mation of another higher category of ruling elite ran parallel to the formation of
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this ‘binary’ structure and within its framework. Speaking visually, this might be
located in the area where the two original groups overlap. At the same time, the
traditional situation was unavoidably preserved: groups of a few diﬀerent nation-
alities, supported even more by the numerous national groups of the ‘second
echelon’, remained in power. The formation of this ‘third’ (higher) category of
ruling elite was brought about by two opposing tendencies:
• the enrichment of high-ranking state bureaucrats, their (new to them)
involvement in public political activity and the unavoidable formation
around them of latent structures of armed support;
• the acquiring by ‘charismatic’ ﬁgures and nouveaux riches of high-ranking
state or economic posts through the procedure of state appointments or
democratic elections.
Both tendencies led through a zone of numerous, often extremely embittered
conﬂict situations to the formation of a top political elite consisting partly of rep-
resentatives of the old regime but mostly coming from the nouveaux riches of the
perestroika epoch. In this way, the general structure of the ruling elite in Dagestan
does not consist only of the two original categories, but also of a ‘third’. It is very
clear that the ‘third category’ of the ruling elite is made up of the most inﬂuential
persons, relying on their national groups, and is gradually gaining inﬂuence and
control and is becoming the dominant group. The numerous members of the two
‘ﬁrst’ categories of elite, who have not succeeded in acquiring the qualities of the
third category, have found themselves in many ways marginalised. They ended
up on the fringes of the ruling class. It is well known that as a result of this diver-
gence in status, members of marginal groups are more radicalised; however,
while being divided into ‘national quarters’ and ‘marginals’, they were getting
themselves involved in the diﬃcult process of political bargaining, but they did
not call upon the people to overthrow the existing power regime. 
All this did not save Dagestani society from clashes of an extremely bitter char-
acter within the Dagestani ruling class: above all, between ‘heavyweights’, i.e.
among the representatives of the ‘third’ category of elite, but also between the
‘third’ and the two original categories; between the two original categories; and
ﬁnally,withinthesetwooriginalcategories. Inthecourseof theseconﬂictsaninter-
woven network of horizontal and vertical relationships of power and subordina-
tion formed, the subjects of which were the ethnic monolithic groups. Although
there was a tense stand-oﬀ between ‘heavyweights’, they were no less interested in
agreeing on a common course of action against a member of the ‘second rank’.The
‘second-rank’ fragments were in the course of internal feuding developing into
groups of support for one or the other ‘heavyweight’. Simultaneously, representa-
tives of the ‘second rank’ (‘marginals’), trying to get into the higher category or, at
least to retain high-ranking oﬃces or material resources, sought support either
from ‘above’ or ‘below’, building hierarchical chains of patron–client relations.
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There were many excesses in Dagestan, but they all had a ‘patchy’ charac-
ter, i.e. they did not get prolonged into mass demonstrations and clashes between
large groups of people. According to data oﬃcially published in June 2001, after
a series of attempts on the life of Magomed-Salikh Gusaev, the Minister for
Nationalities, Information and External Relations, who is popular in Dagestan
there have been eighty-six terrorist acts and other crimes were committed
against representatives of power in Dagestan since 1990. From these, there were
160 killed and 300 injured (Novoe delo 22 June 2001). All of this did not aﬀect
the political stability in the republic of Dagestan in any way. 
It was clear that the strongest basis for the formation of this interwoven
network of relations between numerous authorities was a diﬀerence in national-
ity. The theme of the nationality of leaders and their groups in Dagestan burst
into life and became crucial in political discourse for the duration of the transi-
tional period, and remains so. At the same time the Russian component of the
Republic’s ruling class was completely insigniﬁcant.
In Chechnya, it all turned out completely diﬀerently. After ‘their own’ (Doku
Zavgaev) came to power the euphoria of national celebrations quickly gave way
to the prosaic humdrum of political struggle, for the victory passed to one person
alone. The coming to power one of ‘their own’ in place of a ‘Russian’ did not
bring, and nor could it have brought, a general national unity in the conditions
of increasing destabilisation in the country and the previously invisible but now
revealed possibilities for enrichment. A new stage of bitter ﬁghts for power began,
but now among ‘their own’. 
Under the slogans of national unity and cleaning the authorities of corrup-
tion Dogu Zavgaev, like any new leader, began to strengthen his personal power.
In this connection the highly characteristic action of the new highest Party
leader was called the ‘Spring Fall’ among the people. In February–March 1990
in all the rural regions of the Republic there was a wave of meetings and demon-
strations of people’s protest demanding the dismissals of the raion CPSU First
Secretaries. This time it was a question not of Russians, but of Chechens and
Ingush. In one month, seven First Secretaries and the majority of responsible
CPSU and soviet bureaucrats, workers and law enforcement agencies were dis-
missed, and most of them were of Chechen nationality. Everywhere Zavgaev was
able to put his people in the vacated posts and only in one raion (Achkhoi-
Martanovskii) did the leader of a local informal movement (Sh. Gadaev) succeed
in becoming leader (Muzaev and Todua 1992: 35–36). 
Analysts assert that there is no doubt that the ‘people’s demonstrations’
were organised by Zavgaev himself in order to strengthen his power. As the well-
known Chechen historian Dzhabrail Gakaev writes in his article cited above: ‘the
wave of meetings, which occurred in the rural regions of the CIASSR in
February–March 1990 was initiated by Zavgaev with the help of the People’s
Front.’ Furthermore Gakaev expresses the important idea: ‘It did not remain
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unnoticed that Zavgaev used the people’s discontent and meetings in the regions
for the dismissal from power of people in the rural regions of the Republic who
were unwelcome. Soon, Zavgaev’s political opponents employed just such a
device against him’ (Gakaev 1999: 153). 
The device used by Zavgaev was also actively employed in Dagestan.
However, there, where power is traditionally shared between representatives of
the diﬀerent nationalities of a multi-ethnic society, the consequences of such
actions turned out completely diﬀerently. In Dagestan all actions linked to the
substitution of leaders of the central team require agreement and adequate
compensation in order to preserve the balance. In Chechnya, all actions which
reinforced the leader of the Republic led to the reinforcement of discontent and
to resistance on the other pole – in the irreconcilable opposition camp. This
binary polarisation of all political forces (on the one hand those in power, and
on the other the opposition to those in power) in a transitional and transform-
ing society can easily ‘swap poles’ and as a result of this become even more
unstable.
Soon, Zavgaev laid his hands on the duties of the Presidium of the Upper
Council of the CIASSR, both preserving for himself the dying Party power and
forming from his people the whole pyramid of power, which in Dagestan, owing
to the reasons noted above, could not have been accomplished. In this way, in
Dagestan we have revealed an elite, which one can divide into two, mutually
intersecting categories: on one side high-ranking oﬃcials and state bureaucrats
and on the other authorities in the sphere of non-governmental activities, etc.
which, in the course of mutual opposition, forms a new higher stratum of group-
ings led by representatives of diﬀerent nationalities which oppose, but also coop-
erate between, themselves. In Chechnya something completely diﬀerent came
about. Here, the two given, primary categories have begun to disperse to two
diﬀerent poles. Moreover, power turned out to be built as a pyramid, without
tension and counterbalances. There was no room for any kind of separate and
opposing groupings within the system of power. 
It also proved to be important that both opposing forces in the struggle
against each other appealed and sought support not in diﬀerent segments of
society, but in one target general to both – the Chechen people. This led to the
‘echoing’ of nationalist feelings. Those in power explained all their actions as
being in the interests of the Chechen nation, which the opposition also did in the
struggle against those in power. In every case the raising of nationalist feelings
may be nourishing opposition forces from without, i.e. most often Russia.
However, the ethnic ‘monolithic’ character of the Chechens, which brought
such an easy and painless ‘divorce’ from the Ingushetians, concealed, for the
time being, the explosive force of traditional Chechen clan structures (teips) and
other associations (see below). Zavgaev could not but use the force of cohesion
within the clan in the course of reinforcing his personal power; already, then,
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internal teip solidarity had awoken to political life. Subsequently, it tore the whole
of Chechen society apart.
Nationality, dzhamaat and teip
Dagestani nationalities, just like the Chechens, even in the recent past hardly
existed. Imam Shamil in his struggle against the Russians did not know of any
nationalities in Dagestan and did not formulate any ‘national’ tasks. For him and
his brothers-in-arms at that time the subjects of political confrontation were
completely diﬀerent. The political discourse of that time in Dagestan distin-
guished between ‘orthodox Muslims’ and ‘those, who called themselves Muslims,
but were not’ as the central political opponents. Avar, Dargin, Kumyk, Lezgin,
Lak, etc., ‘Dagestani nationalities’ from an ethnographic point of view, existed
objectively far more clearly then than they do now, however at that time they
were not meaningful elements of socio-political discourse, they did not contrib-
ute to social consciousness, they were not a means of ideological reﬂection on
events taking place and the motivation of the actions of their participants. 
Occasionally one can read in the text of the chronicle that someone ‘cried
out in the language of Ansali or that ‘Shamil’ spoke to them through a trans-
lator’, but a person’s nationality – which has become for contemporary
Dagestanis practically the most important attribute of a person’s identity –
remained outside the ﬁeld of vision of the enlightened person of that time.
At the same time, in the very same chronicles of the Caucasian wars,
Chechens appeared for all the Dagestani chroniclers as something whole and
diﬀerent from ‘Dagestanis’. It was stipulated that in Chechnya there were no
politically diﬀering compact territorial formations, analogous to the Dagestani
‘unions of free societies’ – or ‘republics’ as the Russian military correspondents
called them – or authoritative ‘principalities’: shamkhalates, khanates, utsiinates,
etc. But the clan structures of Chechens in the conditions of strict Shariat, and
generally all mountain peoples, were established by Shamil as an enemy in the
face of the ‘gyaurs’ (unbelievers), and they were in this political context abso-
lutely inseparable. 
The development of diﬀerent ‘nationalities’ –Avar, Dargin, Lezgins, Kumyks,
Laks, Tabasaran, Nogay, Tats, Rutul, Aghul, Tsakhur but also Chechens and
Ingush, took place ﬁrst in the period of the communist regime. This process took
place in a framework developed by the Bolsheviks, with the understanding of
nation and people enforced by violence, and in the context of a national policy of
‘the self-determination of peoples’. It is true that the understanding of ‘national
self-determination’ was then emptied of any authentic political meaning, and
instead was ﬁlled to the brim by a whole wealth of ethnographic material. 
The contemporary nationalities of the mountain peoples developed ‘from
above’, pre-empting a national consciousness, as a result of decisions taken by
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the authorities relating to the establishing of a ‘scientiﬁcally founded’ nomenkla-
tura of nationalities and their registration in all civil documents, bureaucratic
forms and passports. Of course, in doing this attention was paid to objective eth-
nographic characteristics and to ethnic identiﬁcations developing in the con-
sciousness of the population. It must be said that signs of ethno-cultural
proximity or ethnic relatedness did not necessarily constitute factors in deter-
mining the motivation of national self-identiﬁcation. They may have proven to
be the idea of political conjuncture, the communist leadership’s changing polit-
ical blows in the direction of ‘ethnic processes’ (the ‘dawning’ or ‘rapproche-
ment’ of Soviet peoples) or, let us say, the nationality of high-ranking oﬃcials or
other social, political and far from ethnographical factors.
The communist regime, propagating proletarian internationalism in this
phase of its formation, in the following phase initially underwent unavoidable
nationalist erosion precisely in the elite; to start with in the artistic elite, then
carefully supported by the scientiﬁc and political elites. The history of the last
twenty-ﬁve–thirty years of the USSR was marked by a growing social awareness
of nationality. Because, as the regime decayed, personal relations of trust which,
as is well known, are easier to establish among persons of a common ethnic
origin, started to acquire more and more importance among the ruling class in
the centre and the republics, and a hidden nationalism began to put down strong
roots.
Similarly in Dagestan, with its particular multi-ethnic structure, mono-
ethnic groupings of mutual dependence and support not perceivable on the
surface of public life started to form, especially among the elite. The process of
strengthening national bonds vertically and horizontally initially remained in
the shadows, but immediately after the collapse of the communist regime in
August 1991 the forces which had formed, based on intra-ethnic solidarity,
revealed themselves in all ﬁelds of political struggle. The peculiarities of the
Dagestani ethnic structure detailed above began under the new conditions to
determine the direction of political process in Dagestan. The ruling elite of the
Republic, consisting of representatives of the basic Dagestani nationalities,
having lost their base in the power structures which had collapsed, re-established
it in the systems of conﬁdence between personal friends, relatives, co-regionalists
and especially among co-ethnics.
The national organisations of the respective peoples, emerging and gaining
strength and authority in the population, actively opposed the republican
authorities, thus forcing the old ruling elite to strengthen vertical intra-national
ties. This is why the subsequent political process in Dagestan consisted of the
extension of the political elites’ inﬂuence on the national movements of their
peoples. High-ranking oﬃcials tried to become the leaders of their peoples, and
the informal leaders of the national movements and the nouveaux riches, who
stepped forward completely unexpectedly, endeavoured to become members of
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the ruling elite. To a certain extent both goals were realised. As a result, in the
course of the transformation of the 1990s the multi-ethnic structure of
Dagestan turned into a decisive political factor. 
The mobilisation of political forces in the republic did not take place on the
basis of ideological diﬀerences and political parties, but of identities, at the core
of which were traditional ethno-cultural values. Nationalities, which quite
recently still did not play any political role and were merely objects of the
‘national politics’ of an authoritarian and essentially centralised state, were now
transformed into the determining subjects of the political process.
In Chechnya–Ingushetia ethnic processes ran diﬀerently. From the very
beginning, Chechens and Ingush, as an integral unit, diﬀered distinctly as inde-
pendent peoples, and in their political history within the framework of the com-
munist system. This was reﬂected in the administrative divisions of the 1920s,
which were directed from above. Subsequently, they were universally exiled from
their homeland and found themselves in extreme living conditions in an alien
ethnic environment. Chechen and Ingush representatives of the Soviet politi-
cal–administrative, military and intellectual elites were torn out of the commu-
nist establishment and began, in the heart of their people, to try and get a niche
in the informal leadership of the traditional clans and religious ‘aksakals’ and to
integrate with them. In the conditions of exile, the Chechen and Ingush tradi-
tional clan structures failed to weaken, and gained an even greater deﬁnition and
a signiﬁcant source of functional stability. Parallel with this, the general national
self-awareness of their peoples grew stronger. 
Returning to the homeland after the amnesty in 1957, the Chechens and
Ingush found a completely occupied socio-political space and they had to ﬁght it
and ﬁrst of all the Russians little by little. The region where they lived and where
their Republic was restored, at that time, thanks to Groznyi oil, became in indus-
trial terms the most developed in the North Caucasus. Chechens and Ingush
started once again to create a political–administrative elite and intelligentsia,
and to obtain for themselves an increase in political weight in their Republic. But
nevertheless, right up until the fall of the communist regime, the ethnic Russian
component continued to dominate in political and civil institutions of the
Chechnya–Ingushetia Republic. The transformation of the regime, as we have
already shown, continued there, by contrast to Dagestan, primarily in the
general national movement for liberation from Russian guardianship. 
However, it seems strange that nationalism, for all its importance in the
social consciousness of Dagestani peoples and Chechens has, in both places, its
own peculiar limits of diﬀusion. In Dagestan, we see that leaders of one and the
same nationality bitterly clash among themselves, and often ally with groups of
other nationalities. In Chechnya we see equally bitter struggles between author-
itative leaders, the grounds for which serve personal ambitions and mercantile
motivation and prevail over general national state interests. Why is this so? 
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In Dagestan, political practice bears witness to the fact that although people
do not stop talking about nationalities they have, as a rule, become of secondary
importance or have completely lost their importance when it comes to the solu-
tion of serious problems. For example, popular leaders of national movements,
whose mass authority is based on the clear expression of historical and contem-
porary grievances, and the needs and demands of their respective nationality, do
not succeed in even gathering the necessary number of signatures for registra-
tion as a candidate for the republican parliament. If some of them do manage to
break through to the ruling class, then it is probably at the price of defending the
interests of their respective peoples and owing to other qualities, unrelated to
nationality issues. Alternatively, for example, the leader of one nationality ‘unex-
pectedly’ forms a political alliance with an authoritative ﬁgure of another
nationality against a second leader of his or her own nationality. 
In Chechnya the overthrow of Doku Zavgaev happened exclusively with
support from the centre, in as much as the inﬂuential ‘Moscow Chechens’, for
their own personal aims, supported the growing internal opposition of the ‘new’
Chechens. Subsequently, the fragility of Chechnya’s political structure remained
the same: a universal change in the ruling class with Dzhakhar Dudaev, and the
formation of a new irreconcilable opposition of all who were now out of power. 
With all of the pro-Chechen political action and nationalist rhetoric of
Dudaev, his power not only failed to strengthen, but actually lessened from the
beginning of his leadership. Only the crude and foolish interference from
Moscow turned Dudaev into an all-nation leader. On 7 November 1991, Yeltsin
with his presidential decree No. 178 ‘introduced’ a state of emergency in
Chechnya, on the evening of 8 November Chechnya found out about it, on 9
November the triumphal inauguration of President Dudaev took place and on
10 November 1991 Yeltsin cancelled his ridiculous decree. The threat of a new
deportation of Chechens and the crude interference from without rallied the
Chechen nation around their new leader. Henceforth Dudaev again gradually
began to lose the authority of a national leader and met with growing opposition
up until the moment when Russia attacked the mutinous Republic. The war from
1994 to 1996 once again made the Chechens into a monolithic nation ﬁghting
an external enemy, but after the end of the war and the gaining of de facto inde-
pendence, Maskhadov, the victor in the war and in all-nation alternative demo-
cratic presidential elections, did not manage to establish eﬀective control over the
situation in the country. The leaders of the Chechen people in their narrow mer-
cenary struggle among themselves gave up themselves and the Chechen’s
national interests, and in the end, on the eve of civil war, and in order to avoid it
they found a new supply of national unity in an external enemy: they attacked
the neighbouring Republic – Dagestan. 
Something is clearly hiding behind the nationalist discourse both in
Dagestan and Chechnya. A deepened analysis of the practice of confrontation in
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the top political leadership of Dagestan, studying the mechanisms of appoint-
ment to high oﬃce, the formation of political groups, research into the electoral
behaviour of the population and the adoption of campaigning technologies and
much else allows one to draw the conclusion that the nationalist discourse,
which dictates to the public conscience the forms and means of thinking about
what is happening, does not reveal but hides the genuine structure of political
relations which have formed here. In Dagestan the situation usually pictured is
such that in the concrete political process in the republic the respective national-
ities assume the role of agents of the opposition. However the real subjects in the
Dagestani political scene turn out to be structures, which are not present in polit-
ical discourse and which thus seemingly do not exist in reality. However, they can
be uncovered if one turns one’s attention from what is happening at the front of
the stage to follow concrete internal political events.
These latent organised structures can be provisionally named ‘ethno-
parties’, in as much as they possess all the formal attributes of western European
parties:
• a degree of common thinking and corporate interest indispensable for the
mobilisation of social forces;
• an organisational structure, consisting of one or several authoritative leaders
and a suﬃcient number of activists to carry out the necessary activities;
• ﬁnancial support from representatives of the highest property elite and the
mass support of certain segments of the population.
The diﬀerence is ‘merely’ in the fact that the leaders of these ‘parties’, the
mass and ﬁnancial support of their activity, as a rule, are realised by the repre-
sentatives from one subnational ethnic community at the level of rural villages
or groups of closely situated villages, historically linked with each other, i.e. that
which in Dagestan has long born the name ‘Dzhamaat’.4 Among the functionar-
ies of the ethno-parties one can even meet persons of other nationalities,
however the key components of these political formations (leaders, ﬁnancial and
mass support) are composed of persons of a single traditional community, more
organised than the national groups. Thereby not one Dagestani nationality has
a single political centre, i.e. one ethno-party. They serve the interests of particu-
lar groups and thus cannot embrace the whole nationality. The leaders of these
‘parties’ often not only do not unite with other groupings of the same national-
ity, but even ally themselves with the ethno-parties of representatives of other
nationalities against ‘their own people’, if it seems necessary to them.
What has been said here can be illustrated by the results of election cam-
paigns. The opinion that Dagestanis vote for the representatives of their own
nationality and the ruling elite consolidates along ethnic lines is axiomatic in the
public consciousness of the Republic, but these ideas do not correspond with
actual practice, which can be reconstructed from concrete sources.
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For example, at the election to the Duma in 1996 in the Makhachkalinskii
constituency (comprising all of northern and central lowland Dagestan), four
authoritative Avar leaders hindered each other in winning the elections and a
representative of the relatively sparse Lak nationality, Nadir Khachilaev, became
deputy with only 27 per cent of the votes. The Lak population in this constitu-
ency comprises not more than 8 per cent of the population.
The election campaign and the elections of the mayor of the Republic’s
capital, Makhachkala, equally vividly conforms to the thesis that the genuine
subjects of the political process are not the nationalities, however much this
might seem obvious in everyday perception, but rather concrete ‘parties’, the
basis of which form a denser traditionalist community, acting in a complex
system of political relations with other similar structures. In this case the basic
struggle developed between the Dargin Said Amirov and the Avar Sheruchan
Gadzhimuradov. In the capital of Dagestan the Avar population is considerable
larger than the Dargin, but they do not account for more than 26 per cent of all
inhabitants of Makhachkala. For some reason, two candidates of Avar national-
ity lacking even the slightest chance of victory joined the struggle between the
two main pretenders. In the end, Said Amirov won with an overwhelming major-
ity (71 per cent of the votes).
In the by-election for a Duma deputy’s mandate in 1997 the Lezgin
Magomed-Fazil Azizov won instead of the Avar Ramazan Abulatipov, appointed
by the then Vice-President of the Russian Federation in the Buijnaksii region. In
the course of the election campaign the following attracted attention. After the
well-known Avar leader Gadzhi Makhachev – a ﬁgure who would have undoubt-
edly gone through – for some reason withdrew his candidacy, the ‘Avar Popular
Movement’ which he headed took the decision to support not the candidacy of
the Avar Magomed Aliev, who realistically aimed for victory and was supported
by the former deputy for the constituency Abdulatipov, but rather a diﬀerent
Avar, Arkadii Ganiev, whose chances were unanimously rated as nil. The real
struggle unfolded between the Avar Aliev and the Lezgin Azizov, and the latter
won with an impressive result – 54 per cent of the votes. In this region Lezgins
constitute only 22 per cent of the total population. Of course, the victor could
secure himself the block voting of his fellow Lezgins. Indeed, in the ﬁve deeply
‘Lezgin’ districts of Dagestan (Magaramkentskii, Kasumkentskii, Kurachskoii,
Achtynskii and Dokusparinskii) he received around 60,000 votes, and his basic
rival Magomed Aliev only 150. All in all, in southern Dagestan, which addition-
ally includes Rutulskii, Agukskii, Hivskii, Tabasaranskii and Derbentskii raions,
Azizov got more than 130,000 votes and his main rival only 20,000. We observe
the mirror image of this in the basically ‘Avar’ districts. From ten such districts
belonging to the constituency Aliev received only 74,000 votes, but Azizov ‘cap-
tured’ from him 11,000 Avar votes. Thus, in the ‘purely’ Avar district of
Gubetovskii out of 7,000 voters, 4,000 voted for the Lezgin Azizov. Azizov’s ﬁnal
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victory was handed to him by the ‘Dargin’ districts of the republic. In them,
Azizov received 53,000 votes and his main opponent 24,000. Azizov came
second to Aliev only in the ‘Dargin’ district of Kaitagskii (4,800 votes to 5,200).
In the Lakskii district the share of the vote went Aliev’s way (4,500 to 2,800).
All these and other examples of real political practice bear witness to the fact
that Dagestan has not gone down the road of national segregation and that nation-
alism here, in the ﬁnal analysis, did not become the catalyst for political confronta-
tion. Although if one were to follow the social–political discourse of this entire
period, everything apparently comes down to the problem of national solidarity, of
the ‘rights’ of nationalities to their share of political power, to ‘their’ land, etc. Why
did nationalism yield in the real political process to a diﬀerent type of solidaristic
relationship, constituting the basis of the structure we refer to as ethno-parties?
The explanation must quite clearly be sought in history of Dagestan.
From as far back as the early Middle Ages in Dagestan, clan identity was
replaced by a political identity, which did not embrace the whole settlement area
of ethnographic collectives with a common origin. In the historical chronicles of
that time we do not come across clans, but rather well-deﬁned political forma-
tions (Derbetskii emirate, Serir, Khaidak, Zerikhgeran, Shandan, Filan, Zuklan,
Karakh, Tabasaran, Gumik, Lagz) (Gadzhiev, Davydov and Shikhsaidov 1996:
234–254).
Subsequently from the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries onwards a complex
system of independent, but inter-related political formations with norms of self-
government developed – the so-called dzhamaats. The ethno-cultural (tribal) uni-
formity of large areas, which outside observers detected easily, from antiquity up
to the present day, already had no political meaning in Dagestan, at least from the
ﬁfteenth or sixteenth century onwards.
The social–legal structure of the dzhamaats were essentially uniform
throughout Dagestan, but of course with numerous nuances. The dzhamaat, ﬁrst
and foremost, strictly separated its citizens from all outsiders. Belonging to a dzha-
maat constituted the strongest identiﬁcation for a Dagestani and was supported
by written laws. The highest degree of punishment was expulsion from the dzha-
maat, which led to the loss of its protection and almost certain death or disaster.
Every dzhamaat comprised a few (at least three) clan groups, or ‘tukhums’. The
tukhum (a large community of blood-ties) did not possess any common property
and or an inherited leadership (leader of the family). New settlers could be taken
into the tukhum, families could move from one tukhum to another and even
broader redistributions of the population of a dzhamaat could take place between
tukhums. At the same time, civil arrangement of the internal life of a dzhamaat
was such that the energy of natural internal tukhum solidarity between members
of one clan group was strictly limited and regulated by written dzhamaat laws
(adat).5 The membership of a dzhamaat member in a certain family group
(tukhum) was constituted ‘from above’ as an institution which, alongside other
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measures, secured public order. The tukhum, in its essence, was a mechanism (a
conductor) with the purpose of eﬀectively transmitting decisions of the author-
ities to the individual members of the dzhamaat. The entire adult male population
of the dzhamaat, excluding temporary settlers, guests and prisoners of war, were
equal before the law. Ownership of land and all other property was divided up
exclusively into dzhamaat (woods, pastures and hayﬁelds), private (farmed plots
and gardens) and vakuf, i.e. the formerly private land, inherited or presented by
the mosque of the dzhamaat. The basic social cell of the dzhamaat was the family,
usually extended, as occurs quite often up to the present day. There was a well-
established institution of individual private property, especially land. Property
rights regarding land were scrupulously determined by dzhamaat laws and were
limited only in cases of the sale or gifting of land to another dzhamaat.
In this way, the dzhamaat was the civil and political unit of the traditional
social organisation of the Dagestani population. It possessed distinct territorial
boundaries. Its land was protected not only with military resources, but also by
legislation regarding the rights to buy and sell land. In essence the dzhamaat was
a city-state, a polis.6 In a certain sense contemporary Dagestani nationalities,
founded in the course of the ‘socialist settling of the national question’, are a
bureaucratic ‘reanimation’ of ancient clan communities, the basis of whose con-
struction was ethno-cultural similarity, i.e. general ethnic characteristics, which
can be easily ascertained by objective examination. The total number and list of
nationalities, which in the ﬁnal analysis were institutionalised in the period of
communist rule, were (1) the Avars, (2) the Dargins, (3) the Kumyks, (4) the
Lezgins, (5) the Tabasarans, (6) the Rutuls, (7) the Aghuls and (8) the Tsakhurs.
The bureaucratic authority which had established this structure of nation-
alities, only had to disappear and disorder break out for the structures of the tra-
ditional political organisation of the Dagestanis to start to revive. 
Judging by all of this, traditional social structures have also been revived and
involved in the contemporary political process in Chechnya. And here we turn to
the deepest diﬀerence between Chechnya and Dagestan, the teip (clan) system of
Chechen society. 
Dagestan, beginning in the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth centuries with the for-
mation period of the main, uniﬁed, numerous clan groups (tukhums) and settle-
ments (dzhamaats), went down the path of forming compact territorial political
identities of a civic type. Clearly, this depended on the stormy and all-enveloping
development of Islam in the region at the same time. Islam at that time in
Dagestan was turning into the most important component of the ideological,
legal–political and cultural life of every single dzhamaat and, at the same time, was
the basic formation of the whole system of internal Dagestani economic, political
and cultural relations: the process of dzhamaat union formation, their upper
unions, the uniﬁed common market system, single language and ideology. In this
century (ﬁfteenth–sixteenth) the understanding of ‘Dagestan’ as a separate and
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distinct political–cultural entity took shape, diﬀerent to Christian Georgia, Shiite
Azerbaijan and heathen Chechnya.
In Dagestan the laid-down structure of a traditional society consisted of the
following elements: the family (nuclear or extended); the tukhum (the clan
society of close relatives through the male line, existing exclusively within the
framework of a given dzhamaat); the dzhamaat (a politically autonomous and ter-
ritorial unit, organised with the help of civil laws); the ‘voluntary society’ or
‘principality’ (political union of a ﬁxed majority of compactly located dzhamaats,
on the principle of either equality or inequality, on the basis of a republican or
authoritarian regime); Dagestan (a whole economic–cultural and histori-
cal–ethnographic society). 
Chechen traditional society was built diﬀerently: the family – dyuozal, dezal
(nuclear or extended); dzha (the extended family, kin, a few closely related fami-
lies, living nearby); niekeii (clan society, the aggregate of related kin, not depen-
dent on the place of residence); gar (the aggregate of related people with distant
but genuine common ancestors); teip, var (the aggregate of related gars); tukuam,
tukkhum (the tribe, the aggregate of the identiﬁed relations, teips and vars); kam
(the whole people, Chechens) (see Nash Dagestan 1995). 
In particular, evidence of the deep diﬀerences between Dagestanis and
Chechens in the organisation of life is that among Dagestanis it is permissible and
even encouraged for cousins to marry, whereas Chechens are still categorically
opposed to marriages even within the same teip, i.e. between relatives through
the father’s line, the unity of which can be traced deep into antiquity, over the
distance of ten–ﬁfteen generations; there cannot be marital relations as they are
still considered ‘brother’ and ‘sister’. 
The structure of traditional Chechen society, built on a ‘clan’ principal, has
inescapably turned out to be highly intricate. Thus there is no one opinion on the
quantity of teips and tukkhums; sometimes no diﬀerence is made between these
two categories and sometimes it is particularly emphasised. Sometimes one also
hears that one or another teip or tukkhum is ‘impure’ or ‘not Chechen’, etc. 
The war with Russia which uniﬁed all Chechens could not halt the process
of stratiﬁcation of Chechen society into ‘teips’.7 The structures of military units
(the army) headed by ‘ﬁeld commanders’, to a large extent, reﬂect the teip struc-
ture of contemporary Chechen society. 
The coming to power of the ﬁrst Chechen (Doku Zavgaev) in 1991 switched
on a mechanism for internal power struggles in the Republic. With the collapse
in the legal and ideological system of the communist regime and open power
struggle, the Chechen traditional clan identity should have inescapably become
the most important resource for the regulation of social relations. If in Dagestan
ethno-parties were built on the foundations of traditional dzhamaat identity, then
it is clear that Chechen ethno-parties stand on teip solidarity. However, the
diﬀerence is that dzhamaat is a distinct fragment of a given nationality – that is,
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that social category which is openly controlled and regulated in the system of
political relations in Dagestan. As far as teip structure is concerned, it does not
exist existentially (it is present in the consciousness of Chechens) so it is not pos-
sible to imagine how it could be taken into account. 
The Dagestani model of ‘consociational democracy’
The new Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan was passed on 26 July 1994,
after three years of tortuous searching for the political structure most acceptable
to the republic. For the entire duration of its preparation the key idea of all con-
cepts, which determined the direction of the search and fuelled the basic conﬂicts
and disagreements, was the observation of the ‘rights of nationality’. A broad
class of social and political activists and specialists – members of the ‘Group for
the Composition of a New Constitution’, grappled with a solution to the problems
of organising power in the republic, which could oﬀer guarantees for the rights
of all the peoples of Dagestan to ‘their’ respective land and ‘their’ natural
resources, and secure a just representation of every nationality in the organs of
state power and in organisations responsible for material production, education,
science and culture. However it was impossible, for very understandable reasons,
to ﬁnd public agreement in the solution of such questions.
On the other hand, the highest political leaders, who were to decide what the
Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan would look like, were interested in an
organisation of power, which would exclude the possibility of its concentration
in the hands of one person. All these eﬀorts led in the end to a quite original polit-
ical structure in Dagestan.
Thus, according to the new Dagestani Constitution, the organ of the
supreme executive power consists of fourteen people. These are the members of
the State Council, and they are not elected directly by the people, but by a special
institution, the Constitutional Assembly, which assembles exclusively for such
cases and also for constitutional amendments. It comprises members of the
Parliament and also a number of members specially elected by representative
assemblies of district and city organs of self-government.
According to the Constitution of Dagestan, ‘not more than one representa-
tive of a single nationality’ can be a member of the State Council, consisting of
fourteen members (Article 88).8 Members of the State Council cannot be parlia-
mentary deputies, members of the government or judges, but are allowed to
combine executive functions with work as procurators, lecturers, managers or
employees of corporations or state organisations or enterprises.
Initially the chairman of the State Council – the ‘head of state’ according to
the Dagestan Constitution (Article 92) – is elected secretly by the Constitutional
Assembly. A second member of the State Council takes his seat without being
elected – this is the Prime Minister, who takes up his post at the suggestion of the
Stability in Dagestan but not in Chechnya?
121
Chair of the State Council and after conﬁrmation by Parliament. The Prime
Minister, in this way, automatically becomes a member of the State Council and,
what is more, the ﬁrst deputy of its Chair. Subsequently, when the nationality of
the two aforementioned members of the State Council is known, the procedure
of electing the remaining twelve members begins in the Constitutional Assembly.
Every member of the Constitutional Assembly independent of his own national-
ity has the right to recommend a candidacy for the State Council of any nation-
ality for the remaining twelve seats. After the lists of forwarded candidates (who
do not necessarily have to be members of the Constitutional Assembly) are
drawn up, grouped by nationality, a ﬁrst secret vote picks out two candidates
from each nationality, chosen according to the largest number of votes received.
A secret vote then determines which of these two remaining candidates per
nationality become members of the State Council.
The Parliament of the Republic (The People’s Assembly of the Republic of
Dagestan) consists of 121 deputies, elected by universal, direct and conﬁdential
ballot in territorial constituencies. At the same time, the Constitution of the
Republic of Dagestan ordains that ‘the representation in Parliament of all
nationalities of Dagestan be guaranteed’ (Article 72), and the mechanism for the
realisation of this constitutional norm is secured by the law ‘On Elections to the
People’s Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan’.
According to this law the mechanism for securing national proportionality
consists of the following: the territory of the republic is subdivided into ethnically
uniform territories (mainly the mountainous regions of Dagestan, which are
populated by compact masses of Avars, Dargins, Lezgins. Laks, Tabarasans and
other nationalities) and ethnically mixed territories, the cities of the Republic
and the rural districts of the plain. In ethnically uniform regions there are no
restrictions on the nationality of parliamentary candidates. In the ethnically
mixed regions and the cities the Law ‘On Elections’ gives the Republican Electoral
Committee the right to establish special ‘national territorial constituencies’, in
which only candidates from one nationality can campaign. At the same time, the
electorate of these multi-ethnic constituencies are in no way subdivided accord-
ing to nationality; the entire population of the constituency votes for candidates
belonging to a single nationality. This is done so that the electoral campaign
between authoritative leaders does not go outside of one nationality, and so that
for the multi-ethnic electorate of such a constituency the nationality of the can-
didates is meaningless and has no bearing on the results of the election.
Thus, in the ﬁrst election in 1995, of the 121 constituencies, sixty-six were
nationally deﬁned, i.e. each of them was designated to a certain nationality taking
into account the necessary proportion of national representation.9 For this
purpose twelve Avar, twelve Kumyk, ten Russian, seven Dargin, ﬁve Tabasaran,
ﬁve Azeri, four Lezgin, four Chechen, three Lak, two Tat constituencies and one
Tsakhur constituency were created from the multi-ethnic districts and all cities.
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One other constituency was allowed to have candidates of any nationality. This
made it possible to avoid the problem of legislative discrimination of members of
nationalities apart from the fourteen (for example Armenians, Jews, Georgians,
Ukrainians, etc.). These quotas, combined with elections in constituencies with
ethnically uniform populations (of which ﬁfty-ﬁve remained) made it possible in
the end to obtain a parliamentary body which adequately reﬂected the national
composition of the republic’s population. The parliamentary election of 1999
took place according to an analogous arrangement.
This entire system succeeds in functioning within the norms of the
Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan: ‘Everyone has a right to freely choose
and indicate his national belonging. No one should be forced to choose and indi-
cate his national belonging’ (Article 31).
Apart from the rules regulating the national composition of supreme state
institutions, there is also a norm securing the protection of the most important
attributes of nationality. Article 81, part 33 of the Constitution of the Republic
of Dagestan ordains something resembling the power of veto: ‘In the considera-
tion of questions regarding changes in the established administrative–territorial
structure and also the demographic, linguistic, socio-economic and cultural
environment of the people of Dagestan, in the case of disagreement with the
drafted motion of a deputy or a group of deputies from a given territory a deci-
sion must be passed with a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly.’
Such a system of taking into account national representation is exposed to
constant criticism from the numerically few, but active liberal intelligentsia. The
basic ﬂaw is seen to lie in the fact that this system contradicts the rights of a
citizen to vote in the constituency in which he wishes to vote. The ‘medieval
restrictions’, in their opinion, establish the regulation of people by national char-
acteristics, which cannot correspond with the norms of the equality of citizens.
Many rules regulating the national balance, although not supported in arti-
cles of the Constitution, in laws or in any written rules at all, are strictly carried
out in practice. Thus, according to an unwritten rule, the senior ﬁgures in the
supreme institutions of authority (The Chair of the State Council and of
Parliament and of the Prime Minister) have to belong to diﬀerent nationalities.
The Prime Minister’s deputies are selected so that representatives of diﬀerent
nationalities are present and, if possible, not more than one belongs to any single
nationality. The situation with the deputies of the Chair of the People’s Assembly,
the leaders of parliamentary committees, the Administration of the State
Council, etc. is the same. National representation is also taken into account
regarding the senior ﬁgures in higher institutions of education and science.
The Dagestani model of political structure was formed free of any inﬂuence
from the concept of consociational democracy (Lijphardt 1977). At the same
time, it is clear that it can be considered to count as such a type of political
arrangement. 
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The fact that in Dagestan it is not nationalities which oppose each other but
ethno-parties signiﬁes a greater pluralism of political forces then it might seem if
only nationalities were to be singled out in the Dagestani political structure. That
also signiﬁes a more complex intertwining of variegated alliances of political
groupings, but at the same time the multiplication of possible causes of confron-
tation between them. All these circumstances taken together secure political
stability in Dagestan and, more importantly, discredit in the public consciousness
the nationalist discourse with which representatives of the elites, as a rule, justify
their eﬀorts to mobilise ‘popular’ support for their beneﬁt.

1 In Dagestan live more than thirty ethnic groups. Fourteen are regarded as ‘basic’ in
Dagestan. Traditionally, the political elite is recruited from the four largest groups Avars
(28.0 per cent), Dargins (15.8 per cent), Kumyks (13.1 per cent) and Lezgins (11.5 per
cent).The overall population is about 1.77 million. (Figures as of 1989, Natsionalny sostav
naseleniia SSSRpo dannym Vsesoiuznoiperepisi naseleniia 1989 goda (Ethnic Composition of
the USSR’s Population according to the All-Union Census of 1989), Moscow: Finansy i
Statistika, 1991.)
2 Imam Shamil was a Dagestani Avar from the Gimra dzhamaat. Shamil was the third
leader of the movement (imam) after the Avars Gazimagomed and Gazatbek. The begin-
ning of the opposition to Russia was organised under the leadership of the imams, but
opposition also started in 1830 on the territory of Dagestan and not directly against the
Russians, but against their stronghold in the mountains – the Khunzakh sovereigns (of
the Avar khans). Only after defeat at the hands of tsarist forces in a long and bloody battle
on the Akhulgo mountain in 1839 was it necessary for Shamil to leave and hide in
Chechnya, where he got shelter and support. In 1840, when the Chechens yet again rose
up in answer to Russian punitive expeditions, Shamil succeeded in organising their spon-
taneous demonstrations as a holy war against the unbelievers.
3 Used here in the sense of the Soviet term ‘nacionalnost’, referring to an oﬃcially recog-
nised ethno-national group.
4 ‘Dzhamaat’ is an Arabic word, meaning ‘society’, a distinct organised collective of people.
In traditional Dagestan there was no common term, signifying a state formation. They all
had their own names (Achty-para, Akusha-dargo, Nutsal (Chunzach), Utsmiist
(Kaitagsk), Antsuch, Agul, etc.). General terms, when they appeared and began to spread,
were borrowed from Persian, Arabic or Turkish. 
5 Adat (the Arabic for custom) signiﬁes the usual law of the peoples, which opposes Islamic
law – the Shariat. However, the use of this term to refer to the so-called ‘Dagestani Adats’
is mistaken. The written ‘constitution’ of the Dagestani political dzhamaat formations
(‘free societies’ and ‘unions of free societies’) were written and adopted by the mountain
people in their time as Muslim Shariah statutes. The perception of them as ‘adats’
appeared only at the beginning of the nineteenth century amongst Dagestani Myuridist
ideologists, who in the course of the war with Russia expanded the struggle with indepen-
dent dzhamaats for the uniﬁcation of Dagestan. The demand for the establishing of ‘pure
Islam’ on the whole of Dagestan’s territory unavoidably converted the ‘constitution’ of
independent dzhamaats into ‘adats’, with which to confront the Shariat. The Russian colo-
nial administration and historiography accepted this ‘Myuridist’ conceptual framework,
but in the struggle with this terrible ideological force in Dagestan, they relied on the return
of the ‘adat’.
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6 City-state’ and ‘polis’ are used here although these terms are not used by historians
writing about the political history of Dagestan. The generally accepted terms for the polit-
ical formations of traditional Dagestan outlined here are now ‘rural society’ or ‘feudal
society’. Shikhsaidov calls the process of development of political formations of the dzha-
maat type in Dagestan in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a ‘process of develop-
ment of large villages’, ‘a period of intensive formation of large settlements’, ‘the
formation of new administrative-territorial units (large settlements)’; Shikhsaidov writes:
‘These processes [the growth of villages] also coincided with a time of noticeable strength-
ening of old and the emergence of new unions of rural communes, with changes in the
social structure of Dagestani society’ (see Gadzhiev, Davydov and Shikhsaidov 1996:
318–319). The historical phenomenon of the Dagestani ‘polis’ is so original that until
now no term has been found to describe it. Mamaichan Aglarov (1988), who has reﬂected
more than anyone on the phenomenon of Dagestani traditional ‘society’, writes that
Russian soldiers, oﬃcials, travellers and historians discovered the principal diﬀerence
between Dagestani ‘societies’ and traditional peasant communes. Thus, I. Gerber, one of
the best-informed authors, called them ‘territorium’, similar to the feudal regions of
Dagestan, and I. A. Gildenshtedt (at the end of eighteenth century) termed them ‘dis-
tricts’, thus terminologically not diﬀerentiating them from political formations, governed
by personal rulers. P. G. Butkov (at the end of the eighteenth century) writes about the ‘the
unions of private regions’ similar to ﬁefdoms. A. I. Achverdov, a young oﬃcer at the end
of the eighteenth century was the ﬁrst to call them ‘republics’, after which this term
becomes dominant in military and business correspondence in Russian. Thus, the
Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus General-Major Graf Pauluchin in reports to the
armed forces minister Rumyantsev in 1812 calls the unions of dzhamaats ‘the republican
societies of the Lezgin’. S.M. Bronevskii (at the beginning of the nineteenth century)
writes of the ‘federative republics’ in Dagestan. Thereby all these terms are applied exclu-
sively to Dagestan, and not at all to the regions, populated by the mountain peoples of the
northern Caucasus. Only with the beginning of the national-liberation war in Dagestan
did the ‘republics’ in Russian business texts change into ‘ﬁefdoms’. This last term stays
generally accepted up to the present day (see Aglarov 1988: 6–11). Much new and inter-
esting material regarding the dzhamaat political construction in Dagestan can also be
found in Aglarov (1998).
7 In this case we are using the term ‘teip’ as a generalised category of clan identity of any
level signiﬁcant for Chechens. 
8 Fourteen nationalities are regarded as ‘basic’ in Dagestan (in order of size): Avars,
Dargins, Kumyks, Lezgins, Russians, Laks, Tabasarans, Azeris, Chechens, Nogays, Rutuls,
Aghuls, Tsakhurs and Tats. It should be emphasised that this list is not ﬁxed in any legis-
lative acts. However there are indirect, but weighty indications to treat them as the ‘state-
forming’ nationalities of Dagestan. Two constitutional conditions, i.e. ‘the fourteen
members of the State Council’ and ‘one from each people’ necessarily point to this choice
of nationalities. As we have seen, Russians, Chechens and Azeris are included among the
‘Dagestani nationalities’. The fact that these nationalities have a historically rooted rural
population on the territory of Dagestan can serve as another indicator of the choice of this
number of and of these nationalities.
9 The constitution of Dagestan does not provide for the election of deputies by party lists.
All 121 members of parliament are elected by a majority system in single-mandate con-
stituencies.
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7Civil wars in Georgia: corruption 
breeds violence
Pavel K. Baev
Introduction
G   incredibly rich and uniquely complicated case for theanalysis of modern civil wars. It is a newly independent state that appearedwith the collapse of the USSR, but it also has a long history of statehood. It
is a relatively small state, but it occupies a key geopolitical crossroads which has
acquired strategic importance with the new development of hydrocarbon
resources in the Caspian area. Its population is small and declining but the ethnic
composition, cultural and religious traditions are extremely diverse. From the
moment that Georgia restored its independence, it has found itself engulfed by
political violence organised along several separate but criss-crossing tracks, with
destabilising impulses spreading unchecked. In 1992–93, Georgia came breath-
takingly close to collapsing as yet another ‘failed state’, however, all major violent
clashes had terminated by the end of 1993. Despite serious international eﬀorts to
assist peace processes and internal reforms, to date none of the conﬂicts has been
resolved, generating occasional skirmishes and, more importantly, signiﬁcant
uncertainty regarding Georgia’s ability to survive as an independent state.
It is obvious that the civil wars in Georgia in 1990–93 erupted as a conse-
quence of the break-up of the USSR;1 however, in most Soviet constituent repub-
lics the inevitable destabilisation resulting from that cataclysm did not take such
violent forms. Many regions in Central Asia (the Fergana valley), in the North
Caucasus (Dagestan, see Chapter 6 in this volume) and in Georgia itself (Ajariya)
had explosive combinations of risk factors but remained relatively peaceful. The
collapse of the USSR, therefore, cannot in itself be the explanation for the
Georgian wars, but should instead be seen as their macro-context and environ-
ment. Similarly, the interference from Russia cannot be interpreted as the all-
dominant force;2 Russia’s involvement and inﬂuence were certainly signiﬁcant
factors but they were not the determinants of the violent escalations of internal
crises in Georgia. The main assumption of the following analysis is that the main
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causes of Georgia’s troubles should be sought in the anomalies and distortions of
its own society, political institutions and elites. And the main source for these dis-
tortions is presumed to be not in the ethnic grievances, or past injustices, or
Communist legacies – but in the all-penetrating shadow economy and corrup-
tion.3
What makes the Georgian case particularly interesting, and maybe even
unique, is the parallel development of three major political conﬂicts – the struggle
for power at the state level, the secession of South-Ossetia and the secession of
Abkhazia–whichoccurredwithsigniﬁcantoverlapsinthespaceof just fouryears,
from November 1989 to October 1993.They will be analysed here as separate civil
wars; however, since such isolation could lead to signiﬁcant deﬁciencies in the
analysis, every eﬀort will be undertaken to trace the interplay between them.
Background: it is the stupid economy!
There is neither space nor, presumably, need to provide here detailed information
on Georgia’s history, geography and demography (see Aves 1997; Corley 1999);
it is, perhaps, suﬃcient to say that the rich history of Georgia was remarkably
conﬂict-free and that with its broad ethnic diversity and strong national identity,
Georgia had a record of peaceful coexistence of indigenous and immigrant
ethnic groups. There might be, however, a need to present some basic economic
data, both for Soviet Georgia and for the new republic, with inevitable reserva-
tions about the highly unreliable nature of all statistics. 
The fundamental problem with economic data on the period immediately
preceding the wars in Georgia (1985–89) is that the only source is Soviet eco-
nomic statistics with all their deﬁciencies; the problem of accurate measurement
of GDP of the USSR (and its constituent republics) has not been resolved even
retrospectively.4 As the USSR was sinking into an economic abyss during the
second half of the 1980s, the oﬃcial statistics maintained fewer and fewer con-
nections with reality. 
Another part of the problem is that the 1980s were a decade of fast growth
of the ‘shadow’ economy in the USSR, and Georgia was, quite possibly, one of the
leaders in this area. There were several objective reasons for this leadership: the
mild subtropical climate provided Georgia with a natural monopoly on the pro-
duction of citrus fruits (mandarins) and ﬂowers (mimosa) that were of great
demand on non-state markets; the Black Sea coastline from Gagra to Batumi pro-
vided a booming tourist industry, with signiﬁcant unregistered elements. But it
was political and societal factors that determined the fast spread of illegal activ-
ities. Georgia’s political elites were purged by Stalin with particular brutality, and
then unceremoniously reshuﬄed during the ‘de-stalinisation’ campaign, which
created quite mixed feelings in the Georgian society. Those who came to power in
the late 1950s were real survivors, with few ideological illusions but with clear
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understanding of the structures of power and networks of inﬂuence.5 The elites
were redeﬁning the norms of aﬄuence and success, and the society was eager to
embrace those and develop grass-roots entrepreneurial skills, that formally were
equal to criminal activities. 
Growing in aﬄuence during the 1960s, Georgia acquired an unsavoury rep-
utation for corruption; the appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze as the repub-
lic’s leader in 1972 was intended to arrest this trend. Shevardnadze duly purged
corrupt oﬃcials but in fact his reign (which lasted until March 1985 when the
newly arrived Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made him the Soviet Foreign
Minister) was marked by a steady growth of clan-based corruption culture.6
Overall, while the oﬃcial ﬁgures for Georgia from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1980s showed a slow growth of the so-called ‘Net Material Product’ (NMP) and
per capita income, in fact in that decade more wealth was generated ‘informally’
than was registered in the accounts. By the late 1980s, the real level of income
and the standard of living in Georgia were signiﬁcantly higher than the average
for the USSR. 
The collapse of that economic prosperity was unprecedented in its devasta-
tion across the former USSR. In 1990, NMP declined by 11.1 per cent, in 1991
by 20.6 per cent, in 1992 by 43.4 per cent, and in 1994 by further 40.0 per cent;
the GDP estimates (corrected retrospectively), show a decline of 35.0 per cent in
1994 and a total decline from 1989 to 1994 of more than 70 per cent; the World
Bank estimates that Georgia’s GDP declined at an annual average of 26.9 per
cent in 1990–95. Modest recovery started in 1995, and in 1996–98 GDP
showed annual growth of 11.2 per cent; however, in 1999 growth slowed down
to just 3.0 per cent and in 2000 to 1.8 per cent. Oﬃcial government ﬁgures now
include adjustments for ‘unrecorded activity’ which amount to 40 per cent of the
total.7
The almost complete disappearance of the ‘oﬃcial’ economy in 1992–94
meant ﬁrst of all the total paralysis of two key sectors: heavy industry and
tourism. Georgian industry had been based on complicated cooperative ties with
other Soviet republics; the disintegration of that system led to the ‘sudden death’
of heavy industries in Georgia – the share of industrial production in GDP was
just 13 per cent in 1998–2000, and most of it was in food processing. Tourism
used to be a massively proﬁtable sector, with 1.5 million oﬃcially registered tour-
ists coming to Georgia annually (another million can safely be added for unregis-
tered visitors) and it has disappeared entirely. Agriculture was also in deep crisis
as Georgian fruit and vegetables, tea and tobacco, wines and mineral waters could
not compete on the Russian markets owing primarily to high transportation
costs. The privatisation of land in 1991–92 actually weakened the potential for
market production and fostered a reorientation towards subsistence agriculture.
Sharp economic decline was accompanied by deep ﬁnancial crisis. Russia’s
price liberalisation in January 1992 led to a jump in inﬂation, but also necessi-
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tated the introduction of a national currency. The ﬁrst attempt at this with the
coupon, undertaken by Tbilisi in spring 1993, resulted in monthly inﬂation
reaching 100 per cent by the end of the year. The second attempt with the lari,
undertaken in autumn 1995, was more successful, but the stability of the new
currency was entirely a function of external borrowing which has accumulated
a debt of $1.6 billion (41 per cent of GDP for 2000).8 One result of this ﬁnancial
catastrophe was a sharp demonetarisation of the economy; another was the
even sharper fall in personal income. By mid-1994 the average monthly salary
was estimated at $0.5; while by mid-1996 the average monthly household
income was estimated at $160, only a quarter of it came from salaries; in 1999,
per capita income was estimated at $620. 
Even with the approximate character of these ﬁgures, they paint a picture of
an economy that contracted massively in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s, and then –
after a short recovery – stabilised at half its previous level. Even if estimates of the
size of the ‘shadow’ economy as 80 per cent of GDP are accepted, the total value
of the Georgian economy would still be about 2 per cent of the Russian economy,
and the government revenues in 2000 would be only about 0.5 per cent of the
Russian government’s revenues. This means that neither Georgia’s ‘oﬃcial’
economy nor its ‘shadow’ economy were able in 1992–95 to generate proﬁts
suﬃcient to sustain signiﬁcant military activities and later were not able to
support a serious military build-up. The picture had not changed that much by
2002; the defence budget of about $22 million can barely sustain the armed
forces of about 12,000 – and the caricature mutiny of a National Guard unit in
May 2001 (which ended in two days after Shevardnadze promised to pay back
salaries) conﬁrms this (see Broladze 2001). The most proﬁtable economic sectors
(for both the state and the maﬁas), like tourism or export agriculture, have been
devastated beyond rehabilitation, and the new sources of income, like Western
aid or oil transit, are low-volume.
It can be assumed, with hindsight, that the ‘conﬂict entrepreneurs’, who
pushed for the escalation of civil wars in Georgia at the start of the 1990s, had
unrealistically high expectations of future revenues. The blossoming of corrup-
tion and the ‘shadow’ economy in the 1980s created a peculiar quasi-market
mentality among the political elite who took high proﬁts from the natural rent
for granted. However, partly as a result of drastic changes in the economic envi-
ronment and mostly owing to the violent conﬂicts themselves, the object of the
claims – the ability to control proﬁtable enterprises – has shrunk; the loot has
therefore practically disappeared. 
Struggle for power in Tbilisi
Three diﬀerent and slightly overlapping phases in this struggle can be easily
identiﬁed: the wresting of political power from the Communist Party apparatus
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led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia (April 1989–May 1991); the ousting of President
Gamsakhurdia from power (September 1991–November 1993); and the consol-
idation of power in the hands of Shevardnadze (October 1992–November
1995). While it is only the second phase that qualiﬁes as a civil war, the paramil-
itary organisations created in the middle of the ﬁrst phase continued to play a
role up to the end of the third phase, as well as ﬁguring prominently in two other
Georgian wars (see Nodia 1996; Zverev 1996; Ozhiganov 1997). 
At the starting point of the Georgian ‘time of troubles’, in early April 1989,
there were demonstrations in Tbilisi, perhaps 15,000 strong but without any
semblance of organisation, unarmed but violent. In late November 1989, more
organisation was visible, when a column of 20,000–30,000 marched from
Tbilisi to Tskhinval (some 120 km); it was still unarmed and was easily blocked
by a few hundred Soviet Interior troops, but some paramilitary groups were
already present and the ﬁrst blood in the ﬁrst war was spilled. The group which
claimed the honour for this dramatic event, the Legion of Georgian Hawks, never
appeared in the political arena again, but the organisational resources for the
march came from a diﬀerent source: it was the leader of the Georgian
Communist Party, Givi Gumbaridze, who, together with Gamsakhurdia, led the
column and also provided the logistics.
The chaotic and disorganised parliamentary elections of September–
November 1990 showed more passion and enthusiastic networking than struc-
ture-building, but one of the ﬁrst laws adopted by the new Parliament on 15
November 1990 declared the conscription of Georgians into the Soviet Armed
Forces illegal – and that prepared the ground for organising a proto-army, called
the National Guard. The corresponding legislation was approved during the
second half of January 1991 and it authorised the build-up of a 12,000-strong
force on the basis of conscription. Owing to the sharp conﬂict with the Soviet
authorities in Moscow, the Georgian government had extremely limited
resources at its disposal and was unable to allocate suﬃcient funds to the
National Guard. Instead of conscription, it actually had to rely on volunteers
who enlisted to serve with their own weapons – and they also had to rely on these
weapons to feed themselves. The Commander of the National Guard, Tengiz
Kitovani, a man with no military experience but with strong entrepreneurial
skills, had few doubts about squeezing various ‘shadow’ businesses, in fact he
built his forces through ‘soft’ extortion rackets.
A diﬀerent paramilitary organisation was growing alongside (and, perhaps,
one step ahead of) the National Guard: the so-called Mkhedrioni (the Knights) led
by a prominent criminal ‘authority’ Dzhaba Ioseliani. This organisation had few
connections with the competing political forces and was built as a combination of
criminal groupings and urban teenage gangs. It relied entirely on illegal sources
of income (targeting particularly petrol supplies) and exploited connections with
the Georgian underworld in Moscow. By mid-1991, the National Guard and the
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Mkhedrioni had about 10,000 members each and focused their attention on
getting access to arms, buying or seizing them from Soviet military garrisons.
The turning point in the chaotic internal struggle for power in Georgia was
set by the coup attempt in Moscow (19–21 August 1991), when Gamsakhurdia
was so scared by the demand from the ‘Emergency Committee’ (GKChP) to
disband all armed formations that he did indeed order the National Guard to
disarm. Kitovani ﬂatly refused to follow the order and moved his forces (some
2,000 troops) outside Tbilisi, setting up a military camp that became the base for
the opposition. Gamsakhurdia, aware that his control had been eroded by a series
of minor clashes, attempted to restore control by the means of ‘patriotic’ mobil-
isation and provoked a new escalation of the war in South-Ossetia. However, by
autumn 1991, the chiefs of the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni had become
quite certain that they had nothing to gain from capturing the already looted
South-Ossetia, so they eﬀectively sabotaged the mobilisation campaign. The deci-
sive escalation of the crisis came in late December 1991, when Kitovani led his
forces (by then, perhaps, only 500 troops) into Tbilisi and besieged the parlia-
ment buildings. Gamsakhurdia failed to organise forces for resisting the coup and
after a week of ﬁghting in central Tbilisi he ﬂed the country. 
It is possible to conclude that the struggle for power in Georgia degenerated
into a civil war primarily because of the inability of the new post-Communist
leadership to control the newly created paramilitary forces. The broad and quar-
relsome coalition of democratic forces that sought to remove the Communist
nomenklatura from power saw a strong need for military instruments owing to the
threat of forceful interference from Moscow and brewing conﬂicts in the ethnic
autonomies. However, the only resource base for building and sustaining a par-
amilitary organisation was taxation of the ‘shadow’ economy, but this inevitably
determined the criminalised character of the armed forces. While the personal
features of the new leadership did play a role (the ambitious and unbalanced
Gamsakhurdia quickly alienated most former supporters), the main purpose of
seizing political power by the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni was to secure
their monopoly on extortion rackets and to ﬁnd new loot. This explains why the
scale of such a decisive battle was so miniscule (perhaps, 500 people were
ﬁghting in Tbilisi on both sides) and why the number of casualties was so low (not
more than 200 people were killed in the initial phase of the civil war). 
The coup in Tbilisi in early January 1992 brought a signiﬁcant change in the
character of the struggle for power: it became regional as its focus shifted to
western Georgia (Mingrelia) where Gamsakhurdia found a support base. In
Tbilisi, the victorious opposition faced a serious problem with legitimising its
power; at the same time, the rapidly shrinking resource base undermined the sus-
tainability of both the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni – and set the scene for
a potential clash between them. The ﬁrst problem was partly resolved by inviting
Eduard Shevardnadze to chair the newly created State Council. The second
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problem had no solution, but at least the clash was avoided by carefully dividing
the spheres of control, so that the Mkhedrioni got a monopoly over the distribu-
tion of fuel, while the National Guard sought to proﬁt from arms trading. Neither
organisation managed to ﬁnd stable sources of income, but both remained loyal
to their leaders (see Fuller 1993). 
Initially Shevardnadze was squeezed between these two warlords (Kitovani
and Ioseliani) and focused his mid-term game on the parliamentary elections
scheduled for October 1992. Meanwhile, he tried to connect both paramilitary
forces to the state, presenting the National Guard as the ‘oﬃcial army’ (and making
Kitovani the Defence Minister) and the Mkhedrioni as the interior forces (making
Temur Khachishvili, one of Ioseliani’s lieutenants, the Interior Minister). The task
of keeping western Georgia under control was assigned to the Mkhedrioni, which
duly looted and burned several villages there. But it was the National Guard that
in mid-August rolled its newly acquired tanks into Abkhazia, seeking to proﬁt from
a new war. Despite this emergency, Shevardnadze pushed forward with the elec-
tions, which produced a very divided parliament but, most importantly for him, a
strong personal mandate for leadership.
The war in Abkhazia turned out to be much more protracted and much less
proﬁtable than Kitovani budgeted for, and this gave Shevardnadze a chance to
replace him as the Defence Minister with the young and dynamic Giorgi
Karkarashvili. The devastating defeat in Abkhazia in September 1993 led to a
pro-Gamsakhurdia uprising in western Georgia, which neither the demoralised
National Guard nor the disorganised Mkhedrioni was able to check. Shevardnadze
was forced to appeal to Russia for help, and several Russian battalions took
eﬀective control over western Georgia in a matter of a week.9 This, essentially, was
the end of the civil wars in Georgia; Gamsakhurdia died in late December 1993,
and several minor uprisings in Mingrelia (for instance, the one led by Akaki Eliava
in 1999) were of no great threat.
However, Shevardnadze still had a long way to go in consolidating his power.
It was the sustained erosion of the resource base for the paramilitary organisa-
tions that helped him most, together with the removal of the immediate threat of
a new escalation of wars. From late 1993, relying mostly on aid from Russia,
Shevardnadze started to build security forces, answerable to new State Security
Minister Igor Giorgadze, and soon was able to take assertive steps. In February
1994, the weakened Mkhedrioni was formally transformed into a Rescue Corps;
in May 1995 this organisation was ordered to surrender its arms; and after the
August 1995 assassination attempt on Shevardnadze it was disbanded and its
leadership arrested. Even before that, in January–February 1995, Kitovani was
provoked into attempting a new march on Abkhazia; this attempt was then pre-
sented as mutiny and duly suppressed by security forces. In autumn 1995,
Shevardnadze also managed to get rid of Giorgadze, which left him the sole
master of Georgia’s ‘power structures’, feeble as they were (see Aves 1996; Fuller
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1997). Even with military aid from the United States and Turkey, Georgia could
not build combat-capable armed forces; its army of about 8,500 (including the
National Guard of 1,600) had some 5,500 conscripts and was more a source of
risk then a security provider.
The struggle for power in Georgia involved various participants and had
several sharp escalations, which marked a civil war period of about three years
(autumn 1991–autumn 1993). The total number of casualties is estimated at up
to 2,000 (mostly in western Georgia). Perhaps the most remarkable feature of
that war was the swift destruction of its resource base, so that the cost-eﬃciency
of hostilities diminished and the sustainability of paramilitary organisations
declined. In the ﬁnal tragi-comic act of the war, a rebel force of about 1,000
threatened to conquer the country – but was miraculously dispersed by an exter-
nal intervention. The post-war reconstruction of the devastated state has pro-
ceeded without a clear sense of direction and with much uncertainty. The
‘shadow’ economy continues to concentrate and redistribute the bulk of the
resources. While Shevardnadze has very carefully constructed a situation where
there is no political ‘alternative’ to his leadership,10 resting on a system of
corrupt and semi-criminal networks, he has in fact become the central part of
the problem – but not of a solution. 
The war in South-Ossetia 
The conﬂict in South-Ossetia escalated into violence earlier than most other
conﬂicts in the Caucasus; this was unexpected because in relations between
Tbilisi and Tskhinval there had never been such tensions as there had been, for
instance, in the Abkhazian case. The core of the problem was that the rise of the
democratic movement in Georgia was directly linked to the struggle for restoring
independence and this fuelled the nationalistic trends – and many Ossetians saw
these as worrisome and even threatening. 
The largely symbolic decision of the Georgian Parliament in August 1989 to
strengthen the status of the Georgian language triggered the public campaign in
South-Ossetia for upgrading their status from that of autonomous oblast to
autonomous republic. It was a newly created organisation, the Adamon Nykhas
(People’s Assembly), that championed this cause, but the decision of the South-
Ossetian Parliament on 10 November 1989 sparkled a sharp public protest in
Tbilisi (although at that moment no secessionist claims were advanced).
Gamsakhurdia’s march on Tskhinval, blocked by Soviet Interior troops, led to the
mobilisation of Ossetians around the Adamon Nykhas and helped this organisa-
tion to build an armed grouping (by seizing light weapons from the helicopter
regiment based in Tskhinval). But it also allowed for the build-up of a Georgian
paramilitary organisation known as the Merab Kostava Society which took
control of several Georgian villages in South-Ossetia.11
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The local resource base for the conﬂict was very shallow, as South-Ossetia
had always been one of the poorest regions in Georgia with no ‘lootable’
natural resources. The escalation/de-escalation of the war was at every stage
driven by the political struggle in Tbilisi. Since regional parties were banned
from the parliamentary elections in Georgia in October 1990, South-Ossetia
boycotted those and in early December 1990 held its own elections. Following
these, the new Georgian parliament decided to abolish South-Ossetian auton-
omy altogether. This prompted Moscow to declare a state of emergency in
South-Ossetia, which had very little eﬀect on the situation. The Gamsakhurdia
government enforced an economic blockade of South-Ossetia, cutting oﬀ the
electricity and gas supplies, and in early January 1991 it made several attempts
to take control over Tskhinval with militia forces, which were repelled in ﬁerce
street ﬁghting.
South-Ossetia’s deﬁance was sustained less by interference from the Soviet
centre (in fact, Moscow remained mostly neglectful) than by support from North-
Ossetia (a part of the Russian Federation). Some 320,000 Ossetians lived there
(of the total population of 630,000), compared with just 60,000 in South-
Ossetia, so the arrival of a few hundred armed volunteers made a big diﬀerence
at the key point of the conﬂict in Tskhinval. It should also be noted that even
during the lull in the hostilities in the ﬁrst half of 1990, the nationalistic pres-
sure on the Ossetians living in Georgia created some 20,000 refugees who mostly
moved to North-Ossetia.
Conclusions about the eruption of war in South-Ossetia point directly to the
strategy of the Georgian opposition, which aimed at winning power by mobilis-
ing society around the independence programme, which contained a design for
a unitary centralised state. This programme inevitably involved the separation of
South- and North-Ossetia by a state border, so the ﬁrst forceful steps in its imple-
mentation provoked violent clashes – used by both sides for mobilisation. It is
impossible to identify any signiﬁcant economic causes for the war, since South-
Ossetia with its backward economy was by no means a prize, and the mobilisa-
tion took place on a very shallow resource base. Nevertheless, by the end of 1990
both sides managed to build up and deploy paramilitary forces of 4,000–5,000
troops (most of them part-time combatants). 
The war in South-Ossetia remained remarkably static, if brutal, throughout
its course and had several peaks of intense ﬁghting. After the eruption of hostil-
ities in January 1991, the economic blockade was maintained throughout the
winter, with only sporadic clashes and the looting of a few villages. In early
March, Gamsakhurdia outlined his programme for resolving the crisis through
restoring ‘rightful authorities’ in Tskhinval and reducing South-Ossetia’s status
to that of ‘cultural autonomy’. After this, South-Ossetia voted strongly in favour
of the preservation of the USSR in Gorbachev’s referendum of 17 March 1991
and refused to participate in Gamsakhurdia’s referendum on restoring Georgia’s
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independence of 31 March 1991. Two days before the vote, Gamsakhurdia –
obviously seeking to bolster public support for full independence – sharply esca-
lated the propaganda war and ordered the newly formed National Guard to move
into South-Ossetia. After a couple of weeks of more intensive clashes, the
National Guard retreated from the area, leaving the local paramilitaries of the
Merab Kostava Society to keep the war going.
For the rest of the spring and the whole summer of 1991 the level of hostil-
ities remained relatively low, but it is during this period that most of the
80,000–85,000 Ossetian refugees arrived in North-Ossetia from Georgia. The
next escalation started in September, when Gamsakhurdia – facing increasingly
determined opposition after his blunder during the August coup in Moscow –
again ordered the National Guard to move into South-Ossetia. His plan was prob-
ably aimed at strengthening his hand by scoring an impressive victory, but the
National Guard saw very little incentive in engaging itself in protracted irregu-
lar warfare in the province which had no ‘lootable’ resources. A few detachments
loyal to Gamsakhurdia did indeed attempt several attacks, but these were
repelled by better-organised Ossetian forces.
The coup in Tbilisi created an opportunity to de-escalate and then resolve the
conﬂict; the referendum on independence and ‘reuniﬁcation’ with Russia held in
South-Ossetia on 19 January 1992 was hardly a major obstacle to this. Indeed,
Shevardnadze initiated a series of talks, seeking to put the blame for the war
squarely on Gamsakhurdia. Much more unexpected was the massive attack on
Tskhinval in early June. At ﬁrst, the Georgian government tried to present the new
escalation as the initiative of the local paramilitaries, but then had to admit that
it was the National Guard that had burned down and destroyed by artillery ﬁre up
to 80 per cent of the city’s housing. The aim of this ‘last push’ was to achieve not
so much a decisive victory but rather a position of strength in the ﬁnal round of
negotiations that were held in Sochi on 24 June 1992 and concluded an agree-
ment signed by Shevardnadze, Yeltsin and the representatives from South- and
North-Ossetia.This agreement established a ceaseﬁre that was to be monitored by
a joint peacekeeping force for which Russia contributed a battalion of 700 lightly
armed troops (see the relevant chapters in Baev 1994, 1996).
This agreement marked the end of the war, but the political conﬂict, never-
theless, remains unresolved and South-Ossetia continues to exist as a quasi-
independent unrecognised entity outside any control from Tbilisi. It is essential
to emphasise that it was not the intervention from Russia that terminated the
hostilities, Russian peacekeepers constituted merely a symbolic and isolated force
that was not even able to rely on any direct support. Throughout the war, the
34th Army Corps of Soviet/Russian Armed Forces based in Georgia remained
‘neutral’ and did not perform a single operation either towards South-Ossetia or
in the struggle for power in Georgia.
The war in South-Ossetia lasted for about eighteen months and resulted in
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700–1,000 casualties, of which perhaps two-thirds were on the Ossetian side.
The Georgian authorities were never able to raise forces capable of capturing a
substantial territory with a hostile population or at least to launch an assault and
keep control over the capital. It is even unclear whether there ever was such an
intention, since the war in South-Ossetia was on every escalation point linked to
a certain agenda in the internal struggle for power in Georgia. The hostilities pro-
duced up to 100,000 refugees, only a few thousand of which (mostly Ossetians)
have been able to return to their homes. The war from the very start had a very
shallow resource base and by June 1992 had exhausted it completely. While
resisting an attack is always a more cost-eﬃcient form of warfare, the better
organisation of the ﬁghting force (while no larger than 5,000 ﬁghters) on the
South-Ossetian side was to a large degree the result of direct material support
from North-Ossetia. 
The war in Abkhazia
Tensions in Abkhazia had been evident long before the eruption of hostilities and
in fact the April 1989 demonstrations in Tbilisi that were the starting point of all
troubles were held in part in protest against Abkhazian ‘secessionism’. The
strongest warning about the forthcoming conﬂict was the violent clash in
Sukhumi in July 1989, provoked by the attempt to divide the University into two
parts, one of which was to become a branch of the Tbilisi University. While both
sides have strikingly diﬀerent narratives of the immediate causes of the conﬂict,
and indeed its historical roots,12 it is obvious that the source of the tensions was
control over lucrative agricultural and tourism-oriented businesses (the
University itself was a money making machine). Local clans with heavy connec-
tions with the blossoming ‘shadow’ economy were eager to grasp more direct
executive power, but Tbilisi was equally eager to preserve its control; the previous
decadal round of nomenklatura elite rotation had taken place (with serious ten-
sions) in 1979–80, so it was quite predictable that 1989–90 would bring new
trouble. 
Abkhazia managed to stay away from the escalation of war in South-Ossetia
and from the internal struggle in Georgia (eﬀectively abstaining from participa-
tion in the March 1991 referendum on independence), but the collapse of the
USSR made it imperative to deﬁne their position towards the independent
Georgian state. The risks at that moment were higher than before because two
wars had already erupted and clearly destroyed the peaceful heritage of previous
decades. The situation was further complicated by the support that the evicted
Gamsakhurdia was gathering in western Georgia. Kitovani’s National Guard
moved into Abkhazia and entered Sukhumi, seeking to deter an escalation of the
rebellion. This prompted the newly elected Abkhazian Parliament to approve the
decision to create its own National Guard; before then there had been hardly any
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eﬀort to build up a paramilitary force, the activities of the Aidgilara (People’s
Forum) had been centred on the Parliament. While some ﬁnancial resources
were available locally, more came from well-connected diaspora and some
sources in Moscow. The key problem was that there were not enough Abkhazians
with even elementary military training; support, therefore, was sought from the
recently created Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples (this loose organ-
isation held its congress in Sukhumi in November 1991). 
Afterashort lull intensions,theAbkhazianNationalGuardinmid-June1992
madeitsﬁrstmoveandoccupiedtheInteriorMinistryinSukhumi,whichhadbeen
under Georgian control. On 23 July 1992, the Abkhazian Parliament (the
Georgian members boycotting the work) restored the republican Constitution of
1925 and eﬀectively proclaimed Abkhazia an independent state.That demonstra-
tive move might have passed without serious repercussions, but hostilities in
western Georgia again escalated and several Georgian oﬃcials were kidnapped.
On 14 August 1992, some 5,000 soldiers of the Georgian National Guard moved
into Abkhazia and entered Sukhumi; another 1,000 guards landed in Gagra,
blocking Abkhazia’s border with Russia. The Abkhazian Parliament retreated
north towards Gudauta and mobilised against Georgia’s ‘invasion’; its armed
forces (perhaps, only about 1,000 strong) took up defensive positions along the
River Gumista, with the Russian airbase to their immediate rear.
It was – and still is – unclear to what degree Shevardnadze was in charge of
the situation in Tbilisi in summer 1992 and whether Kitovani acted largely on
his own initiative. What is clear is that the National Guard in July 1992 received
a large amount of heavy armaments, including some ﬁfty tanks, from the former
Soviet bases which Russia had taken under its control. With this new strength,
the National Guard was ready to claim new loot – and Abkhazia was the most
promising prize.
It is possible to conclude that the war in Abkhazia erupted as a result of delib-
erate escalation of political tensions by both sides, and the instability in western
Georgia served mostly as a catalyst. While there were some legal grounds for
making the case for independence and while both sides applied ethnic mobilisa-
tion techniques, the main cause of the war was gaining control over the highly
proﬁtable ‘shadow’ economy. It is in this war that the miscalculation by the rivals
is particularly obvious: as the violence escalated, the tourist industry was
destroyed beyond repair, and as transport communications were interrupted,
agriculture lost its markets. Abkhazia was ruined for the next ten years. 
In a matter of a few weeks after the Blitzkrieg of 14–15 September 1992, the
war turned out to be a much less proﬁtable and more resource-consuming prop-
osition than the National Guard had budgeted for. The looting of Sukhumi had
to be restricted since the Georgian authorities wanted to keep a semblance of
order in the capital city; the supply base in the Gali region was enough for feeding
the troops but did not produce many volunteers or paramilitaries, since the polit-
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ical sympathies there were mostly on Gamsakhurdia’s side. The troops that had
landed in Gagra found themselves surrounded and Kitovani was not able to
organise their supplies using only marine lines of communications. By the end of
September, up to 1,000 volunteers arrived from the North Caucasus via moun-
tain passes to support the Abkhazian government, so on 2–3 October 1992 a sur-
prise attack was launched towards Gagra and the isolated Georgian grouping
was completely defeated. After restoring control over the main lines of commu-
nications with Russia, the Abkhazian government managed to stabilise the situ-
ation and started to build up its forces.
The key factors determining the outcome of the war were to be found outside
Abkhazia, and the most controversial of these was the position of Russia.13 The
Russian government consistently tried to mediate the cessation of hostilities on
the basis of a compromise, although it was not so much concerned about the fate
of Abkhazia as Russia was about its control over the North Caucasus. One part
of the Russian military, particularly the Command of the Trans-Caucasus
Military District, supported Georgia and supplied it with heavy weapons and
ammunition. Another part of the Russian military, ﬁrst of all the forces based in
Abkhazia around the airbase in Gudauta, directly supported the Abkhazian side,
perhaps with the implicit consent of the Defence Ministry (see Baev 1997). The
main source of military support to Abkhazia was the republics of the North
Caucasus, where volunteers were openly recruited and ﬁnanced through the
Confederation of Caucasian Peoples. Chechnya, which since autumn 1991
existed outside any control from Moscow, was the most active party, and the
Chechens were ﬁghting in Abkhazia side-by-side with the Cossacks and even vol-
unteers from Trans-Dniestria. The sources of ﬁnancial support to this motley
force were highly diverse: from the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey to Russian
ultra-nationalists in Moscow.
It was barely possible to sustain this support for more than a year, so the
Abkhazian side from June 1993 started to increase its military activities, under-
taking a strong oﬀensive in mid-July and launching the decisive attack on
Sukhumi in mid- September. While Russia was the guarantor of the ceaseﬁre
agreement of 27 July 1993, attention in Moscow was entirely consumed by the
sharp internal crises (culminating in the forceful suppression of the violent revolt
in Moscow on 2–3 October 1993). Despite the desperate eﬀorts of Shevardnadze,
Sukhumi fell on 27 September 1993 and by the end of the month Abkhazian
forces had driven the demoralised National Guard south of the River Inguri,
establishing control over the whole territory of Abkhazia and forcing some
200,000 Georgians to ﬂee. That was the end of the war, but the negotiations on
the resolution of the conﬂict remain deadlocked, and this has led to the occa-
sional resumption of hostilities, most seriously in May 1997 and October 2001. 
The war in Abkhazia lasted just thirteen-and-a-half months but was the
ﬁercest of the Georgian wars. Up to 20,000 ﬁghters took part in the clashes from
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both sides and the total number of casualties could be as high as 20,000 (the
lowest estimate is 6,000). While Abkhazia was the richest province of Georgia in
the 1980s, by 1992 its economy had been weakened (there still were tourists on
the beaches when tanks rolled into Sukhumi) and there was no local basis for
sustaining the hostilities on such a scale. The external sources of support that
Abkhazia was able to mobilise were only short-term which necessitated eﬀorts to
achieve a decisive victory. The deployment of Russian peacekeepers in July 1994
(about 3,000 troops) under the CIS mandate and UN monitoring (by the 100-
strong UN Observer Mission in Georgia – UNOMIG) has not helped in setting an
eﬀective framework for the peace process. The clan of Abkhazian President
Ardzinba has established very eﬃcient control over what little is left of the
economy and expects to beneﬁt from ties with the newly dynamic Russia (see
Baev 2001). 
Conclusions
Georgia’s wars had remarkable similarities in their duration and timing: one
secessionist war started right after another one had ended, while the violent
struggle for power escalated in the middle of the ﬁrst war and subsided right after
the end of the second. All three wars were ended after a military victory of one
side and both secessionist conﬂicts are frozen in internationally illegitimate stale-
mates, while the negotiations are deadlocked. It appears reasonable to assume
that these similarities are caused by the presence of the same factors in the polit-
ico-economic structure of each war. This analysis argues that the main cause of
the wars was the struggle between competing elite groupings for control over
lucrative and proﬁtable resources. The short duration of the wars is then
explained by rapid depletion of the resource base, since the very possibility of
extracting rent was destroyed by the escalation of violence. The deadlocks in
resolving the frozen conﬂicts result from the inability of the central authorities to
mobilise suﬃcient resources for building up the necessary military organisation.
It could be argued that these deadlocks are also the result of the consistent
implementation of state building projects in quasi-independent Abkhazia and
South-Ossetia;14 the latter has even acquired a semblance of an electoral democ-
racy, while the former makes an example of a centralised corporate entity which
is based exclusively on the ‘shadow’ economy but maintains suﬃcient integrity.15
The success of these state projects should be measured not in absolute terms, but
in comparison with the stagnant rump of Georgia; Abkhazia and South-Ossetia
have perhaps even fewer resources at their disposal (including foreign aid), but
their population is only approximately a half of the pre-war levels. Combining
the informal taxation of various semi-legal businesses with permanent mobilisa-
tion plans, the authorities in Tskhinval and Sukhumi are able to cover the basic
needs of their societies and sustain suﬃcient military capabilities.16 For that
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matter, the recurrent violent clashes in Abkhazia, like the ones in the Kodori
Valley in October 2001, help the Abkhazian authorities to maintain the mobil-
isation preparedness, while they resonate quite painfully in Tbilisi.17
The central issue in both the political economy of Georgian wars and the
post-war reconstruction is corruption, which penetrates into all spheres of social
organisation and corrodes all state structures to a degree of complete functional
stupor. There are certainly many forms of corruption and many links between it
and the ‘shadow’ economy, which is also a complex phenomenon, which
includes both the informal survival-oriented networks and the criminalised
underworld. What is typical for Georgia is proliferation of micro-size businesses
that redistribute the small extra product of the subsistence economy and are
taxed informally by local administrative structures which then redistribute the
proﬁts upwards. On top of that there is some smuggling and narco-traﬃcking,
but not of Central Asian proportions.18
Georgia is unlikely to ﬁnd much comfort in the fact that it does not make it
into the Transparency International Corruption Index;19 according to various
measurements of corruption undertaken by the World Bank, Georgia is one of the
leaders in the category of administrative corruption.20 Shevardnadze’s numerous
promises to combat this evil and the setting up of various high-proﬁle commis-
sions have brought negligible results; the commissions are typically disbanded the
moment they approach the activities of the commissioner’s own family clan.
It may seem that since 1995 the internal situation in Georgia has
signiﬁcantly stabilised, but in fact the country is trapped in a vicious circle of low
legitimacy and fundamental ineﬃciency, where corruption is the main curse.
The semblance of stability is entirely a function of Shevardnadze’s ability to
manoeuvre among weak opponents and the opposition’s inability to mobilise
any resources owing to their general scarcity. The long overdue departure of the
‘father of the nation’, necessary as it is, may prove to be a major source of
instability, not so much in terms of restarting the wars in Abkhazia and South-
Ossetia, as in terms of general state failure, which might include disintegration
and new secessions of, for instance, Adjaria and Akhalkalaki.21 In the context of
the new global situation, driven by the US-led anti-terrorist campaigns, Georgia
cannot expect much international attention to its problems, dire as they may
become. It will not even be able to resort to the habitual cure of blaming Russia,
because this uneasy neighbour may turn out to be its only hope. 

11 For a provocative comparative analysis of the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia,
with more attention to the latter, see Lukic and Lynch (1996); for a competent and
insightful analysis of the role of ethnic factors in the Soviet collapse see Tishkov
(1997); for a useful analytical framework for analysing post-Soviet conﬂicts, see Arbatov
(1997).
12 Martha Brill Olcott, making a list of counterproductive assumptions about the Caucasus,
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includes there the view that all problems are caused by the behaviour of the regional
hegemon – Russia – and can be solved only by Russia as well (Olcott 2001). 
13 This chapter builds on the author’s research on Georgia’s civil wars for the project on ‘The
Economic of Political and Common Violence’ conducted by the Development Economic
Research Group (DERG) of the World Bank. While the author cannot fully subscribe to the
set of hypothesis advanced by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeﬄer (see, for instance, Collier and
Hoeﬄer 2001), their basic approach to civil wars as economic enterprises is certainly
helpful and productive.
14 The debates and disclosures at the conference on CIA analysis of the USSR in 1947–91
provide a good illustration of this point: the CIA experts were more successful in estimat-
ing the scale of Soviet military eﬀorts than in measuring the size of the USSR economy,
either in absolute or in comparative terms. The collection of documents can be found at
www.foia.ucia.gov/historicalreport.htm. 
15 It could be said that owing to the accelerated rotation the Georgian elites were just one
step ahead of the rest of the Soviet nomenclatura in rejecting ‘the two fundamental taboos
– engaging in nationalism and private accumulation’. See Derluguian (2000: 215).
16 For excellent accounts of the social and political consequences of the growth of the
shadow economy in Georgia, see Fuller (1987a, 1987b).
17 Most of this economic data comes from the Eastern Europe and the CIS 1994, 1997, 1999
and the World Bank estimates, available at www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/. See
also Stone and Weeks (1998).
18 In spring 2001 the IMF and the World Bank jointly prepared a report on external debt and
ﬁscal sustainability in Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Tajikistan,
which can be found at http://eb18.worldbank.org/ECA.
19 Vladimir Baranovsky (1995: 195), noting that the campaign in western Georgia ‘was
closer to farce than to large-scale tragedy’, explains that ‘Shevardnadze’s opponents were
contesting control of a system which had almost completely fallen apart and was in a state
of virtual paralysis’.
10 For some current reﬂections on that see Baran (2002).
11 This war has generally received much less attention in Western academic studies then
most other conﬂicts in the former USSR. For useful presentations, see Herzig (1999:
73–76) and MacFarlane, Minear and Shenﬁeld (1996). 
12 For a multi-perspective presentation of the conﬂict, see Cohen (1999); for an attempt to
focus academic research on the search for solutions, see Coppieters, Darchiashvili and
Akaba (2000). 
13 For early reﬂections, see Dale (1993); for a more balanced view, see Herzig (1999:
102–108); for a more economy-oriented perspective, see Avakov and Lisov (2000).
14 For a sharp and solid argument on the stability of these quasi-states, which in fact suits
the interests of all parties to the conﬂict, see King (2001).
15 On the ‘shadow’ economy as the source of tensions in the Gali region, see Billingsey
(2001).
16 For a telling picture gallery of present-day life in South-Ossetia, see Novikov (2001).
17 A competent assessment of Abkhazia’s military capabilities can be found in Mukhin
(2001); see also an interview with Abkhazian General Dbar in VestiRu (2001).
18 On the scale of the problem of production and transportation of narcotics in Central Asia,
see Olcott and Udalova-Zvart (2000).
19 This Index is estimated on the basis of perceptions, so Georgia, presumably, would hardly
rank there much higher than Azerbaijan who currently shares the 84th to 87th places
(out of 91) with Bolivia, Cameroon and Kenya. See Transparency International (2001).
20 This category estimates the amount of revenues that businesses had to pay in bribes and
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other unoﬃcial payments. Georgia scores 4.3, as compared with 5.7 in Azerbaijan and
2.8 in Russia. See Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000).
21 On the peculiar situation in the latter region, where a Russian military base has become
the functional centre, see Lieven (2001).
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8The art of losing the state: weak empire to weak
nation-state around Nagorno-Karabakh
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher
The conﬂict around Nagorno-Karabakh oﬀers an insight into the rules and pro-
cesses that governed the transformation of a weak empire into even weaker
nation-states. More than other conﬂicts escalating into collective violence during
the demise of the USSR, Nagorno-Karabakh had connotations of civil and inter-
state war, heavily involved oﬃcial central and local Soviet institutions and led to
the creation of new local institutions. The Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict was
midwife to the diﬀerent ways three post-Soviet entities organised their (recog-
nised or unrecognised) statehood.
This chapter deals with the interdependence of institutional weakness of
states and the organisation of conﬂict. Institutional weakness of statehood is at
the same time both cause and consequence of violent conﬂict. On the one hand
the escalation of conﬂict into violence is connected with the local exploitation of
organisational voids in the oﬃcial Soviet institutions. On the other hand, re-
institutionalising non-violent conﬂict after war and forced exchange of popula-
tion has proven to be a formidable challenge to weak post-Soviet statehood.
What is it all about?
Usually, when writing about a conﬂict, the ﬁrst thing to do would be to introduce
the object of and parties to the conﬂict and to oﬀer a bracket around time and
place. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict these parameters themselves
are strongly disputed. According to the position of the Azerbaijani government,
part of its territory is occupied by the neighbouring state of Armenia and the
conﬂict is therefore a problem between two sovereign states. To oﬃcial Armenia
and, for that matter, also to the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh government, it
is a struggle for independence and self-determination by the Armenian popula-
tion of Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan. 
A rather anecdotal result of these diﬀerences in the interpretation of what
the conﬂict is about and who is party to it is the fact that diplomats concerned
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with the conﬂict bear oﬃcial titles too long to ﬁt on any business card. There is,
for example, a ‘Personal Representative of the Chairperson in Oﬃce of the OSCE
on the conﬂict dealt with by the Minsk Conference’. 
These neatly clear-cut and opposing perceptions of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conﬂict soften and blur in a diachronic perspective that not only relates to the
positions formulated in the international arena. In the beginning the ultimate
normative frame of reference was ‘Moscow’ rather than international law and
the conﬂict was played according to the Soviet rules of the game. The key admin-
istrative initiatives at the beginning of 1988 focused on either keeping the status
quo (i.e. Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast (AO) remaining a subordinated
administrative region inside the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR)) or
changing its association (i.e. transferring Nagorno-Karabakh AO as subordinate
administrative region into the Armenian SSR). The Soviet institutions involved
initially respected the hierarchy of competence; the ﬁrst oﬃcial requests for a
transfer in February 1988 were addressed by the local Nagorno-Karabakh AO
Soviet to the Supreme Soviets of the Republics and further to the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR. At this early stage nobody of consequence raised the question of
upgrading the status of Nagorno-Karabakh AO instead of transferring it from
one Union Republic to the other. 
However, the proximate objectives of the parties directly involved changed
over time: 
• The evolving Armenian leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh initially moved
away from demanding the transfer of the territory to Armenia to a (tempo-
rary) transfer to the RSFSR or, alternatively, to direct administration from
Moscow. The demand for, from the Armenian point of view, a re-uniﬁcation
with Armenia was later changed to the current oﬃcial viewpoint of inde-
pendent statehood.
• The positions of the Armenian Karabakh Committee and later leadership of
independent Armenia also changed over time and was only slightly diﬀerent
from the Karabakh positions: from transfer of the AO to uniﬁcation with
Armenia after independence and ﬁnally to the de facto independence of
Nagorno-Karabakh. For some time the question of oﬃcial acknowledgment
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as an independent state by Armenia
remained a sticking point between factions in the ﬁrst government of
Armenia.
• The position of the Azerbaijani authorities changed from maintaining the
status quo to favouring direct rule by Baku and the annulment of autonomy
altogether, to the current oﬃcial position of oﬀering Nagorno-Karabakh
maximum autonomy within Azerbaijan.
The question of a starting point in space and time for the conﬂict became as
disputed as the question of what the conﬂict is over and who is ﬁghting. 
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According to the oﬃcial Azerbaijani perception, Armenian inhabitants of
Nagorno-Karabakh AO started the conﬂict in February 1988 by unilaterally
demanding the transfer of the oblast to the Armenian SSR. Armenians, on the
other hand, consider the escalation of violence against their ethnic compatriots
in the industrial town of Sumgait some 30 km north of Baku at the end of
February 1988 as the immediate starting point of the conﬂict.
In the course of seeking ultimate justiﬁcation for their objectives, the ideol-
ogists of the conﬂicting parties pushed the question of when the conﬂict was
started decisively backwards in time. It has been increasingly linked to the ques-
tion of ‘who was ﬁrst to settle on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh’. This ques-
tion gained importance in relation to the dispute over the legitimacy of borders
and administrative status established in the early days of Soviet rule (Goldenberg
1994: 159–160; Jacoby 1998a: 71–76). Whereas the latter issue touches upon
the general problem of the legitimacy of borders decided by colonial powers
(Swietochowski 1995: 161–168), the ﬁrst issue has been raised by both sides as
a fundamental claim to ethnically deﬁned ownership of land and tended to drift
from population statistics around the turn of the last century backwards via pre-
Russian, pre-Ottoman and pre-Persian history to pre-history itself. 
Volker Jacoby’s view on the somewhat absurd dilemma of the intellectual
game of ‘who was ﬁrst, wins’ cuts through the futile debate (Jacoby 1998b: 238,
translated by the author):
The territorialisation of questions of origin is in any case highly problematic. The line
of argumentation of ‘we were here before you’ does not decide the question of origin;
the latter depends on the time frame applied in order to assess autochthony or alloch-
thony. Is the frame of reference 100 years, 200 years, 4,000 years or 1.5 million
years? In the end even zoological evidence needs to be consulted to prove a point.
Violent conﬂict in word and in deed
Generally speaking, the search for rules governing social processes is complicated
by two factors when dealing with society in violent conﬂict: (1) the widening
divide between the rationale of action and the normative narratives assigning
sense to deed ex post and (2) the increasing relevance of informal institutions,
often hidden in the coat-tails of their oﬃcial hosts and dressed in fancy gowns
sewn by the ideologists of conﬂict.
The bulk of journalistic and, in part, also scholarly writing on the present
Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict concentrates either on the emic conceptualisations
of the causes of conﬂict or on geopolitics and outside interference in the conﬂict.1
While most observers come to the conclusion that the mutually exclusive dog-
matic positions of the parties to the conﬂict cannot be taken at face value they
tend to assume that the core problem of the conﬂict lies in these mutually exclu-
sive normative narratives of ‘us’ and ‘them’, of historical injustice and grievance.
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The impact that the way people make sense of themselves and the other has on
conﬂict and in particular the sense made of violence endured and inﬂicted, is not
denied here. However, making sense of a social process (like violent conﬂict) and
the social process itself are not the same thing and require diﬀerent approaches
for analysis (see Laitin and Suny 1999).
Concerning external interference, while outside interests certainly do play a
role in the politics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict today,2 outside inﬂuence
has sometimes been grossly overestimated for the phase of hot conﬂict itself (for
the very limited impact of various external mediation eﬀorts, see Mooradian and
Druckman 1999). This is also true for Russia, which became an external rather
than internal force at the end of 1991, although it did play a role in terms of sup-
plying weapons and training at diﬀerent stages to all parts of the conﬂict. Before
the dissolution of the USSR outside interference was either diﬃcult to deﬁne (in
the case of interference from the centre) or was irrelevant (as in the case of dias-
pora support for Armenians). 
Unless an outside power directly intervenes it has to play to a large extent by
the local rules of the game, making use of lobbies and interest groups existing
on the ground. Focusing only on the normative transcript of a violent conﬂict
blurs the crucial analytical line between socially controlled conﬂict and conﬂict
beyond the bounds of a society’s toolbox of regulation. Collectives capable of for-
mulating distinct interests while sharing limited resources are bound to conﬂict
with each other. But only when conﬂict breaks the boundaries of its social embed-
ding, when it takes place in a space not penetrated by the rules set by society, is it
perceived as disruptive and dangerous (see the classic concept of social conﬂict
elaborated by Coser 1956: 121–128; compare also Hirschman 1994: 297–299).
The focus of analytical scrutiny should therefore not concentrate so much on who
started the conﬂict between Armenians and Azeris or whose normative claims
appear to be justiﬁed but rather on the process of disintegration of the institutions
that controlled conﬂict and negotiated order between the distinct groups.
In practice, under the condition of a functioning statehood, the social self-
organisation between diﬀerent communities is usually less mutually exclusive
than the normative narratives of those communities may suggest. Since the ideal
order of (imagined) communities is usually transported in the sphere of values
and believes these normative tales may easily imply cultural clashes as the core
of conﬂict. In the way Armenians and Azeris conceptualise the Karabakh
conﬂict a notion of mutually exclusive ‘culture’ or ‘civilisation’ occupies a prom-
inent place next to versions of historic truth among nationalist intellectuals (on
primordial concepts of ‘ethno-nations’ propagated by (post-) Soviet intellectuals,
see Tishkov 1994: 450–451). However, in order to understand the decisions and
behaviour of people in conﬂict it is not suﬃcient to take into consideration only
the normative discourses on identity. Media and especially the entrepreneurs of
communitarian identities (be they cultural, national, ethnical or the like) are
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selling this excluding story of ‘us’ and ‘them’. In situations governed by violence
and fear the war-mongers may succeed in oﬃcially turning the normative iden-
tity into a total identity, not only subordinating, but denying other strategies of
orientation for individuals and groups inside the we-group.3 Here the radical
exclusiveness of identity is rather the result of dynamics of violent conﬂict than
its cause. As long as the Soviet state functioned in the sense that it prevented
violent strategies of conﬂict-resolution between social groups, ‘culture’ as ability
to command various social languages (from local over Caucasian to Soviet codes)
was rather a means to connect, communicate and do business with each other
(Koehler 1999: 43–46).
Undeniably, however, late Soviet statehood ceased to function for decisive
social forces in and around Nagorno-Karabakh AO and it is this fact, rather than
ancient history, cultural superiority or who ﬁred the ﬁrst shot which should serve
as starting point for the analysis of the escalation that followed. 
Stages of Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict escalation 
Usually the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict is divided into two phases deﬁned by
change in the level of violence from low-intensity to all-out war and roughly
coinciding with the dissolution of the USSR in the second half of 1991. Instead
of concentrating on a subjectively perceived degree of violence, the conﬂict
process will be subdivided into stages deﬁned by changing social modes of
conﬂict control and organisation of violence (cf. Waldmann 1999: 70–76). The
capacities of the USSR in the periphery and the post-Soviet states to emerge serve
as starting point of discussion: 
In October 1987 the regional administration of the Azerbaijani town of Chardakhly
in the vicinity of the Armenian border took the decision to transfer some land from
one kolkhoz (collective farm) to a neighbouring one; the former kolkhoz was adminis-
tered by Armenians, the latter by Azeris. When the Armenian workforce refused to
comply, the RAICOM (regional committee of the Communist Party) ﬁred the
Armenian director of the kolkhoz. This measure led to demonstrations by Armenian
farmers and escalated into a violent confrontation with security forces (allegedly
units of the KGB) from the Azerbaijani SSR in which at least one oﬃcial was injured.
Thereafter Special Forces surrounded the village in the kolkhoz and physical reprisals
against some inhabitants reportedly took place (Jacoby 1998b: 169). When the news
broke, the ﬁrst public demonstrations took place in Stepanakert (Nagorno-
Karabakh) and Yerevan, demanding the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh and
Nakhichevan to the Armenian SSR. (Fuller 1987)
In a nutshell, here is a model picturing the initial protagonists of the mystery play
‘dawn of the Soviet empire’, repeated in various interpretations all over the
peripheries of the former USSR. 
As in the case of the ﬁrst violent clashes in Abkhazia around the introduction
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of a branch of Tbilisi University as a competitor to the existing Abkhaz-con-
trolled Sukhumi University (Gelaschwili 1993: 91–92), the initial conﬂicts were
not new nor about ethnic belonging. Instead they were about the control of
lucrative segments of the ‘shadow’ economy by competing networks of trust –
or, more bluntly, as Georgia’s witty warlord Djaba Ioseliani put it on many occa-
sions, they were about ‘the legal entitlement to steal’ (here as quoted in
Gelaschwili 1993: 91). 
Since the 1960s illegal economic activity, intimately linked with oﬃcial
functions in the Soviet state-run society, increasingly began to structure those
parts of the social space in which the organisational voids of the oﬃcial system
were most obvious. Thus a sophisticated system of parallel rules emerged in the
shadow of the oﬃcial institutions. This system became known as the ‘parallel’
economy of the kombinaty (industrial complexes), kolkhozy and sovkhozy (state
collective farms), the ‘shadow’ economy in general, the ‘economy of shortages’
and the ‘administrative market’.4 By the 1980s, especially in the southern
periphery of the empire, these shadows had merged into a parallel social order
and had a tendency to ‘catch up and overtake’ the oﬃcial order as incentive
structures for the relevant participants in the society.5
Serious and well-organised illegal business needs to address one crucial
deﬁcit: the deﬁcit of trust. Trust is essential in any long-term and far-ranging
business operations involving the transfer of commodities and cash ﬂows, in
operations based on unspeciﬁc reciprocity rather than direct exchange of goods
or favours. In the oﬃcial world this future reliability is usually achieved by con-
tracts between institutions rather than individuals (guaranteed by national or
international law and backed by the sanctioning power of functioning states)
and reinforced by the threat of sanctions involving reputation (spoiling the pres-
tige of a company in the relevant market segment).
Obviously, in the illegal business activities of apparatchiki-biznesmeny (Soviet
entrepreneurs) trust could not be generated by written contracts, taking the
cheating business partner to a Soviet court or ruining his reputation by com-
plaining to a ‘tovarishchskii sud’ (court of comrades) about breaking an informal
agreement, were not options.
There were a number of more or less eﬀective ways of generating trust in the
shadows of Soviet statehood (cf. Koehler 2000: 75–104); the most important for
the development of conﬂict control in the region of interest were (ethnic) kin and
‘zemlyachestvo’. In the writing of journalists and political scientists these two
frames of reference are often merged and called ‘clan’, a term more concealing
than revealing unless clearly deﬁned.6 ‘Zemlyachestvo’ refers to solidarity from a
notion of community, of the same local or regional upbringing, usually irrespec-
tive of ethnic or religious belonging.7 Kin, by contrast, was the most important
social institution in the Caucasus that remained very sensitive to ethnic and
religious belonging. Mixed marriages in the bigger cities did take place; however,
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they were the exception to the rule and very often accompanied by serious
conﬂicts in the extended families (Anderson and Silver 1996 (1983): 494–96;
for the Georgian case, see Koehler 2000: 73, 97). 
It would be misleading, however, to assume that from ethnic connotations of
kin a principle of solidarity among ethnic groups followed; for the network of
trust based on an emic notion of kinship, the point of reference was rather the
extended family than an imagined ethnic community. In the case of patrons in
the ‘shadow’ economy (the soviet entrepreneurs we call apparatchiki-biznes-
meny), their identity was closer to a socio-professional group that relied, as key
resource for trust, on interpersonal relations with relatives belonging mostly, but
not exclusively, to one ethnic group. These were not ethnic networks of trust but
patron–client networks that were frequently dominated by one ethnic group as
a by-product of informal constraints on interethnic marriage.8 These networks
cooperated or competed with other networks of the same socio-professional
group, as in the above example of the ‘Armenian’-administered and ‘Azeri’-
administered kolkhozy. Except in cases where a strict (informal) ethnic division of
labour had been implemented for some time (e.g. Azeris as shepherds in Armenia
or Kurds as street-cleaners in Tbilisi), contact in this important informal world
may have been as rare and as insigniﬁcant as it was in public life.
Kinship as one of the key resources for knitting networks of trust to secure
economic or social advantages in the Caucasus is by no means a private matter,
a pre-modern cultural leftover in opposition to or retreat from the state, as
implied by some authors (cf. Theisen 1999). Family business in this sense was
(and is) closely integrated into the way both the Soviet and post-Soviet states
functioned in the Caucasus. ‘Tradition’ has been a ﬂexible resource to react to
chances and deﬁcits of the oﬃcial order and proved to be – in a non-normative
sense – a creative social and political asset (cf. Platz 1995). Taking into account
the interplay between state, kinship and neighbourhood, the ‘privatised’
Caucasian network-state may appear rather post- than pre-modern. 
During perestroika the well-established relationship between oﬃcial Soviet
institutions and the ‘shadow’ economy with its entrenched networks of trust were
shaken by two developments. First, the legalisation of some private economic
entrepreneurship (the blossoming of cooperatives, usually under the patronage
and on the territory of existing Soviet industrial complexes and kolkhozy) helped to
institutionalise economically interested networks of trust oﬃcially. The second
was the public development of a nationalist frame of reference to explain success
and failure, hardships and diﬀerence, ﬁrst in semi-oﬃcial, later in oﬃcial local
media outlets.This sense-generating ﬁlter was not entirely new – before perestroika
the normative nationalist discourse had simply rarely left the kitchen and the occa-
sional piece of ‘samizdat’. Going public with nationalist ideology was the domain
of those provincial representatives of the intelligentsia, who had been rehearsing
this hidden code on their informational island of marginalised dissidence.
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What is signiﬁcant in the above kolkhoz incident is that a conﬂict over which
group controls legal (and, probably more relevant, illegal) revenues from two
kolkhozy was publicly taken up as a national discrimination issue in administra-
tively unconnected entities (the centres of the neighbouring autonomous oblast
and the Union Republic) and was then connected to fundamental questions of
revising administrative borders between Soviet republics. 
Hidden transcript into public transcript: dissident nationalists 
leave their informational island
What actually has been the most striking feature of Armenian politics since indepen-
dence is a lack of ideology rather than ideological diﬀerences. Had the survival of
African elephants been a popular issue in Armenia, there can be little doubt that the
same individuals who formed the Karabakh Committee would have been members of
a “Save the Elephants Committee” if this would have given them chances of coming
to power. (Simonian 2001: 377) 
A common feature of late-Soviet mass movements in the peripheries of the
empire was that initially most of them appeared in public as pro-perestroika envi-
ronmentalist movements. This holds true for the ﬁrst rallies that were organised
in Armenia, after details of the ecological problems were published, in Yerevan
in summer 1987 up until the ﬁrst mass demonstrations there on 16 February
1988. Even the above-mentioned demonstration of October 1987, in which
about 2,000–4,000 demonstrators raised the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and
Nakhichevan, had developed as a splinter group from a larger demonstration
under ecological banners (Platz 1996: 98). 
News – but more often rumours – of violent incidents between Azeri and
Armenian individuals, kolkhozy, villages or communities in Nagorno-Karabakh
and some border regions in Armenia with large Azeri populations were spread-
ing at that time in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Before the end of February 1988
these rumours had not turned into the oﬃcial transcript of the Armenian move-
ment but remained mostly under the cover of the oﬃcial ecological motto. As
stated above, a situation in which local incidents between individuals or collec-
tives have been interpreted along ethnic lines – independent of the actual back-
ground of the concrete conﬂict – was not new to the kitchen gossip of Armenian
and Azeri households. What, indeed, was new in Armenia was the galvanised
atmosphere of mobility of a rapidly evolving public with the organisational
know-how of the new masters of those masses. This situation in the Armenian
capital was in stark contrast to the reality in Baku where no public was ferment-
ing into a movement independent from the organisational potential of oﬃcial
Soviet institutions, yet. 
During the last ten days of February 1988 the tide turned and the hidden
code of a nation under dire threat went public. The two crucial events, which are
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usually used as markers of the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict, took
place: 9 on 20 January 1988 the Armenian delegates of the Soviet of Nagorno-
Karabakh AO (Azeri delegates did not participate) passed a resolution to the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Azerbaijani SSR and Armenian SSR requesting
the transfer of the oblast to the Armenian SSR; and between 26 and 29 February
a mob rampaged unhindered by Soviet law enforcement agencies through pre-
dominantly Armenian inhabited quarters of Sumgait, an industrial city in the
vicinity of Baku.10 On 24 February 1988 a group of organisers of the ‘ecology’
movement had already reinvented themselves as (ﬁrst) Karabakh Committee
(Jacoby 1998b: 172).11 On 27 February it had declared a moratorium on dem-
onstrations after assurances from the Politburo in Moscow.12 Instead, on 4
March 1988 the Karabakh Committee issued a declaration branding the vio-
lence in Sumgait a genocide against the Armenian people and thereby linking it
to the genocidal massacres and deportations Armenians suﬀered during the First
World War under the cumbling Ottoman Empire (Jacoby 1998b: 180). In
Stepanakert on 3 March the Krunk Committee was founded by representatives of
the Armenian intelligentsia, the local Soviet and by local patrons (the directors
of kolkhozy and industry) to coordinate and informally represent the interests of
the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. This cocktail of newly invented
institutions, a prestigious intellectual establishment, a vitalised Soviet institution
of democratic representation and inﬂuential oﬃcial patrons from important
informal networks quickly developed into an organised formidable adversary to
the central control of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in
Nagorno-Karabakh and in Armenia. It proved to have the power and will to
reframe existing rules of conﬂict and, ultimately, withstand and organise sus-
tained violence.
Those last ten days of February resulted in a paradigm shift that rapidly
rocked the region and ﬁnally the USSR on three diﬀerent levels: 
• The canon of Armenian historical experience, trained over decades as a
hidden transcript of an oﬃcially suppressed discourse of national identity
among provincial intelligentsia, was breaking into the open discourse of an
organised public. The ritualised dogmas of this canon were (a) the latent
danger of again being subject to genocide at the hands of the Turks (who in
this discourse equal Azerbaijanis) and (b) the historical experience of being
left in the lurch, even betrayed, by a supposedly friendly power (Russia). The
programmatic term ‘genocide’ was used in a vast variety of connotations:
as ‘white genocide’ or ‘white massacre’, referring to the repression, assimi-
lation or eviction of Armenians from their (claimed) historical homelands
by non-violent means; as ‘biological/ecological genocide’ referring to the
level of pollution caused by Soviet infrastructure in Armenia and, after
Sumgait, as physical extinction (Platz 1996: 96–97). This formerly hidden
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discourse of permanent victimisation rapidly developed into the new and
mighty normative transcript of the national cause, publicly administered by
the Karabakh Committee.
• On the oﬃcial level a taboo had been broken in Stepanakert by formally abso-
lutely legal means: the irrelevant and powerless institution of a local Soviet
had, like a zombie, come to life and dared to place a nationalist demand,
bypassing (and eventually even ‘bringing to heel’)13 parallel local CPSU and
executive control (the RAIKOM and IZPOLKOM) against the traditional top-
down command line. There had been territorial administrative changes
before in the USSR – but always the decisions were cooked up and ﬁnally
taken by the centres of power. The problem was not of a legal matter – for-
mally, when both the involved Union Republics were in favour of a territorial
transfer and the Union Centre had no objections, they were free to do so. The
problem was that a local institution which had never been charged with
signiﬁcant power by the centres of Soviet might, took the initiative and thus
had indisputably come to life – and no one knew how to put it back to sleep
(for the diﬀerent approaches discussed in the Politburo, see Gorbachev
1996: 333–340).
• Sumgait became the ﬁrst widely publicised example, in a long list of similar
failures to come, in which the Soviet state grossly undermined its very basis:
the legitimate monopoly of violence (and of collective violence in particu-
lar). The disintegration of the USSR has shown that the legitimacy of
modern statehood, not only in western free-market democracies, essentially
rests on two principles: the convincing defence of its monopoly of violence
and the implementation or at least facilitation of procedures ﬁt to deal with
the conﬂicting interests of its citizen in a non-violent way on a day-to-day
basis. The USSR performed poorly on the level of oﬃcial procedures and del-
egated a good part of those functions to informal institutions; the legitimate
monopoly of violence, on the other hand, was functional and undisputed.
The agony into which the Soviet state was sliding was a combination of
lacking oﬃcial institutions to deal with publicly ethnicised conﬂict in a sove-
reign and calm manner and at the same time (from ignorance, arrogance or
outright panic on the part of the central decision makers) the failure to at
least deliver what people had come to rely upon: a strong, decisive but in
eﬀect rather neutral central force consistently suppressing the collective use
of violence on a local level (with the possible exception of General Lebed’s
performance in Moldova/Transdnestr). When Soviet law enforcement not
only failed to intervene for days during the rampage in Sumgait, but was
even widely suspected of having encouraged the violence in order to deliver
a warning to Armenians with their unheard-of nationalist demands, Soviet
legitimate authority exposed itself to a rapid undermining in the eyes of per-
petrators and victims alike. 
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher
154
It is no coincidence that it was in Armenia that the interpretation of multi-
faceted conﬂict ﬁrst ‘switched’ to a radically simplifying nationalist paradigm in
public discourse. Following the concept of ‘hidden transcripts’ developed by
James Scott (Scott 1990) for the organisational potential of hidden discourses in
oppressed societies,14 it is shown that behind the curtain of the oﬃcially pre-
scribed discourse of ‘druzhba narodov’ (friendship of the peoples) most peoples of
the USSR practiced some variations of national identity in private space.15 Not
every private discourse on identity has the potential to be a hidden transcript, the
potential to function as a code for sudden uniﬁed resistance against the oﬃcial
order upon its public expression. In the Armenian case, the ﬁrst diﬀerentiating
criterion of hidden national discourse was its level of integration: national
belonging and ‘Armenianness’ were not a question of individual interpretation
but an individual obligation in the most ethnically homogeneous of the Soviet
republics (Platz 1996: 192–197). The second and maybe even more important
qualifying criterion was the normative, internally unquestionable and therefore
dogmatic code that connected national identity to the historical experience of
genocide. The public redeﬁnition of political and social conﬂict (on pollution,
control of resources, communal violence in another Union Republic) as poten-
tial or actual genocide taking place connected to a uniform normative code indi-
vidually rehearsed in thousands of Armenian kitchens and triggered oﬀ a truly
national change of public discourse on the world. The physical survival of the
nation appeared once again to be at stake and a repetition of the failure of 1916
not to perceive this threat and not to take decisive countermeasures in time to
head oﬀ the threat would be committing the ultimate crime against the nation.16
‘Any problem connected to Nagorno-Karabakh is connected to the question of
the existence of our people’ (position paper of the Karabakh Committee delivered
in summer 1988, quoted by Jacoby 1998b: 265).
On the oﬃcial discourse level the dominating normative narrative of social-
ism had been replaced by nationalism among Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia. 
Conﬂict breaking out of its social embedding
The essential breakdown of societies’ capacity to deal with conﬂict in a non-
violent way or at least to avoid an escalation of violence does not take place on
the level of discourse. It takes place on an institutional level – or, more precisely,
when conﬂict loses its social embedding and ﬁnds itself re-embedded in institu-
tionalised violence. 
The problem with the USSR confronting public reinterpretations of conﬂict
along national fault lines was that the state had not established the rules of
a game that was considered taboo by the CPSU (i.e. nationalist demands from
a subordinate entity). The institutions formally designed to deal with the
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conﬂicting interests of communities on a local level – most prominently the local
Soviets with elected representatives from the diﬀerent professional and ethnic
communities – were practically dependent on the decisions taken by their
counterparts in the centre and more generally on guidelines transmitted by the
local branches of the most powerful hierarchal Soviet institution – the CPSU.
Therefore the local Soviets (and for that matter the Soviets in general) were
unable to take signiﬁcant decisions by due, reliable procedure and were more of
a place representing a ritual power generated by other institutions. With oppo-
nents of perestroika gaining ground in the CPSU, Gorbachev increasingly relied
on the popular support organised in the Soviets and therefore cleared the way for
reviving those dormant pseudo-Parliaments.17
After February 1988 the local Soviet in Stepanakert was de facto taken over
ﬁrst by the Armenian majority of deputies, then detached from the informal
power line connecting it to the RAIKOM and simultaneously connected to the
informal, agenda-setting Krunk Committee.18 Attempts by the Central Committee
of the CPSU to regain its local inﬂuence by replacing functionaries of the
RAIKOM proved unsuccessful.19 This logic of reactivating dormant but existing
institutions rather than destroying them and inventing new ones was a trait fol-
lowed on a grander scale some months later in Armenia.20 Here the powerful
informal Karabakh Committee called the shots but left the procedures of the
Supreme Soviet unharmed. It implemented its will through existing rules of the
game, a practice that – quite like events in the Baltic republics – proved functional
in providing for an internally non-violent transition to independent statehood. 
In the course of consolidation by nationalist radicalisation, any oﬃcial or
informal institution that might have had a mediating eﬀect thanks to cross-
cutting ties and interests was brought to heel, driven out, or outright ‘nation-
alised’ (including inter-regional segments of the criminal world and ‘shadow’
economy, explicitly targeted by Minister of the Interior Vano Siragedian in
1993–94). An unavoidable by-product of uniﬁcation by radicalisation were the
new fault lines inside the nationalist camp. The pressure on moderate positions
in the ranks of the Karabakh Movement increased in the course of their ascent
to power. First conﬂicts appeared between Levon Ter-Petrosian’s so-called prag-
matism in relations with Turkey and concerning the question of recognition of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and representatives of diaspora-backed posi-
tions like the ruling Dashnak party in Stepanakert or co-founder of the Karabakh
Movement Vazgen Manukian in Yerevan (Goldenberg 1994: 147–150; Jacoby
1998b: 257–291).21 Until the end of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh these rifts
inside the new Armenian political leadership and even between the, at times,
very diﬀerent interests of the Armenian state and Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians did not lead to a major political crisis and were kept under the cloak
of national cause and unity. 
The discourse of existential national urge entertained by urban intellectuals
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found a sturdy and reliable manifestation in the Karabakh Armenians willing to
hold on by all means to the land they lived on. This ‘war-nationalism’, a mixture
of rehearsed nationalist cause and concrete existential exterritorial threat, disci-
plined Armenian politics as long as the war was going on and delayed the
inﬁghting between informal networks that was to haunt the country for the rest
of the 1990s (cf. Dudwick 1997: 89–91; Iskandaryan 2001).
The way in which the binding power of the oﬃcial Soviet institutions deteri-
orated in the capital of Azerbaijan was quite diﬀerent, though no less signiﬁcant,
for the further development of the conﬂict. The most visible diﬀerence is marked
by the fact that: 
• apopularmassmovement(thatonlybyJuly1989becameknownasthePopu-
lar Front) emerged only a year after its Armenian counterpart (Croissant
1998: 31) and there was no rapid and all-encompassing switch in public dis-
course from communism to nationalism, and
• the emerging national movement did not succeed in taking over Parliament
(the Supreme Soviet) and then eventually the government by playing by the
rules of existing institutions. It was rather the communist leadership’s
attempted to control the opposition movement by a combination of conces-
sions and manipulation, like falsifying elections, abolishing institutions
(temporarily the Supreme Soviet) and inventing new ones (Milli Shura), that
lead to uncontrolled change. 
If the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict served to integrate national dogma for
Armenian politics – a factor that soon even centrally appointed CPSU secretaries
had to fall in line with – in Azerbaijan the conﬂict instead served to gain and lose
the highest portfolios on sale in the corridors of power of Baku. Ayaz Mutalibov
was installed as First Secretary of the CPSU of the Azerbaijan SSR in the after-
math of the 20 January 1990 military crackdown on the opposition in Baku
ordered by Moscow. This change of CPSU leadership was the last in a series of
general attempts of the Central Committee of the CPSU to keep the situation in
Azerbaijan and Armenia under control by well-established means (i.e. by install-
ing new local leaders of the CPSU ﬁrst in Stepanakert, then in Yerevan and ﬁnally
in Baku).
Up to this point oﬃcial Baku, in relations to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem,
had followed a script which it seemingly never even came close to controlling and
one that was hardly inﬂuenced by the oﬃcial measures taken. As in the case of
serious and highly symbolic incidents of inter-communal violence in February
1988 in Sumgait and January 1990 in Baku no matter if and how the author-
ities in the Azerbaijani capital were involved in providing for actual escalation
(Altstadt 1997: 122), the initiative and control of the consequences were never
with the authorities. In both cases the Armenian side made ‘innovative’ admin-
istrative moves through decisions taken in the local, respectively Supreme Soviet
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(in the ﬁrst case formally requesting the transfer to the Armenian SSR, in the
second by the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR deciding to include Nagorno-
Karabakh in its budget). The corresponding Azerbaijani institutions in both inci-
dents oﬃcially reacted by condemning the decisions. Right after these decisions,
gangs rampaged through the Armenian quarters in Sumgait and Baku, respec-
tively, undisturbed by local law enforcement agencies. 
When the centre ﬁnally decided to react and sent armed forces into Baku on
20 January 1990, the measure was too late for the remaining Armenian citizens
and too heavy-handed for the opposition movements to be interpreted as a
central state exercising its monopoly of legitimate force to restore order. The
move basically prevented the Popular Front from taking over from the CPSU and
provided for the implementation of a handpicked new First Secretary – Ayaz
Mutalibov. 
Nowhere and at no time in the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict did the central
state use its resources decisively and successfully in order to prevent mass expul-
sion and ethnic cleansing taking place. Even operations that took place in dete-
riorating situations and under an agenda clearly in line with the core functions
of a legitimate state monopoly of violence – such as those to stop violent rioting
and plunder in Baku or disarming guerrilla formations north of Nagorno-
Karabakh in April–June 1991 – the so-called operation Koltso (Ring) – the
central state authority was seen from all sides more as part of the problem than
as a superior and legitimate force (cf. the compilation of material on abuses on
the Memorial homepage).
Until the dissolution of the USSR and change in government in Baku the
communist leadership in Moscow and in Azerbaijan, while reacting strongly to
administrative acts and decisions taken in Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia,
seemed to have had no interest in addressing the fact that parallel to the expul-
sions of Armenians from cities in Azerbaijan all of the Azerbaijani population of
Armenia was driven out. It was the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians who raised
this subject by sharply protesting against the resettlement of Azerbaijani refu-
gees from Armenia in the administrative unit to which they laid claim, and on 12
September 1988 a general strike in Nagorno-Karabakh was resumed in connec-
tion with this forced transfer of population (Jacoby 1998b: 198). In Azerbaijan
the exploitation of this very signiﬁcant failure of the Soviet state – i.e. protecting
minorities against majorities – was left to the propaganda of the opposition
groups.
After the installation of Mutalibov, the dynamics of political process in Baku
and its relation to the conﬂict in Nagorno-Karabakh changed. The heavy-handed
and short-lived military occupation of Baku left the legitimacy of central Soviet
institutions shattered. Mutalibov’s attempts at saving his authority by applying
a mixture of concessions to the demands of the opposition while at the same time
misusing and manipulating new democratic procedures, further added to the
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rapid decline of statehood itself. The ﬁrst multi-party elections to the Supreme
Soviet in September 1990 were overshadowed by fraud so obvious that after only
one year the overwhelming victory of Mutalibov’s CPSU was de facto annulled by
the invention of a new consultative body, the Milli Shura, which was made up of
members of the opposition and the communist majority of the Supreme Soviet
(twenty-ﬁve members each) and functioned as a de facto ‘small’ parliament
(Altstadt 1997: 124; Goltz 1999: 114). It was a concession of the First Secretary
of the CPSU of Azerbaijan to the opposition that in the long run put the newly
elected Parliament beyond use. The ‘full’ parliament was reintroduced with the
Milli Milet in May 1992 but parliamentary elections did not take place until
November 1995 (Altstadt 1997: 124). At the same time – in the aftermath of the
August putsch in Moscow that the First Secretary in Azerbaijan allegedly initially
backed – Mutalibov left the CPSU and had himself elected as ﬁrst president of the
independent republic of Azerbaijan in single-candidate elections. By contrast to
his Armenian counterpart he did not achieve this position following an election
to ﬁrst become speaker of Parliament (Supreme Soviet), and then president. 
With the state institutions weakened and the opposition excluded from
signiﬁcant responsibility in oﬃcial institutions and thus conﬁned to the power
techniques of a mass protest movement, the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict became
the single most important toy in the hands of the political struggle between oppo-
sition and government in Baku. The Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict grew to be domi-
nant in Azerbaijan not as a nationalist cause of great urgency unifying the political
forces as in Armenia; on the contrary, it was simply the most important tool of polit-
ical inﬁghting in the capital. In a nearly bloodless coup, Mutalibov was ﬁnally over-
thrown by the Popular Front in May 1992 after he tried, by manipulating
Parliament’s procedures, to return to power. His regime had come under increas-
ing pressure after ineptly attempting to cover up the ﬁrst signiﬁcant successful and
rather ugly22 military counteroﬀensive of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh
in late February (Goldenberg 1994: 153; Goltz 1999: 117–130). As an immediate
result Mutalibov was forced to resign and temporally cede power to the Speaker of
ParliamentYakub Mamedov (nicknamed ‘Dollar’, allegedly for preferring bribes in
hard currency in his former job as director of the republic’s Medical Institute).
During his three months as acting president Azerbaijan managed to lose the stra-
tegically crucial and from a military viewpoint unconquerable town of Shusha to
the Armenian forces, resulting in the opening of the Lachin corridor from
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia (Altstadt 1997: 126). However, the real new pres-
ident, Abulfez Elchibey, elected in chaotic but otherwise undisputed and free elec-
tions in June 1992 with nearly 60 per cent of the votes, only a year later fell victim
to the same dynamics of un-institutionalised conﬂict that had brought him to the
top in the ﬁrst place. Elchibey’s credentials as a nationalist and ‘pure’ patriot were
and remained undisputed. His main problem was that he did not have anything
even close to a staﬀ of professional bureaucrats (a lack of professionalism in
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political administration that extended to himself) at his disposal to run the country
(Yunusov 1997: 155–156). Since he was not inclined to make use of the just
ousted former communist networks he had to seek new alliances with local and
regional strong men.The two most importantﬁgures to do the networking were the
newly appointed minister of the interior and powerful leader of the paramilitary
Grey Wolfs (Bozkurt), Iskender Hamidov, and Ministers of Defence, former head of
the Military Defence Council of the Popular Front and maths-teacher in real life,
Rahim Gaziyev, whom Elchibey inherited from the interim president Yakub
Mamedov. The crucial objective was to integrate the various armed groups into a
disciplined army (cf. Altstadt 1997: 133; Croissant 1998: 83). In the quest of a
middle way between pressure and incentive deals were also struck with local big-
men of the biznesmen-patriot type like Surat Huseinov, warlord in Ganja and former
director of a wool mill in Yevlakh. The problem with these kinds of allies was that
they continued to be highly unreliable in the way they conducted (or entirely failed
to conduct) the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. In eﬀect, the project of creating an inte-
grated army failed; even the early military success of a large oﬀensive Elchibey
ordered on 12 June 1992, right after taking oﬃce, has been attributed more to the
signiﬁcant amount of military hardware the departing Russian army left behind
than to organisational improvements (Croissant 1998: 83–84). The year Elchibey
stayed on in power ended with devastating defeats of the Azeri forces in Nagorno-
Karabakh. When in spring 1993 the Kelbajar corridor between Nagorno-
Karabakh and Armenia was swiftly taken by Armenian forces while Huseinov, who
had pledged to defend the region with his well-armed troops and was ordered to do
so, was busy requisitioning the military equipment from the leaving Russian army
base in his hometown of Ganja, time was up for Elchibey (Goldenberg 1994:
124–125; Goltz 1999: 345, 357–359). The problem was that on 8 February
Huseinov was dismissed from his self-styled position as ‘commander of forces of the
northern front’, coinciding with the sacking of Minister of Defence Gaziyev
(Altstadt 1997: 128). But instead of succeeding to call the warlord to order that
very biznesmen-patriot decided to have his men march on Baku to make sure the
people responsible for trying to bring him to heel would be punished. When
Elchibey ﬁnally called the high-proﬁle Soviet leader Heydar Aliev to the rescue, mil-
itary operations in Nagorno-Karabakh were conducted by a state that in eﬀect no
longer existed.
Physical loss of the state’s monopoly of violence
The most obvious aspect of conﬂict spinning out of control is the state physically
losing its monopoly on violence and enforcement. The deterioration of the legit-
imacy of this functional monopoly has been discussed above as one aspect of the
failure of core state institutions. However, without the emergence of organised
armed groups challenging the state, conﬂict does not escalate into civil war.
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State control over the material and organisational resources of violence are
essential assets of statehood and were provided for by the Soviet state. With the
sense of security and trust in state capability and willingness to protect its citi-
zens from collective violence fading, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and the
region of Shaumian to the north started organising self-defence units at a very
local level, individual courtyards, tower blocks, or streets; armed with primitive
weapons like sticks, knives or hunting riﬂes. In a situation of mistrust, the lack of
state guarantees of security and the lack of reliable information, it is generally
impossible for collectives to diﬀerentiate between the aggressive potential and the
defensive intention of such armed groups (a situation political scientists call a
‘security dilemma’) and some local Azeri communities reacted accordingly. In
other regions, quarters of cities and towns with compact ethnic settlements, the
option taken by the minority was virtually everywhere ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’
– Azeris in Armenia and Armenians in all other parts of Azerbaijan left without
organising signiﬁcant resistance and without being protected, backed or organ-
ised by any state agency.
Military equipment entered the scene with the emergence of armed gangs in
Armenia ‘organising’ weapons from local police and army units through illegal
trading and raids, a process that gained velocity in 1990 and resulted in the dec-
laration of a state of emergency by the Supreme Soviet of Armenia on 29 August
1990 in order to disband the armed groups (Zverev 1996; Croissant 1998:
38–39). These groups had been organised on a nationalist pretext of backing
their ethnic brethren in and around Nagorno-Karabakh but soon became a
serious problem for internal stability in Armenia (cf. Dudwick 1997: 78, 83)
before being more or less successfully disarmed or merged into semi-oﬃcial for-
mations loyal to the government. At the time of the declaration of independence
in September 1991 the Armenian National Army (ANA), was the most formid-
able among the unoﬃcial groups, a semi-oﬃcially institutionalised proto-armed
force of Armenia. The various guerrilla groups were ﬁnally disbanded or
absorbed into the oﬃcial army only after the ceaseﬁre in 1994. 
On the Azerbaijani side, police and army units obviously possessed serious
weapons from the outset and were – when under local command – taking part
with a strong Azeri bias. However, like the Azeri population in Armenia, the
Azeris of Nagorno-Karabakh seem to have relied more on Soviet troops and law
enforcement for protection than their Armenian counterparts did. This
diﬀerence in local organisational resource proved to be of decisive impact on the
conduct and outcome of the war: from the onset the local Karabakh Armenian
population was clearly the highly motivated backbone of the ﬁghting while the
military action of the opponent was organised by a ﬂuid gathering of Soviet appa-
ratchiks, nationalist intellectuals and biznesmeny-patrioty inﬁghting for power in
far-away Baku (Kechichian and Karasik 1995: 62–63; Petrosyan 2000a).
With diminishing discipline on the side of the oﬃcial local and central armed
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forces, weapons became increasingly available also in Azerbaijan to informal
armed gangs only nominally under any oﬃcial command (as in the cases of the
private armies of Surat Huseinov or the Bozkurt of Iskender Hamidov already
mentioned). In eﬀect the late Soviet state and the succeeding republics of
Armenia and Azerbaijan deteriorated in Nagorno-Karabakh into one armed
gang among others. After the break-up of the central state, this situation has
been characterised by the hesitant and, in eﬀect, unsuccessful attempt in
Azerbaijan to form an integrated national army since autumn 1991 and the
overall reluctance of Ter-Petrosian in Armenia to embark on transferring the
various gangs into an oﬃcial state army, a process that ﬁnally took oﬀ in 1992–93
(Zverev 1996). There may have been a number of reasons for Mutalibov and Ter-
Petrosian being less than enthusiastic about establishing an eﬀective and inte-
grated armed force in the brand new states they found themselves governing. One
may have been the fear of confrontation with the institution of real ﬁring power
– the still deployed former Soviet, then Russian Army. An internal and no less
signiﬁcant reason may have been the intuition of those leaders recognising that
it is highly unlikely for ‘instant armies’ to be loyal to an, in eﬀect, as yet non-
existent state and that it is far from clear that the leaders of those armed forces
(particularly if they were Soviet professionals or, worse, nationalist hotheads)
would show any personal loyalty to the presidents. If the state is weak, armed
forces with a functioning central command can be quite threatening to a fragile
political leadership. For Armenia, another factor played a role: oﬃcially the
country was not involved in the ﬁghting in Nagorno-Karabakh. The situation of
having (after initial diﬀerences on the practice of raiding before independence) de
facto control over by far the strongest informal force, the ANA, while abstaining
from organising an oﬃcial force that might get involved and trigger oﬀ an inter-
state war, probably made a lot of sense to the political leadership weary of the
long-term goal of international recognition for the Armenian cause.
Finally, with the clashes escalating to warfare including the use of heavy
artillery and tanks it was the (former) Soviet Army, pulling out of Azerbaijan,
which made supplies available to both sides, certainly not always according to
agreement or central control from headquarters in Moscow (Zverev 1996; Malek
2000: 11–13).
The fact that the Armenian ‘informal’ forces towards the end of the conﬂict
proved much more eﬀective than their ‘oﬃcial’ Azeri adversary is also owed to an
important organisational advantage (Petrosyan 2000a): both newly indepen-
dent states had recalled their conscripts and professional soldiers from the (suc-
cessors to the) Soviet Army. Of the professionals who answered the call, as a rule
the Armenians were much higher in rank and ‘battle-readiness’, because pro-
portionally more Armenians made careers in the Soviet Army than did represen-
tatives of Muslim republics. Conscripts of those republics usually served not in
combat units but rather in the notoriously undisciplined stroibaty (construction
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battalions) (Altstadt 1997: 127). The Azerbaijani defeat was also associated with
the fact that professional soldiers and oﬃcers proved reluctant to oﬀer their skills
under the dubious command and increasing ranks of warlords with no military
education whatsoever. In Armenia the situation was diﬀerent in two regards:
as long as the all-encompassing nationalist hype imitated statehood (cf.
Iskandaryan 2001) it kept a notion of an urgent common cause alive and inter-
nally disciplined the armed gangs. Also as the going got increasingly rough
(around 1991–92) highly qualiﬁed oﬃcers like ‘Commandos’ (Arkadi Ter-
Tadevossian) were granted the authority they requested by the biznesmeny-patri-
oty. When the war came to a victorious end, this authority was again taken from
the professional soldiers and in many cases they were left oﬀended by their
unprofessional colleagues driving Jaguars and Mercedes 600s in the ranks of
generals with salaries of around $US 80 a month. It therefore came as no sur-
prise that ‘Commandos’ was asked in May 2000 to lead the competitor veteran
organisation (‘Union of Veterans of the Liberation Struggle’ – UVLS), which was
designed to reduce the power of war veterans and war proﬁteers organised
around Yerkrapah,23 founded and led until his death by Minister of Defence,
then Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian (Petrosyan 2000b; Ter-Saakyan 2000).
‘Commandos’ quit after a few months, arguing that it was impossible to keep the
organisation out of politics (Fuller 2000b).
The end of violence
Violence ended with a radical reduction in the complexity of the conﬂict, which
was implemented on the ground: the Armenian side in and around Nagorno-
Karabakh achieved maximum gains on the battleﬁeld, including a sizable buﬀer
zone, sealed by a handpicked Line of Contact around a completely ethnically
cleansed and physically wrecked territory (Mooradian and Druckman 1999:
723–724). Armenia had rid itself of all its Azeri population and no Armenian
minority was left in Azerbaijan. 
Violence stopped because one side won the war over the control of territory
and both sides consistently reduced the social complexity of the conﬂict to a mil-
itary question of high, electriﬁed fences keeping people, commodities and infor-
mation apart.24 Even during the period of violent clashes there was more contact
between local commanders and the heads of neighbouring local administrations
on both sides than after the ceaseﬁre.25
The real challenge for the three entities considering themselves states began
when they had to embark on institution building without war. It proved to be espe-
cially challenging because the war was won or lost, respectively, not by disciplined
armies but by a motley gathering of entrepreneurs of violence, unprofessional
volunteer ﬁghters, nationalist believers and few (though decisive) professional
oﬃcers and soldiers from the former Soviet army. The returning biznesmen-patriot
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type of ‘big men’26 proved to be the greatest challenge for stabilising post-war state
institutions, particularly in the Armenian case where they returned victorious
and were conscious of the fact that in any functioning state system their educa-
tion, abilities and recent personal history of professionalising in violence would,
at best, bring them back to till the ﬁelds they came from, and at worst they might
end up in jail or die a violent death.
In Azerbaijan it took the new political heavyweight Heydar Aliev about a
year to get rid of the most ambitious biznesmen-patriot, the former Soviet wool
‘merchant’, unruly warlord and short-lived Prime Minister, Surat Huseinov in
October 1994. The destabilising ‘Huseinov Factor’ stayed for some time in
Azerbaijan’s internal politics and ceased to be a real threat only after forces loyal
to president Aliev put down a mutiny of special police forces under Rovshan
Dzhavadov in March 1995. Some last remnants of the inﬂuence of former war-
lords have kept ﬂaring up, the last one in early 2000 when the local ‘big man’
Aga Akperov, a pharmacist turned major, was ousted from his position as head
of local administration in the Goranboy district, and his son, Colonel Rasim
Akperov and commander of an infantry brigade, threatened to overthrow the
authorities if his father was not reinstated. The son was arrested on diﬀerent
charges on 9 February 2000, just one day after his father had been sacked by the
president (Fuller 2000a). 
In Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh it proved much more diﬃcult for a polit-
ical establishment that did not owe its power directly and solely to the organisa-
tion of violence in the war to regain some inﬂuence. Already during the long
demise of the Ter-Petrosian regime people like the physical education teacher,
Vazgen Sarkisian, founder of the Armenian army and of the politically, econom-
ically and militarily extremely inﬂuential organisation of veterans (Yerkrapah),
were in control of vital institutions of the state by means exceeding their oﬃcial
posts (for Sarkisian the Minister of Defence, and then Prime Minister).27 His
deputy in the organisation and former lorry driver, Manvel Grigorian, had a noto-
rious reputation as a ‘fund raiser’ by any means among the directors of factories
and former apparatchik-biznesmeny in general, who were persuaded to share the
burden of building up the armed forces and backing the campaign in Nagorno-
Karabakh by donations in cash and in kind. Grigorian succeeded Sarkisian as
acting leader of Yerkrapah (the deceased Sarkisian was elected eternal president)
and became Deputy Minister of Defence (Danielyan, Khachatrian and
Melkumian 2000). The hybrid oﬃcial and informal network of power around
Vazgen Sarkisian dramatically ceded inﬂuence to the new Karabakhian key
leaders of Armenia – President Kocharian (the former ‘president’ of Nagorno-
Karabakh) and Minister of National Security, then Minister of Defence Serzh
Sarkisian – only after he was killed together with ﬁve other leading politicians,
two members of parliament and one journalist in the massacre in the Armenian
Parliament on 27 October 1999. 
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The internal political situation in Nagorno-Karabakh resembles Armenia on
a smaller scale. This is owing to the fact that both political entities, though
oﬃcially separate (Nagorno-Karabakh is not even recognised as a sovereign state
by Armenia), are informally intrinsically connected and maintain interdepen-
dent relations (Panossian 2001). The budget of Nagorno-Karabakh is almost
entirely secured by Armenia. Their armed forces are closely related and in part
integrated, including both command and conscript levels. Karabakhians that
need to travel abroad receive passports of the Armenian Republic. From the very
beginning these relations, as obvious as they may be, have never been fully
oﬃcially admitted and have always taken place on an informal level. 
The most important test for the professional politicians (‘professional’ in that
they are not essentially connected in their power to the legacy of war) thus far
was reducing the inﬂuence of the biznesmeny-patrioty turned politicians and
replacing the high-ranking warlords in the army with professional soldiers.
Samvel Babayan was removed from his posts as Minister for Defence in June
1999, and on 17 December 1999 with the hands-on backing of the Ministry of
Defence from Yerevan also as Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the
would-be state (Khachatrian and Atanesian 1999). His replacement was Lt Gen
Seyran Oganyan, a professional soldier who received a good part of his profes-
sional training at the Military Academy in Baku. On 22 March 2000 the presi-
dent of the statelet, Arkadi Gukasian, was seriously wounded in an attempt on
his life. This assassination attempt was immediately linked to Samvel Babayan
and he, his clan in part and his associates (altogether around thirty people) were
arrested in the days following the incident. The authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh
successfully used the possibility to demolish the ‘system Babayan’ and bring the
assets of this system under their own control, including the relevant segments of
the army loyal to their former commander and decorated hero of the Karabakh
war. To this end, just like in Armenia after the sudden and violent death of ‘big
man’ Vazgen Sarkisian, a new veteran organisation was set up in competition
with the powerful Yerkrapah, controlled by popular war heroes considered loyal
to the political leadership.
To gain and keep control over the lower ranks and conscripts as well has
never been an easy task in post-Soviet armies in general and in the region in par-
ticular: crucial authority in the units is exercised by an institution of informal
authorities in principle inherited from the Soviet Army but tainted with a partic-
ular underworld understanding of honour and aspects of the idealised ‘big men’
of the warlord system of the civil war (cf. Snark 2000).The widespread and highly
institutionalised informal substructure of authority among the conscripts in the
Soviet Army was called ‘dedovshchina’ (Lewada 1993: 126–139). It has proved
diﬃcult to eliminate the institution in the post-Soviet armies and the high rate of
non-combat deaths in Armenia and Azerbaijan are to a large extent attributed to
the fact that this ‘school of cruelty’, as it was called by the sociologist Jurij
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Lewada, survived in one form or other (Snark 2000; Ali 2001). In Armenia the
authorities of this system are now called ‘observer’ instead of the ‘ded’ (grandpa)
of the ‘dedovshchina’ and are exercising authority that the oﬃcers are also unable
to ignore. Often oﬃcers have to negotiate their orders with or via the informal
authorities. For ordinary soldiers to survive this parallel system of command
physically unharmed they (or their family) either have to bribe oﬃcial and
unoﬃcial authorities (these payments may be outright extortion from the fami-
lies of recruits) or to prove themselves as ‘good lads’, capable of withstanding and
applying violence. Random shootings often occur because of peer pressure and
inner-group violence in those small units of directly associated young men.
Paying bribes or using relatives (doctors, military ranks) to avoid service was
common practice not only in the Transcaucasian republics in the late Soviet
period. The extortion of money seems to be a new phenomenon, though, con-
nected to the fund raising practice of the Karabakh war.28
The situation in the Azerbaijani forces seems to be diﬀerent insofar as the
oﬃcial authorities (oﬃcers, commanders) managed to ‘take over’ the ﬁnancially
interesting part of the informal system of authority, not to abandon it but to
exploit it materially for their own beneﬁt.29
Endnote: farewell to arms 
The peace process – or the re-institutionalisation of non-violent conﬂict as a
norm – has been more oﬀ than on ever since violence came to an end. This
process, loosely equipped with an international diplomatic toolbox called the
Minsk Process in the framework of the OSCE, is inﬂuenced by a number of factors
on the ground, factors intimately connected with the process of conﬂict escala-
tion and the way violence came to an end. 
From the perspective of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders involved,
there has been an informal timeframe pending over the principal chances for
peace. On the one hand a political decision maker must feel conﬁdent enough at
home that he politically, or even physically, will survive a deal based on mutual
compromises. This situation has never been fully achieved in Armenia and
Karabakh ever since they reached their objectives on the battleﬁeld. Some
observers even consider that it is not in the interest of the present (Karabakh)
leadership of the Republic Armenia to strike any deal because only the situation
of ‘no war, no peace’ guarantees their power (cf. Shakhnazaryan 2001). On the
other hand the deal has to be done before age, health, the constitution or poorly
manipulated democratic elections force a leader capable of delivering a peace
deal out of oﬃce and trigger a race for power and the resources of competing net-
works that may well paralyse or even destabilise the state for an unforeseeable
period. As stability in Azerbaijan depends on a single person, the age and health
of Heydar Aliev are the core variables in Azerbaijani politics.30 The question of
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striking a peace deal including painful compromises in Azerbaijan has not so
much been a question of whether Aliev could deliver; it is more a question of how
long he will still be around to deliver and, connected to this, of how long a deal
guaranteed in eﬀect not by a state, but by a strong patrimonial network with
ailing super-patron, can last.
Both states, Armenia and Azerbaijan, are states with decisive institutional
weaknesses even though they present themselves as authoritative states (and
often are perceived even by their citizens as authoritarian).31 The institutions and
procedures deﬁning statehood have in eﬀect been taken over by informal pressure
groups, networks and institutions that are not taken into account by the way the
state is formally constituted. The fact that inﬂuential patrons occupy key posi-
tions in the state and keep services to some degree functioning, conceals to some
extent the absence of a raison d’état. It conceals a situation in which the oﬃcial
part of the state is run in many cases as a non-proﬁt organisation, a noble NGO-
engagement of apparatchiki-biznesmeny turned biznesmeny-patrioty pursuing
network interests rather than common or national interests.

11 The level of narratives and geopolitical circumscription in Armenia is explicitly targeted
by Volker Jacoby, and narratives and making sense of change by the anthropologists Nora
Dudwick and Stephanie Platz (Dudwick 1994; Platz 1996; Jacoby 1998b). All three dis-
sertations are excellent ﬁrst-hand accounts of Armenian society in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, respectively. Engaged journalists and scholars may take a less critically con-
scious approach to the view of the world from within (e.g. Chorbajian, Donabedian and
Mutaﬁan 1994; Mamedova 1995; Soljan 1995). Notable exceptions to this are the few
ﬁrst-hand accounts by journalists who stayed for a long period of time in the region and
are, for some part, describing social processes rather than discourses on processes (e.g.
Goldenberg 1994; Goltz 1999).
12 An obvious example would be the initially unaccounted for and later admitted Russian
weapons delivery amounting to about $US 1 billion to Armenia in 1993–96 (Malek 2000:
11–13); more general but often-quoted topics are the US oil interest in assumed but for
the larger part not yet proven Azerbaijani oil reserves and ambitious pipeline projects
bypassing Russia (Lieven 1999–2000); also last but not least the radicalising factor of
Armenian diaspora inﬂuence on the interpretation of conﬂict and (long-decreasing)
ﬁnancial support.
13 Scheﬄer (1995) convincingly makes the point that this strategy of unifying by force is
always ambivalent: a violent claim to total identiﬁcation with a group always creates lines
of division, uncompromisingly separating ‘others’ (like traitors, unbelievers, dissidents
and the like) outside and inside the deﬁned group. In situations where expectations of deci-
sive gains (e.g. in the case of administrative privileges) or losses (e.g. in the case of admin-
istrative discrimination or even suppression) are not formally connected to the way a
person deﬁnes their identity, people do not seem to care too much about a limiting
deﬁniteness in deﬁning their belonging. Choice is radically limited as soon as people are
being convinced that they will not be able to master their everyday life if they do not
unambiguously deﬁne their identity.
14 Diﬀerent from the ﬁrst two anonymous terms widely used in the USSR the latter two have
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‘name-tags’ attached to them: the economy of shortages was introduced by Kornai
(1980) and the concept of the administrative market by Kordonskii (1995).
15 For an extensive portrait of the patronage and parallel networking in Soviet Azerbaijan,
see Willerton (1992). 
16 See for example Kechichian, Karasik (1995). In social anthropology the term ‘clan’
usually refers to a group of people deﬁning themselves by a notion of common decent, that
is by an emic concept of extended kinship, usually drawing on a mythical common ances-
tor. 
17 In the case of, for example, the often-quoted Nakhichivanian ‘clan’ of Heydar Aliev
(Kechichian and Karasik 1995: 60–61; Altstadt 1997: 142) as an important power base
for his political career, the question of breaching ethnic or religious borders does not arise
since the point of territorial reference is, in an ethnic sense, homogeneous. 
18 Katherine Verdery links the concept of ‘economy of shortages’ in her case study of
Romania directly to ethno-nationalism, rather than treating it as a by-product; her view
concentrates more on ‘whom to favour’ with deﬁcit goods than on ‘whom to trust’ with
illegal activity (Verdery 1993: 173–175); the latter seems much more important for the
larger-scale and longer-term business relations the apparatchiki-biznesmeny in the
Caucasus were seeking.
19 Sometimes cited by Karabakh Armenians as the ﬁrst deadly incident but neglected here
(for lack of general symbolic weight) is the clash between Armenian and Azerbaijani dem-
onstrators close to Askeran (Nagorno-Karabakh AO) on 22–23 February 1988 that
resulted in the death of two Azeri demonstrators and ﬁfty people injured on both sides; the
Armenian version maintains that a primitively armed Azeri mob marched on Askeran
and Armenians defended their settlement.
10 According to the ﬁnal oﬃcial account thirty-two people were killed, six of them Azeris, the
remaining Armenians (Jacoby 1998b: 178).
11 This ﬁrst committee, dominated by activists also with a explicit irredentist nationalist
agenda in relation to Turkey, was replaced in May–June by the group of leaders that
became known as ‘The’ Karabakh Committee and founding fathers of the Armenian
National Movement (ANM) (cf. Dudwick 1997: 78–79; see Shakhnazaryan 2000). The
new committee put considerable eﬀort into separating the general ideological issue of ‘Hai
Dat’ (the Armenian cause) from the struggle in Karabakh. 
12 The events have been reconstructed here drawing on detailed accounts of Platz (1996),
Croissant (1998), Jacoby (1998b) and, in some cases, interviews with eyewitnesses of
that time, conducted in 1996 and 2001 by the author.
13 Only a day after the local Soviet placed its request on transfer of the AO, the OBKOM of the
CP in Stepanakert agreed overwhelmingly (80:10) to the resolution. Informal local pres-
sure and incentives proved to be stronger than the attempts of the Central Committee in
Moscow to rein in their comrades in the outpost. 
14 James Scott focuses his discussion on the conditions of development of hidden transcripts
on the part of the weak and powerless (Scott 1990). According to Scott ‘hidden tran-
scripts’ are identity exercises or discourses of power(-lessness) of the weak behind the
curtain of the oﬃcial discourse of power (public transcript). Hidden transcripts may serve
as an unrecognised breeding ground for mostly passive resistance. Scott considers open
resistance to be rarely successful over longer periods of time. However, the relevant case
here is not only a hidden transcript going public but also being successful and turning into
the next dogmatic public transcript.
15 One prominent earlier outbreak took place on 24 April 1965 in Yerevan in the realm of
semi-approved mass demonstrations about the ﬁftieth anniversary of genocide
(Goldenberg 1994: 139).
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16 The most important accusation against the Dashnak party was that they missed the
opportunity to organise eﬀective resistance by trying to reach agreement with the
demands of the Ottoman, then Young-Turk government of that time; this devastating
criticism of being partly responsible for the genocide of one’s own people by failing to
engage in civil war was reactivated in the showdown between the Dashnak party and
Levon Ter-Petrosian in late 1994 that ended with the (temporary) ban of this important
Armenian party of the diaspora in December of that year (Jacoby 1998b: 287).
17 On 15 September 2000 in an interview with BBC’s Tim Sebastian, Gorbachev regretted
(again) not having cooperated with local movements more as an alternative to the unre-
formed CPSU.
18 On 23 March 1988 Krunk was banned by the authorities, but as an alternative Karabakh
Armenians organised a ‘Council of Directors of Enterprises’. Krunk and the Council of
Directors of Enterprises were banned between 12 January and 28 November 1989, in the
period of central administration of the Special Administrative Committee.
19 Most importantly the replacement of the First Secretary Boris Kevorkov with Henrik
Pogosian on the initiative of the Politburo in Moscow was executed via an especially
founded PARTAKTIV (special task force of the CPSU) in Nagorno-Karabakh (25 February
1988).
20 The same futile attempt to regain the central initiative occurred some months later in
Yerevan, when the Central Committee decided to replace Karen Demirchian with Suren
Harutyunian as First Secretary of the CPSU in Yerevan.
21 For a critical assessment of an oversimplifying division taken by former members of the
Ter-Petrosian government into pragmatists (like Ter-Petrosian) and ideologists or hardlin-
ers (like the early Kocharian or Manukian), see Simonian (2001). To him pragmatism or
ideology in Armenia is not an opposing conviction but rather a situative strategy of
accessing power.
22 The strategically important village of Khochaly was taken on 25 February 1992, in an
operation that left a large number of civilians dead.
23 Yerkrapah was originally founded as unpolitical association of Karabakh war veterans but
quickly developed into the most powerful informal organisation capable of turning the
fortunes of ministers and even presidents (as in the case of the ousting of Levon Ter-
Petrosian in 1997–98) and claiming the last say in any peace deal (Seyranian, Melkumian
and Zakarian 2000). The inﬂuence of Yerkrapah has been diminishing after the death of
their paramount founding father and leader Vazgen Sarkisian.
24 This radical segregation is implemented only at the oﬃcial level – informal exchanges do
take place on small scale, e.g. some Azerbaijani products are available in Stepanakert;
more signiﬁcant is the semi-oﬃcial inter-regional market in Sadakhlo, a region in Georgia
inhabited mainly by Azeris and bordering Armenia where business mainly takes place
between Armenians and Azeris (de Waal 2000).
25 This was a frequent complaint of local administration and commanders in conversations
during visits in the vicinity of the Line of Contact during 2000, who pointed out that it
was easer to settle common local problems during conﬂict than after; compare Mooradian
and Druckman (1999: 725). 
26 For the classic classiﬁcation of the political entrepreneur, securing inﬂuence by control-
ling violence and the redistribution of goods, called the ‘big man’ of non-state-societies,
see Sahlins (1963) and Strathern (1991).
27 For an insight into the most important patrons of powerful networks around the mid-
1990s, see Dudwick (1997: 90–91).
28 Information on this subject is, to best of the author’s knowledge, scarce (cf. Dudwick
1997: 91 on the amounts to be paid for exemption of active service in Armenia). The
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author’s information is therefore not representative – it was gathered in a number of infor-
mal conversations with (former and active) conscripts and their families. It is a fact,
though, that even international employers in negotiating the salary with their local staﬀ
are sometimes taking these considerable and regularly paid ‘health-insurance taxes’ into
consideration.
29 As a Baku-based oﬃcer related to the author oﬀ the record in late 2000, referring to the
better-oﬀ ﬁeld commanders: ‘Do you believe they would allow anyone else to collect money
from their soldiers?’
30 In September 2000 Aliev’s health politics became known as the ‘Cleveland games’ when
the president chose unexpectedly for the public and, as it seemed, most of his own team, to
prolong his US visit and have a check-up in a favourite Cleveland hospital. When fresh pic-
tures were absent for some days and a Russian newspaper reported the death of Aliev even
the diplomatic corps was getting a little nervous. A well informed high-ranking diplomat
relatedtotheauthorthat it ispossiblethatonlytheMinisterof Defence,Headof Presidential
Administration and Aliev’s son knew exactly what was going on, in order to enable the
President to check on the loyalty and faith of the rest of his men (cf. Lelyveld 2000).
31 Commenting on the preoccupation of international observers with formal and rather
superﬁcial indicators of democratisation Nora Dudwick observes for Armenia: ‘for its own
citizens, life in Armenia has become a disturbing mixture of chaos and authoritarianism’
(Dudwick 1997: 69). This assessment would be as accurate for the situation in Azerbaijan
with the qualiﬁcation that the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs is putting less eﬀort
and resources into selling a story of genuine democratic achievements to western politi-
cians and observers. 
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9Conﬂict management in the Caucasus via
development of regional identity
Olga Vassilieva
Introduction
T   the preconditions for and possibilities of Caucasianintegration as a way of conﬂict management in the region. The 1990s hasrevealed that a common Caucasian identity might be used for ‘construct-
ing’ a regional security community. To testify to this thesis, a signiﬁcant part of
the chapter addresses the question of how diﬀerent identities have inﬂuenced the
development of nationalism and cooperation, conﬂict escalation and conﬂict set-
tlement since 1990. It analyses the impact of diﬀerent cooperative organisations
on conﬂict management, both directly and via the changes in governmental pol-
icies towards ethnic conﬂict and the identities which fostered it. Of special inter-
est are the current policies of the ‘external’ powers (Russia, Turkey, Iran and
western countries) and the possible changes in their policies towards the region,
which might promote the construction of a regional security community and, as
a consequence, conﬂict management in the Caucasus.
A high conﬂict potential in the Caucasian region, and in the North Caucasus
speciﬁcally, is conditioned by ‘natural’ causes of conﬂict such as a poly-ethnic
and poly-cultural population, the scarcity of resources (primarily territory), a
high population growth rate, extensive migrations and, at the same time, the
preservation of compact ethnic communities. Soviet national policy based on the
idea of ethno-federalism smoothed ethnic tensions and provided inter-ethnic
peace during the industrialisation period, but it also created the conditions that
promoted ethnic competition in poly-ethnic autonomous and ‘union’ republics
since the 1960s. Among these conditions were the recognition of an ethnic iden-
tity as a national one (i.e. ethnic nationalism versus civic nationalism), the pro-
motion of the ethnic cadre and ‘intelligentsia’, and the creation of a hierarchy of
quasi-sovereign national-territorial units.1
Social mobilisation during Gorbachev’s perestroika turned into ethno-
national movements under slogans calling for the restoration (or the creation) of
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national autonomy for the ‘historical territory of a particular ethnic group’ that,
in turn, fuelled inter-ethnic conﬂicts all over the Caucasus as several ethnic
groups considered the same territory to be their ‘ethnic motherland’.
However, together with the development of competitive ethno-national
movements, diﬀerent coalitions of these movements have also been created in the
Caucasus: (1) at the republic level, for the purposes of settling inter-ethnic
conﬂicts (the Congress of Dagestani Peoples) and/or to coordinate the activity of
the opposition to communist leaderships in the North Caucasian republics; (2) at
the regional (North Caucasian) level, to resolve common problems (the
Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus – CMPC); (3) although the
idea of the Common Caucasian Home had never been realised in practice, it has
been discussed: cooperative organisations had contributed to conﬂict resolution
in the Caucasus.
Both processes – the growth of competitive ethno-national movements and
the development of diﬀerent cooperative organisations – reﬂect a multi-level
choice of identity among the population of this region, who ascribe themselves
to a local community, to a tribe, to an ethnos, and to particular religious or polit-
ical movements. But what unites all these peoples now living in diﬀerent states,
is the common Caucasian identity based not on a common language but on
shared myths, traditions and values. 
Ethnic identity has played a key role in the development of ethno-
nationalisms and as a consequence, in conﬂict escalation, in considering the
scarce resources and mutual claims. Caucasian identity resulted in the develop-
ment of cooperative movements, which contribute to conﬂict resolution,
although their inﬂuence on conﬂict development was much weaker than was the
contribution of ethnic identity to conﬂict escalation.
In explaining the formation of ethno-nationalism, scholars have proposed
two basic approaches – ‘primordialistic’, which explains ethno-nationalism via
the universal and natural character of ethnicity (i.e. ‘loyalty to one’s own ethnic
group, culture or place of origin’); and ‘constructed’, which considers ethnic
culture and nation to be primarily social constructs, subjects for manipulation by
elites in their competition for wealth and power. These were named ‘imagined
communities’ by Benedict Anderson (Bogdanor 1987: 210). 
In reality, however, it is impossible to ﬁnd a scholar of nationalism who sub-
scribes to ‘primordialistic ideas’. Even Anthony Smith, who stressed that pre-
modern ethnicity is the root for modern nationalism, did not claim the
‘naturalness’ of an ethno-nation, as Craig Calhoun notes in his comprehensive
review of modern approaches to ethno-nationalism; the ‘primordialist’ approach
is, in many respects, political myth and belief (Calhoun 1993). 
A reasonable question arises from this conclusion: if politicians are so
successful in ‘constructing’ ethno-nationalism, what should be done in order
to construct successful regional cooperation or a security community in the
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Caucasus? Who are the political entrepreneurs interested in such a social
construct?
Karl Deutsch deﬁned a ‘security community’ as an integrated group, where:
By integration we mean the attainment, within territory, of a ‘sense of community’
and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure,
for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectation of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.
By Sense of Community we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that
have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems
must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’, By peaceful change we
mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalised procedures,
without resort to large-scale physical force. (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5)
The Caucasus has demonstrated a strong sense of community and a Caucasian
identity, which has deep cultural and historical roots. The development of coop-
erative organisations in the region show the possibility of establishing ‘institu-
tional procedures’ for the peaceful resolution of social problems. Strong
ethno-nationalism resulted in a short life for integrative associations.
What is presented here is an idealistic attempt to implement ‘pure theoreti-
cal conclusions’ from studies of [ethno-]nationalism to conﬂict management in
the Caucasus, i.e. it is an attempt to suggest possible strategies for the construc-
tion of a security community in the Caucasus, using its ‘primordialistic’ all-
Caucasian identity, the construction of which may become the basis for peace
making and peace building eﬀorts in the region.
For these purposes, how diﬀerent identities have inﬂuenced the development
of nationalism and cooperation, conﬂict escalation and conﬂict settlement in the
Caucasus within the last decade have all been considered. The impact of diﬀerent
cooperative movements on conﬂict management directly, and via the changes in
governmental policies towards ethnic conﬂict and the identities which fostered it,
have also been analysed. Of special interest are ‘the external’ powers (Russia,
Turkey, Iran and western countries), their current policy (or how it is perceived
among Caucasian people) and possible changes in their policies towards the
region, which might promote integrated communities and, as a consequence,
conﬂict management in the Caucasus.
A multiple choice of identities and their impact on conﬂict development
A multiple choice of identity deﬁnes the diﬀerent means of consolidation and
mobilisation during the second wave of nationalism in the Caucasus.2
‘Natural’ sources for ethnic identity and ‘Soviet constructivism’
An ethnic identity, which diﬀerentiates between ‘them’ and ‘us’ on the basis of cri-
teria such as common cultural traits, common history, language and attachment
Olga Vassilieva
176
to a certain territory has provided a high degree of group solidarity in the
Caucasus. In many situations, it has overlapped identities on the lower level, such
as loyalty to a local community (on the level of small villages) or ethnic subunits
(teips (clans), tribes and so on). It has also destroyed common territorial identities
(at a republican or regional level), and political identities (‘pro-democratic’ move-
ments), which revealed themselves in the Caucasus in the 1990s.
The fast and mass ethno-national consolidation during perestroika resulted
from the presence in the Caucasus of both important factors in ethno-
nationalism: the strong loyalty of the population to a particular ethnic group
and a class of political entrepreneurs (‘national intelligentsia’, ‘national cadre’,
‘national bureaucrats’).
In comparison with other national regions of the former Soviet Union, the
special importance of ethnic loyalties has been conditioned by the traditionalism
of Caucasian societies which, in turn, can be explained by several factors.
Throughout the centuries, the topography of the Caucasus has fostered the high
level of diversity among local communities and the preservation of their
compact settlements and their traditional economic and social life. Owing to a
geographic position on the crossroads of major routes between Europe and Asia,
the Caucasus became a battleﬁeld for great empires and has been exposed to
invasions by nomadic tribes. The wars and invasions prevented attempts at self-
organisation and the formation of modern states and resulted in a ‘primitive’
economic life and the conservation of traditional political institutions for many
years.
Russian colonisation and the modernisation of the Caucasus did not
signiﬁcantly change the traditional structures of society, especially in the North
Caucasus, which resisted Russian invasion until the beginning of the twentieth
century. Local communities considered loyalty to traditional institutions and the
traditional way of life a resistance to Russia’s colonial policy. 
Soviet national policy also failed to signiﬁcantly modernise traditional life
and ties. Moreover, its essence was based on the recognition of national identity
as an ethnic identity. ‘The support of and development of national cultures’ in
the form of creating national theatres, ﬁlm production, national academies of
science and humanities, etc. helped not only to create a whole system for the
reproduction of ethnic myths, but also to promote the preservation of ethnic
identities. For many small ethnic groups, this policy resulted in the creation of
the ‘political entrepreneurs’ of ethno-national movements during perestroika,
and the ‘national intelligentsia’ and ‘national cadre’.
Policies of assimilation and resettlement (other elements of ‘social con-
structivism’) often had the same eﬀect: they provoked the resistance and, in
many cases, promoted the re-establishment of traditional institutions. Svetlana
Alieva, a daughter of a well-known Karachaev writer who had survived during
the years of deportation (1943–57), notes that it was during the deportation
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that ‘stareishiny’ (the older Karachaev men) prohibited marriages between
Karachaevs and non-Karachaevs, which had been widespread during the 1920s
and 1930s.
Urbanisation and economic modernisation could have inﬂuenced the trans-
formation of traditional ties in a society. However, the Soviet policy of levelling
the standards of economic development was carried out by means of intensiﬁed
industrialisation; it did not aﬀect the traditionally agricultural occupations of the
local population and required the regular import of qualiﬁed manpower from
other regions of the Soviet Union. As a result the local population worked in agri-
culture and was employed in the upper echelon of power, while immigrants, who
were concentrated in the cities, were employed in industrial production and the
medium echelon of administration.
The speciﬁc system of employment fostered the conservation of traditional
ties, structures and, as a consequence, ethnic identities. The Soviet policy of
recruiting national cadre was based on the class principle (representatives from
among the peasants, agricultural workers and industrial workers were preferred
for the administrative services) and on the national ‘representative-ness’ princi-
ple (all diﬀerent national groups had to be represented in power bodies). Having
got a position in the Soviet administrative system, new bureaucrats strove to help
people from their local communities to get a position in administrative hierarchy.
In the poly-ethnic autonomous regions of the Caucasus, such an approach exac-
erbated inter-ethnic competition and provided a large number of collective grie-
vances. The diﬀerent statuses in the Soviet hierarchy (being a union and an
autonomous republics, or an autonomous oblast and okrug) deﬁned diﬀerent
access to resources, and also promoted competition among ethnic elites and the
conservation of ethnic identities. 
Thus, the Soviet national policy directed at creating a new social construct,
‘Homo Soveticus’, in reality fostered the development of both the essential ele-
ments for ethno-national mobilisation: the preservation of traditional ethnic
identities and the creation of ethnic entrepreneurs, which included national
bureaucrats, national intelligentsia and national managers of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).3 All these groups considered perestroika a
chance to signiﬁcantly change the ethnic balance in administrative structures in
favour of their ethnic groups and to get access to additional resources. The weak-
ening of the central authorities and the elimination of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, which broke the ethnic balance in administrative structures,
accelerated ethnic mobilisation, especially in the regions where strong ethnic
grievances had persisted – such as regions with resettled ethnic groups
(oppressed peoples, many peoples of Dagestan, etc.); regions with a territorial
hierarchy of ethnic units (Georgia, Azerbaijan); or with an administrative hier-
archy for ethnic groups (especially, in dual-ethnos autonomous regions such as
Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkesia).
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The development of ethno-national movements pushed the countermobil-
isation of neighbouring ethnic groups and strengthened tensions between local
communities. The ethnic mobilisation and countermobilisation, as well as the
competitive purposes of ethno-national movements resulted in a wave of violent
interethnic conﬂicts all over the Caucasus. 
Cooperative associations at the republican level, or ‘democratic constructivism’
Cooperative organisations in the North Caucasian republics were conditioned
not only, and not so much, by the traditional common Caucasian identity, but
also by the common political ‘pro-democratic’ or ‘self-determination’ stance of
the leaders of national organisations. Certainly, the adherence of leaders of the
so-called ‘informal movement’ to democratic values was much weaker than their
strong ethnic loyalty. However, the joint struggle against the Communist Party
leaderships in the republics explains the cooperation among new political elites,
which resulted in the settling of several inter-ethnic conﬂicts.
The cooperation was conditioned by the history of the ‘informal movement’,
which had developed at the end of the 1980s around ideas of democratisation
and human rights. Most upcoming organisations tried to unite activists irrespec-
tive of their nationalities. National parties were closely connected with ‘pure
political’ (democratic) organisations and were often headed by the same leaders.
Their programmes declared citizenship for all those living on the territory of
would-be republics. Inclusive nationalism at this stage was caused by a number
of factors. In some regions, the informal movement, including national parties,
stemmed from the dissident movement of the 1970s which was based on the idea
of individual human rights rather than group rights. In other cases, the leaders
of ethno-national movements strove to get support for their nationalist slogans
from other ethnic groups, living on the same territory. Sometimes, the devotion
to a local community (an incompleteness in ethno-genesis) inﬂuenced the delay
in ethno-national mobilisation.
Certainly, associations and joint ethno-national organisations with oppos-
ing and competitive aims were weak and were doomed to a rapid disintegration.
However, from time to time, the confrontation between old ‘communist’ elites,
which had stayed in power, and new ‘democratic’ parties promoted cooperation
between competing ethno-national organisations. These attempts included the
creation of electoral clubs to support non-communist candidates in the parlia-
mentary elections of 1989 and 1990; the formation of small democratic factions
in the republican Supreme Soviets in 1990; and the coalition of democratic and
national organisations under the slogans of ‘democratisation’ and the re-
election of the Communist republican leadership, which supported the coup in
August 1991. None of the coalitions of the ethno-national organisations and
movements in the republics, except Dagestan, declared conﬂict settlement to be
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among their goals. However, they created the environment, a workshop for
‘interactive problem-solving’, which fostered negotiations and personal contact
among leaders of competing ethno-national organisations that, in turn, posi-
tively inﬂuenced conﬂict resolution (see Chapter 6 in this volume). The role of the
‘third party’ was usually played by leaders of other ethnic associations.4
The associations of new political parties of diﬀerent ethnic groups had an
additional impact on conﬂict settlement. Fears that the opposition could unite on
the democratic platform and challenge the former communist elites stimulated
oﬃcial leaders to search for a compromise on such issues as the ethnic ‘represen-
tative-ness’ of power structures and control over resources. The proposal of the
Congress of Peoples of Dagestan to elect parliament according to ethnic quotas
and to provide for the rotation of power structures was reﬂected in the 1994
Constitution of Dagestan and its electoral law. The parity of ethnic groups in the
power structures of Adygeya, Karachaevo-Cherkesia and Kabardino-Balkaria
became a compromise among acting oﬃcials.5
Sociological surveys showed that a signiﬁcant part of the population in the
North Caucasian republics supported such an approach. During an all-North
Caucasian survey in 1996, 54.4 per cent of the surveyed people in Adygeya were
satisﬁed with how their ethnic groups were represented in the legislative branch
of power and 53.6 per cent evaluated the ‘representative-ness’ of executive
power positively. In Dagestan, it was 37.9 and 35 per cent, respectively, in
Ingushetia 63 and 59.8 per cent, in Kabardino-Balkaria 55.2 and 50.8 per cent,
in Karachaevo-Cherkesia 50.0 and 43.8 per cent, and in North-Ossetia 55.2 and
53.2 per cent.6 The balance in the political ‘representative-ness’ of ethnic groups
and some degree of public consensus testiﬁed to the realisation of some forms of
consociational democracy in the republics.7
The consensus among ethnic elites resulted in attempts to redeﬁne the
notion of nationhood; although an ethnic approach still dominated, it is possible
to ﬁnd signs of a transfer to a civic, inclusive nationalism in the North Caucasian
republics. Both notions of a ‘Dagestani people’ and ‘Dagestani peoples’ are
present in the Constitution of Dagestan. ‘The people of Kabardino-Balkaria’ are
mentioned along with the ‘Kabardin people’ and the ‘Balkar people’ in the
Constitution of Kabardino-Balkaria. Although a mixture of approaches has
dominated in political discourse, transition away from an ethnic notion of
nationalism is important for conﬂict transformation and the construction of
regional identities.
The ‘Common Caucasian Home’
The idea of the ‘Common Caucasian Home’ is the essence of a common
Caucasian identity. This identity is also based on common values, beliefs and tra-
ditions. Moreover, these traditions formed around the idea of conﬂict resolution
Olga Vassilieva
180
and mediation. An ethnic and religious mosaic, the scarcity of resources as well
as the preservation of primitive forms of political and economic life, especially in
the mountains of the Caucasus, often led to conﬂict. These conﬂicts could last a
very long time, considering the Caucasian terrain, the use of primitive weapons
and the roughly equal balance of capabilities, which did not allow one party to
win overall and establish a new political regime. In these conditions, the peoples
of the Caucasus elaborated rules to mediate conﬂicts via meetings of the elders
from warring tribes, the invitation of third-party mediators, people’s diplomacy
and many other elements of pre-modern conﬂict resolution techniques. To
prevent conﬂict, many traditions were established like, for example, sending chil-
dren to grow up in a neighbouring tribe, hospitality for travellers, protection even
for enemies if they came to the house, blood revenge, and others.
During the 1990s, there were several attempts to create regional organisa-
tions, with the ﬁnal goal of creating a ‘Common Caucasian Home’. All these
organisations have deﬁned the boundaries of this house diﬀerently, some of them
considered it to be only the North Caucasus; others included Transcaucasian
states. The reasons for this stemmed from recent Caucasian conﬂicts and
reﬂected alliances which developed over centuries or under the pressure of
current political conditions.8
The North Caucasian level: traditionalism as a regional ideology
There were several attempts to create cooperative movements at the level of new
political leaders as well as among the oﬃcial elites of the North Caucasian repub-
lics and administrative regions of Russia. Among them only the Confederation of
Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) created in the summer of 1989, and
the North Caucasian Economic Association of Local Councils and Executive
Bodies of the Regions of the North Caucasus (the Economic Association)
founded in the summer of 1991, have worked for a relatively long time and
inﬂuenced conﬂict resolution in the region.
The main objective of the CMPC, incorporating sixteen national move-
ments, was deﬁned as the coordination of activities for solving the problems of
‘small’ Caucasian peoples, namely, (1) inter-ethnic conﬂicts (providing condi-
tions for negotiations between the confronting sides), (2) political lobbing (for
solving the problems of the oppressed peoples, enhancing the prestige of
national movements at the regional and federal levels, etc.) and (3) assisting the
cultural integration of the North Caucasian peoples.
The sphere of CMPC activity was limited from the very beginning. First, the
competition among ethno-national movements at a republican level inﬂuenced
the activities of competing ethnic movements in the CMPC: if Adygean
(Kabardin, Cherkess, Adygean, Abazin) and Ossetian national movements
deﬁned the CMPC’s actions, Karachaev, Balkar and Ingush leaders participated
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in the CMPC round tables only from time to time. Another reason for the unequal
participation was central federal policy, speciﬁcally the Federal Rehabilitation
Law, which was approved in 1991 and guaranteed territorial rehabilitation. The
national movements of the oppressed peoples considered the federal centre the
main and most powerful ally in achieving their purposes. The federal centre, in
turn, made every eﬀort to destroy the CMPC, which expressed support for
Chechnya’s demand for independence.
Secondly, the covert struggle of the diﬀerent blocs for the leadership of the
CMPC (e.g. between Adygeans and Vainakhians, Chechens and Ingush), the
contradictory objectives of national movements and the personal ambitions of
leaders had circumscribed the range of the CMPC’s major programme guide-
lines. The CMPC as well as the other cooperative associations was in fact used by
its members to defend the interests of their ethnic groups: e.g. Ingush hoped to
use the CMPC to make Ossetians recognise their rights to territorial rehabilita-
tion; Ossetians, in turn, strived to repel Ingush territorial claims. Chechens, who
were interested in support for their national aspirations, considered the CMPC a
‘ﬁrst step’ to independence for the Caucasus.
Thirdly, the consolidation of the CMPC became possible due to external
factors: Georgian policy towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as Russian
policy towards Chechnya. This factor deﬁned the geographic boundaries of coop-
eration. For example, the CMPC did not accept the membership of Svan and
Megrel organisations (western Georgian subethnic groups) which, in turn,
inﬂuenced the transition of Abkhazian-Georgian tensions to military actions in
1992–93.
Despite all the internal controversies, the CMPC provided the mechanism for
negotiations in ethnic conﬂicts in all North Caucasian republics. The inability of
the CMPC to settle the Ossetian–Ingush conﬂict was conditioned by the fact that
this military conﬂict developed as a conﬂict between the Ingush national move-
ment and the oﬃcial leadership of North-Ossetia, which had had no personal
contactorgroundsfornegotiations.TheOssetiannationalmovementfailedtohalt
the development of the conﬂict, as (1) it was involved mainly in the long-running
Ossetian–Georgian conﬂict and (2) it maintained an unoﬃcial status that pre-
vented it from having any inﬂuence on the North-Ossetian authority. Besides
which, after the approval of the Rehabilitation Law, Ingush leaders preferred to
appeal to Moscow directly, and did not participate in regional organisations.
The CMPC was successful in initiating the negotiations between the national
movements of mountain peoples and the Cossack Hosts in the South of Russia
(they are dispersed through Rostov, Stavropol and Krasnodar territorial units, as
well as in national republics of the North Caucasus). ‘Round tables’ managed
tensions between Cossacks and ‘Caucasians’ in the Caucasus in 1993–94.
The idea of the Caucasus as a Common Home for Cossacks and mountain
peoples provided the basis for their cooperation. Traditionalism (using the tradi-
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tional methods of conﬂict resolution among peoples in the Caucasus and foster-
ing the ideas of common history and roots) became a peculiar analogue of
nationalism at the regional level, and it possessed the main features of national-
ism, i.e. heedfulness of a common past, hopes for the future, and a speciﬁc role
for the poly-ethnic Caucasus as a bridge between two civilizations – Muslim and
the Christian, between the West and the East. 
Despite the popularity of the idea, the common Congress of the Peoples of
the North Caucasus had been postponed several times. Pressure from the
Russian federal centre, which feared the strengthening of separatist tendencies
in the Caucasus, was one of main inﬂuencing factors. Traditionalism and the
appeal to the past also resulted in the failure of the initiative: the shadows of the
Caucasian War against Russia in the nineteenth century to a great extent con-
tributed to the failure of this initiative. The decrease in popular support for the
political movements led to a situation where the initiative naturally expired.
The contradictions and competition among national movements speeded
the decline of the CMPC. Besides, the CMPC failed to elaborate common con-
structive approaches to the Caucasian Federation. The idea of Caucasian unity
outside the Russian Federation, which was proposed by the Chechen leadership,
exacerbated the internal tensions in the CMPC; although many peoples criticised
Russian policy towards the Caucasus and the military intervention in Chechnya,
few in the North Caucasus supported the idea of independence from Russia.
However, the declarations to build a united Caucasus outside Russia resulted in
a situation whereby the Russian leadership began to consider any cooperative
movements created without its sanction as a threat to Russian interests in the
Caucasus and undertook actions to destroy such cooperative movements. The
transformation of the population’s political activity to the economic sphere also
inﬂuenced the decline of the CMPC during 1995–96.
The federal centre itself tried to use the idea of a common Caucasian iden-
tity and initiated several cooperative organisations. The North Caucasian
Democratic Congress, the Assembly of the Peoples of the Caucasus, several
round tables of representatives of ethno-national parties were held under the
aegis of the Nationality Soviet of the Russian Supreme Soviet (1993) and the
Ministry for National Aﬀairs and Regional Policy between 1993 and 1995.
However, these attempts enjoyed little, if any, support in the region, and their
impact on conﬂict resolution was insigniﬁcant. They incorporated small and
unknown organisations, the leaders of which hoped to increase their status at
local and regional levels through their participation and federal ﬁnancial
support. An uncohesive and unclear Russian policy towards the Caucasus forced
national movements to keep away from the Federal centre, which had enjoyed
their support in 1989–91.
The North Caucasian Economic Association of the Local Councils and
Executive Bodies of the Caucasian Regions reﬂected, primarily, the idea of the
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geographic and economic unity of the region. The Association did not consider
conﬂict settlement a central objective of its activities. Members of the Association
haveadheredtotheprincipleof non-interventionin‘internal’aﬀairsandtherefusal
of mutual territorial claims.9 However, the Association contributed to conﬂict set-
tlement in the Caucasus where many ethnic groups were divided by administrative
boundaries. Joint economic activities and project development might create an eco-
nomic basis for the development of a supra-ethnic, Caucasian unity.
The Caucasian community
One more level of Caucasian cooperation is the unity of the Caucasus on both
sides of the Caucasian range. In recent years, this idea has developed from pure
declarations of the Common Caucasian Home breaking away from Russia (the
role of the new integrating centre in such a ‘home’ was assigned to either Tbilisi
or Grozny) to an elaborated concept considering cooperative institutions and
regional ideology. 
Alexander Kukhianidze, a Georgian political scientist, proposed, for
example, the model of ‘Caucasio-central’ democracy (Kukhianidze 1995). In his
opinion, inter-Caucasian relationships should be based on the ideology of cen-
trism, counting on ‘reaching mutually acceptable decisions’. This principle could
become ‘the Caucasian reply to the globalisation and separatism that destroy a
national state from the top and from the bottom’; it would reﬂect ‘modern ten-
dencies in state inter-connections: the formation of regional democratic com-
munities’. The structure of this cooperation should include an all-Caucasian
two-chamber Parliament, in which one chamber would incorporate national
authorities (three Caucasian states and Russia); the other would join representa-
tives from autonomous republics, regions of South Russia and national minor-
ities. In Kukhianidze’s opinion, the right to veto for both chambers would have to
guarantee the balance of national and local interests. It might resolve tensions
between authorities of Transcaucasian states and Russia, on the one hand, and
state, local authorities and national minorities, on the other. The model should
also include some executive bodies as well as regional peacekeeping forces
created ‘not on the basis of nationality’, that could be used only in the case of
ethnic conﬂicts or natural disasters.
Obviously, however, the realisation of this model would face signiﬁcant prob-
lems, which were not considered in the scheme. For example, it would be diﬃcult
to elaborate norms for representation: should Russian or Armenian minorities in
every subject of the Caucasus be represented in the Parliament? Also, who can
be considered national minorities? The combination of representatives from
state-like autonomous republics and a part of the population (national minor-
ities) would inevitably produce tensions. Beginning the discussion of such issues,
however, would promote the development of this initiative.
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In 1998, several attempts to organise the Meetings of the Heads of the
Caucasian States, Republics and Regions were undertaken. However, this coop-
erative initiative was short-lived. Several factors inﬂuenced the inability to move
towards stable regional cooperation. Modern Caucasian conﬂicts weakened the
cooperative potential. The participation of external actors (Russia, Turkey, the
international community) and their competition for inﬂuence in the region exac-
erbated tensions among Caucasian states and peoples. The contradiction of
international approaches to state sovereignty (self-determination versus the
inviolability of state boundaries) also inﬂuenced centrifugal tendencies in the
Caucasus. Joint economic projects, which could promote peace in the future,
have resulted in competition for foreign investment and for the pipeline itinerary
from the Caspian Sea. Besides, fearing the recognition of sovereign status for
their autonomous republics, the Transcaucasian states are not ready to partici-
pate equally with representatives of minorities and local republics authorities.
The current situation in the Caucasus
Excluding Chechnya, the current situation in the Caucasus can be best described
by the formula ‘no peace, no war.’ The unstable balance might be easily broken.
Internal conditions
At present, most conﬂicts in the Caucasus are frozen. The implementation of
speciﬁc forms of consociational democracy could settle ethnic tensions in auton-
omous republics of the North Caucasus. Ethnic cleansing along with the separ-
ation of conﬂicting groups by a third-party intervention stopped conﬂicts in
North-Ossetia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, although inter-ethnic peace there might
turn into a new conﬂict at any time.
In the North Caucasus, both the major tendencies of a return to the confron-
tation between the ethno-national movements and the transition to more stable
forms of consociational democracy, may come about with almost equal probabil-
ity. The realisation of one of them will depend on the combination of many
factors: the ability of the federal centre and local authorities to overcome socio-
economic crisis; the development of cooperative institutions and rules accepted
by all of the major political actors; the openness of the decision making process,
especially in conﬂict regions; and the transfer of signiﬁcant power to the local
level. 
The East Caucasian region has the most unfavourable economic, social and
demographic conditions in comparison with other parts of the Caucasus. The
Ossetian–Ingush conﬂict led to the ethnic cleansing of the Ingush population
from North-Ossetia, but Ingush hope to return to their houses in the future. The
federal centre might solve this problem by buying the properties, but owing to the
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corruption at diﬀerent levels, the population itself has not received a signiﬁcant
part of any aid. In Dagestan, consensus among major ethnic groups on power
distribution and ethnic quotas in the government and parliament was conﬁrmed
in the 1994 Constitution. The Russian wars against Chechnya (1994–96 and
1998 onwards), although preventing the development of other conﬂicts, have
also threatened the stability of the region in the long run.
Although socio-economic conditions in the West Caucasus are more favour-
able, preconditions for new ethnic mobilisation are also preserved in Kabardino-
Balkaria and Karachaevo-Cherkesia. These republics failed to elaborate their
own models of ethnic representation in power structures, and disputes among
ethnic elites arise from time to time. These disputes can lead to the mass mobil-
isation of ethnic groups, as happened, for example, in Karachaevo-Cherkesia
after the 1997 presidential elections, when a Karachaev representative won.
After numerous Abazin and Cherkess protest meetings, the federal authority
annulled the results of the elections. In Adygeya, the political dominance of the
titular ethnic group guaranteed by the Constitution has led to tensions between
Adygeans and Russians, which numerically dominate the republic.
In the Transcaucasian states, the ‘freezing’ of some conﬂicts resulted from
the fact that the central governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan de facto lost
control over republics. This situation can easily turn into inter-ethnic conﬂict
again. For example, the central government and political forces in Georgia are
not ready to recognise the federal structure of the Georgian state (this provoked
conﬂicts in the 1990s); in turn, the Abkhazian and South-Ossetian governments
have insisted on independent status, after the ‘victory’ and expulsion of the
Georgian population. The fragile balance might be easily broken if the central
governments try to restore control by using military forces. 
External powers
The activities of external powers have also helped preserved the ‘no peace, no
war’ situation. First of all, however, it is very diﬃcult in some cases to deﬁne
‘external factors’. Whether Russia, for example, should be considered an exter-
nal or internal factor in the Caucasus, remains a question. Politically and geo-
graphically the North Caucasus is a part of the Russian Federation. Should the
participation of North Caucasians in Abkhasian–Georgian and Georgian–
Ossetian conﬂicts be considered part of Russian oﬃcial Caucasian policy? In
turn, how should the leaders of the Transcaucasian states involved in direct
negotiations with political elites of North Caucasian republics of Russia be con-
sidered? How should the participation in conﬂicts of oﬃcers of the former
Soviet (now Russian) army who have stayed in the Caucasus, and whom the
local authorities have continued to consider a reliable help in all situations, be
considered? Could this explain the involvement of Russian military forces in
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inter-ethnic conﬂict and political struggle in the Transcaucasus (e.g. Georgia in
1992)?
Frozen conﬂicts in the Caucasus, in many respects, result from the uncer-
tainty of a transitional phase. The relationships among neighbouring countries
and peoples, which became ‘foreign’ in 1991, are, in many respects, deﬁned by
common historical experiences, common values, ethnic ties between peoples
of the North Caucasus and the Transcaucasus (Abkhazs and Adygeans,
Ossetians, Avars, Lezgins, etc.), and even personal contacts among the members
of the Communist Party Central Committee Politburo (Boris Yeltsin, Eduard
Shevardnadze and Heydar Aliev).
Meanwhile, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, led to the involvement of
other countries in the region after two centuries of the Russian domination,
mainly neighbouring Turkey and Iran, which had actively participated in
Caucasian politics for centuries. The ethnic proximity of Turks and Turkic lan-
guage-speaking Caucasian peoples makes other ethnic groups fear Turkey’s
involvement in regional aﬀairs. Russia, where about twenty Turkic language-
speaking peoples live, is apt to see Turkey’s turn to the North as malice prepense.
Western countries that had abstained from active involvement in the
region’s aﬀairs for a long time began to show some interest in the region – from
the supervision of peacekeeping operations (currently fulﬁlled by Russian mili-
tary forces under the supervision of the United Nations in Abkhazia and of the
OSCE in Karabakh) to the oil potential of the region.10
Only the West has not got a negative image among peoples in the Caucasus
because of its traditional remoteness. It could have promoted peace in the region.
However, the West does not seem to be ready to invest resources in peace making
and peace building processes in the Caucasus. Criticising Russian unilateral
involvement, the West carefully avoids getting involved in operations, as in the
Balkans.
Considering the existing contradictions between the right to self-determina-
tion and inviolability of borders, the West would be in a diﬃcult position to try
and deﬁne its policy towards the Caucasus. All parties in Caucasian conﬂicts have
diﬀerent expectations from external interventions: some talk about the right to
self-determination, others about the inviolability of borders. Georgian and Azeri
governments are seeking external support to restore control over rebellious
autonomous regions. Karabakh and Abkhazia, in turn, hope for recognition of
their independent status, having insisted that ‘the legacy of newly independent
states like all over the world are based only on the empire past’ (Katz 1996: 29).11
Until now, judging by events in Somalia or Rwanda, the West, and the interna-
tional community as a whole, has no solution for weak or failed states if these
states are not in the zone of someone’s strategic interests.
External powers have essentially inﬂuenced conﬂict development (in both
escalation and management) not only, and not so much, by their direct policies
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towards the Caucasus, but also, and mainly, owing to the expectations of
Caucasian peoples. Caucasians have traditionally considered themselves as
living at the crossroads of civilisations and, thus, are the focus of attention for
the rest of the world; this myth has fostered both ethno-nationalism and region-
alism. The image of traditional competition between Russia, Turkey and Iran
overcomes its real potential. Political elites in the Transcaucasian states are apt
to see discrepancies of interests in terms of the continuation of the Cold War
between Russia and ‘the West’ and try to use ‘domino-logic’ in their foreign
policy decisions. Perceptions of external powers have inﬂuenced the political
behaviour of Caucasian elites, sometimes more than real policies and actions.
A pluralistic security community in the Caucasus
A few will argue that peace in the Caucasus can be achieved only by the partici-
pation of Caucasians in peace building. Initiating peacekeeping and peace
making operations, external forces are able to stop a violent conﬂict but not to
resolve it. External interventions might even aggravate conﬂict in the future
because they often support mutual suspicions that the external forces are bias in
favour of the opposite side. 
Attempts to resolve any particular conﬂict in the Caucasus will have limited
success. Owing to the ethnic proximity of many ethnic groups, often living in
separated territories, the Caucasus demands an all-in-one treatment rather than
a single operation in a particular zone. The Caucasus really needs to be inte-
grated into a pluralistic security community (Deutsch et al. 1957). Although in
many respects the decade of development of modern cooperative organisations
was an unsuccessful experience, it showed that regional integration is not as
utopian as it ﬁrst seemed.
On the basis of an in-depth analysis of ten historical cases, both successful
and failed security communities, Karl Deutsch deﬁned two conditions essential
for the development of pluralistic security communities, namely, the compat-
ibility of major values and mutual responsiveness. Both of these conditions
have existed in traditional but not political life in the Caucasus. Despite relig-
ious, ethnic, economic and political tensions, as well as numerous deadly
conﬂicts throughout history, the Caucasus has demonstrated adherence to a
common identity and common values. Sharing democratic values might
strengthen the ‘compatibility of common values’. Mutual responsiveness has
been historically characteristic of the Caucasus, and is one of the major ele-
ments of traditional cultures. Although it would be diﬃcult to construct them
in the Caucasus, considering the socio-economic and political situation in the
region, a move in this direction would have a good chance of success (Deutsch
et al. 1957: 123–132).
Five other conditions, which Deutsch designated as ‘helpful’ for the develop-
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ment of pluralistic security communities, might be created in the Caucasus.
Among these conditions are the expectation of joint economic reward, a wide
range of mutual transactions, the broadening of elites, social communications
links, and greater population mobility (Deutsch 1957: 133–154).12
Owing to the recent common past, ‘social communications links’ and the
common language, which is not a necessary but is a useful precondition, are a
positive legacy of the Soviet period. Some of these communications links are
broken as a result of conﬂicts; others often become the reasons for complaints
and considered ‘foreign interventions’. These links have to be redeﬁned to provide
‘eﬀective channels of communication both horizontally and vertically’.
Caucasian traditions might work well in favour of such development.
The ‘expectation of joint economic reward’ has already demonstrated its
power for conﬂict settlement: oil projects in Azerbaijan and oil transportation
has provided real conditions for the ceaseﬁre in Karabakh, and for improving the
attitudes of Georgians to Azeris living in eastern Georgia. At the same time, pro-
jects implemented in such a way that they would beneﬁt only several ethnic
groups might foster a rise in new competitions and grievances. For example, an
oil pipeline built round Armenia might cause the situation in Karabakh to dete-
riorate. A variant of regional economic cooperation like the North Caucasian
Economic Association, but including Transcaucasian states, might become the
ﬁrst step to economic growth via a ‘wide range of mutual transactions’.
Currently, mutual transactions in the Caucasus mainly exist only at the level
of individuals involved in shuttle trading in the territory devastated by conﬂicts
and war. Economic ties in the former Soviet Union were developed without the
consideration of regional beneﬁts, therefore the economic ties of factories in the
remaining industrial complexes were orientated outside the region. The
Caucasus has to develop new economic ties within the region, using a traditional
division of labour. Considering the current lack of ﬁnancial resources and instru-
ments, these ties might be developed in the form of state insured barter.
Economic development and cooperation might foster ‘greater population
mobility’. The collapse of the economy in the region has led to a situation where
many Caucasians have moved to Russia in search of jobs and education.
Economic projects might create possibilities for ﬁnding work without leaving the
Caucasus.
The ‘broadening of elites’ is another element helpful for constructing a
security community. It implies two processes – the inclusion of representatives
from broad range of ethnic groups into management as well as a transfer of
power and responsibilities to local authorities (at the level of small districts and
even villages, when considering the size of ethnic communities in the Caucasus).
North Caucasian republics are making the ﬁrst steps towards the realisation of
consociational democracy. These attempts, along with the essential decentralisa-
tion of power, have to be continued.
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Cooperation, external powers and future peace in the Caucasus
Although the Caucasus has the preconditions and a shared regional identity for
being ‘successfully integrated’, it seems not to have the other important element
for ‘constructing’ regionalism and cooperation – political entrepreneurs.
Obviously, only one group – current or future political elites – may be considered
possible candidates. Meanwhile, the 1990s revealed that Caucasian politicians
seem not to be ready for the essential self-limitation and laborious search for
compromise, without which the realisation of any model of the regional, and
especially the Caucasian, community is impossible. Caucasian historians have
treated the common history in diﬀerent ways and promoted negative images of
neighbouring peoples. The socio-economic situation in the region may be
described as devastation. In such conditions, the policy of the international com-
munity towards conﬂict settlement in the Caucasus and Caucasian integration
becomes of greater importance.
Michael Brown has given several reasons why outsider powers should care
about ethnic war, even though these wars do not create direct threats to their
strategic interests (Brown 1993). Ethnic war ‘poses a direct challenge to impor-
tant international norms of behaviour’, they create ‘chain reaction eﬀects’, and
the problem of refugees is among them. The international community, and not
only neighbouring states, might be interested in a policy promoting peace in the
Caucasus. Support for integrating eﬀorts could be one of the main applications
of such policy.
Countries involved in Caucasian aﬀairs (the West, Russia, Turkey and Iran)
should coordinate their political and economic activities and avoid fostering
competition among the Caucasian elites. Cooperative eﬀorts are in need of tech-
nological and information support about experience and best practice in resolv-
ing problems and tensions as they arise. Considering the necessity of multi-level
integration, the support of non-governmental sector networks might be an
essential element of international assistantship.
During the past decade, the political elites in the autonomous regions of the
North Caucasus began moving towards consociational forms of democracy. For
many reasons, however, this tendency is weak and controversial. The govern-
ments need special expertise and help in the development of consociational
democracy in developing countries. This expertise might be implemented in
many other regions. The idea of all-Caucasian integration, arising diﬃculties
and successes should be discussed widely during international conferences on
regional problems. At the same time, local politicians and political scientists
should get the opportunity to study world experience on relevant issues.
Obviously, however, Caucasian integration will be necessary for several
decades to come or even more. But this approach to peace development in this
region has no alternatives. 
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
1 There were no unique rules or criteria in the decision to confer autonomous status.
Sometimes, this decision by the Central Communist Party Committee was deﬁned by the
successful or unsuccessful actions of an ethnic cadre, sometimes for other political
reasons (the autonomous regions of oppressed peoples between 1943 and 1956, the
change of Karelia’s status, etc.). Diﬀerent statuses in the hierarchy provided a diﬀerent
degree of control over resources (primarily, control over the regional economy) and
welfare distribution.
2 The ﬁrst wave was a rise in nationalism in the Caucasus at the beginning of the twentieth
century.
3 SMEs were usually republican or joint republican-central property.
4 The method of the ‘interactive problem-solving workshop’ was introduced by Herbert
Kelman (see, for example, Kelman 1991). A signiﬁcant diﬀerence with the Caucasian sit-
uation is that leaders of ethno-national parties developed or used conﬂict resolution tech-
niques themselves (without any training or third-party intervention), on the basis of
Caucasian traditions. 
5 The Congress of Peoples of Dagestan was elected by the representatives of national move-
ments on 24 October 1992 on the basis of an ethnic quota which reﬂected the ethnic com-
position in the republic: Avars, Kumyks, Lezgins and Dargins got seven mandates, Laks
and Tabasarans ﬁve, Chechens three, Tats two, and two mandates were reserved for
Cossacks. The federalisation of Dagestan, which was supported by the Kumyks, Lezgins
and Nogays, became the most controversial issue for this cooperative movement.
6 In Adygeya, 22.5 per cent thought that the peoples of the republic were disproportionally
(‘unjustly’) represented in administrative bodies and 21.8 per cent said the same about
representative bodies of power, in Dagestan it was 28.6 and 31 per cent, respectively, in
Ingushetia 24.4 and 22.8 per cent, in Kabardino-Balkaria 20.4 and 22.9 per cent, in
Karachaevo-Cherkesia 25.6 and 32.5 per cent and in North- Ossetia 21 and 21.7 per cent,
respectively (Khoperskaya 1997: 221–222).
7 Lijphart introduced the notion of consociational democracy as ‘particularly suitable for
the governance of plural societies, that is societies which are deeply divided by religious,
ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural or ethnic diﬀerences’. Consociational democracy
is deﬁned in terms of two essential principles, executive power-sharing and a high degree
of autonomy for the all segments, and two helpful principles, proportionality and the
minority veto (Bogdanor 1991:137).
8 A variety of approaches were characteristic for the Caucasus at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. ‘The Alliance of United Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus’; ‘the
South-Eastern Alliance of the Cossack hosts, Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus and Free
Steppe Peoples’, ‘the Transcaucasian Seim’; ‘the Republic of the Union of Mountain
Peoples of the Caucasus’; ‘the Tersk People’s Republic’ and other attempts to realise the
idea of a Common Caucasian Home after the February Revolution of 1917 proposed
diﬀerent forms of political and geographic unity for the Caucasus.
9 The oﬃcial leadership of Ingushetia has recognised the moratorium on territorial reha-
bilitation, but has insisted on the complete fulﬁlment of the Law on Rehabilitation.
10 The population and political elites of the Caucasus do not distinguish between western
countries because the existing policy of the West towards the Caucasus seems united in
comparison with policy towards conﬂicts in the former Yugoslavia. Only during voting on
the Karabakh problem in the OSCE in 1994 did France vote against the condemnation of
Armenia. But this case has not inﬂuenced the united image of the West. 
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11 Mark Katz has researched this problem for other cases of newly independent states (Katz
1996: 29).
12 Conditions such as ‘the necessity of core areas and their capability’ (Deutsch et al. 1957:
137), which was more appropriate in a ‘pure realist world’ before signiﬁcant changes in
international environment, has been omitted. Although until now foreign policy has
reﬂected a realist approach, it is not only this approach that deﬁnes international rela-
tions. European integration testiﬁes that the security community is possible without core
areas. Two conditions here have also been conﬂated, namely ‘superior economic growth’
and the ‘expectation of joint economic rewards’, because, in my opinion, these are two
successive stages of one process. The ‘compatibility of major values’ condition and the
‘distinctive way of life’ which Deutsch proposed to consider diﬀerently, implying again the
speciﬁc Cold War situation of a diﬀerent economic and political life between the East and
the West, have also been joined as one condition (Deutsch et al. 1957: 134). 
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Bringing culture back into a concept of
rationality: state–society relations and 
conﬂict in post-socialist Transcaucasia
Barbara Christophe
R,   number of contributions to the vivid debate on‘ethnic’ violence have been classiﬁed according to their underlyingtheoretical assumptions (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Approaches
which follow the culturalistic turn of sociology are counterpoised with more
conventional concepts, based on the premises of rational choice theory. But
the constant failure to relate empirical studies to one of these competing
models has revealed the confusing ambivalence of the discourse. To analyse
the rational strategies of ethnic entrepreneurs, who are suspected of having
an interest in the provocation of inter-group conﬂict as a means of strength-
ening their position in intra-group competition for power, does not necessarily
mean ignoring the cultural logic of mobilisation. A combination of elite
centred top-down approaches, exposing the highly selective and functional use
of ethnic symbols for rational purposes, with bottom-up approaches, drawing
attention to the reasons for society’s responsiveness to mobilisational eﬀorts,
thus seems to oﬀer the most promising results.
The following attempt to read the hidden transcript of ethnic conﬂict in post-
Soviet Transcaucasia is obliged to an intellectual tradition, that tries to reconcile
culturalist and constructivist approaches with rational actor models. But at the
same time it suggests a quite unorthodox way of bringing culture back into a
concept of rationality. Instead of referring to cultural constraints on goal setting
or manipulation of discourses as a technique of mobilisation, it introduces his-
torically evolved and culturally embedded patterns of state–society relations as
a key variable.1 A speciﬁc mode of state building, adapted to and shaped by a cul-
turally mediated social structure, is analysed as a crucial precondition for the
proliferation of ethnic violence. 
The analysis is based on ﬁve theses. Starting from the secure ground of more
or less commonly accepted knowledge on conﬂict analysis, the chapter ﬁnishes
with considerations of a rather speculative character. Owing to a lack of
suﬃcient empirical data the chapter is conﬁned to drawing the blueprint of an
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analytical framework, that may serve as a guideline for further comparative
research on state collapse and state building in Transcaucasia. 
The phenomenology of ‘new war’
The ﬁrst thesis directly contradicts assumptions which are still widespread in the
literature on Transcaucasian aﬀairs. This region is commonly analysed in terms
of a naive culturalistic paradigm. Conﬂict and violence seem to be triggered
either by the aggravation of objective ethnic grievances or by the clash of
contrasting concepts of ethnic identities. The main players in the political arena
appear to be collective actors – that is peoples, nations, ethnicities. These assump-
tions can be objected to on two levels. Firstly, it is not ethnicity, but rather the col-
lapse of virtually all modern state structures into anarchy and lawlessness that
provides the key variable in explaining the violent escalation of conﬂicts
(Fairbanks 1995). Secondly, the stage of action is not particularly dominated by
collectivities, integrated by a declared commitment to national symbols. In what
Mary Kaldor termed ‘new wars’, it is instead necessary to deal with private
actors, more or less loosely integrated by a mixture of personal ties and utilitar-
ian considerations (Kaldor 1999). Making use of and even encouraging the dis-
solution of state power, these actors reap substantial proﬁts from the removal of
any kind of institutional constraint on the pursuit of self-interest at the expense
of the public. The Transcaucasian mode of warfare, described in various reports
from international organisations such as Human Rights Watch (Human Rights
Watch 1995), provides a wide range of empirical illustrations for the validation
of this thesis.
All these wars involved a permanent blurring of the distinction between
organised violence for political purposes and organised crime. This statement not
only refers to paramilitary groups and criminal bands, but also holds true for the
so-called ‘regular forces’. First, despite diﬀerences in status they all stood out for
their surprisingly low degree of professionalism. Secondly, nearly all of them
lacked a clear chain of command, which might have ensured a certain level of
discipline. For example, in sharp contrast to the internal structure of conven-
tional armies it is hard to ﬁnd the rank of sergeant in these units, which normally
serves as a crucial link between oﬃcers and common soldiers (Jones 1996).
Thirdly they were typically not linked to an organised logistical system, funded
by the state. The arbitrary seizing of military bases was therefore quite a common
means of obtaining weapons.2 Looting became a sheer necessity for survival.
Under these conditions the combatants sooner or later turned into pre-modern
brigands. All these features amounted to an eﬀective feudalisation of warfare.
Soldiers were more engaged in making money by stealing, selling their arms,
dealing drugs or extorting transit fees from refugees, than in fulﬁlling military
tasks. Consequently, analyses have to account for low-intensity conﬂicts, marked
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by a clear avoidance of battles. To further complicate the situation, the state
sometimes even played on these motives. For instance the Georgian government
released prisoners in exchange for their agreement to take part in the Abkhazian
war. Very often a further escalation of conﬂict was provoked by the arbitrary
moves of warlords, who acted beyond political control. As a rule they took to
arms when a possible solution became apparent: an example of this would be
Kitovani’s march towards Suchumi in August 1992 (Fuller 1993, see also
Chapter 7 in this volume). Occasionally these troops even turned their weapons
against what remained of the weakened state – like the Zviadists in Georgia at the
peak of the Abkhasian war or Surat Huseinov in Azerbaijan, who did not hesi-
tate to reject the government of Elchibey during a period of intense ﬁghting in
Karabakh (see Chapter 9 in this volume). The ease with which these warlords
shifted their alliances (Kitovani, for example, was suspected of collaborating with
the Russians as well as with the Zviadists) seems to indicate that their behaviour
was not so much motivated by a dissident notion of national interest. They do not
interfere with politics for political reasons, but were instead interested in the per-
petuation of anarchy as an ideal precondition for realising essentially private
goals.
The legacy of the weak socialist state
To replace nationalism with state collapse as the main factor behind the prolife-
ration of violence in Transcaucasia not only provides answers, but also raises
many questions. The second thesis seeks to resolve one of them. It identiﬁes the
destructive dynamic of the socialist system as the driving force behind the with-
ering away of the post-socialist state. The notion of ‘state weakness’ used here
refers to Jadwiga Staniszkis’ distinction between the modern regulatory state,
which gains strength by adhering to the rule of law, and the negative power of
the socialist production state, which is based upon a destruction of autonomous
regulatory mechanisms (Staniszkis 1992). The rationality of control, which
motivated the destruction of society’s capacity for self-regulation, condemned
the state to a permanent intervention in the organisation of social and produc-
tive relations, a necessity that clearly overstretched its capabilities and thus
undermined its very ability to exercise eﬃcient control. In attempting to compen-
sate for the ever-increasing loss of control, the socialist state was forced to seek
remedy in neopatrimonial strategies of incorporating those it was unable to sub-
ordinate to its own rules into its own power structures. It thus destroyed the very
notion of public interest and unintentionally opened the door for a colonisation
of the state by society (Nee and Stark 1989).
In a study on Soviet Transcaucasia, Gerald Easter has shown that state build-
ing eﬀorts in that region already in the Stalinist period relied heavily on the incor-
poration of clientelistic networks, integrated by personal ties and predominantly
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opportunistic considerations, into the chain of command (Easter 1996). From a
wide range of theoretical literature, dating back to Max Weber, it is clear that the
very character of patrimonial administrative structures, vesting power in
persons more than in rules or oﬃces, unavoidably weakens state capacity.
Resources tend to be diverted to members of the ruling elite. Thus the tacit pri-
vatisation of the state, which ended in the total destruction of the very notion of
public interest, had already started under communism. The fragmentation of
power structures, so characteristic of post-socialist Transcaucasia, can be
explained as the logical result of socialist techniques of exercising power, which
were designed to stabilise the system in the short term, but proved to be increas-
ingly destabilising in the long term. 
The legacy of tradition
Reference to the socialist legacy of state weakness by itself suggests a far too
general argument as to permit an understanding of the peculiarities of the
Transcaucasian situation. Why the breakdown of the Soviet state produced a
great variety of diﬀerent outcomes is a question which must necessarily be
addressed. The following theses are therefore based on comparisons drawn
between diﬀerent regions of the increasingly heterogeneous post-Soviet space.
Post-socialist development in Russia, on the one hand, and in Georgia and
Armenia, on the other, are contrasted ﬁrst. In all cases it is necessary to address
a dramatic decrease in the rule setting and enforcing capabilities of the state. But
despite these similarities, the quite diﬀerent strategies applied by particularistic
actors in exploiting the advantages arising from the absence of institutional con-
straints should be noted. The Russian scene is dominated by powerful players
alternatively called ‘oligarchs’, ‘political entrepreneurs’ or ‘rent seekers’
(Christophe 1998). All these competing labels refer to speciﬁc patterns of accu-
mulation. Proﬁt seeking, based upon a sober calculation of costs and beneﬁts, is
replaced with rent seeking, based on the externalisation of costs and asset strip-
ping. The techniques applied for this purpose range from the deliberate stimula-
tion of inﬂation to the spontaneous usurping of state property and the
exploitation of political inﬂuence in order to obtain privileged access to economic
resources and to exclude competitors from organised markets. In Transcaucasia
the framework of action was shaped by a diﬀerent kind of actor, engaged in a
much more primitive form of accumulation. The political entrepreneur of the
Russian type, which proﬁts from the marketisation of political decisions about
the redistribution of resources, is pushed into the background by the entrepren-
eur of the Georgian type, who reaps beneﬁts from the dissolution of the state
monopoly of violence which is promoted by inter-ethnic or civil war. Under these
conditions it is the marketisation of violence which may be observed. It is the
control over the privatised means of violence that was turned into a productive
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force, successfully exploited by means of looting, extortion or the commercialisa-
tion of a genuine public good like the procurement of protection. 
It was therefore not accidental that economic activity in Georgia as well as
in Armenia was concentrated around the so-called ‘power ministries’. But it
should be borne in mind that they did not act as representatives of the state. Even
ﬁnancially they were no longer dependent on the state. With the dramatic
decline in revenues from taxation, they increasingly relied on so-called ‘non-
budgetary funds’, that is, on resources accumulated by rendering services to
private actors in exchange for cash (Fairbanks 1995). Three inter-related factors
account for these diﬀerences and are explored below.
First, the scope of corrupt networks in Georgia, incorporated into oﬃcial
structures, was much wider than in other parts of the Soviet Union. To give a
slight indication of scale, more than 180,000 people were tried for the abuse of
oﬃcial positions and the misuse of state property in Georgia between 1958 and
1972 (Gerber 1997). Control over the ﬂow of resources was weakened to a much
greater degree. Despite the fact that Georgia was among the least successful of all
Union Republics in terms of economic growth rates, it showed private saving
rates of twice the Soviet average (Schröder 1983). A similar pattern may be seen
in the distribution of durable consumer goods. This has crucial implications for
the post-socialist option of asset stripping. Owing to the diversion and diﬀusion
of resources into a dense system of networks deeply embedded in society, strate-
gies of asset transfer were not directed at the state as a target of ﬁrst priority.
Instead they were aimed at the dispossession of society as the real locus of
wealth. Thus the illegal proﬁts of pyramid schemes in Georgia were estimated to
be as high as $30 million (Georgian Chronicle 3: 1995), thus nearly equalling the
tax revenue of the Georgian State in 1994 (Gerber 1997). This imposed a quite
diﬀerent rationale on actors, who may be characterised as prey seekers instead of
rent seekers. In contrast to rent seeking, prey seeking does not depend on the pen-
etration of state structures. Instead it is facilitated by a war of everybody against
everybody else as the ideal pretext for primitive accumulation. 
Secondly those mechanisms of control that were built into the Soviet system
to restrict the disintegrative eﬀects of neopatrimonialism did not work that
eﬃciently in the Transcaucasus. This refers primarily to the principle of nomenk-
latura, the centrally controlled appointment of cadres. While in the rest of the
former Soviet Union a person’s access to scarce resources and therefore their
position in informal networks of exchange was determined by their status in the
oﬃcial power structures, Georgian career patterns revealed a quite diﬀerent
logic. A person’s potential for networking was the crucial precondition for being
recruited to positions of power, which could not have been exploited for obtain-
ing resources otherwise (Mars and Altmann 1983). So it is the very origin of
power, embedded much more directly in social status and prestige, which
accounts for the Georgian deviation from the Soviet norm.
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The third factor that contributed to the acceleration of institutional collapse
in post-Soviet Transcaucasia was the limited ability of the socialist state to pene-
trate the rural periphery of society. This phenomenon manifested itself in the
preservation of a multitude of informal traditional practices, dwelling behind the
façade of formal institutions and inside the paradoxes of the self-subverting
system. Ethnological research on rural life in Soviet Armenia (Kilbourne
Matossian 1962) and Georgia (Dragadze 1988) points, for example, to the repro-
duction of the structures of a village economy, at least in remote areas. In large
parts of both countries the brigades, as the new Soviet-style working units were
called, consisted predominantly of close relatives. Even traditional patterns of
distribution survived. In many cases Soviet principles of rewarding peasants
could not gain a foothold. Agricultural workers were not paid according to the
highly diﬀerentiated Soviet system of evaluating work, but according to social
status or the amount of land they or their families brought into the collective
farm (Kilbourne Matossian 1962).
These processes of informalisation did not restrict themselves to the control
of resource ﬂows. They even caught hold of the means of violence, which were
manipulated and occupied by traditional actors for purposes openly contradict-
ing the oﬃcially declared rationality of the socialist system. To give just one
example – Mary Kilbourne Matossian describes the case of a collective farm,
whose chairmen handed over a peasant to the NKVD for refusing to accept a
negotiated marriage between his daughter and the chairman’s son (Kilbourne
Matossian 1962). 
To summarise, the socialist legacy of state weakness is much more acute in
the Transcaucasus, which had much more dramatic consequences after the
implosion of the socialist system. The lingering decay of the socialist state
resulted from the attempt to adapt to the conditions of self-produced complexity
and modernity by relying on pre-modern modes of state building. Striving to
stabilise oﬃcial institutions of rule setting and rule enforcement, the Soviet elites
tried to reinforce them with a dense network of more reliable personal relations.
Without any institutional mechanism to assure against opportunistic behaviour,
the Soviet bureaucracy soon degenerated into a neopatrimonial structure that
was integrated by private purpose. The very notion of impersonal rules, claiming
validity independent of the context and the status of the persons involved, was
destroyed. Thus there was no space left for a concept of public interest, capable
of imposing constraints on particularistic actors’ strategies of enhancing power,
prestige and wealth at the expense of the society as a whole. 
Moreover socialism in Transcaucasia was somewhat special. State struc-
tures were not only re-embedded in neopatrimonial structures of clientelistic
relations; these clientelistic networks were grounded in traditional institutions,
much more resilient to the detraditionalising interventions of the Soviet state.
Consequently it is necessary to examine three and not two diﬀerent patterns of
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institutionalising rules in that speciﬁc region, stabilising and subverting each
other at the same time. These more complex forms of hybridisation accounted for
the notorious failure of central eﬀorts to cope with the disintegrative eﬀects of the
tacit privatisation of control. Large sections of society, especially in the country-
side, were fenced oﬀ against the corrective intervention of the socialist state. At
the same time these loopholes allowed for a more or less uncontrollable accumu-
lation of resources, which were fed into clientelistic networks. Thus these net-
works not only conﬁned themselves to the function of intermediary between
centre and periphery, but also obtained a greater degree of independence as gate-
keepers, controlling not only resources, but access to resources as well. 
Nationalism and clientelism
Referring to a more speciﬁc notion of institutions, which emphasises the abstract
and impersonal character of the underlying rules, we can analyse the destruc-
tive dynamics of the socialist system in terms of an ongoing process of deinstitu-
tionalisation. This perspective leads to a conceptualisation of transformation
that diﬀers in quite crucial aspects from the common use of that term. What
seems to be at stake is not the transition from plan to market, from one-party rule
to democracy or the replacement of previously applied mechanisms of steering
and controlling social relations with more eﬀective ones. It is not even the intro-
duction of new rules designed to deal with new forms of conﬂict. The central task
can be deﬁned in much more radical terms as the institutionalisation of rules as
such, which are understood as guidelines of action independent of context var-
iables (Lepsius 1996). 
This should aid precision in deﬁning the factors accounting for the failure
or success of transformation. Once again the problem will be approached by
means of comparison, but now focusing on the Baltic and the Transcaucasus,
the two regions in the post-Soviet space that mark extreme poles of contrast
with regard to progress in institutionalising an eﬀective post-socialist order.
Despite striking similarities – both regions proved to be exceptional in terms of
the strength of their national movements and both were among the ﬁrst to
break the Communist Party’s monopoly of power and to secede from the Soviet
Union – they represent quite diﬀerent models of development. The remarkable
success in the Baltics (Christophe 1997a) stands out in sharp contrast to the
gloomy perspectives of the Transcaucasian region, which suﬀers from the
violent escalation of conﬂicts, political uncertainty and economic decline
(Hunter 1994). This would seem to reject interpretations which refer to nation-
alism as a key for understanding post-Soviet conﬂicts. Producing quite diﬀerent
outcomes in diﬀerent contexts, nationalism is far too ambiguous a category to
ﬁt into the role of ‘independent variable’. But the fact that it plays various roles
does not necessarily mean that it plays no signiﬁcant role at all. Modifying the
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previous argument, it is therefore now suggested that nationalism should be
treated as a dependent variable.
From a theoretical perspective, it is the Baltic case that raises less suspicion.
In seeking the preconditions of successful modernisation, historical sociology
has always pointed to the enormous integrative potential of nationalism, which
promises to rebuild society on a new foundation. The rise of national conscious-
ness transforms the very nature of social integration and thus contributes to the
emergence of new trust generating mechanisms. Instead of being conﬁned to the
boundaries of face-to-face communities and resulting from the everyday experi-
ence of concrete social interaction, trust is now based on the belief of belonging
to a community of people who share the same values. It is this notion of gener-
alised trust between individuals, who do not necessarily know each other, that
forms the backbone of the modern nation as an imagined community (Anderson
1996).
In recalling the substantial contributions nationalism has rendered in laying
the foundations of modernity, the challenge of explaining why this recipe failed
to work in the Transcaucasian case needs to be met. Common sense usually
points to two factors: the intensity and the content of nationalist discourse in
that speciﬁc region. However, a comparison with the Baltic experience makes this
argument appear less convincing. Content analysis of public debate at the peak
of national awakening in Lithuania (Christophe 1997b) and Georgia (Gerber
1997) reveals that Georgian nationalists touched upon the same issues as their
Lithuanian comrades in spirit. Both spoke about ethnic discrimination, the dis-
tortion of national history and memory, and the subjection to foreign rule, which
had encouraged alienation and a cynical attitude towards the state. Even corrup-
tion appears to be a prominent theme in both cases. In order to ﬁnd diﬀerences,
it is therefore necessary to examine the structural dimension of nationalist argu-
ments. Corruption provides a good example. In Lithuania, the debate concen-
trated on the incorporation of the whole society into corruptive networks as a
means of undermining the moral self-esteem of the nation. This kind of under-
standing prepared the ground for a conceptualisation of ‘nation’ as a symbolic
construct, which could bring about a break with the personalist logic of socialist
neopatrimonalism, at least at a normative level. National revival was meant to
imply a return to the principles of generalised reciprocity. To call up the memory
of national glory was a means of overcoming informal practices which helped
each individual member of the nation to adapt to the incentive structures of the
socialist system, but which was actually devastating for the nation as a whole.
A similar way of reasoning cannot be found in the anti-corruption rhetoric
of the Georgian national movement. The populist attacks of Gamsakhurdia, for
example, were predominantly directed against certain sections of society, espe-
cially the urban intellectuals, who were suspected of having enjoyed privileged
access to resources under socialism (Jones 1993). But the deformations which
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caught hold of the society as a whole due to the clientelistic mode of integration
imposed on it by socialism were hardly ever mentioned. Therefore the discourse
called for the restoration of a substantial form of justice instead of backing the
demands for the introduction of procedural norms as a guideline for the distri-
bution of resources. This resulted not only in a reproduction of a socialist mode
of reasoning, but paved the way for a very arbitrary mode of exercising power.
For example, the police chief of a provincial Georgian town, when asked to
comment on the immediate aftermath of Gamsakhurdia’s takeover, started to
talk about a group of armed young men, totally unknown to him, who entered
his police station and demanded the sudden release of prisoners as well as the
handing over of money (van der Leeuw 1999). 
Obviously the national movement in Georgia did not really succeed in
replacing the clientelistic structures of the socialist society, which reinforced per-
sisting traditional patterns of social integration with a modern, that is national,
mode of integration, based upon procedural norms. It kept on conceptualising
social relations in terms of personal ties. In sharp contrast to the internal coher-
ence of the Popular Fronts in the Baltics, their Georgian counterpart fell into
competing factions very quickly. The emerging cleavages can hardly be explained
in terms of programmatic diﬀerences. Instead they were rooted in personal rival-
ries, for example, communists were being scattered about the whole spectrum of
political organisations. Again it is the arbitrary logic of personal ties that
accounts for this phenomenon. Thus, the breakaway of the Socialist Party from
the coalition with the ruling Citizen Union in summer 1997 had nothing to do
with programmatic diﬀerences. Instead it was the result of a violent clash of the
commercial interests, represented by these parties (Kjeldsen 1999). 
Thus it was the weakness and not the strength of Transcaucasian national-
ism that proved to be harmful. Owing to these fundamental shortages it obvi-
ously failed to overcome the legacy of socialist neopatrimonialism. This amounts
to no less than a failure in nation building. More than this – the very project of
nation building was captured and aborted by particularistic actors. More or less
consciously, all of them used a nationalist rhetoric as a disguise for the promo-
tion of exclusively private goals, thus leaving no space for the articulation of a
public interest, which might have otherwise served as a symbolic point of refer-
ence for an institutional breakthrough to modernity. 
Stabilisation without stability
This section covers the developments in recent years. The actual situation in the
Transcaucasus obviously diﬀers from the chaotic and anarchic picture drawn
above. The intensive ﬁghting on the various battlegrounds of ‘ethnic’ conﬂict in
the region has ceased. However fragile, ceaseﬁres have proved to be quite
eﬀective. Remarkable progress in the consolidation of state power seems to
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contradict the explanatory model employed here, which instead points to the
structural obstacles to successful state building. In an eﬀort to account for these
recent trends this section therefore concentrates on the example of Georgia,
which seems to provide the most challenging provocations. 
The same warlords who had beneﬁted from the dissolution of statehood by
turning violence into a productive force, re-entered the scene as supporters of a
policy aimed at the restoration of a minimalist version of law and order. Having
ousted President Gamsakhurdia in a strange coalition with members of the old
nomenklatura and representatives of the privileged intelligentsia, they voluntar-
ily ceded power to Shevardnadze. Although the former Party Secretary initially
respected a kind of power sharing agreement, Shevardnadze soon took on the
task of disarming his former allies. At ﬁrst glance the Georgian entrepreneurs of
violence thus seem to have taken part in a destructive move against the system
of criminal accumulation upon which their very existence depended. This course
of events poses two serious questions, which hardly appear to be answerable
within the framework of the explanatory model used here. The ﬁrst refers to the
underlying rationality of this seemingly self-destructive decision. The second
asks about the organisational mechanisms which were installed to achieve what
is termed here ‘stabilisation’ without stability. 
Common sense would probably point to a miscalculation on the part of the
losers, to a lack of capability in anticipating the unintended consequences of
what was meant to be only a tactical move. But such explanations unquestion-
ably take on the perspective of the winners, who legitimised their ascent to power
as a decisive move towards the consolidation of statehood and engaged in the sim-
ulation of reform to justify themselves in the eyes of their international patrons.
This interpretation can be rejected on the basis of two inter-related observations.
Firstly, the system of rule established by Shevardnadze did not really mark a
break with the dominant prey seeking logic. Instead it stands for the adjustment
of its underlying rationality of extraction to self-produced change. The main
achievement of the previous years consisted of the attraction of urgently needed
grants and credits from the international donor community. Far from encourag-
ing authentic change, the opening up of access to international aid instead
assured the survival of a self-exhausting social order, that was incapable of self-
reproduction and therefore highly dependent on the permanent input of exter-
nal resources. 
Secondly, the institutional and organisational mechanisms applied in the
course of the so-called ‘normalisation’ were clearly reminiscent of the neopatri-
monial strategies of rule that had weakened the rule setting capabilities of the
Soviet state. The ‘success’ of the Shevardnadze regime was actually accom-
plished by the more than skilful combination of two classical techniques of exer-
cising rule by a tacit feudalisation of power.3 On the national level of horizontal
power relations, relative autonomy was retained by a permanent play on inter-
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nal frictions between competing groups of warlords. Shevardnadze reached a
high degree of mastery in allying with one faction in order to isolate the other
and thus step by step managed to eliminate all his rivals. In an attempt to prevent
the accumulation of independent power resources not subverted to his control,
he repeatedly reshuﬄed the leading positions of various state agencies. The con-
scious creation of a multitude of state institutions, with ambiguously deﬁned
and intermingling realms of jurisdiction, served the same purpose.4 On the level
of vertical relations of subordination a fragile hegemony at the centre was re-
established by the incorporation of local leaders into the power structure.5 In
conceding them privileged access to state controlled resources and simultane-
ously controlling them through the judicious manipulation of the central right
to appointment, centrifugal tendencies could have been tamed, without really
running the risk of penetrating the periphery and thus provoking irreconcilable
resistance.
As a gatekeeper to international capital injection the centre has obviously
succeeded in altering the balance of power in the informal networks of
patron–client relations, which emerged in the period of unrestrained warlord-
ism. In accordance with a consequent strategy of venality as a mode of state
building it has reinvested the rents, and it has acquired in the shape of develop-
ment aid, in the strengthening of its hegemony. Potential power brokers were
allured to subordinate and cooperate by giving them a share in revenues as well
as in the exercise of power, which additionally provided them with a vast range
of opportunities for extortion. The ability to take part in looting was thus no
longer dependent on the command of independent means of violence. Instead it
became an oﬃcially sanctioned right that was conﬁned to members of the state
apparatus. State oﬃcials from tax inspectors and the traﬃc police to ministers
are entitled to demand payment alternatively for the rendering of services which
are oﬃcially free of charge or for their readiness to grant exemption from the
enforcement of regulations, which seem to have been imposed with the sole
purpose of creating opportunities for bribe-taking.6 Heads of local administra-
tions, which are heavily involved in the illegal transfer or export of state prop-
erty, enjoy the support of the centre in the defence of their claims against rivals.
The case of a west Georgian, Gamgebeli, who was more or less openly charged
with both organising the smuggling of timber from the state-owned forest to
Turkey and with the distribution to his clients of credits from the local budget
that will never be paid back, but who nevertheless survived a vote of no
conﬁdence in the local parliament, provides an eloquent example.7 The fact, that
ministers are often engaged in business activities precisely in the sphere which
they are supposed to regulate points in the same direction. Obviously the
Georgian state has paid for consolidation with the total abandoning of every
claim to a central feature of modern statehood: the capacity to set the rules of
the game. The state even encourages the arbitrary manipulation of rules by his
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agents to their personal advantage as a means of ensuring the internal coher-
ence of his power structures.
The anarchic forms of prey seeking in Georgia, that characterised the early
years after independence, have thus been successfully replaced by more hier-
archically organised methods, already well known from Soviet times. As in the
good old days of stagnation, the institutionalisation of corruption left a bureau-
cracy that was only superﬁcially integrated, more as an arbiter than an executive
of power. Nevertheless the means that were employed to strengthen the state’s
control over of the ﬂow of economic resources, diﬀer signiﬁcantly. State property
as an institutionalised form of subordinating economics to politics was replaced
by a more subtle repeal of the legally recognised institution of private property
that is constantly undermined by the logic of personalistic ties. In Georgia the
problem is not only restricted to the phenomenon of insider privatisation. The
fact that private property is not protected against a permanent encroachment of
individual state agents weighs much more heavily in this context. Enterprises
belonging to clients of the ruling elites, who decide to change their aﬃliation and
desert to the opposition camp, are frequently pushed into bankruptcy by bureau-
cratic ‘spoon-feeding’.8 This not only refers to the most proﬁtable branches,
where high rents are extracted, but also to less lucrative spheres of economic
activity. The experience of a petty trader, whose merchandise was conﬁscated by
the police, because he refused to agree to the price dictated by his political patron,
does not seem to be exceptional.9 In an Imeretian village the author was told, that
peasants who do not belong to the mayor’s clientele shrink back from land lease
for fear of retaliation.10
The consequences of the Georgian variant of political capitalism are
twofold. On the one hand every entrepreneur who wants to run a successful busi-
ness is obliged to invest heavily into the preservation of personal relations with
individual representatives of the state.11 On the other hand those who adhere to
these tacit laws of the Georgian market, are in exchange rewarded with a wide
range of competitive advantages over their rivals. As a rule they are released from
the obligation to pay tax and custom duties. These informal proﬁt sharing agree-
ments between entrepreneurs and state oﬃcials not only create distorted incen-
tive structures, but also block the rational allocation of scarce resources and thus
prevent economic recovery. They moreover incur high ﬁscal losses for a state,
whose capabilities are severely weakened even in the most elementary dimension
of extraction. After having incapacitated itself to a critical degree by relying
exclusively on venality as a mode of state building, the central government more-
over has to accept the permanent siphoning away of taxes on various levels.
Local administrations have repeatedly violated legal tax sharing agreements. For
many years they have simply refused to transfer the legally prescribed share of
certain taxes to central bank accounts. They are able to do this without fear of
sanctions for two reasons. Although also formally subordinated to central
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organs, with regard to such central issues like job security, tax inspectors are, as
a rule, much more obliged to the representatives of local power.12 The situation
is aggravated by a striking lack of transparency in accounting procedures.
Obviously the central government is not even able to determine how much of the
total revenues it has actually received. Consequently it also falls victim to con-
stant cheating on the part of individual tax inspectors. 
To summarise these observations, it can thus be asserted that the ruling elite
in Georgia succeeded in employing hierarchically organised corruption as a
resource for the reproduction of a neopatrimonial state. But compared to the
lucky times of Soviet rule these structures are very much reduced. The venal
strategy applied for that purpose has not really paciﬁed rival elites. Up to now
they have only precluded the formation of a common front against the regime.
The political settlement achieved under Shevardnadze was not the victory of a
consolidated state over anarchy, but the accommodation of formerly autono-
mous prey seekers within a single state structure. In allowing them to share in
the proﬁts and prestige of the state, it incorporated their interests, which previ-
ously were represented through independent institutions, within its structures.
The ability to control rested on the ability to conciliate the most powerful rival to
state power. The state has thus itself become the site for conﬂicts among elites.
Necessarily this state of aﬀairs is of a highly fragile character. The decreasing
ability to satisfy the resource hunger of the incorporated elites – either due to
crisis or commitment to real reform, i.e. the eﬃcient allocation of resources –
could trigger conﬂict at any moment. 

1 In the development of this concept I am very much indebted to Barkey’s impressive anal-
ysis of conﬂict and state building in Ottoman Turkey (Barkey 1994).
2 Fieldnotes, Sagarejo, 3 September 1999.
3 Compare Lachmann’s (1989) analysis of divergent modes of state building in absolutist
France and Britain, which reveals striking similarities with the case of present-day
Georgia despite the historical distance of more than 200 years.
4 In his brilliant analysis of the dilemmas faced by national leaders of strong societies with
weak states, Migdal (1988) decribes analogous strategies in terms of a ‘policy of survival’.
5 The nomination of the Mingrel Otatar Patsatsia to the post of the Prime Minister in
August 1993 provides just the most prominent example.
6 To cite just some of the more curious examples, minibus drivers are obliged to take an
alcohol test every morning and exchange bureaux must have oﬃce space of more than
30m2.
7 Fieldnotes, Baghdati, 29 September 1999 and 1 October 1999.
8 Fieldnotes, Kutaisi, 27 September 1999.
9 Fieldnotes, Kutaisi, 24 September 1999.
10 Fieldnotes, Obtscha, 4 October 1999.
11 Compare the World Bank survey of 350 enterprise managers in Georgia, cited in
Kaufmann, Pradhan ans Ryterman (1998).
12 Fieldnotes, Sagarejo, 3 September 1999 and Baghdati, 5 October 1999.
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Reconciliation after ethnic cleansing:
witnessing, retribution and domestic reform
John Borneman
W   conditions that might make possible reconciliation afterethnic cleansing? This chapter addresses reconciliation in light ofspeciﬁc ethnic cleansings and ‘ethnicisations’, with a focus on the
most recent example in Bosnia. It neither elaborates a speciﬁc case nor makes
speciﬁc historical–cultural comparisons. The potential contribution is theoreti-
cal, specifying psycho-social terms and processes integral to reconciliation after
violent conﬂicts. The arguments presented are therefore relevant for reconcilia-
tion after conﬂicts other than those analysed here, but are restricted to the
extreme case of ethnic cleansing. ‘Reconciliation’ is deﬁned not in terms of per-
manent peace or harmony, but as a project of ‘departure from violence’. To rec-
oncile is an inter-subjective process, an agreement to settle accounts that
involves at least two subjects who are related in time. They are related in a tem-
poral sense not in that they necessarily have a shared past or a shared future.
Consensus about what was shared in the past or what will be shared in the future,
in modern parlance a ‘collective memory’, is not necessary for reconciliation and
its expectation may in fact awaken counterproductive drives to recover a lost
whole or to produce a harmonious community. Rather, in order to reconcile,
diﬀerent subjects must agree only to share a present, a present that is non-repet-
itive (Moore 1987). To agree to a present that does not repeat requires both the
creation of a ‘sense of ending’, of a radical break or rupture from existing rela-
tions, and the creation of a ‘sense of beginning’, a departure into a creative rela-
tionship marked not by cyclical or rebounding violence but by trust and care.
Traumatic loss after ethnic cleansing
After ethnic cleansing, victims, and to some extent perpetrators, are not merely
engaged in a struggle for survival, for resources such as food and shelter. To ﬁnd
food and shelter after an ethnic cleansing is frequently no small feat, especially
given that hostilities and violence continue in some form, but physical survival
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is a solvable problem. Much less resolvable is a problem located at a deeper, exis-
tential level: that survivors are suﬀering from despair, an agony or melancholy of
inconsolable and inexpressible grief. Despair, if we follow Kierkegaard, does not
result from an inability to live but from: 
the disconsolateness of not being able to die. The survivor’s despair, then, rests not in
having lived through the recent confrontation with the deaths that they witnessed
(or the murders they committed) but in the fact that they themselves have not died
and cannot die. What keeps the gnawing pain alive and keeps life in the pain . . . is the
reason why he despairs . . . because he cannot consume himself, cannot get rid of
himself, cannot become nothing. (Kierkegaard (1974 [1844]: 342) 
Because most survivors cannot die, much to their consternation, they are con-
tinually confronted with the psychic, social and political tasks of dealing with the
ever-present loss of those who did die. They must, in some way, attempt to recover
or redeem this loss. Yet the profound loss suﬀered in an ethnic cleansing, the
unbearable loss of loved ones and the damage inﬂicted on one’s own standards
of self, irrespective of whether one is perpetrator or victim, is never fully recover-
able. Some sense of the loss continually reappears, if not in consciousness then
minimally in dreams and fantasies. Because of this continuous and uncontrolla-
ble reappearance of loss, survivors remain, necessarily, in a state of melancholy,
unable to detach themselves from the love-object or, as Freud would have it,
prone to repetition compulsions.
The possibility of non-repetition, then, rests on the recuperation of losses
that are impossible to recover, to reconcile with an end to which there is no end.
This paradox is the key to reconciliation after ethnic cleansing. Attempts to
recover this loss, or these losses, manifest themselves in many ways. Two
common attempts are revenge and physical reproduction. Following an ethnic
cleansing, in the face of a loss that cannot be articulated and that is unrecover-
able, revenge is a frequent response. Revenge after ethnic cleansing takes many
forms, from reciprocating one’s own suﬀering by expelling the expeller, to creat-
ing myths about the eternal evil of the ethnic other. However it is conducted,
revenge is the enactment of a repetition of the violence, the only diﬀerence with
the ‘initial’ violence being that those victimised are, or hope to be, temporarily on
the ‘winning’ side. The alternative to revenge after ethnic cleansing is, as is made
clear below, a legal reckoning with the violence, an invocation of the principles
of the rule of law to settle accounts, which in turn facilitates the building of net-
works of trust and principles of accountability.
Recuperation of loss through physical reproduction
A second attempt to recover the loss is the compulsive physical reproduction by
victims that follows events of this sort, including most wars. One might think
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that physical reproduction following ethnic cleansing is a positive transforma-
tion of a loss into a life-aﬃrming event. This interpretation of reproduction is
dangerous, however, ﬁrst, because it does not take seriously the impossibility of
such recuperation and the fundamental paradox in a project of recuperation,
and secondly, it does not acknowledge the likely consequences of trying to
recover a loss through physical reproduction. Recuperation is impossible because
of the speciﬁc nature of traumatic loss, which is experienced as a temporally
delayed and repeated suﬀering of events that can be grasped only retrospectively
(Caruth 1996). Loss that becomes traumatic is characterised by not having been
experienced at the time of occurrence. In other words, the loss is only, if at all,
experienced later, as it returns to the victim unbidden, frequently as a horrifying
silence that cannot be spoken. Hence our diﬃculty in detecting, understanding,
or treating such an experience.
The suﬀering of traumatic loss cannot be stopped or overcome through the
possibility of return to a prior state of innocence or fullness. Any recovery from
traumatic loss, a recovery that might be a reconciliation, a departure from vio-
lence, is possible only if the loss is ‘relentlessly mourned and mourned’. To
assume a deﬁnitive end to this mourning is mistaken. Assuming an end is to place
oneself in a limbo, as Serge Leclaire writes, ‘in the milky light of a shadowless,
hopeless waiting’ (Leclaire 1998 [1975]: 3). Waiting for an end to the despair, to
the inability to die, is to wait for the deliverance of death, and that comes only
with suicide. Yet those victimised are challenged to begin anew without an
actual end; they are challenged to create an end and a departure that paradoxi-
cally also acknowledges its ﬁctional character, a beginning that does not deny the
loss.
Impatient with relentless mourning, to deliver oneself from this waiting,
many survivors have babies. The arrival of the child changes the nature of the
waiting, but it does not end the despair, the inability to die. A child cannot recover
a loss that is unrecoverable. But it changes the waiting by presenting a potential
fullness to ﬁll the absence left by the loss. Immediate physical reproduction after
ethnic cleansing is the substitution of a child for the loss of a loved one, a living
substitute for the dead. It is the displacement of a loss. This child might well be
the product of an act of love, and might be thought of as a new beginning, but it
carries with it the despair, the inability to die, that motivates much of the sur-
vivor’s grief. This grief now takes a less private form; the circle of grief is enlarged
and includes the new child. Immediate reproduction perpetuates this despair by
passing it on to the child, who then grows up bearing the parental expectations,
their unfulﬁlled wishes and hopes, of recovering the loss suﬀered in the initial
ethnic cleansing. The child is brought up in the light of these expectations, ‘in the
milky light of a shadowless, hopeless waiting’. This ‘wonderful child’, the child of
hope and despair, is asked to deliver the parents from their waiting. But deliver
what? Herein lurks a likely repetition of the violence, a strong motive for revenge,
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for the child to begin a new cycle of what Maurice Bloch (1992) calls ‘rebound-
ing violence’.
To be more speciﬁc and historical, and situate reproduction after ethnic
cleansing within the contemporary global movement of ‘ethnicisation’, an
increase in ethnicisation, a recovery, reinvention, or intensiﬁcation of ethnic
belonging, is observable in much of the world, especially in states that legitimate
themselves through ruling majorities, and in places on all ﬁve continents. It is
also prominent among people who have suﬀered ethnic cleansing, especially
among those who remain at the site of the violence, or who are asked to reconsti-
tute the social in the space of this violence. Individuals who live in dispersed dias-
poras, such as American Jews, have been speciﬁcally excluded from this
discussion. This new ethnic identiﬁcation is often talked about as a kind of ‘fun-
damentalisation’, akin to a religious fundamentalism. By this, observers usually
mean that the group turns in on itself, engages in a further puriﬁcation of its prin-
ciples, a nostalgia for autochthony and obsession with origins, a clear demarca-
tion of itself from other groups. Such a turn inward, an inner puriﬁcation, not
only appears to complete, in a putatively voluntaristic spirit, the ethnic cleansing
initially perpetrated on the group, but it also institutionalises a further ‘cleans-
ing’ of the group by enforcing endogamy on its members (Borneman 1998). No
marriage with ethnic ‘Others’. No statistics to prove this coerced endogamy are
provided here, and such a form of proof may well be impossible to oﬀer. But based
on the impressions of others, it is asserted here that this holds true following most
of the ethnic cleansings of the 1990s, e.g. in Cambodia, Bosnia and Zambia.
I want to draw attention to the relation of compulsive reproduction follow-
ing ethnic cleansing to this ethnicisation at the social and political levels.
However understandable at a personal level, immediate reproduction after
ethnic cleansing permits the ﬁction of a recuperation of the loss through substi-
tution of the living child for the dead loved ones. New group leaders, who under-
stand their purpose to be the reconstitution of the social, frequently utilise this
ﬁction in order to mobilise followers. Insofar as their authority is tied to an eth-
nicisation of the group, political leaders encourage the illusion of recuperation
of personal loss through substitution of the living child for the dead loved ones.
In today’s world, where the legitimacy of rule in most states is based on consti-
tuting a numerical majority, ruling majorities are most easily created based on
ethnic aﬃnity. This is especially true after an ‘ethnic cleansing’. Reconstituting
the social becomes a project in political ethnicisation that is realised through an
endogamous reproductive politics. ‘Mixed marriages’, as they are called, are the
antithesis of this politics of exclusion. Endogamous pronatalism, then, substi-
tutes a demographic argument of numerical majority for an argument based on
other more inclusive principles of aﬃliation. The intention here is to demonstrate
how the socio-political logic of ethnicisation feeds oﬀ the attempt to recover an
individual loss through physical reproduction.
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In short, ethnicisation is a politics of repetition and is unlikely to lead to a
departure from violence. Recall the discussion of reconciliation above. The pre-
condition of reconciliation is a desire for non-repetition and an appreciation of
the inter-subjectivity of the present. Such reconciliation is improbable if not
impossible without domestic reform, without a new and more inclusive politics
of the domestic group. What is also important to explore is under what condi-
tions women actually refuse reproduction after such violence. This may be the
case in Peru, for example, where compulsive reproduction has not followed the
violence of the last several decades, perhaps because the active inclusion of
women in political life has presented them with opportunities to change the
social as a means of recovering losses (Billie Jean Isbell, personal communica-
tion, April 1999). Physical reproduction is an altogether diﬀerent mode of recov-
ery from ethnic cleansing. It tends to create a sense of continuity instead of a
radical break or rupture from existing relations. It also relegates women to the
presumably apolitical role of mothers of the future. The sense of beginning that
might be associated with the birth of a child is an illusion, in this case, since the
baby represents the wish to return to a prior state of wholeness and innocence.
Especially today, given the political uses of pronatalism to support ethnic major-
itarian projects, leaders tend to narrate new children into a story of recovery.
Because such endogamous physical reproduction contributes to a denial of the
inter-subjectivity of the present, it deﬂects from the work needed to reconcile and
actually increases the likelihood of a repetition of violence. The alternative to
ethnicisation is the cultivation of care (in German ‘Sorge’, in French ‘souci’),
reciprocal but non-egalitarian practices that aﬃrm inter-subjectivity (Tronto
1993; Borneman 1997b). Such care might take the form of a politics of sterility,
which necessarily focuses radically on the present. This may be called the ethics
of ‘caring for the enemy’.
Recuperation of loss through revenge
Revenge, too, increases the likelihood of violence. Revenge is an exchange, a form
of taking-turn, in which individuals or groups engage in reciprocal violence.
Much like the physical reproduction discussed above, revenge is an attempt to
recover a loss. It is often motivated by individual frustration with continued
injustice; individuals act to solve their own problems where judicial authorities,
or the state, will not or cannot act. In anthropological literature, the principle of
revenge is frequently equated with other forms of justice administered by the
state, but it distinguishes itself from legal redress in one crucial respect: it is the
arbitrary, narcissistic exercise of violence in which there is no accountability
except to oneself, and to a personal memory of the dead. That the state frequently
fails in its pursuit of justice is admittedly a problem, as is the fact that many states
themselves actually initiate violence. But people taking justice into their own
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hands is simply replacing one problem with another, an arbitrariness of ‘rule by
men’ for a potential predictability in ‘rule by law’. It is a politics of repetition.
Here two separate but complementary processes are addressed as alterna-
tives to revenge, as modes of possible departure from violence, part of a politics
of non-repetition. The ﬁrst is witnessing, the second is legal redress of violence,
or ‘retributive justice’.
Witnessing as cultivated listening
Witnessing after ethnic cleansing is a form of truth-telling, involving the listen-
ing and speaking of at least two parties. It is primarily associated with speaking,
with giving voice to individuals who have been silenced. Ideally, the silenced
voices of victims are brought into discourse, that is, their experiences of harm
and suﬀering, of being victimised in the violence of ethnic cleansing, are articu-
lated publicly. Such articulation most frequently intends to contribute to an
identiﬁcation of causality, ultimately leading to the possibility of making claims
on perpetrators, of holding them accountable for their wrongdoing. There are
many discourses in which this voicing can have an impact, ranging from famil-
ial discussions, to neighbourhood meetings, to legal proceedings.
Witnessing diﬀers from its cousin, confessing, in that the voicing tends to
focus on the fate of the victim and not the perpetrator; and it is voluntary, not
coerced as frequently are confessions. Most recently, in Latin America and South
Africa, the art of witnessing in Truth Commissions has played a crucial role in
reconstructing a public sphere where truth itself is given a value. The value put
on speaking the truth has, in turn, had a signiﬁcant impact on establishing what
may be called networks of trust, networks that include not only neighbours’ rela-
tions with one another but also citizens’ relations with the state, in particular
with the courts and the justice system. The importance of ‘living the truth’ in the
construction of trust was in fact a theme in the plays and essays of Czech leader
Václav Havel when, as a dissident, he wrote about life under the repressive state-
socialist regime of the 1970s and 1980s. An enduring reconciliation is possible
only in a departure from violence through a double rebuilding on the basis of
trust: between neighbours and between citizens and the state.
It is worth pursuing the question as to whether and under what conditions
witnessing as a process contributes to allocating accountability. Witnessing nec-
essarily involves speaking and giving voice but it must be preceded and followed
by listening. To listen is a motivated practice that diﬀers from hearing for it always
involves listening for something. Following an ethnic cleansing, this involves lis-
tening for truth. To listen for everything is to hear a cacophony of sounds, which
is called noise. But to listen for truth entails a complex interpretive and evalua-
tive process that goes beyond documenting experience per se. Listening as a prac-
tice, as an art, is similar to the art of reading or speaking. It is not passive but
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interactive, involving soliciting and questioning, weighing competing accounts,
as well as hearing. Listening can be learned and cultivated, and some individu-
als are far better at it than others. I am suggesting here that we rethink who
might be the practitioners of listening after an ethnic cleansing. They include not
only friends, neighbours, anthropologists and historians, but also professional
observers such as the OCSE, UN ‘monitors’ and individuals who work for Human
Rights Watch. Such professional observers, at their best, actively cultivate the art
of listening for the truth.
The signiﬁcance of listening is not directly linked to its timing. Preferably, lis-
tening for the truth in various experiences would occur at the beginning of any
escalation of violence. This is often impossible, however, and observers are then
limited to documenting the work of memory or the escalation of violence. The
presence alone of professional listeners at a moment of escalating conﬂict may
actually have a cooling eﬀect on potential perpetrators, making them pause
before committing acts of violence.1 When this listening is turned into voicing is
a matter of timing. So is the question pertaining to which forums – familial,
neighbourhood, television, courts – in which the voicing, and the allocation of
accountability, takes place. The timing of voicing claims based on listening
requires sensitivity to the speciﬁcity of place and context, to the politics of the
present. The eﬀect of truth-telling on allocating wrongdoing is highly context-
dependent. But the nature of listening is not. Hence the telling of some truths has
no eﬀect until years after the actual experiences are heard.
The focus on listening here does not aim to discount the importance of voice
but to direct our attention to the ineﬀectiveness of speaking if no one hears and no
one acts on this hearing. One of the serious limitations of many Truth
Commissions is that they explicitly make telling the truth a substitute for any ret-
ribution. It is necessary to create public forums, including newsprint, radio and
television, where participants feel compelled to hear, to weigh and judge compet-
ing accounts, and ultimately to openly acknowledge the ambivalence and com-
plicities in the exercise of power, and the power of truth and trust in social
relations. Listening, in this sense, as a necessary precondition to giving voice,
creates the possibility for departure, for a ‘sense of ending’, rupture, and break. A
sense of ending is possible only by breaking silences concerning the nature of loss
and its attempted recuperation as it relates to the sources of violence and modes
of its reproduction, and the possibility for fair judgement and punishment. The
cultivation of listening as a concrete social practice contributes to making a public
sphere that is vigilant, critical and engaged. Moreover, many of the nascent public
spheres, in Latin America and Europe, as well as in much of Asia, are peopled by
marginal actors, for example women or minority groups, whose interests are
diverse and dissentious and hence are not easily appropriated and utilised for the
purposes of ethnicisation.The success of interventions by the many international
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in their support of ‘civil society’ projects
John Borneman
214
may in fact largely depend on their ability to listen to these marginal voices. It is
frequently the case that pressures for unity after a war silence voices of diﬀerence,
displacing violence formerly directed at an external enemy to marginalised
groups within a society or even to women and children within one’s own domes-
tic group. Listening for the truth of this violence, while itself crucial for long-term
reconciliation, must be complemented by a process of legal accountability.
Retribution
Unlike witnessing, which rests on truth-telling and listening, a legal accounting,
retributive justice is concerned with symbolically aﬃrming the distinction
between right and wrong (Hampton 1992). The timing of legal retribution, as
mentioned above, may not be the same as that of witnessing and listening in the
public sphere, since courts are only formally independent of the other branches
of government. Making judicial appointments, setting the budgets, as well as
determining types of criminality, are very much political decisions that rest with
executive and legislative actors. Moreover, if courts convict, they need the coop-
eration of the other branches of government to enforce their rulings and carry
out their sentences. Because of its embeddedness in political processes, a legal
reckoning with injustices may pragmatically be delayed many decades after the
actual occurrence of harm and wrongdoing. Such is the case, for example, with
the current prosecution of Chile’s General Pinochet. Timing aside, an eventual
settling of accounts that involves the punishment of evil and the rewarding of
good by a higher societal instance, such as a court, is integral to making possible
a departure from violence after ethnic cleansing. It is integral to this process
largely because memory can never be put to sleep.
In Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist States,
I argued that legal accountability is not just desirable but also necessary only in
democracies (Borneman 1997a). Unlike other political forms, democracies
require a form of strict accountability. That is, democracies are destabilised to the
extent that they do not have formally autonomous legal systems that can invoke
principles of accountability and apply these principles to members of the execu-
tive and parliamentary branches of government. Such legal accounting is never
able to redress all of the wrongs perpetrated; in other words, it also cannot
recover all of the losses suﬀered in an ethnic cleansing. Its role stems not from the
eﬃciency of its prosecutions but from the political eﬃcacy of prosecuting sym-
bolically signiﬁcant cases. This eﬃcacy results in establishing trust in non-
arbitrary institutions of law that stand above individual men and women. These
legal institutions, if they make good-faith eﬀorts at justice, produce trust in
government and encourage networks of trust among disparate individuals. This
trust, in turn, relieves victims of the need to take justice into their own hands;
that is, it takes away one of the prime motives for revenge.2
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A further step in this direction occurred in 1998, as 120 nations agreed to
set up a permanent International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. Fully inde-
pendent international tribunals are presently at work in establishing account-
ability for the ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the attempted genocide in
Rwanda. In 1999, an alternative UN joint war crimes tribunal was proposed for
Cambodia, in which Cambodian and foreign judges would try former political
and military leaders of the Khmer Rouge in a single trial. That these tribunals
lack their own eﬀective enforcement powers and are dependent on national judi-
ciaries and armies for exacting compliance with international judgements pre-
sents an obstacle that may eventually doom their eﬀorts. So does the fact that
such supranational courts are not democratically constituted and hence make
no pretence to represent majorities. Without the support of democratically
elected majorities, courts risk a legitimation crisis. This is especially so when they
base their judgements on ‘human rights’ in the defence of injured minorities or
the cosmopolitan ideas of intellectual elites. Unlike civil rights, human rights
have no democratically organised or territorial constituency. Obstacles to
enforcement are present for all judicial systems, however, only they are more for-
midable for those in their formative stages and which lack the naturalised sove-
reignty claims of state-run legal systems.
Whether these obstacles will make a mockery of the tribunals and prove
them to be ‘paper tigers’ is a question that will be resolved only through a lengthy
struggle, as the timing of the prosecution of cases, as mentioned above, is a stra-
tegic decision in each and every context. The time lag in the popular reception of
legal judgements will undoubtedly aﬀect their eﬃcacy, but not in ways that can
be clearly foreseen. Eﬃcacy is a processual achievement, never achieved imme-
diately and once-and-forever. The crucial factor, at present, is that the tribunals,
as with national courts, make good-faith eﬀorts, through the time-tested proce-
dures of the rule of law, listening for the truth, witnessing and documenting the
harms perpetrated and procuring remedies for them. Passing and enforcing
judgements is crucial, to be sure, but it is only the last step in a settling of
accounts that itself can never draw a thick line over memory. Retributive justice
merely creates a sense of ending by stopping the cycle of rebounding violence,
thereby opening the possibility to mourn the losses and articulate alternative
beginnings.
Reconciliation and peacekeeping
In sum, it has been argued that reconciliation, as a departure from violence,
requires both domestic and governmental initiative. Our ability to imagine depar-
tures from violence is hampered by inadequate understanding of both the pos-
sibilities of justice and alternative responses to personal loss. The former, the
possibilities of justice, alerts us to the potential eﬀects of a system of national and
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extra-national legal accountability, such as those embodied in the principles of
the rule of law, as an alternative to revenge. The latter, responses to personal loss,
alerts us to the importance of principles of care, networks of trust and an inclu-
sive political vision that might serve as alternatives to the politics of endogamous
physical reproduction and its potential eﬀects as ethnicisation.
Presently local, regional, international as well as transnational actors and
organisations are increasingly challenged to respond to the escalation of vio-
lence and proliferation of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Often this response takes the form
of what are called ‘international peacekeeping eﬀorts’. Especially for the militar-
ies of the United States and Europe, peacekeeping eﬀorts increasingly supple-
ment, if not replace, coercive military operations. Such eﬀorts are attempts to
end ‘hostilities’ and bring about a ‘reconciliation’, a non-repetition, after a period
of intense violence, at its most extreme after an attempted genocide, within a par-
ticular locality. Imagining what departures from violence might look like is
essential for their success.
While peacekeepers must open themselves up to understanding the locale in
its own terms, or as ﬁeldwork-based anthropologist Urvater Malinowski put it,
‘from the native’s point of view’, that is only a part of their task. They must also
understand how they are perceived in these settings, as they are already a part of
the imagery of that locale. Once they enter as bodies with money, tools, guns and
access to other worlds, they become an integral and internal part of the shaping
of local culture.3 Hence they necessarily play an active role, consciously by way
of active listening for the truth, by encouraging legal accountability through
governmental reform and by encouraging domestic reform that builds larger net-
works of care and trust. If ‘reconciliation’ is to be pursued as a utopian project of
‘departure from violence’, it must then be conceived as the fundamental paradox
of an ongoing recuperation of a loss that is not recoverable. This entails cultivat-
ing a vision of inter-subjectivity that is necessarily reﬂexive and relativist, that
requires an often uncomfortable encounter with diﬀerence. It challenges us to
construct new selves and institutions in terms of relationships of accountability,
trust and care for the other, including the enemy.

1 The Russian presence in the Caucasus oﬀers an interesting example of the eﬀect of the per-
ception of active listening over intervention. Initially, this presence destabilised relations
as it was perceived as a continuation of Soviet hegemony in the region. Later, the presence
of Russian monitors helped stabilise the situation. (My thanks to Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi for
this insight.)
2 The necessity of redistributive schemes of justice depends on the social and political loca-
tion of the party claiming injury. Socialist regimes were initially motivated as redistribu-
tive responses to unjust distributions of wealth, which they, in turn, tried to rectify by
creating public, shared forms of wealth. Their demise everywhere and reintegration into
the capitalist world system has meant a re-redistribution of public and private property
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and wealth from the historically less well-oﬀ to the better-oﬀ. The legitimation of post-
socialist states has not been less contingent on their new re-redistributive schemes than
on democratic and economic reforms. In places like Russia, however, capital re-redistribu-
tion to the better-oﬀ has been so extreme that it threatens to destabilise democratic
reforms. In the transformation of long-standing, authoritarian oligarchies to democratis-
ing states, their legitimation might depend on both retribution and a redistribution of
property from large landholders to the less well-oﬀ.
3 The impossibility of being ‘external’ was clearly revealed in the position of the US
American marines in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984, but one could just as well take
the examples of peace makers in Somalia or Bosnia. While the US marines in Lebanon saw
themselves as external, neutral peace makers, local parties immediately made them a part
of the conﬂict.

Bloch, M. (1992), Prey into Hunter: The Politics of Religious Experience (Cambridge). 
Borneman, J. (1997a), Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist
Europe (Princeton).
Borneman, J. (1997b), ‘Caring and being cared for: displacing marriage, kinship, gender,
and sexuality’, International Journal of Social Science, 154 (December), 623–635.
Borneman, J. (1998), ‘Toward a theory of ethnic cleansing: territorial sovereignty, hetero-
sexuality, and Europe’, in J. Bourneman, Subversions of International Order: Studies in
the Political Anthropology of Culture (Albany), 273–319.
Caruth, C. (1996), Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore).
Hampton, J. (19992), ‘Correcting harms versus righting wrongs: the goal of retribution’,
UCLA Law Review, 29, 1659–1702. 
Kierkegaard, S. (1974 [1844]), ‘Despair’, in R. Bretall (ed.), A Kierkegaard Anthology
(Princeton).
Leclaire, S. (1998 [1975]), A Child is Being Killed (Stanford).
Moore, S. F. (1987), ‘Explaining the present: theoretical dilemmas in processual ethnog-
raphy’, American Ethnologist, 14, 727–736.
Tronto, J. (1993), Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York).
John Borneman
218
12
Intervention in markets of violence
Georg Elwert
Introduction
W   backbone of a state, the monopoly of violence.The society loses its cohesion. Behind smokescreens of ethnic, political,religious or other ideological goals appears a new – mainly economic –
reference for social action: acquisition based upon violence. Markets of violence
are highly proﬁtable social systems, which can remain stable over several decades.
The dominant actors in this system, the warlords, combine violent appropriation
with peaceful exchange.
Markets of violence generally originate in conﬂicts of a non-economic
nature. The continuation of the violence is, however, based on economic motives
or unconscious economic behaviour. From the perspective of the warlords, vio-
lence can be used to maximise proﬁt to such an extent that it is on a par with
other economic methods. The fact that the balance sheet is far from positive in its
eﬀect on the overall system is irrelevant. This inherently rational economic beha-
viour can continue as long as the warlords are able to exercise their power
without the support of the majority. 
The expansion in economic potential, the fall in arms prices, the widespread
existence of command-state structures and a reluctance on the part of foreign
powers to intervene in such situations enables the continuation or even increase
in such markets of violence. They can collapse as a result of the monopolisation
of violence, the exhaustion of inner resources or a blocking of access to external
resources. Only then can peace gain stability, when formal and informal institu-
tions of conﬂict regulation limit the use of violence.
Markets of violence and policies of help and intervention1
Osama Bin Laden, the ghost behind the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001,
came out of a market of violence. Sudan’s and later Afghanistan’s territories
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enabled his group to train and organise their troops. Their place was among the
warlords; they were respected as partners. The markets of violence, which
enabled them to develop their organisational network, were older. Paradoxically
it was the violent environment which gave them the time they needed to ﬁnd, by
trial and error, more and more eﬃcient modes of operation for their ideological
enterprise. This enterprise, al-Qaeda, shares with other warlords the condition
that the income, be it from smuggling/trade, from violence or from donations
(which is dominant for al-Qaeda), has to reproduce the power apparatus. 
To analyse only the warlords’ ideologies leaves the structural conditions of
their enterprises in the dark. The protagonists and their representatives cite ven-
erable traditions of hate, revenge and religious–moral obligations as justiﬁcation
for their activities. The long-term basic patterns of these markets of violence
are, however, based on rational, comprehensible economic behaviour. Emotions,
such as hate and, above all, fear are instrumentalised in this context but are not
structurally formative. Actors, who are active within both the internal markets
for blackmail and receiving stolen goods and external markets for gold, weapons
and drugs, appear to fulﬁl an organisational function. The leading actors – and
not necessarily the ﬁghters who in addition to pecuniary gain are also motivated
by other purposes – are primarily characterised by a high sensitivity for the eco-
nomic rationale of their enterprise. This does not exclude the fact that their per-
sonal motives and – in most cases – their propaganda is dominated by an
ideological self-representation. The economic aspect is, however, behind the
reproduction and self-stabilisation of markets of violence.
The origins of such violent conﬂicts can be explained by other factors. The
disintegration of the monopoly of violence – more precisely: the monopoly of
coercion – can be triggered by a series of various motives and situations. The
longer the violence lasts, however, the stronger the compulsion to rely on eco-
nomic imperatives (cf. Waldmann 1999). In many cases, the continuation of the
violence can be explained only in terms of the existence of markets of violence.
During the 1980s, the 1990s, and at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst
century, markets of violence could and can be found in Afghanistan, Angola,
Bosnia, Chad, Columbia, Congo/Zaire, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique,
Northern Burma, Northern Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, the
Caucasus and the Central African Republic.2 Acquisitive behaviour similar in
nature to the markets of violence also plays a role in some other violent situa-
tions. Terrorism or military ﬁghts in Northern Ireland, the Basque Country of
Spain, the southern Philippines, in northern Sri Lanka and some other regions
instrumentalise ideological motives to win some popular support but follow a
clear economic strategy for its reproduction. The state’s monopoly of coercion is
severely damaged insofar as it cannot hinder the economic reproduction of para-
state structures which ﬁnance violence. Although these situations are not (yet)
the dominance of a market, a market of violence, over a (civic) society, they may
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well degenerate into it once the state loses its last protective capacity or once the
military and police convert into warlordism.
The concept of ‘monopoly of violence’ (Gewaltmonopol, literally ‘monopoly
of coercion’, Weber 1922) should be central to any reﬂection about alternatives
to markets of violence. In a social structure governed by a monopoly of violence
it is not everyone who can use violence. The occurrence of violence is very much
restricted. This creates violence-free realms. As Norbert Elias (1978) has shown,
such violence-free realms were essential for the development of European civil-
isation out of the Middle Ages. For a democracy, a monopoly of violence is a nec-
essary condition; but it can also exist perfectly well in undemocratic structures.
It may, for example, be a class monopoly of knights and kings. Violence-free
realms are more stable if even the persons authorised to use violence are bridled
by the law. If they can exert coercion – including violent coercion – only within
the limits of legal regulations and legal procedures, then violence-free realms
become realms of predictability. Under them, long-term investments in intellec-
tual formation and the means of production also make sense for persons far from
the centres of power. The lack of a monopoly of violence produces (under com-
petitive conditions) spaces open to violence – violence ﬁelds. In these violence
ﬁelds, people invest individually in the social and physical conditions of security
in much higher proportions. Development, growth or productive innovation are
not their preoccupations.
The general practice of state policy towards violence ﬁelds organised by
markets of violence is that of non-perception masked by humanitarian interven-
tion. Formally, the continuous existence of the states concerned is assumed.
Diplomats of the former states transformed into markets of violence are paid by
the country of residence or feed themselves through some smuggling. Non-
interference is justiﬁed with the sovereignty of the country, which once existed.
Sometimes neighbouring states let their armies or secret services proﬁt from the
situation in order to pursue economic goals, as in the cases of Afghanistan,
Sierra Leone or Zaire/Congo. In most cases some western states directly or indi-
rectly send (under the cover of refugee programmes) humanitarian aid, which
contributes to the warlords’ economies. The inﬂuence goes, however, in both
directions. These open spaces of violence oﬀer excellent breeding and selection
conditions for the evolution of new forms of organised crime and organised ter-
rorism, both of which may also aﬀect peaceful industrial countries. 
Markets of violence as systemic process
Markets of violence are understood as economic areas dominated by civil wars,
warlords or robbery, in which a self-perpetuating system emerges and links non-
violent commodity markets with the violent acquisition of goods. Violent and
non-violent trade become so entwined that the system-speciﬁc opportunities for
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proﬁt give direction. A self-perpetuating economic system emerges beneath the
surface of a moral world-view and power conﬂicts – and even in the absence of
such attempts at legitimisation. This may be based on the fact that the economic
motive of material proﬁt dominates beneath the surface. It is also possible that
irrespective of the conscious motives of the actors (such as freedom, honour or
revenge), only those actors who pursue economically proﬁtable strategies – irre-
spective of their intentions – will survive. Markets of violence can emerge in
areas open to violence, i.e. where there is no monopoly of violence.3 The disinte-
gration of a monopoly of violence is not generally caused by directly economic
factors. In fact, it is mainly political and not economic motives that predominate
in the initial phase.
Areas where there are no rules, which build channels for the use of violence,
are open to violence. The unregulated violence may lead to the establishing of
routines, it will not, however, result in the formulation of rules. Contracts
between the warring parties can also be breached. Violence can even destroy the
clientelist relations within a warring party and between warlords, their chiefs
and mercenaries. The oﬃcer of a warlord may revolt against him or may betray
him allying with his enemies. The possibility of murder for the sake of murder
cannot be excluded in areas open to violence, even if such a murder would
appear uneconomical to most actors.
Thus, to summarise, a market of violence is a ﬁeld of activity which is mainly
characterised by economic aims, in which both robbery and barter and the
related activities of collection of ransoms, protection money, road tolls, etc.
feature. Each actor has a number of basic options ranging from theft to trade.
The generals, princes, militia chiefs and party leaders who lead the troops in
such conﬂicts are known in the research as ‘warlords’. This term is used without
anyacknowledgementof itsconnotationswithrespecttothecivilorcriminal legal
status of these persons. Warlords are understood as entrepreneurs who use delib-
erate violence as an eﬃcient tool for achieving economic aims. These ‘entrepre-
neurs’ diﬀer from normal entrepreneurs in that they also use violence – although
not exclusively – as an instrument for the generation of revenue. This image of
persons primarily acting on an entrepreneurial level is conﬁrmed by the few aca-
demic reports emerging from the centres of such conﬂicts. In Ethiopia, the same
circle of actors who once fought each other now cooperate as peaceful entrepren-
eurs (Zitelmann 1993). This view does not coincide with the stereotypes largely
propagatedinthemedia,whichciteemotionsandtraditionbywayof explanation.
Unlike pub brawls, modern wars necessitate strategic planning and logistics. The
killing cannot be sustained without cool and calculated planning for supplies of
weapons, munitions, food and fuel. The planning of strategic action and military
logistics requires a cool head and not the sustained evocation of emotion.
Owing to the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the big powers have lost
interest in violent interventions in such situations and in the control of weapons
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sales, an important external factor is no longer present. 4 In Russia the nomenk-
latura even lost interest in controlling the events in its marginal territory
Chechnya in the period 1991–94; the wars of 1994 and later years were merely
a means to generate symbolic capital within Russian politics (Zürcher 1998:
107, 117, see also Chapter 6 in this volume). Organised crime made use of the
situation. Markets of violence will continue to emerge wherever there is a coin-
cidence of areas open to violence, exploitable resources and corresponding
markets. Where the external framework conditions remain unchanged (partic-
ularly the reluctance to intervene and control the traﬃc in arms), they are more
likely to increase than decrease in number. Whether the intervention in
Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 will bring a new
policy of internationally coordinated intervention to restore monopolies of vio-
lence globally is yet to be seen. 
Partial markets and developed strategies
The theoretical perspective presented here is less concerned with revealing eco-
nomic motives behind conﬂicts bearing ideological labels, or demonstrating the
economic success of individuals in situations previously solely characterised by
destruction than with demonstrating the systematic character which lies behind
conﬂicts which otherwise appear to be chaotic in nature.5 Thus, the observable
regular forms of economic behaviour in these areas are focused on ﬁrst, followed
by the external economic forms of stabilisation and, ﬁnally, how such markets of
violence are formed. The manifold causes of the emergence of the markets of vio-
lence do not explain their durability; this lies in their systemic nature.
The players in this game are not only former entrepreneurs or criminals.
They may also appear (and subjectively act) as security providers, government
oﬃcials, politicians or religious leaders. This does not change the need for repro-
duction, although it may add further sources of income.6 If a foreign country
intervenes – as Russia did in Abkhazia – it may lose money; this is diﬀerent to the
warlords’ calculation.7 The troops ﬁnanced by this outside support have,
however, to avoid deﬁcit, and this does not exclude economic behaviour equiva-
lent to embezzling credit or fraudulent bankruptcy on behalf of the troop leaders.
Commanders ﬁnanced by neighbouring countries, such as Russia and the USA
in Afghanistan, have noted this possibility.
The decision whether to steal or obtain certain goods through commercial
transactions is basically always open in the markets of violence. The warlords
need to win time so that they can make strategic decisions and keep their options
open. Thus, the actors are confronted with a strategic triangle of violence, trade
and time. The warlord makes calculated moves between these poles, carefully
considering and optimising the cost/beneﬁt relationship. Given that it is often not
recognisable as such, this calculating rationality is explained below.
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It is not suggested that cultural values or emotions have no structurally for-
mative role to play in the social process. In the markets described here, however,
optimisation processes are based exclusively on economic imperatives. This does
not, however, eliminate the possibility that emotions make a signiﬁcant impact
on the cost aspect of the individual instruments and thus inﬂuence the cost
structure of the market. Theft and enslavement are particularly obvious in this
context.8 Theft, however, is rarely for personal consumption. Anyone who hauls
oﬀ refrigerators, video recorders and cars in Bosnia (or removes gold teeth) is not
fulﬁlling a personal need but is reacting to the demands expressed by the receiv-
ers of such stolen goods. 
The production of violence is also based on economic imperatives. The aim
is to reduce the cost of the violence. Weapons, munitions and fuel are indispens-
able resources and it is not advisable for the warlords to save money by skimping
on quality. It makes more sense to economise on the ﬁghters’ fees. Thus,
‘marauding’, i.e. systematic theft by soldiers, is an obvious form of the reproduc-
tion of working capacity. Indeed, a market actually develops for the marauding
itself. In other words, it is possible to participate in organised robberies for a fee.
In Yugoslavia, volunteer organisations made use of the support of ‘weekend sol-
diers’ who on Friday afternoons for a suitable fee and the loan of weapons were
bussed to the front to return with their rich pickings on Sunday evening. That
sadists who have paid their money are also allowed to seek their satisfaction is
‘economic’ in this sense.
Costs can be reduced by the well-meaning activities of foreigners too, food
aid has also been used to supply troops (e.g. in Liberia). Research reports on
refugee camps in Africa, describe how they have been converted into barracks
full of troops awaiting deployment.9 A parallel development could be observed in
the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, which gave birth to the violent movement
of the Taliban (Rashid 2001). The intervention of international donors follows a
pattern which is instrumental for building up the organisational structures of
warring groups and which later provides infrastructures for warlords, as one
might have been able to note back in the 1960s, when violence broke out in
Congo (cf. Mummendey 1997). The refugee camps in Congo, then established
under UN supervision, bore considerable responsibility for the recruitment of the
militia which continues to exist in Congo/Zaire. The parties succeeded in creat-
ing their armies by terrorising their ‘tribal brothers’. Such developments are
favoured by the collusion of warlords with organisations active in the distribu-
tion of aid. They do not wish to jeopardise the ﬂow of aid as a result of critical
reports and the absence of monitoring of the conﬂict’s dynamics (beyond the
mere counting of victims and the needy).
Another way in which the warlords can reduce their overheads is by exploit-
ing desire for social prestige. Young men can easily be won over as highly moti-
vated ‘volunteers’ if involvement in dangerous acts (e.g. multiple robberies)
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means they will be ﬁnally considered ‘real men’, or if the exercise of violence is
one of the conditions of an initiation ritual. In Georgia, the criminal underworld
and militant political leaders make eﬃcient use of the prestige rituals of young
males (Koehler 2000, see also Chapter 7 in this volume). Threats and acts of
limited violence are central symbols of a code which communicates prestige,
status and power ambitions. The high level of common violence thus reached
several times brought the country to the brink of a dominant market of violence.
If a country turns into a market of violence the ensuing chances for income gen-
eration through violence then aﬀects the prestige pattern. In Albania in
1997–98, young males engaged in violence as an honourable activity. This activ-
ity, in a situation where the monopoly of violence had broken down, generated a
considerable income. The exhibition of this wealth and the chance to master the
violence under their own order brought the young men a status which the sen-
iority system that had existed until then could not provide for them
(Schwandner-Sievers 1998: 75).
In the short term the promise of justice and freedom – or to be more precise,
the hope of resolving latent conﬂicts or overturning despotic rule – can be
suﬃcient to mobilise volunteers (i.e. unpaid actors) and this is particularly
important in the initial phase of a market of violence. 
The generation of fear is a particularly cost-eﬀective form of mobilising
troops. Propaganda is thus an important instrument of production in such
conﬂicts. From an economic perspective, ‘senseless violence’ can ﬁnd a meaning
in this way. The fear of retaliation on the part of the victims leaves no option open
but to join an army or support it for one’s own protection. Fear of revenge stab-
ilises the system. Fear of becoming a victim of violence oneself can also motivate
to preventive attacks. These are generally not based on strategic planning, can
escalate rapidly and end in the slaughter of neighbours with whom the attack-
ers may previously have had close relationships. Reports from Rwanda and
Bosnia demonstrate the importance of radio and television propaganda in this
context (Bringa 1995; Neubert 1999). In Rwanda, the radio service, which was
set up using development aid funding, was responsible for spreading and rein-
forcing the fear which ultimately provoked the bloodbath.
The main diﬀerence between markets of violence today and those in the
nineteenth century lies in the way in which propaganda can electronically reach
large populations more quickly and cheaply. It can thus convert the fear of people
into mass panic or participation in military actions (which are economically
proﬁtable for a small minority) on a scale previously unknown. The automation
of revenge and fear of revenge creates unanimity where multiple memberships
(e.g. based on language or religion) would previously have left people neutral
towards the militant actors. This new unanimity means that massacres can take
place on a large scale; there is no need to omit individual houses during ﬁring.
The militarily meaningful friend–foe distinction can now be ideologically
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reformed and take the form of ‘ethnic cleansing’. The fear of being declared an
enemy and thus becoming a potential victim, or fear of revenge, motivates civil-
ians to assume the role of unpaid ‘cleansing agents’. 
The most important resource for trade is goods, which are easy to transport.
For this reason, trade in valuable objects is of disproportionate signiﬁcance in the
market of violence. Precious stones and precious metals assume particular
importance as they enable the transfer of large values in a single movement.10
Drug trading, e.g. opium in Afghanistan (Goodhand 1999), and the weapons
trade are not less lucrative. Wherever markets open to violence have developed,
trade does not only centre on these valuable commodities but may even be
attracted to the area, as could be observed in Tajikistan and the Balkans.
Professional protection of the transport of goods by warlords and possibly even
entrepôt trade (temporary storage in a ‘safe’ location) can be particularly attrac-
tive services for all kinds of illegal trading such as drugs and weapons smuggling.
Smuggling routes move into these areas. This leads to consequential feedback
processes. Afghanistan’s market of violence fostered drug smuggling, which
helped to ﬁnance violence in Central Asia. The collapse of state structures there,
especially in Tajikistan, widened the opportunities for drug smuggling from
Afghanistan and stable production structures for drugs could be built
(Goodhand 1999). The Bosnian market of violence created relay structures for
Kosovo-based organised crime. This, together with the great weapons sale in
Albania in 1997, contributed to the abolishing of state structures in Kosovo (see
also Chapter 5 in this volume).
The collection of protection money – also referred to as duties – and the
taking of hostages have assumed major signiﬁcance as an intermediary activity
between trade and theft in markets of violence. The guarding of goods is today a
particularly relevant phenomenon. The ‘work’ of the diamond and gold smug-
glers in contemporary Congo/Zaire,11 qat traders in Somalia, emerald smugglers
in Columbia and last but not least the protectors of convoys carrying food aid in
Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and Bosnia, have made this branch of commercial activ-
ity the warlords’ most important source of income. 
In some markets of violence there is a commodity sold which the buyers do
not recognise as such: the sacriﬁce of human lives for the sake of ideology. Battles
are fought in pursuit of an ideal and accompanied by detailed reporting. Lives on
both sides of the divide are sacriﬁced for one product, which is of value to emi-
grants or foreigners interested in the fate of the world. ‘The Free West’, ‘the
Socialist World Revolution’, ‘the Honour of Our Nation’, ‘Saving our Islamic
Faith’ are the issues which appear to be at stake. Considerable resources are
transferred into the market of violence from outside if the warlords pay special
attention to this commodity through the establishing of a special troop which is
trained in rhetoric and international communication. It was in this way that
Jonas Savimbi succeeded in selling his battles in Angola as both a sacriﬁce for the
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Maoist socialist world revolution and then later for the defence of the free West
against socialism, before turning his attention again to his main activity in
Angola’s and Zaire’s diamond business. 
The victims of these sacriﬁces do not need to be in the market of violence
itself. Terrorist attacks steered from within the market but targeted at outside
goals can be no less eﬃcient if they receive suﬃcient publicity. The al-Qaeda of
Osama Bin Laden and others managed to win an important share in this dona-
tion market. Their annual income is estimated at between US$20 and 50 million.
Whereas other violent ideological entrepreneurs are engaged in the market of
mass ‘charity’ (such as the IRA in Northern Ireland), al-Qaeda lives oﬀ the
market of wealthy organisations and individuals. Each trade has its own rules.
Whereas conventional warlords have to seek a military superiority simultane-
ously with the continuous control of exploitable resources, an ideology entre-
preneur such as al-Qaeda requires the protection of a military partnership and
has to remind the public from time to time of its existence by spectacular acts.
Competition in the donation market among organisations of the same type pro-
duces an outbidding in the visibility of symbolic action.
If warlords blend their organisation with the features of a charismatic social
movement, they may gain social cohesion and ease compliance with their com-
mands. This is especially important if warriors have to undertake tasks far away
from their commanders. In such a movement’s atmosphere the perception of
hierarchy is covered by the sentiment of living in a community of equals, of
‘brothers’. The great utopian goal and the words of the guru create subjective
clarity where before there was the mist of an opaque and chaotic future. Thus the
hardships of daily life and all the petty conﬂicts lose relevance before the senti-
ment of their alleviation. One is in the clouds, ﬂying to higher goals. Bin Laden’s
al-Qaeda network obviously made use of charismaticism as a resource (Elwert
2001b).
It is possible to observe an accumulation not only in the means of violence
and money but also in time options. Time options are created ﬁrst and foremost
by ensuring means of subsistence. Such guarantees can take the form of con-
tracts for food supplies (including those from aid organisations) or the delivery of
tributes from enslaved farming communities. Time options are also created
through pacts with competitors or opponents. Finally, time is won through nego-
tiations: it is possible to negotiate about non-aggression, the delivery of supplies
or pacts without necessarily being primarily (or even ‘secondarily’) interested in
the non-aggression, goods or pact in question. What is important is winning
time. Mediators who fail to understand this part of the strategic game become
unsure and nervous when local or national rulers hold them in threatening sit-
uations. Some internationally noted attempts at mediation ride on concealed
propagandist juggling with violence or exchange of goods and also time. Is it
better to rob someone, extort a contribution, exchange goods or block everything
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and play for time? One plays for time, allowing the non-aggression to be bought
and then calling it taxation, duty or ﬁnancing the peace process. Time-wasting
can weaken or simply unnerve the other side, making military success easier to
achieve.
Stabilisation of markets of violence: ‘civil war’ as a long-term state
In ﬁelds of violence, the areas open to violence, a deregulated market economy
develops. Economic opportunities determine who cooperates and who attacks
whom. It is not ethnic groups and clans who oppose each other in these civil wars
but economic interests. Economic systems based on the use and generation of
violence become established, systems which repeatedly erect smokescreens of
political or religious legitimisation. They are happy to assume and replay cultu-
ralistic interpretations, because this gives their activity a higher moral value and
hinders outside intervention from persons sharing the same political or religious
orientation.
One consequence of violent situations is that the opportunities for income
generation disperse into alternative economic sectors. Trade, industrial produc-
tion, peaceful commercial activity and agriculture enter crisis and completely
collapse when they become dependent on continuous external inputs. Wages
and income in these sectors sink. Invested capital is devalued. In many cases, the
only way that those dependent on wages, and the self-employed can survive is to
become soldiers and/or marauders. Entrepreneurs are well advised to invest their
liquid capital in the formation of a troop and the purchase of weapons. Thus, it
is not surprising that Somalia’s warlords were previously – in times of peace –
mainly involved in wholesale trading or as political entrepreneurs, but also as
partners in development cooperation. The incipient market of violence makes
the (relatively) higher wages and proﬁt opportunities in the violent market sector
absorb work force and capital. Warlordism thus becomes established simultane-
ously with the increasing pressure on alternative income sectors, which for the
most part lose their opportunities for reproduction.
Autostabilisation also involves eﬀorts in the symbolic–ideological sphere.
Armed parades in front of the cameras of international television crews are as
much a part of the successful propaganda methods used by this trade as the
demonstrative brutality. The ideological self-presentation, which forces violence
to the forefront, is intended to stabilise the position in the market of violence. It
facilitates inter alia the sale of ‘protection’ and the inﬂux of donations.
The selection of victims is based on highly complex calculations. Not every-
one with possessions is subject to theft. The warlords also need trading partners,
supporters and neutral powers. It is helpful to allow the violence to follow clear
symbolically delineated lines to enable them to feel safe. Religion, urban or rural
costume, regional accents, etc. are all suitable as the basis for distinction here.
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They give the impression of ethnic or religious confrontation. However, no
trading partner or associate can be sure that they will not fall victim to the cov-
etousness of yesterday’s ally. Given the high risk of betrayal of leaders by troops,
commanders try to revive proven patterns of authority. These eﬀorts can lead to
an ‘innovation’ which will then undermine the markets of violence. In order to
win an easy loyalty, leaders may emphasise the belonging of their subjects, the
so-called ethnic or religious ‘identity’. This multi-faceted word (not really a
precise concept) means in this context that distinctions gain in importance and
that a traditional authority is invoked which should bind members of the deﬁned
we-group. This may create or recreate ethnonational units with an authority
structure and some legitimacy, which produces rule compliance. This may not
end but stabilise the violence within clearly deﬁned boundaries (Schlee 1996,
2000; Elwert 2001c). The progression to classic war as well as to a ceaseﬁre
between commanders who are representative and capable of entering into an
agreement are both possible outcomes.
The widespread hope that the majority of the population which is the victim
of violence and impoverishment will rebel against the warlords can materialise
only if a monopoly of violence is established from outside. This promise was the
strong argument of the Taliban, when they won over other warlord organisa-
tions in Afghanistan. Their failure to keep control shows, however, some of the
conditions for lasting peace. Free elections and, what is often neglected, the estab-
lishment of justice, of peaceful forms of conﬂict regulation and the circulation of
free information can make the monopoly of violence a normality for the state’s
citizen. It is not in the interests of the warlords to allow this to happen as long as
their trade remains proﬁtable. If an end to the violence is actually achieved, a
shift in values often occurs within the population, which now places a taboo on
the willingness to engage in violence. Thus, whoever establishes a monopoly of
violence – whether by democratic or non-democratic means – can be sure of a
high degree of legitimacy.
Markets of violence as a breeding ground for evolutionary processes
Nothing is forbidden in the market of violence; there are no bridles on creativity;
everything is conceivable in terms of what one can create and maintain by one’s
own (armed) power. The brutal selection by violence – violence that pays – oﬀers
an eﬃcient test for new institutions and new forms of violence. Any organisation
unable to secure by its deeds the means to reproduce weapons and to sustain
ﬁghters will lose and has to give up. In the selection process the most eﬃcient
organisations show up rapidly. Markets of violence enable a high-speed evolution
– from dinosaur to modern predator in a decade. If the organisation exhibits
diﬀerent forms it may also survive in diﬀerent environments. 
The al-Qaeda, active from Afghanistan, successfully combines features of a
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formal organisation with a network structure and, most notably, the features of
a charismatic movement. It has changed its targets over time – the Saudi Arabian
government, the Soviets in Afghanistan and now the United States. In
Uzbekistan’s Ferghana valley they started as agitators for the Wahabbist version
of Sunni Islam against the region’s traditional Islamic rituals. Then, after clear
failure, they opted for the vigilant role criticising the ‘unislamic’ behaviour of
some state oﬃcials. The means of donation collection, of propaganda and of
internal communication have changed constantly, adapting and innovating
after each failure. The virtues of systemic diﬀerentiation were thus learned.
Special staﬀs were devoted to organisation, fundraising and the technologies of
murder. Some specialist services were bought, some troops were rented out.
These contractual relations bridged ideological diﬀerences. In 1998 some ‘Arabs
from the Arab peninsula’ – probably al-Qaeda – asked the Tamil Tigers if they
wished to rent out a brigade of suicide assassins (Elwert 2001b). That this Sri
Lankan terrorist group is rather hostile to its own Muslim minority and has an
ideology which blends Hindu and Marxist elements, did not hinder the contact.
It failed because of the ﬁnancial terms of the contract, the nationalist limitation
of the Tigers necessary for their troops’ cohesion, or because of the perishable
character of the goods oﬀered.
Warlords learned rapidly how to manage their ﬁnancial assets. The time of
gold-hoarding generals is gone. They launder money at the best European, North
American and Caribbean banks. They invest their money in trade and transport
and have, as the Elam Liberation Tigers of Sri Lanka have, a special oﬃce for asset
management. Ironically, the only surviving part of the warlord-ridden Liberian
State is its New York-based oﬃce of ship registration, which is a useful institution
for some warlords’ transport business. Bank accounts are held in Liechtenstein,
Cyprus, on island dependents of Great Britain and in Canada and the United
States. The safety of ﬁnancial systems protected by a rule of law are largely pre-
ferred to the institutions of ‘rogue states’.
Given that markets of violence largely destroy the internal institutional struc-
ture and production potential of a country, they are highly dependent on clients,
suppliers, banks and other services outside of their area. It is easy to overlook the
importance of the service sector. Markets of violence need external infrastruc-
ture. Somali warlords, for example, make extensive use of educational centres,
special hospitals, banks, insurance companies, stock exchanges and commerce
arbitration courts in other continents (North America and the Middle East).
Markets of violence do not develop and exist in a vacuum. They grow out of
self-organising social systems, which by virtue of their nature depend on an
exchange with their environment, and they continue this exchange in (evolving)
forms. Exchange across the borders of its own system is, therefore, one of the vul-
nerabilities of markets of violence. Blockades, i.e. the prevention of this
exchange, can destroy them from outside.12
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In markets of violence organised crime targeting the population of other
states ﬁnds positive growth conditions as long as it does not seek its victims
among the impoverished population of the host country itself. Criminal entre-
preneurs in this environment have, however, diﬀerent working conditions from
the classic maﬁa (cf. Krauthausen 1997). They lack the support of corrupt but
so far-reliable state institutions. But they proﬁt from a considerable freedom
margin. Warlords, ideological terrorists and organised crime share the same evo-
lution-enhancing environment. What future threats may come out of markets
of violence cannot be predicted with precision. It can only be said that the evolu-
tion goes on at high speed.
Prevention and the origins of markets of violence
For the sake of prevention it is important to know how markets of violence come
into being. A monopoly of violence does not, however, disintegrate suddenly. It is
merely perceived suddenly – when it is too late. It crumbles with increasing speed
as a result of contraventions which reveal the fragility of the system. The sustain-
ing success of robbers or the obvious violence of despotic local power holders
may lead to this perception. In most cases, however, the monopoly of violence
disintegrates from within. That means state intervention contravenes the notion
of a legitimate use of violence, which exists among the people. These violations
legitimate counterviolence or an imitation of this arbitrary violence for a com-
peting despotism. Despotism is a characteristic of the Command State, ‘the
brother of the command economy’. In this form of government the authority
present has priority over laws, contracts and other written regulations (Elwert
2001a). Clientelism and corruption overrule formal laws and they marginalise
regulations, which should provide for fair markets.
Conﬂict as such does not lead to violence. ‘Conﬂict’ in the meaning attrib-
uted to this concept in the social sciences is any incompatible divergence of inter-
ests. Most conﬂict is dealt with by institutional arrangements providing for
arbitration or compromise. Violence is the system’s default option. In some soci-
eties avoidance may also be a current option. If a higher level of interaction is
needed, then avoidance favouring societies will turn more often to violence, since
alternative institutional arrangements are weak (Elwert 2001d). Modern soci-
eties are characterised by an ‘institutionalisation of conﬂict’. The more conﬂicts
a society can deal with peacefully, the greater its capacity for social transforma-
tion. The lack of conﬂict processing capacity is a major weakness of the
Command State.
Arbitration and the security of the legal system can prove too weak or unre-
liable when they are heavily challenged by economic development. Thus the idea
of ‘self-help’, materialised as violent strife or feuding, appears as a means of
achieving justice. This option becomes especially obvious when economic
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growth necessitates a higher institutional capacity for conﬂict resolution. This
‘self-help’ takes violent forms particularly in the vital area of land rights: the
expulsion of sections of the population during and immediately after periods of
economic growth in Nigeria, the Ivory Coast and Central Asia led to the emer-
gence of temporary or permanent ﬁelds of violence. If there is a higher level of
economic activity, then people engage in more potentially conﬂictual interac-
tion. These require a greater processing capacity of the regulating institutions. If
these institutions did not grow at the same pace as economic development, then
failure is probable and the avoidance of interaction or violence are obvious
options.
The temporal coincidence of democracy movements and the increase in
internal state violence has led some observers to the conclusion that one is the
cause of the other. In actual fact, however, both are a consequence of the end of
the Cold War. Large powers and former colonial powers now enjoy less legitim-
isation for intervention when violence or a power shift occurs in their area of
interest. They now allow local actors to prevail in situations, where they would
previously have taken immediate action. This can give rise to a situation whereby
free elections take place without the monopoly of violence being in the hands of
the state. It is also possible that parliaments elected in this way have no de facto
legislative authority, as the public servants do not feel bound by the laws. The
Command State does then also exist in democratic forms. Willingness to compro-
mise is weak when it is perceived as a loss of the prestige – vital for assuring cred-
ibility in the future. Violence is the better alternative to compromise as long as
the gradual conﬂict (the more-or-less conﬂict) does not replace the alternative
conﬂict (the either-or conﬂict) as dominant paradigm of conﬂict interpretation.
Liberation movements or a violent opposition, which merely aims to trans-
fer the exercise of the monopoly of violence to other (i.e. their own) hands, actu-
ally create a second pole of violence. When violence comes from both sides, the
monopoly of violence can quickly collapse and areas open to violence emerge. In
the course of further development, the economic motives for the exercise of vio-
lence can become dominant in these ﬁelds of violence. That is not to deny that
politically motivated wars of liberation exist. The transition to an economy of
violence is, however, ﬂuid. On the one hand, the guerrillas gain legitimacy from
the violent state despotism, a despotism which serves the individual proﬁt of the
oﬃcials; on the other hand, however, the long-term ﬁnancing of weapons supply
necessitates that the war sustains itself from the war. Thus, ideologically moti-
vated ﬁghters become economically motivated warlords who continue to prom-
ulgate the old ideology for the sake of greater legitimacy.
In local societies, which are not subject to central state control, an economic
or technological imbalance – e.g. a demand for scouting services to help robbers
or gold-digging, or cheap and eﬃcient weapons – can lead to failure in the inter-
nal control of violence. In the case of the Ugandan civil war, the Ik, who were pre-
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viously mainly active as hunter-gatherers, saw the opportunity to enrol as scouts
(Turnbull 1972). This brought about the partial disintegration of the internal
moral control and produced a famine among the old and the women and chil-
dren they left behind. In the highland of New Guinea, feuds became war when
automatic ﬁrearms became available and replaced spears, bows, axes and
cudgels. In Somalia, some militias emerged from nomadic self-help units, which
needed to obtain access to wells and food without state protection. They obtained
their weapons from their trading partners in the cattle trade who were econom-
ically dependent on the cattle supplied by the nomads. The young people who –
unlike in the traditional clan system – controlled these weapons soon discovered
that the taking of hostages, protection and blackmail are also proﬁtable activ-
ities. These examples throw light on both the problem of international weapons
trading and the necessity of a monopoly of violence guaranteed by a state gov-
erned by the rule of law. These two areas were not previously considered basic
concerns of development-aid policy; however, they clearly exercise a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on development processes.
The disintegration of the monopoly of violence is a necessary but
insuﬃcient condition for the emergence of markets of violence. The future war-
lords must be at least familiar with the rules of a market economy. This explains
why, for example, in the Caucasus and Central Asia the warlords mainly origi-
nate from the circles of the former ‘shadow’ economy. Furthermore, weapons,
munitions and fuel must be available at acceptable prices. The fall in the price of
the weapons of war which can be observed in Africa since the early 1990s may
have contributed to the spread of markets of violence there (Lock 1997). Finally,
a certain level of disposable resources must also be available. Extreme poverty of
the victims prevents the emergence of markets of violence in situations open to
violence (e.g. in the mountain regions of Afghanistan and Tajikistan). A concen-
tration of wealth and access to legally or illegally exploitable resources promotes
the emergence of these markets (e.g. precious metals and stones have sustained
the markets of violence in Congo/Zaire since the 1960s). Thus, even if the other
parameters remain unfavourable, positive economic development can favour the
development of markets of violence.
When areas open to violence and the market economy coincide, there may
be positive interaction between them; i.e. the market interests are increasingly
realised in areas open to violence. Thus, the self-stabilising system of the market
of violence is generated.
How it ended: historical experiences on the demise of markets of violence
Markets of violence ‘only’ ever exist for a few decades. There are several factors,
which lead to their eventual demise. Everything is permitted in the radical free
market economy, including breach of promise. Thus, anything that can stabilise
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relationships of trust is particularly in demand. Associations based on religion,
language, origins or (secret) associations are created. Eﬀorts are made to mark
out small areas of internal morality, areas in which violence is eliminated and
trust established, within the radical free market, which permits all violence and
breach of honour. The invention of an ethnic group or religious community is
one way of doing this. In Somalia and Afghanistan, for example, the concept of
religious community (umma) came to the foreground.
Such moral groupings can lead to underground transformations, which can
elude observers focused on violence for a considerable time. At the beginning of
the twentieth century, underground secret societies ﬂourished in China, which
was torn and divided by warlords. They included groups with high ethical claims
(even one Christian lay mission succeeded in becoming established among some
of the armed troops). One of the secret societies, which ﬂourished in this under-
ground was based on a particularly successful combination of charismatic obe-
dience, the concept of peaceful Utopia and eﬃcient military organisation: the
Chinese Communist Party. Many observers deemed it not contemporary owing
to its moral rigour. And yet this was the very characteristic which proved the key
to its success. 
The disintegration of a market of violence can, of course, also lead to the out-
break of a classic war situation as discussed above. This often has particularly
unpleasant consequences for the populations involved. In the ‘normal’ market of
violence, owing to the cost of the violence there are actually fewer victims than
in classic wars (e.g. in many phases in the development of the war in
Afghanistan). The warlord also sees death in terms of its ﬁnancial cost. The
deployment of ‘cheaper’ volunteer forces, which are mobilised through fear of
the enemy (e.g. fear of the ‘enemy’ ethnic group) can, however, result in a drastic
increase in the number of victims. When the violence is used to serve non-
economic aims (such as territorial rule of an ethnic group or the prestige of a
nation), when ethnic cleansing becomes an aim along with theft and blackmail,
the nature of the activity changes and the number of victims increases. Why
should warlords resist the temptation to put themselves in the service of such a
‘superior’ object if the business continues to be proﬁtable for them (as demon-
strated in the Bosnian conﬂict)?
No market activity is purely based on motives of proﬁt, subsistence and con-
sumption. Market events cannot be consolidated without secondary motiva-
tion.13 Secondary motivations – such as eﬀorts to create a new ethno-national
community – can become primary motivations, which then establish a new ref-
erence. This was also the European experience: the capitalists of the mercenary
armies of the Thirty Years War became both power-accumulating statesmen and
peaceful entrepreneurs (Tilly 1985). Then, as today in Lebanon, the exhaustion
of resources caused by the violence may have contributed to the establishing of
relative peace. 
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The transition from market of violence to other forms of violence, or to
more peaceful states, can, therefore, be achieved through three developments:
(a) the exhaustion of resources, especially through the imposition of external
blockades, (b) internal shifts in orientation linked to a military imbalance in
favour of the carriers of the new ideology and (c) the imposition of a monopoly
of violence accompanied by the creation of conﬂict resolving institutions. An
important and typical change in orientation is the establishing of institutions
which promote trust, the long-term predictability of the regulations and in addi-
tion – like relations – the moralisation of behaviour, or – like a legal system – the
regulation of conﬂict. The transition period is characterised by ambivalent activ-
ity. It is as though players of a game seated together at the same table interpret
the moves diﬀerently. Players judged ‘irrational’ in terms of the majority can
prevail if they manage to gain control over a scarce resource or synchronise
their actions with the eﬀects of an external blockade or the exhaustion of inter-
nal resources.
Means for developing prognoses about the growth or demise 
of markets of violence
Even before a violence-free space comes into being, it can be predicted whether
or not warlords will dominate the game. A sound prognosis requires ﬁrst that the
(potential) warlords’ ideological statements are not taken at face value but as
nothing more than a means to win support and deter interference. Analyses have
to be based on economic facts and on social patterns. Ten parameters have to be
studied with priority.
The patterns of violence
That violence is patterned is an important ﬁnding of anthropological research.
Violence exists in every society at least as a default option if no other means to
pursue power interests are attainable. Violence in every society is contained by a
normative arrangement which anthropology calls ‘embedding’ (Elwert 2002).
This arrangement may vary in respect of the functioning or failure of institu-
tions in respect of the changing demands put upon them. The patterns of vio-
lence with their historical variations have to be described.
The institutions of conﬂict regulation 
The study of institutions of conﬂict regulation is necessary in order to assess
their eﬃciency. How far are they capable of processing conﬂicts in a peaceful
way? And to what extent do people feel unsatisﬁed and opt either for avoidance
or for violent solutions?
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The actual status of the monopoly of violence 
How far is the monopoly of violence respected? In which social and regional
sectors does violence occur without the legitimisation of the formal rules?
Self-violations of the legitimate monopoly of violence
As formulated above, the violation of the legitimate monopoly of violence is the
most common of all triggers for civil war.
The development of autonomous sanction capacities
A recent study on warmongers and mediators draws our attention to the estab-
lishment of autonomous sanction capacities within subgroups as a necessary
condition for their transformation into collective violent actors (Eckert et al.
1999). Once these groups have established such an autonomous sanction capac-
ity they are ‘ripe’ for civil strife. Whether they start attacking other groups or
defend their own depends instead on the perceived balance of power.
The degree of violence inducing disinformation
As shown above, disinformation may motivate violence out of fear. Disinforma-
tion is especially helpful for endo-strategic mobilisation, that is, a mobilisation
whereby would-be leaders declare the need to defend their group against
assumed enemies.
Mobilisable economic goods
Mobilisable economic goods have to be assessed. The quantities of goods which
may be stolen, the money which may be attracted by ransom taking, extortion or
hostage taking, or that which may be gained through illegal trade has to be com-
pared with the income sources within the formal and legal sector of market
economy. The availability of such goods is a necessary but insuﬃcient indicator
of potential transformations into markets of violence.
The potential of violent ideological entrepreneurs
Violent political organisations, which mobilise along ideological lines, may have
a high fund-raising capacity outside their country. If the size of the resource ﬂow
depends upon spectacular deeds, then terrorism is a likely option.
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Labour power assessment 
The number and quality of persons who could be mobilised as volunteers, sol-
diers, mercenaries, as compared with the numbers of such persons in peacekeep-
ing forces is another good indicator.
Resource transfer opportunities
Stolen goods have to be sold, ransoms have to be collected. Proﬁts have to be
stored, saved or reinvested. All this requires safe structures for money launder-
ing, transfer and investment. The availability of such structures enhances the
chances of warlords dominating the game.
Political options to promote peace from the outside
‘Fattening the booty’: or the ambivalence of distributing aid
Currently the most common form of intervention in conﬂicts is humanitarian
aid. Doctors and nurses are dispatched to the war zones; food and clothing are
distributed to the victims of violence; infrastructures get repaired; for logistic
reasons refugees or people suﬀering from hunger get concentrated in camps. This
measure is highly ambivalent, since recruiting troops is made easier rather than
more diﬃcult for the warlords (as demonstrated by the example of Rwandan ref-
ugees in Congo/Zaire or the Taliban’s recruits from refugee camps in Pakistan).
Decentralised supply concepts would be more suitable.14 Warlords use refugee
camps not only to recruit but also to regenerate their troops. They may also invite
in humanitarian organisations because they can sell them their services as pro-
tection forces against the risks generated by other warlords or by themselves.
Warlords may as well scale down the violence as long as humanitarian forces dis-
tribute food and repair infrastructures, if the population has become too poor to
be robbed. Once the ‘booty is fattened’ the cycle of war starts again. It is impos-
sible to completely avoid aid supplies being diverted from the intended recipients
as a result of blackmail, ‘duties’, payments for transportation, protection or theft.
It would, however, be possible to avoid such supplies being used to beneﬁt the
warlords more than their victims through monitoring. The ‘booty-fattening’
eﬀect can be avoided only if humanitarian action also implies the establishing of
a monopoly of violence.
Blockade
It is possible seriously to jeopardise the economic interests of warlords through
blockades. Smuggling, the investment of the proceeds of trade, theft, blackmail
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or hostage taking in safe third-party states, weapons and fuel supplies are all vul-
nerable to intervention. Such blockades are, however, diﬃcult to implement.
They may involve extensive manpower and technological resources on the
borders of the war zones. They necessitate that the personnel who carry out the
border policing are authorised to use weapons in the completion of their duties
(unlike in the former Yugoslavia). Such blockades must also be implemented as
blockades of services, particularly the movement and laundering of money. This
is seen by some states as interference in their ‘freedom of banking’.
Armed peacekeeping and the need for support for institution building
In some situations, the market of violence can come to an end only if the intra-
state monopoly of violence is guaranteed by external powers for a limited period
of time. This policing (and in the sociological sense non-military) task has four
prerequisites.
First, the arms and logistics resources available to the intervening powers
must be such that they can cope with actors who are potentially violent.
Secondly, the use of sanctioned violence must be based on legal state regula-
tions and enjoy institutional back-up and control. If soldiers can abuse their
power, the intervening force will degenerate into another warlord. Thirdly,
weapons control must be achieved. Fourthly, everyday conﬂicts must be
resolved in peaceful procedures, if violence in the form of self-help ‘for the
achievement of rights’ is not to ﬂare up again; that means building institutions.
The linking up with local concepts of justice and local institutions is unavoida-
ble here if the aim is to lay the foundations for the endogenous development of
the rule of law by native powers. These institutions may be both formal and
informal, e.g. those organising illegal markets (cf. Zürcher and Koehler’s
Chapter 13 in this volume).
All this is based on an assumption of socio-cultural competence on the part
of the intervening party. This is seldom in evidence in the cooperation with devel-
oping countries and is sorely missed in situations of violence.
Building civil society at a grassroots level
A monopoly of violence can be established only if violence-free interaction is
made a matter of routine in daily life. This normalisation of peace requires
changes in what one expects from neighbours and from unknown persons. These
changes require four conditions.
First, power abuses by state oﬃcers, especially arbitrary violence, have to be
controlled. Institutions of justice specialised in this ﬁeld are a highly eﬃcient tool
for ensuring this function. Secondly, criminality has to be curbed. Thirdly, ima-
gined threats, e.g. from witches or from infectious diseases brought by strangers,
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have to be dispelled by enlightening information. Finally, peaceful forms of
conﬂict resolution have to be low-cost and quick.
Forcing violent actors into moves towards peace
In many examples of peacekeeping through external forces the (former) violent
actors are still present. A study of the peacekeeping process in Bosnia shows both
the failures and successes of such processes (Gosztonyi 2001). Violence can be
eﬀectively scaled down provided that there is a consistent system of positive and
negative sanctions, of rewards and penalties. Starting from the status quo the rel-
evant parties have to agree in a formal or informal contract on what will be con-
sidered an improvement or deterioration in the situation. Sanctions have to be
administered consequentially and with a high degree of consistency and reliabil-
ity in respect of the so deﬁned ‘goal corridor’. To achieve this, ﬁrst of all the
donors and intervening forces must be coordinated. If not, they will be played oﬀ
against each other. Then they have to invest heavily in monitoring what is going
on at the local level. Positive sanctions may include investments in welfare, infra-
structure and productive assets. Subsidies and bribes should be avoided or at least
reduced in the process. Among the negative sanctions is of course the removal of
these social or personal beneﬁts. But they must go further. One option may be tar-
geted actions against a warlord’s investments in other countries. The use of the
mass media in the country itself or in countries whose public matters to the
‘warlord-come-politician’ can be an eﬃcient tool, a sanction through negative
reputation. 
Coercive violence – especially the arrest of rule violators or armed interven-
tion to secure the implementation of measures which were part of the contract
– must not be excluded. The Bosnian case shows that once such an intervention
was delayed, the violence level increased. The predictability of the sanctions and
clarity in the agreements are the peacekeepers’ virtues; fuzziness and lack of
speciﬁc consequences for certain actions give them Achilles’ heels. We have
observed that in situations of unstable peace the risk of misunderstandings
owing to delayed action or ambivalent symbols is above average.
Economic opportunities as a means of socio-cultural transformation
Given that states of war particularly reward the values of the warring parties,
there is a particular danger that peace will be seen as only a temporary cease-ﬁre.
In areas open to violence, a prestige situation speciﬁc to violence often gets estab-
lished which links the opportunity for young men to acquire honour and respect
by acts of violence against third parties or revenging the ‘infringement of
honour’. This prestige is mostly bestowed by informal institutions. Age-speciﬁc
organisations of young males play an important role. As long as these institutions
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exist and this prestige situation remains, a reserve army for possible civil war strat-
egies continues to grow, even in peacetime. This is not the only possible outcome
in such situations. It is also possible to open new paths to social recognition. The
promotion of entrepreneurial ambition in peaceful forms can transform poten-
tially destructive energies and provide both proﬁt and prestige.15
As violence is a product of men’s social organisation, so are markets of vio-
lence. There is thus a chance to undo them.

1 This chapter draws on earlier publications of the author. Notes and references are
restricted to arguments not yet contained in Elwert (1999). For this version the author has
to thank especially Julia Eckert, Kristóf Gosztony, Ulrich Hiemenz, Jan Koehler, Dirk
Kohnert, Thomas Zitelmann and Christoph Zürcher for support in the empirical research
(especially Julia Eckert, Kristóf Gosztony, Dirk Kohnert, Jan Koehler, Thomas Zitelmann)
and style (especially Ulrich Hiemenz, Christoph Zürcher).
2 It is important to note that in all of these countries or regions, areas exist or existed where
the use of violence was not a regular occurrence.
3 This system can be described as a ‘market’ only in the descriptive sense of economic
anthropology. In other words, the exchange under this system is based on the exchange
value of the goods and unlike reciprocal systems, personal trust between economic part-
ners is not required. The system described here, in which breach of contract, blackmail
and theft are the rule, could not be described as a ‘market’ in the normative sense. 
4 The diﬀerent forms of violence were not, of course, interpreted as revolts against state
attacks, robbery or markets of violence during the Cold War era but as the subversive vio-
lence of opponents.
5 For more detailed versions of the theory of markets of violence see Elwert (1997, 1999).
The ﬁrst formulations of the theory were presented at a plenary session of the German
Sociological Convention in Düsseldorf in 1992 chaired by Gudrun Lachenmann (Elwert
1996), and a workshop at the World Congress of Sociology in Bielefeld in 1994 chaired
by Amrita Rangasami. I have to thank both of them not only for the invitation but also for
advice and the lively debate.
6 On security ﬁrms in Southern Africa, see Misser (1997a, 1997b), on bureaucracies in the
Sudan, see Keen (1996).
7 Uganda, which in 2000 was able to balance its budget ‘in spite’ of the presence of
Ugandan troops in the neighbouring Congo, shows that governments may also win.
8 For example, in Mozambique cf. Geﬀray (1992).
9 For example, in East Africa for troops from Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, cf. Allen (1996,
1999); Duﬃeld (1997); Hancock (1997).
10 Diamonds, emeralds, gold, silver and minerals containing rare elements appear on the
shopping list. For the diamonds in Sierra Leone example, see Grill (2001), and for eme-
ralds in Columbia, see Krauthausen (1997). 
11 Gold trading and protection or extortion of protection money for the gold trade was the
speciality of the warlord Laurent Kabila who has been active for over thirty years and has
now reached new honour in Zaire/Congo.
12 It is, however, diﬃcult to ﬁnd examples of successful blockades. Mozambique after the
changes in South Africa, which previously provided the external infrastructure for vio-
lence, is perhaps such a case.
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13 This can be seen in German society, for example, in the prestige awarded for academic
work, which is a condition for advancement on the academic labour market.
14 Gerd Spittler developed such a decentralised concept for hunger intervention in the
Sahara (Spittler 1988).
15 Thomas Zitelmann observed this in Ethiopia (cf. Zitelmann 1993; Eckert et al. 1999).
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Institutions and the organisation of
stability and violence
Jan Koehler and Christoph Zürcher
Post-socialist turmoil in Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus
I   and in Former Yugoslavia the collapse of the socialist empireshas caused more hot conﬂicts and wars than in any other transition region.In each region there were four major armed conﬂicts. In the Caucasus, there
was the disagreement between Armenians and Azeris over Nagorno-Karabakh
(1988–93: no political settlement); the wars about Chechnya (1994–96 and
1999–today: no settlement); the internal war in Georgia (1991–92) and
Georgia’s war with breakaway Abkhazia (1992–93: no settlement); and break-
away South-Ossetia (1989–92: no settlement).
In Yugoslavia, the four major violent conﬂicts were the short campaign of
the Yugoslav Army against the breakaway republic of Slovenia in June 1991; the
wars between Croats and Serbs in eastern Slovenia and in the Krajina
(1991–95); the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–95); and the war about
Kosovo, which was fought on the one hand between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians
in Kosovo, and on the other hand between NATO and Serbia (1998–99).
Both the Caucasus and Former Yugoslavia are typical high-risk regions. At
least four factors commonly held responsible for increasing the risk of violence
are present.1 First, there is the legacy of the socialist system of ethno-federalism
(Brubaker 1994; Bunce 1999). Socialist ethno-federalism had linked territories
with a titular nation and provided these territories with quasi-state institutions,
such as citizenship, borders, symbols, political institutions, and in the case of
Yugoslavia, armed forces. Ethno-national mobilisation for independence was
thus prepared by the socialist systems. Secondly, in most cases there was also a
past history of grievance and conﬂicts. Armenians and Azerbaijanis, Chechens
and Russians, Serbs and Kosovars, Croats and Serbs all have stories and experi-
ences of old animosity. Thirdly, the peoples of Yugoslavia and the USSR experi-
enced economic hardships during the 1980s. Lastly, all polities in Yugoslavia
and in the Caucasus (that is, the former Federal Republics and the former
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Autonomous Republics) are multi-ethnic territories with a complex ethnic
geography.
As a result, there is a wide array of conﬂict potential in both regions.
However, far from all potential conﬂicts turned into violent conﬂicts. In other
words, similar permissive conditions do not always and not automatically trans-
late into violent conﬂicts. In the Caucasus, the most surprising case of stability
against all odds is Dagestan (see Chapter 6 in this volume). Despite the fact that
this tiny mountainous Republic is home to more than thirty national groups,
borders war-torn Chechnya and suﬀers from dramatic economic deprivation, it
has managed to avoid large-scale internal violence. But also in Yugoslavia, there
are cases of stability against all odds. Voivodina, Montenegro and, until 1999,
also Macedonia are such examples.
By comparing Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, diﬀerences in the intensity and
scale of conﬂicts may be observed. Fighting in Yugoslavia, as a rule involved more
armed people, and more civil victims. This may partly be explained by structural
diﬀerences between Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, namely by the diﬀerent struc-
tures of the federations, and by the way in which the federal centre was disman-
tled by the federal units. 
In Yugoslavia during the 1980s, the most powerful of the Republics, Serbia,
tried to usurp the position of the dwindling federal Yugoslav centre. When it
became obvious to the Serbian leaders that they would not be able to hold together
the federation, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic they switched to a
nationalist agenda, trying to secure a ‘greater Serbia’ at the expense of the territo-
rial integrity of Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina. This triggered wars
between nationalising states, although these wars were, as in the Krajina, in east
SloveniaandespeciallyinBosnia,mainlyfoughtbytheproxies–theethnicgroups.
By contrast, in the USSR, it was Russia – by far the most powerful republic –
that actively opposed (under Yeltsin’s leadership) the restoration of the Union.
Russia thus became, for a certain period, the natural ally of the breakaway
republics. This explains the smooth and relatively peaceful dissolution of the
USSR. Secondly, Russia itself is a multi-ethnic federation. Russia’s state ideology
is not based on Russian (russkii) ethno-nationalism, but on the multi-national
Russian (rossiiskii) state. The Russian Federation was thus able (with the dra-
matic exception of Chechnya) to contain and defuse ethnic tensions within its
territory. 
In the South Caucasus, however, the patterns of conﬂict are similar to those
in Yugoslavia. Here, the nationalising process of Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan was met with similar nationalising processes in the territories of
minority groups within these states. The conﬂict between breakaway Nagorno-
Karabakh and Azerbaijan stopped short of turning into an oﬃcial inter-state war
between Azerbaijan and Armenia and was accompanied by ethnic cleansing on
all sides. In Georgia, the nationalising Georgian state was challenged by two
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ethno-national secessionist movements, in Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, which
spiralled into wars accompanied by ethnic cleansing.
Violence, transition and state weakness
Between 1989 and 1991, both federations imploded. How was the emergence of
organised violence visible both shortly before and after the break-up linked to this
extreme form of state weakness? 
The systemic transition that occurred in Yugoslavia and the USSR can be
depictedasrapidinstitutionalchange,accompaniedbyabreakdownof hierarchies
and by the loss of the state’s sanction capacities. Systemic transition increases the
risk of violence. Two mechanisms account for this: ﬁrst, when the state loses its
sanctioncapacity, thecosts forbreakingtherules fall.Secondly, insituationof tran-
sition, the premium for the winner is extremely high, because the winner takes all:
what is at stake during transition is essentially the right to write the new rules.The
future is at stake. In short, during transition, the costs for breaking the rules and
organising violence sink, while the booty is ‘fattened’ (see Chapter 12 in this
volume). The risk for socially ‘dis-embedded’, violent competition increases.2
These mechanisms apply to competition between all sorts of societal actors
in transition societies. Relevant for the study of organised violence are, however,
two arenas: ﬁrst, the competition on the ground between two or more ethnic
groups within a multi-ethnic polity. Notably, all Yugoslav and Soviet polities (that
is, the ﬁrst-order, Republics and the second-order Autonomies) are multi-ethnic
polities.
Secondly, these mechanisms also apply for the competition between incum-
bent political elite and challenging political elite. Systemic transition always
opens up opportunities for political newcomers to challenge incumbent leaders.
During such intensiﬁed competition, actors may seek to use all available
resources. The mobilisation of support by instrumentalising ethnicity can be one
of the available strategies. This is, however, a very risky strategy, since it implies
the promotion of a negative and threatening perception of the ‘Other’. Ethno-
radical mobilisation promotes fears of exclusion or even physical destruction,
and can thus easily spin out of control.
A second threat to societal stability that comes with transition, state weak-
ness and elite power struggles is the emergence of parallel and competing politi-
cal institutions. When the entry into existing political institutions is blocked,
challengers often create new, alternative ad hoc institutions. For example, chal-
lengers in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia founded popular
national movements. At a certain time, these alternative institutions were
assigned so much political power that a situation of parallel power emerged: the
formal socialist institutions, in the ﬁrst place the Party and the Supreme Soviets,
were opposed by organised national movements. In Armenia, in a relatively swift
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and constitutional move, the challengers took over the state and consolidated the
new regime. In Chechnya, Georgia and Azerbaijan, however, the competition
between the socialist institutions and the newly founded challenging institutions
(the ‘Popular Front’ in Azerbaijan, ‘RoundTable/Free Georgia’ in Georgia and the
‘Chechen National Congress’ in Chechnya) led to internal instability and eventu-
ally to internal war.
State weakness can cause violence. Therefore, it may be assumed that
rebuilding state capacities must be a high priority of new leaders. A quite unex-
pected lesson to be learned from the study of organised violence in Yugoslavia
and the Caucasus is that this assumption is not necessarily true. This lesson per-
tains in the ﬁrst place to unrecognised would-be states (the formally second-
order units). Abkhazia, South-Ossetia, Chechnya and Kosovo have made no
signiﬁcant progress towards strengthening their state capacities, despite their
aspirations for sovereignty (Nagorno-Karabakh has to be regarded as an excep-
tion because of its very close informal integration with the Armenian Republic).
It is argued here that this is not a paradox, but can be the rational strategy of a
political elite: international legal sovereignty is a valuable resource. Establishing
state capacities, with functioning state bureaucracies, however, is expensive,
risky and can even contradict the interests of elites. All of these ‘statelets’ are
governed by highly institutionalised networks of patronage. In order to stabilise
these networks, the patrons of the networks have to satisfy the needs of their
clientele. Not surprisingly, patrons in such weak network-states usually control
access to resources. In order to secure their position, the patrons must prevent
access to resources to potential challengers and hinder independent activities
outside the network. Therefore, patrons will minimise public goods such as
safety, protection, economic opportunities or legal protection; instead they will
try to privatise these goods and to make them available only within the network.
Patrons artiﬁcially minimise public goods. One means of achieving this is by
keeping the state weak; another means is by tolerating or even promoting low-
level conﬂict, even within their own state, since this increases insecurity and thus
maximises the dependency of political actors (and the population) on the
patron’s good will. State weakness may thus even be the rational choice of
leaders, who base their rule on networks of patronage (see Mappes-Niediek’s
Chapter 5 on Kosovo; Baev’s and Christophe’s Chapters 7 and 10, respectively,
on Georgia; Koehler and Zürcher’s Chapter 8 on Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh; and Kisriev’s Chapter 6 on Chechnya, in this volume).
Institutions matter
What accounts for the diﬀerent ways the various post-socialist societies dealt
with the stress of transition? The case studies in this volume look at the institu-
tional framework of these societies for answers. It is argued here that institutions
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perform three functions which are relevant for the organisation of stability and
violence:
First, institutions are accepted, trained and sometimes enforced patterns of
interaction which ‘embed’ conﬂict. Institutions process competing interests: they
oﬀer rules and procedures for the articulation of interests, they provide for a ﬂow
of information between actors and they oﬀer binding procedures for determin-
ing the outcome of interaction. Institutions, particularly oﬃcial state institu-
tions, are usually ‘protected’ – the state has the means to punish deﬁance.
Violation of the procedures is thus expensive as long as the state has the capac-
ity and the will to sanction deﬁance. The breakdown of such a framework lets
conﬂict spin out of the framework that a society has designed in order to deal
with conﬂicts. Conﬂict potential may then turn into escalated, violent conﬂict.
The fact that a society has institutionalised procedures for dealing with conﬂicts
in place does not mean that there is no conﬂict within the society. Conﬂicting
interests are the normal state of aﬀairs in every society.3 Competing interests can
be processed according to accepted rules or according to unregulated power.
Internal fragmentation and violence is thus not a result of competing interests,
but of unregulated, dis-embedded processing of competing interests. 
Secondly, in general the institutional framework provides the incentive
structure for actors. The costs of organising violence depend on the institutions
at work. When the institutional framework of a society is such that the organ-
isation of violence is cheap, then the risk of conﬂict increases. When, on the
contrary, institutions increase the cost of violence, the risk decreases. In other
words, it depends on the design of the institutional framework whether institu-
tions defuse or diﬀuse violence. A case in point is the socialist system of ethno-
federalism. This system, originally designed for processing potential tensions
between national groups has, once the tight control of the party weakened, pro-
moted secessionist conﬂicts and inter-group violence. The socialist system of
ethno-federalism has prepared the quest for sovereignty and independence of
the federal subjects of Yugoslavia and of the USSR. Ethno-federalism provided
the subjects with a set of political institutions such as borders, symbols, a con-
stitution, citizenship, parliaments, media, educational system, a titular nation
and a national elite. All these prerequisites of statehood were well in place at
the time that the empires broke down. Thus, the cost of state building was rel-
atively low, and the national elite in the republics opted for independence.
Likewise, the national elite of the second-order units (the so-called Autonomous
Republics) opted for independence from ‘their’ republics. Not surprisingly, the
borders of the second-order units mark the hot spots in Yugoslavia and the
Caucasus – in Nagorno-Karabakh, South-Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya and
Kosovo.
Thirdly, institutions have distributional consequences. They structure
access to resources and deﬁne, ‘who gets what’ in society. The relative power of
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actors in a society thus depends on the institutional framework. Changes of the
institutional framework, accordingly, also have distributional consequences.
When institutions cease to work, for example when the state loses its sanction
capacity, then the old elite may lose access to resources, or challengers may gain
access to resources. This shift in the relative power of ‘incumbents’ and ‘chal-
lengers’ may lead to an intensiﬁed struggle for power. The risk that this competi-
tion spins out of control is high, when the sanction power of the state is
weakened. Institutions not only regulate access to resources, they are per se a
resource. Institutions are a set of rules, and some of them have a considerable
organisational power. Those who control bureaucratic or military hierarchies,
parties, clan networks or networks of patronage can use the organisational
power of these institutions in order to mobilise support. 
Institutional framework and local know-how
Evidence from the case studies suggests that the presence of risk factors on the
ground and the collapsing central state alone cannot explain the variance that
may be observed across Yugoslavia and the Caucasus with regard to violent or
non-violent social outcome. 
An explanation of this variance in the institutional framework of these soci-
eties has been sought. But which institutions matter? Social spaces are veined
with numerous rules and procedures; stability and violence are consequently a
social outcome of many institutions intertwining. There is not and cannot be a
general answer to the question which institutions matter, as this may vary
signiﬁcantly from case to case: however, the chapters in this volume present some
road signs. First, the usual suspects matter: the formal political institutions of a
polity – parliaments, presidency, election laws, parties, property rights or admin-
istrative divisions – are important. Signiﬁcant parts of formal institutions of the
USSR and the Yugoslav Federation survived the demise of the central state and
were and still are of consequence. The importance of the administrative–territo-
rial division of the ethno-federations has already been stressed. Other important
legacies of the socialist system are the party structure and the socialist rubber-
stamp parliaments, which acquired real inﬂuence during the course of transi-
tion. In fact, internal cohesion or internal fragmentation depended a lot on how
and by whom these institutions were reused. When elites use existing, ‘trained’
institutions for conquering or keeping the state, the risk of social fragmentation
is lower than when elites invent new institutions, such as round tables, popular
fronts, or national congresses. For example, the communist apparatchik Milosevic
rose by taking over the organisational potential of the Serbian Communist Party
and reusing it for his nationalist agenda. The key to his ‘success’ was combining
two central resources of post-socialist spaces, namely the mobilising power of
ethnicity and the organisational power of party structures. The price for Serbia’s
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internal stability was paid, however, by its neighbours, because Milosevic proved
to be very skilful at externalising conﬂicts.
An analysis of the institutional framework of society must not be limited to
formal state institutions. In challenging widespread state-centric approaches, it
has been argued here that the institutional framework of post-socialist societies
consists not only of the institutional legacy of ‘oﬃcial’ state institutions, but also
of the ‘shadow’ institutions that have emerged as a response to the organisa-
tional voids of socialism, and of those locally rooted traditional norms and con-
ventions that survived in the organisational voids of the socialist state. These
three analytically distinct sets of institutions – the ‘formal’, the ‘shadow’ and the
‘traditional’– form together a hybrid, locally distinct framework, which struc-
tures incentives, opportunities and constraints of actors on the ground.
The existence of a locally distinct, colourful and largely informal set of insti-
tutions clearly contradicts the superﬁcial picture of homogeneous, centralised
socialist states fostered by many outside observers, ruling elites and dissident
intellectuals alike (compare Hann 1996: 7–10). All chapters in this book stress
the fact that the socialist societies were at least in the last decade of their exis-
tence socialist only in form, but informal and locally distinct in content. 
The socialist state in its last two decades was a rather weak state, although
its vertical command lines were functional until the late 1980s. The social insti-
tutions compensating for (or simply exploiting) the failures, voids and weak-
nesses were informal, often even illegal, since the blueprints of the socialist state
did not foresee societal organisation outside the realm of the state’s control. 
These unoﬃcial institutions went largely undetected by political science and
sovietology, which focused mainly on ‘oﬃcial’ state institutions. Again, it is
impossible to name which of these ‘shadow’ institutions are in general relevant
for the explanation of violence. But here, too, road signs exist, and the chapters
in this book present some evidence.
Of the issues with which this book is concerned, the most signiﬁcant organ-
isational void of the socialist state was that it formally banned all open social
conﬂict. On the other hand, it relied on social self-organisation to ﬁll the gaps.
Instead of founding its legitimacy on setting the general rules for local institu-
tions regulating conﬂict, the state condemned those institutions to the shadows
of informality or even criminality. Thus conﬂict was socially embedded in the
informal sector but not institutionalised by oﬃcial state institutions. 
By denying the existence of the conﬂicting interests of social groups the state
was unable to provide a framework of checks and balances between identity
groups or socio-professional lobbies in a given administrative unit. Competing
interests were pushed beneath the oﬃcial surface and were accordingly dealt
with by informal bureaucratic barter at the few ‘switchboards’ of decision
making. Minority groups had therefore no oﬃcial channels for lobbying their
real or perceived grievances. Even lobbying for a change in administrative status
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(like in Kosovo in the late 1970s or in Nagorno-Karabakh on repeated occasions
over the decades after the death of Stalin) had to be organised via informal chan-
nels and was usually aimed directly at the corridors of power in the centre, thus
bypassing the formal political institutions. The failure of the state to provide for
oﬃcial arenas in which identity groups (here the titular nation and a minority)
were able to settle their disputes by procedures aggravated the tendency of radi-
cals of such groups to retreat to what Elwert called ‘informational isolates’
(Elwert 2001a). This in turn increases the risk of future violent conﬂict, since
these informational islands breed radical and exclusive views of the other group.
One species that grew especially well in the organisational voids of the
socialist state were omnipresent networks of patronage (cf. Willerton 1992).
After the collapse of the central state, these networks became, in many places,
the most cohesive institutional structure, substituting state tasks and concen-
trating political power and economic resources. 
The most powerful and relevant informal networks developed in the shadow
of the oﬃcial socialist institutions and were usually closely linked to administra-
tive functionaries who, by virtue of their oﬃcial position, had the power to allo-
cate resources, privileges and protection to their clientele. Often, patrons of such
networks were the provincial ‘strong men’ which Koehler and Zürcher in
Chapter 8 in this volume call apparatchiki-biznesmeny. After the collapse of
empire, many of these apparatchiki-biznesmeny smoothly turned into biznesmeny-
patrioty. It has been shown in another study that in all cases of organised vio-
lence in the Caucasus, the ﬁnancial resources that are needed for the – expensive
– organisation of violence came from the Soviet ‘shadow’ economy (Zürcher,
Koehler and Baev, 2002). The biznesmeny-patrioty that have grown rich in the
shadow economy were the most important ﬁnanciers of the wars in the
Caucasus. Raufer and Mappes-Niediek in Chapters 3 and 5, respectively, in this
volume reach similar conclusions with regard to the war in Kosovo. 
Networks of patronage and trust were especially well suited to exploiting the
opportunities that the booming shadow economy of the late socialist state oﬀered
the entrepreneurially minded (on the scope and growth of the shadow economy
in the former USSR see Baev’s Chapter 7 in this volume). Often such networks
were built around clans and neighbourhoods in order to inject the measure of
trust and cohesion that a successful exploitation of the opportunities of the
socialist economy requires. Thus, as a by-product of generating trust, many net-
works developed an ethnic ﬂavour. Often informal economic activity thus
became ethnicised, and the competition for scarce resources was structured by
ethnic belonging (see Koehler and Zürcher’s Chapter 8 on Nagorno-Karabakh in
this volume). 
The border between networks of patronage designed for the exploitation of
the ‘shadow’ economy and outright criminal networks is blurred, since all eco-
nomic activities outside the planned economy of the state were by and large
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illegal.4 In addition, one activity of criminal networks in the late socialist state,
apart from taxing the informal economy, was to provide services for the appa-
ratchiki-biznesmeny such as protection, contract-security and mechanisms of
enforcement or sanction.5 There is little comprehensive research on organised
crime in the late socialist state, but evidence suggests that organised crime played
an important role in resource generating and organising violence. Koehler and
Zürcher’s Chapter 8, Baev’s Chapter 7, Mappes-Niediek’s Chapter 5 and Raufer’s
Chapter 3 in this volume all support this assumption. They also lend credibility
to the notion that closely-knit ties based on kinship with a high degree of exclu-
siveness were well suited to the organisation of criminal activity. In the former
USSR and in former Yugoslavia such normative frames of reference, referred to
as ‘amoral familism’6 (Schwandner-Sievers 1998 on Albania), could be found as
a parallel legal code in remote regions of Chechnya in the North Caucasus,
Abkhazia and Svanetia in the Southern Caucasus and in Montenegro and
Kosovo. Under conditions of increasing physical and social mobility (as in
growing diaspora communities in remote cities) the exclusive code of such small-
scale identity groups sometimes became relevant for the eﬀective organisation of
maﬁa-like criminal networks (see Raufer’s Chapter 3 on Kosovo in this volume;
compare Jamieson and Silj 1998: 20–39)
Finally, in the organisational voids of the late socialist state a colourful
patchwork of ‘traditional’ institutions may be found, dealing with conﬂict and
negotiating justice and access to resources which had survived socialist homo-
genisation. ‘Traditional’ institutions are presented here as local institutions
without oﬃcial character that use narratives of traditional depth as a resource
for legitimacy.
Kisriev’s Chapter 6 on Dagestan in this volume provides an illuminating
example. Stability against all odds in multi-ethnic Dagestan can be explained by
the existence of the system of dzhamaat. In Dagestan, ‘dzhamaat’ denotes a soli-
darity group, based primarily on neighbourhoods and not on ethnicity that has
been in existence since the ﬁfteenth century. In today’s Dagestan, the dzhamaat
forms the core political unit and performs many functions that in western
democracies are performed by political parties. Dagestan’s constitution and
electoral law reinforces the importance of the dzhamaat: in Dagestan, only
single-mandate electoral constituencies exist, and in each constituency only rep-
resentatives from one ethnic group can run in elections. Political competition on
the local level thus takes place between dzhamaats, but not between ethnic
groups. Thus, the ‘traditional’ institution of dzhamaat and formal political insti-
tutions intertwine and produce societal stability. This example also demonstrates
that even in weak states conﬂict can be eﬀectively socially embedded over long
periods of time, thanks to the division of labour between oﬃcial and informal
institutions.
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Violent conﬂict as dynamic process
Conﬂict escalation and de-escalation is, rather than a temporal sequence of
diﬀerent phases in time, a dynamic process, during which the rationales of the
conﬂicting parties and the incentive structures that govern their action undergo
dramatic changes. The initial rationales of a dispute may thus be very diﬀerent
from those that actually trigger the conﬂict and from those that eventually lead to
either the stabilisation of a violent environment or to a departure from violence.
Generalising the material presented in this book, four diﬀerent stages of the
conﬂict process may be identiﬁed, called here ‘dis-embedding conﬂict’, ‘markets
of violence’, ‘ending violence’ and ‘re-embedding conﬂict.’
Dis-embedding conﬂict
‘Dis-embedding’ is the process whereby conﬂict spins out of the socially con-
structed bonds designed to deal with it. There are four signiﬁcant markers that
accompany the dis-embedding of conﬂict, and each in its own right may serve as
an early warning indicator: the loss of the binding power of oﬃcial institutions;
the loss of the state’s legitimate monopoly of violence; access to resources for
organisers of violence; and the emergence of organised groups that partly sub-
stitute the state.
The loss of the binding power of oﬃcial institutions for the relevant groups
in society has been a latent condition in the late socialist state. The socialist state,
rather than provide for institutionalised procedures for dealing with conﬂicts
over resources or positions, has pushed social conﬂicts into the informal sphere.
As a result, oﬃcial state institutions were detached from the relevant spheres of
society’s self-organisation. Parallel institutions developed or were empowered to
back up functions not provided by the state. The weaker the legitimacy of state
institutions became, the stronger the capacity and legitimacy of the parallel
structures in place grew. This interdependency between the state and its compet-
itors is most straightforwardly demonstrated in the performance of the Serbian
state and the reaction of the Albanian community in Kosovo (see Mappes-
Niediek’s Chapter 5 in this volume).
The second factor that marks the dis-embedding of conﬂict is the loss of the
state’s legitimate monopoly of violence. Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 2 on Kosovo,
Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia, respectively, in this volume demon-
strate that the state’s monopoly of violence is not only endangered by dwindling
state capacities; actually, they indicate that the real threat to the state’s monop-
oly of violence is the loss of its legitimacy to use it. Legitimacy may break down
owing to unpredictable or regular misuse of the state monopoly (as was the case
of the Soviet state in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) or when it is taken over
by one social force that is party to a conﬂict. A case in point is the attempt to take
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over the Yugoslav structures (above all, the army) by Serbian nationalist forces.
Grandits and Leutloﬀ’s Chapter 1 in this volume describes this process from a
local perspective in the case of the Krajina.
This loss of legitimacy of the central state was not, with the possible excep-
tion of Armenia in the Caucasus and Serbia in Former Yugoslavia, successfully
backed up anywhere by the enforcement bodies of the newly independent states.
They were seen either as party to the conﬂict (from the perspective of internal
breakaway ‘statelets’ like Krajina, Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia) or utterly
ineﬀective and atomised beyond any central state control (most dramatically in
Azerbaijan and Georgia until 1995). 
A third factor that speeds up the dis-embedding of conﬂict is access to the
three resources necessary for the organisation of violence, namely ﬁnance, man-
power and weapons. The socialist ‘shadow’ economy provided enough opportu-
nities to the biznesmeny-patrioty to acquire the necessary funds and channel
them into the organisation of violence. Other sources of income stem from the
diaspora and the proﬁts from international crime, demonstrated in the case of
Kosovo in Raufer’s Chapter 3 in this volume.
Access to weapons is a second signiﬁcant factor. Mappes-Niediek’s Chapter
5 on Kosovo in this volume shows how rapidly the relatively stable and non-
violent situation changed once cheap automatic ﬁrearms were available from the
storehouses of the failing Albanian state. In the Caucasus, weapons came in very
large quantities from the storehouses of the disintegrating Soviet Army. Both the
newly independent states and challenging rebel formations had no problems in
arming themselves with cheaply bought or easily stolen Soviet weapons. 
The third factor that helps dis-embed conﬂict is manpower. The organisation
of violence requires the existence of groups of young men7 detached from state
control or the gerontocratic social control of their families. The latter seems very
likely in situations where the traditional family structure is either unable to
secure a future career (be it oﬃcial, informal or criminal) for their young males,
or young men perceive the participation in gangs outside social control as a real
short-cut to access resources traditionally controlled by the older generation.
Mappes-Niediek’s Chapter 5 in this volume shows the relevance of this condition
for Kosovo. The breakdown of social control over young men and weapons has
also been a dramatic experience especially for the older generation in Chechnya
between the two wars in the 1990s and during the Georgian troubles at the
beginning of the 1990s (Koehler 2000: 48–50, 71–74).
Such groups are capable of organising violence only when they possess
mechanisms for internal coordination and internal sanction. This is where the
last indicator for ‘serious trouble ahead’ comes into the equation: the existence
of gangs or networks, often set up initially by specialists of informal violence (like
patrons of organised crime), is the last factor that marks the dis-embedding of
conﬂict. There is a myriad of colourful personalities – most of them now dead or
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in prison – competing for dubious fame: for Albania, Raufer’s Chapter 3 in this
volume outlines the cases of Agim Gashi and Princ Dobroshi; from the Bosnian
war, violence specialists like ‘Arkan’, ‘Tuta’, ‘Stela’ (Hedges 1996; Wood 2000);
and ‘Juka’, ‘Celo’ and ‘Caco’ in Sarajevo (Schork 1994) were important in the
initial phase of organising collective violence by mobilising armed youths and
then merging business interests with the opportunities of the emerging market
of violence. In Georgia, criminal authorities like Djaba Ioseliani and shady biz-
nesmeny-patrioty like Tengiz Kitovani even succeeded in temporarily taking over
the state (Koehler 1999). In Chechnya, Bislan Gantemirov, former militsioner
(Soviet policeman) and entrepreneur in the ‘shadow’ economy, set up the ﬁrst
armed gang in Grozny that was to become the backbone of Dudaev’s National
Guard.
As stated above, the important characteristic of these groups is that they
develop internal sanction capacities: deﬁance of the group’s rules may then often
be costlier for the young members than challenging the crumbling state’s
monopoly of violence. At the same time, such groups oﬀer personal security, pro-
tection of private business and trust for their members and clients. In so doing,
they may become a highly eﬀective competitor for the weak state and partly sub-
stitute state functions.
The establishment of such groups, ready to exploit the new opportunities for
acquiring resources of violence and further undermining the weakened legiti-
macy of the state monopoly of violence and the binding capacity of the oﬃcial
institutions, occurred at some stage in all the cases presented in this volume
(explicitly in the conﬂicts in the Krajina, Kosovo, Georgia and around Nagorno-
Karabakh). Those armed groups were made from diﬀerent raw materials (crimi-
nal, ethnic, clan or neighbourhood networks of trust) and usually went under an
ideological banner of patriotism, nationalism (as in most cases presented in this
volume) or protection of the ethnic kin and freedom as general anti-state
approach (as in the cases of Chechnya and Kosovo). As competitors for ‘the heart
of the state’ they were already in place before violence escalated beyond state
control.
Both Kisriev’s Chapter 6 on Dagestan and Vasilieva’s Chapter 9 on the
greater part of the North Caucasus in this volume show that the disintegration
of central statehood even where weapons are available does not automatically
lead to violence spinning out of control. Local institutions in many cases proved
capable of not ‘dis-embedding’ violence and kept evolving violent alternatives to
the retreating central state under social control. There may well be other such
cases in the Caucasus and in Former Yugoslavia – like Adjaria in Georgia,
Ingushetia bordering Chechnya, Montenegro, the Voivodina and (until recently)
Macedonia – in which violence has been kept in check by institutions other than
the state. 
However, the more striking process has the state disintegrating into an
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armed gang warfare (see the cases of Krajina (Chapter 1), Kosovo (Chapter 5),
Herceg-Bosna (Chapter 2), Nagorno-Karabakh (Chapter 8), Chechnya (Chapter
6) and Georgia (Chapter 7) in this volume) and thus heralding the next stage of
violent performance.
Markets of violence
Whatever the rationale for escalation may have been, sustained organised vio-
lence has a high probability of stabilising as what Elwert’s chapter 12 in this
volume describes as ‘markets of violence’. According to Elwert, markets of vio-
lence are ‘understood as economic areas dominated by civil wars, warlords or
robbery, in which a self-perpetuating system emerges which links non-violent
commodity markets with the violent acquisition of goods’ (p. 221). 
The implication of this development is that no matter what stimuli, noble
ideas or justiﬁed grievances may have accompanied or even motivated the
process thus far, collective organised violence develops its own systemic rules.
Once violent conﬂict is institutionalised as a market of violence, then the process
of dismantling state institutions can hardly be reversed. There may be no way
back to the status quo ante. The institutionalisation of violence as an integral part
of everyday life is a change in paradigm that brings along a set of new rules, new
types of actors with distinct limits, choices, and rationales; the institutionalisa-
tion of a market of violence may be seen as a systemic border after which the
rules that governed society are replaced by a completely diﬀerent logic of action.
From the local perspective of the people used to the former institutions, this
process has to be perceived as destructive and even traumatic. 
While the core of the conﬂict may still be socio-political, the strategic actions
of the entrepreneurs of violence are increasingly structured by short-term eco-
nomic gains. The organisation of violence is expensive, and sustained violence
needs continuous investment. Therefore, entrepreneurs of violence engage in
economic activities which characteristically combine legal business activities,
organised crime and warfare. This economy tends to be integrated in transna-
tional networks of trade and investment. Entrepreneurs of violence engage in
drug or weapons traﬃcking, in kidnapping, extortion, or in taxing the second
economy. Proﬁts are reinvested, or kept in oﬀshore banks. Gradually, short-term
economic interests replace long-term political ones, and entrepreneurs of vio-
lence become interested in avoiding battles and sustaining proﬁt.
Once a market of violence is established, there is a strong rationale for the
warlords to stabilise the status quo. If government oﬃcials receive a share of the
revenues from the market of violence (or are themselves embarking on warlord
politics), they might also become interested in prolonging this violence. In such
cases sustaining low-level violence becomes a rational objective of both, the
‘rebels’ and the ‘state’. This view contradicts the commonly held view of
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prolonged conﬂicts as an ‘unintended and anarchical outcome’, and it also
contradicts the oﬃcial discourse of governments and rebels. Such a situation is
characterised by the lack of real battles between soldiers and rebels. Both sides
may pretend to ﬁght a war, but neither side is determined to commit substantial
resources in order to win and end the war. 
The proﬁt-orientated entrepreneur of violence is at ﬁrst glance hard to dis-
tinguish from the politically motivated rebel. They may share the same political
discourse on historical injustices and political motivations, recruit from the same
pool of recruits und pursue similar military tactics. However, the proﬁt-oriented
entrepreneur of violence has a diﬀerent ranking of priorities: the main rational
is making economic proﬁt. Proﬁt-orientated entrepreneurs of violence go for
absolute gains, while the political motivated rebel goes for relative gains vis-à-vis
the state they are ﬁghting.
Negotiating political solutions to conﬂicts with entrepreneurs of violence is
diﬃcult. Often they have no interest in ending violence because only the escala-
tion of violence brought and kept them in the leading positions and enabled them
to keep the loyalty of their armed followers by acquiring booty to redistribute.
Entrepreneurs of violence may be very reluctant to agree to any peace settle-
ment. A successful peace settlement may lead to the strengthening of the state
and to the re-establishment of a state monopoly of violence. This in turn would
destroy the biotope in which markets of violence blossom. In their view, peace
settlements are bad for business. Once a conﬂict zone has turned into a fully
developed market of violence, any political solution, even one that fully takes into
account the original grievances that caused the conﬂict, is prone to fail. There are
no political solutions for violence that is mainly motivated by private proﬁts.
Entrepreneurs of violence cannot be involved in a lasting (and maybe costly)
peace settlement by granting political concessions to the group they pretend to
represent, since this is not their ﬁrst preference. 
This is not to say that entrepreneurs of violence cannot, in principle, be
involved in conﬂict regulation. But it is vital to understand that their ﬁrst prefer-
ence is to make absolute gains. Hence, they even might support a conﬂict regu-
lation plan that weakens the ‘rebel state’, if it increases their proﬁt. They can, in
other words, be bought. The latter point was most likely relevant in Kosovo since
the leaders of the KLA had reason to feel conﬁdent that they would play leading
roles in post-Serbian Kosovo and retain signiﬁcant access to proﬁtable resources
(not always of the legal kind, as pointed out by Raufer’s Chapter 3 in this
volume).
On the other hand, the most prominent warlords of Former Yugoslavia,
Mladic and Karadjic had no options for political careers in a post-war Bosnia
under the auspices of the international community. Consequently, in order to
smooth the Dayton process, international negotiators put considerable eﬀort into
deconstructing them as possible negotiating partners before Dayton.
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All violent conﬂicts in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus developed for a certain
period into markets of violence. In comparison to near ‘ideal-types’ of markets of
violence like Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sierra Leona or the Democratic Republic of
Congo this stage was, however relatively brief, except for Chechnya, which has
been completely torn apart by rival entrepreneurs of violence after the defeated
Russian army left in 1996. The second Russian intervention in 1999 has until
now not managed to dry out this market of violence.
Departure from violence
How did the Caucasian and Yugoslav polities depart from large-scale, organised
political violence? The ﬁrst striking observation with regard to this question per-
tains to the remarkable diﬀerences between the Caucasus and the Balkans. In the
Balkans, the military defeats of the Serbs in the wars in Bosnia and about Kosovo,
which paved the way to the end of violence, were achieved only owing to decisive
international intervention. Likewise, the current non-violent situation in
Macedonia, Bosnia and in Kosovo and the attempts at reconstructing the state
are borrowed from the international community. It was international military
intervention that implemented a monopoly of violence. In Bosnia and even more
so in Kosovo, state functions are de facto executed by the international commu-
nity. Security and the suppression of violence are exercised by foreign troops and
are not an achievement of internal organisation.
By contrast, in the Caucasus, there has been no military intervention by the
international community, and the precarious stability in and between the post-
Soviet states and ‘statelets’ is a result of internal organisation and of coming to
terms with the consequences of performances on the battleﬁeld.
It is noteworthy that Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were all unable to win
the wars against their secessionist regions. Nagorno-Karabakh, South-Ossetia
and Abkhazia are de facto independent ‘statelets’, and so was Chechnya until the
second Russian military intervention in 1999. On the other hand, none of the
secessionist regions has been able to gain internationally recognised indepen-
dence, and none has concluded a peace treaty with the state from which it
seceded.
The military victories of rebel territories are statistically rather a rare occur-
rence, since the central state usually commands more resources than the chal-
lengers. In the Caucasus, the success of the breakaway territories may be
explained by the weakness of the newly independent states. Both Georgia and
Azerbaijan had to organise their state capacities from scratch. They were eco-
nomically and politically weak states that lacked the resources for intensive
warfare, their soldiers were badly trained and hardly motivated to ﬁght a danger-
ous war in order to keep peripheral regions within the central state. In addition,
both Georgia and Azerbaijan were plagued by internal power struggles. Finally,
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these wars took place in societies that are haunted by a very high level of corrup-
tion. When corruption is widespread – sometimes even the single most impor-
tant source of income for the state administration – people from ministers and
high-ranking oﬃcers to privates may proﬁt from the state of war. They may then
become interested in prolonging the state of war, but have no real interest in
ﬁghting, winning and ending the war. Thus, the violent contest between ‘seces-
sionist rebels’ and ‘states’ in the Caucasus resembled the competition between
two upstarts. In the wars of Azerbaijan against the breakaway Nagorno-
Karabakh and Georgia against the breakaway Abkhazia and South-Ossetia, the
‘rebel’ upstarts proved to be much more eﬃcient in organising violence (includ-
ing resources form outside) than the ‘upstart states’ they challenged.
Consequently, the ‘rebels’ won on the battleﬁeld.
Departing from violence requires not only coming to terms with the neigh-
bouring state or the neighbouring groups. It also requires the reconstruction of
statehood and state capacities. The post-war polities must, in the ﬁrst place,
execute their legitimate monopoly of violence and integrate or neutralise those
groups that have an interested in prolonging conﬂict.
In Kosovo, Bosnia and more recently Macedonia, this task has been largely
outsourced. It is the international community that provides these territories with
the most basic state capacities. By contrast, the post-war Caucasian polities had
to master their internal post-war consolidation by themselves. A formidable
challenge they had to meet was the neutralisation of entrepreneurs of violence
returning from the battleﬁeld and aspiring to take over leading positions in poli-
tics and business. Not all polities have mastered this task. The most dramatic
failure was Chechnya. President Maskhadov’s strategy of incorporating key
players of the market of violence in his administration only sped up the process
of disintegration. By the end of 1998, rivalling warlords had completely disman-
tled the few remaining state institutions and turned Chechnya into a market of
violence. 
More successful were the attempts at reconstructing statehood elsewhere. In
Georgia and in Azerbaijan, the old guard of professional political patrons incor-
porated key players of the market of violence into state-run power agencies, only
to neutralise or outmanoeuvre them at a later date. As it turned out, extensive
Soviet-trained networks of patronage proved to be a resource strong enough to
oust the warlords. 
This, however, succeeded at the cost of opening signiﬁcant shares of state
resources to the ambitions of the old networks of patrons that guaranteed non-
violent stability and at the cost of empowering certain powerful agencies to act
as state agents beyond the control of state (the police in Georgia, the army in
Armenia and the presidential apparatus in Azerbaijan).
In the case of Armenia, where a dogmatic idea of common national cause
with existential urgency remained a paramount integrating factor throughout
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the war, coming to terms with the returning victorious ‘former truck drivers
turned generals turned deputy ministers’ proved to be a very serious and not
always peaceful challenge. Here – as in Nagorno-Karabakh – the Soviet networks
that managed to establish a stagnant stability in Azerbaijan and Georgia had a
much harder time competing with, ﬁrst, the new nationalist elite and then the
entrepreneurs of violence returning victorious from the war in Nagorno-
Karabakh. With the violent death of both the former First Secretary of the CP in
Soviet Armenia and icon of Soviet patronage (Karen Demirchian) and the
leading strong man (Prime Minister and former Minister of Defence, Vazgen
Sarkisian) who were assassinated in the 1999 parliament massacre, a relatively
new network of former politicians from neighbouring Nagorno-Karabakh was
left to run the state (most prominently President Robert Kocharian and Minister
of Defence Serzh Sarkisian).
Re-embedding conﬂict
The process of conﬂict spinning out of socially constructed bonds has been called
‘dis-embedding’. Re-embedding means therefore taming conﬂict by (rebuilding)
socially constructed bonds that reverse this process.
In the study of violent conﬂict the problem of institutionalising peace is
usually not regarded as a dynamic social process in its own right, separate from
the departure from violence. It is either treated as a problem of society after
conﬂict, detaching the question of peace from the dynamics that ruled conﬂict
before, or peace is simply treated as the absence of war. 
The approach taken in this book has been diﬀerent from the outset. By
regarding conﬂict as a crucial, yet very common phenomenon in society the
focus was shifted away from tale and content of the quarrel to the question of the
institutional embedding of conﬂict in order to understand the processes of
violent escalation or its containment in the Caucasus and Former Yugoslavia.
‘Embedding’ refers to a conﬂict being socially controlled by internalised norms
and values and dealt with by the existing and reliable institutions a society has
in place. The ability for adaptation to changing conditions and innovation proved
essential for the societies in transition to keep conﬂict embedded and avoid
passing the threshold of no return and sliding into an economy of violence.
Providing institutions and procedures for handling conﬂicts in a predictable
way according to known rules is essential for the cohesion of a society and can
actually be the foundation of the state’s legitimacy (Luhmann 1983 [1969]:
100–106). It was the economist Albert Hirschman who convincingly claimed
that it is not so much common values that integrate a modern society but the
implemented and guarded institutional equipment of reinterpreting either-or
conﬂicts into more-or-less conﬂicts (Hirschman 1994). The disruptive potential
of a zero-sum game where total gain of a winner means total loss for the loser is
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changed according to the rules provided by a third uninvolved party (the institu-
tion, e.g. a court) into a negotiated outcome. In other words those institutions
must protect the complexity and graduation of a conﬂict from techniques of
radical simpliﬁcation by force – power techniques that lead to either-or
approaches or even deny the opponent the right to dispute altogether. 
The question of re-establishing peace therefore has to be approached in the
same basic way. The crucial question is which institutions societies and states
have left after sustained violence in order to re-embed conﬂict, and what capac-
ities they have to build new ones. Societies after conﬂict must ensure that vital
state tasks such as providing security and opportunities are not taken over by
organised groups; they must prevent organisers of violence accessing resources;
they must re-establish a legitimate monopoly of violence; and they must, ﬁnally,
provide social coherence by establishing the institutions that integrate a society.
These are complex tasks that require time and resources that most post-war soci-
eties do not have. The odds that this will happen without external intervention,
relying solely on societal self-organisation, are very slim. 
A brief overview over the cases presented in this volume shows that none of
the post-war societies has until now managed to complete these tasks. All of
them are still struggling with the many obstacles on the road to institutionalised
peace, and where stability has been achieved, it has come at a price.
Armenia has been the most stable of the Transcaucasian states. The reason
for this may be found in the ethic homogeneity and in the perception of a con-
stant threat of national disaster that is both an integral part of modern
Armenian identity and a political reality in the post-Soviet period. The price for
the relative stability has been the externalisation of conﬂict, a price that both
Armenians and Azeris had to pay. As an Armenian taxi driver in Yervan in the
summer of 2000 put it when complaining about the recently aggravated
problem of high-level political violence: ‘Our problem is our ethnic homogeneity.
We have only each other to blame and ﬁght with.’8
In former Yugoslavia, reconstruction of statehood has so far been borrowed
from the international community, which has invested considerable military and
ﬁnancial resources.The experience in Kosovo teaches us that the task is extremely
diﬃcult. Despite the presence of an overwhelmingly and widely accepted military
force, and despite the impressive ﬁnancial resources the European Union is com-
mitting to the rebuilding of a working state structure in Kosovo, Bosnia and
Macedonia, only extremely benevolent observers would think that the operation
has ended successfully. On the contrary – external forces are getting more and
more deeply involved in the Balkans, and the chances are very high that conﬂicts
will very soon remerge, were it not for the presence of the externals.
With regard to Kosovo, is very doubtful whether those groups that have suc-
cessfully organised violence are willing to engage in meaningful state building
eﬀorts. The fact that the UCK has been deeply involved in a criminal economy
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makes it rather unlikely that this group will become the backbone of the state. In
addition, Mappes-Niediek’s Chapter 5 in this volume reminds us that Kosovars in
general place their loyalty and their eﬀorts much more in the extended family
than the state. It is not hard to predict that the KFOR and the UN administration
of Kosovo will sooner or later have to engage this problem, thereby risking
becoming regarded as an occupying force rather than as protector.
The case of Bosnia also provides an important lesson. External intervention
does not automatically pave the way for state reconstruction. As Gosztonyi’s
Chapter 2 in this volume demonstrates, intervention can actually contribute to
a diﬀusion of power. The intervening force’s eﬀorts at establishing a monopoly of
violence and at holding responsible the local strong men actually makes it ratio-
nal for local elites to appoint weak leaders and to create an institutional ‘jungle’
in order to diﬀuse responsibility. In time, the local elite loses the ability to commit
themselves and to deliver – both preconditions for instability and contradictory
to the fundamental task of re-embedding conﬂict. Such counterstrategies of
local networks prove eﬀective unless intervening states or alliances are willing to
establish a long-lasting protectorate and resume semi-colonial responsibilities –
a task that would clearly overstretch the capacities of the international commu-
nity, even if it wished to do so.
Looking back at a decade of coming to terms with conﬂict in post-socialist
Yugoslavia and the Caucasus, the picture is, as always, neither one thing nor
another. On the one hand, all conﬂicts in the regions are for the time being frozen,
with the exception of Chechnya. However, stability in the Caucasus is precarious,
as it is, despite the commitment of the international community, in the Balkans.
Most successor states of the empires are still far from having established a legiti-
mate monopoly of violence – either it is defunct and working only when the state
happens to drive past, or it is rented out from international organisations. And
lastly, in many cases the networks of patronage of the late socialist state took over
and are in eﬀect running the remnants of the state. Therefore, it would be very
wrong to believe that trading the imitation of socialism for the imitation of
democracy spares the new states (or the international organisations in charge of
implementing state institutions) from the pitfalls of weak statehood. 
And ﬁnally: a word on methodology
It has been argued here that violence and stability in post-socialist societies
cannot be explained without taking into consideration the hybrid institutional
framework of the locality under consideration, since it is the local ‘traditional’
institutions that account for the remarkable variance revealed by comparing the
potential hot spots in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus. Such local institutions
process the impact of various ‘risk factors’ and determine whether a society deals
with these factors in a non-violent way. Violence, and especially internal and
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common violence, is organised at the local level. Consequently, it has been
argued here that the local institutional framework is the most promising level of
analysis. This is not to say that the institutional framework of a polity is not
subject to external inﬂuences, clearly the weakening of the central state hier-
archies; the (intended or unintended) eﬀects of the policies of third countries; the
(intended or unintended) eﬀects of the policies of international organisations
and spillover of violence (‘bad neighbourhoods’) all impact upon the incentive
structures of local actors. External inﬂuence is important, but it needs to be
investigated from the local perspective. 
How can such micro-politics of violence be captured? 
Analytical narratives dealing with the organisation of violence may proﬁt
from a multi-disciplinary approach. Since 1980, quantitative probabilistic
studies have made signiﬁcant progress in identifying risk factors.9 Economic dep-
rivation, a high level of dependence on primary commodity exports, ethnic com-
position, terrain, previous conﬂicts, perceived and real grievances and ‘bad
neighbourhoods’ are among the most prominent risk factors. Analytical narra-
tives should watch out for such factors. One should, however, be aware that risk
factors do not automatically turn into violence. Statistically measured probabil-
ities inform about risks; but they do not show anything about causal links. For
organised violence to emerge, it takes certain social situations in which actors
think that the relative costs of violence are lower than the relative costs of non-
violence. Otherwise actors would not engage in the organisation of violence. In
other words, the organisation of violence depends on the incentive and opportu-
nity structure in which actors are locked. Often, the most relevant of these struc-
tures are not oﬃcial state institutions, but informal and traditional institutions
in the shadow of the façade of statehood. Detecting these requires an intimate
knowledge of the local. Conducting traditional ethnographical ﬁeldwork cap-
tures unoﬃcial institutions, networks, norms and values systems that help
examine local social settings, in which the oﬃcial (normative) story conceals
rather than reveals the ‘real’ story of why actors act. 
To what extent can insights, produced by such a research design, be gener-
alised? What is the potential contribution to theory building of an approach that
focuses on the institutional framework of a society? Such an approach would
produce more than a story and less than a theory. Such a research strategy would
hardly provide the ‘parsimonious, elegant models with a high prediction power’
of which the political scientists of the 1970s and 1980s dreamed. It would also
not produce yet another account of how violence emerged in a speciﬁc time in a
speciﬁc place under speciﬁc circumstances. The level of abstraction stops
halfway: the ‘causes’ for violence or stability cannot be generalised, since vio-
lence is a strategy that, in principle, can be chosen in every social situation.
However, it is possible to generalise aspects of the process of organising violence
and stability. Some of these have been presented in this chapter. 
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